Administrative Law — State Liability and Governance Failure — Supreme Court criticized the "lackadaisical approach" and "systemic failure" of the state machineries in preventing illegal mining - held that a State cannot plead helplessness due to inadequate equipment or weaponry to justify inaction against organized crime - Personal accountability was fixed on officials for any...
Administrative Law — State Liability and Governance Failure — Supreme Court criticized the "lackadaisical approach" and "systemic failure" of the state machineries in preventing illegal mining - held that a State cannot plead helplessness due to inadequate equipment or weaponry to justify inaction against organized crime - Personal accountability was fixed on officials for any further dereliction of duty – Supreme Court issued following directions – i. • Surveillance: Installation of high-resolution, Wi-Fi enabled CCTV cameras on elevated masts at all frequent mining routes; ii. GPS Tracking: Mandatory installation of GPS devices on all mining vehicles and heavy machinery (dredgers, excavators, etc.) in District Morena (MP) and District Dholpur (Rajasthan) on a pilot basis; iii. Enforcement: Constitution of well-equipped joint patrol teams (Police and Forest departments) provided with modern surveillance gear, protective equipment, and appropriate arms; iv. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): States directed to formulate a uniform, inter-state SOP to handle organized and violent resistance by mining operators. [Relied on Deepak Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Naveen Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 2017 SCC Online SC 2087; Bajri Lease Lol Holders Welfare Society v. State of Rajasthan, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1295; Paras 9-21] In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380
Anticipatory Bail - Routine filing and entertainment of anticipatory bail applications in private complaint cases is unnecessary, as mere issuance of summons/process does not entitle the police to arrest the accused. Sessions Courts and High Courts have no jurisdiction to direct an accused to surrender before the trial court while rejecting an anticipatory bail application in a complaint case. The Court may reject the application but cannot compel surrender. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419
Appeal - The High Court cannot assume the role of a statutory appellate authority and decide a matter on merits merely because of delay in the disposal of the statutory appeal. Statutory remedies and the hierarchical appellate mechanism provided under law cannot be bypassed or rendered nugatory on account of delay. Premal Pratap Joisher v. Vikram Jethlal Joisher, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 404
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Definition and Continuity of Proceedings – Sections 2(1)(g), 35, and 40 – The Arbitration Act is a self-contained, complete Code that does not envision arbitration proceedings to cease upon the death of a party - By virtue of Section 40, an arbitration agreement is not discharged by the death of a party and remains enforceable by or against their legal representatives. Consequently, legal representatives step into the shoes of the deceased party for the purposes of the Act - Since an arbitral award is binding on and enforceable against the legal representatives of a deceased party under Sections 35 and 40, the corresponding statutory right to challenge that award under Section 34 must naturally flow to them - Denying them this right would leave them remediless under the statute while simultaneously making them liable to fulfil the award, defeating the very object of the Act. [Relied on Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel, (2008) 13 SCC 667; Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and Anr., (2022) 1 SCC 75; Paras 13-22] V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 vs. Article 227 of the Constitution of India / Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Remedy for Legal Representatives – Held that the appropriate statutory relief for a legal representative aggrieved by and seeking to challenge an arbitral award lies exclusively under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and not via a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 115 of the CPC. V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 36 – Enforcement of Consent Award – Interpretation of Indemnity Clauses – Dispute regarding the timing of an indemnifier's obligation to discharge liability - The Supreme Court held that where a Consent Award contains an absolute obligation to "ensure" that no liability is recovered from the award-holder by a "Forum," such obligation is triggered as soon as a liability is crystallised and recovery is sought, regardless of whether a further appeal is pending. VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 7 and Section 11 – Validity of Arbitration Clause – Interpretation of the word 'can' – Held: An arbitration clause stating that disputes "can" be settled by arbitration does not constitute a mandatory or binding arbitration agreement - The word 'can' in this context signifies a factual possibility or a choice available to the parties, rather than a definitive mandate to refer all disputes to arbitration. Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384
Artificial Breaks – Supreme Court observed that the breaks in service were "artificial in nature" as the Appellants were consistently re-engaged and continued to discharge their duties on the same posts. Such breaks do not reflect genuine abandonment of service. Long service cannot be disregarded by labeling initial employment as ad hoc and relying on artificial breaks - Supreme Court directed the regularization of the Appellants' services with effect from the date similarly situated persons were regularized under the 26.05.2003 policy - Appellants are entitled to continuity of service, increments, and retiral benefits, though actual financial benefits are restricted to the period from the date of the order/reporting for duty. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi and Others (2006) 4 SCC 1; Para 20-22] Prem Chand v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Bail Conditions vs. Final Civil Relief – A bail condition must be regulatory, not punitive or determinative. Ordering the sale of property as a condition for bail is in the nature of a final civil relief that affects property rights and cannot be sustained - Even if a counsel volunteers to sell property to secure bail, the Court should refrain from "tweaking" bail provisions to convert them into recovery proceedings. [Relied on Sumit Mehta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570; Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla Vs. State of Maharashtra (2020) 10 SCC 77; Mahesh Chandra Vs. State of U.P. (2006) 6 SCC 196; Paras 6 – 11] Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389
Bar Council - The Supreme Court has approved the amendment carried out by the Bar Council of India to Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Uniform Rules (and Mandatory Guidelines) for the Elections of Bar Councils, 2016, thereby allowing office bearers of Bar Associations to contest elections to State Bar Councils. Shyam Lal Thakur v. Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 417
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 482 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Supreme Court observed that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion - noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations - The appellant had previously filed FIR against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations - Noted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court of Kerala's order - The appellant is to be released on bail in the event of arrest, subject to – i. Furnishing a cash security of ₹1,00,000/- with two sureties; ii. Complete cooperation with the ongoing investigation; iii. Non-interference with witnesses or evidence. [Paras 10-16] Shankar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2026 INSC 369
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 225 - A Magistrate must conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation under Section 225 BNSS before issuing process against an accused who resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Direct issuance of summons or process without complying with the mandatory procedure under Section 225 BNSS is impermissible. Rajeev Mehta @ Rajiv Kishor Kirtilal Mehta v. Param Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 411
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 483 (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 437/439) – Bail Conditions – Recovery Proceedings – The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of a Court while considering bail is limited to assessing whether an accused should be released pending trial and imposing conditions to ensure a fair trial - It does not extend to adjudicating civil rights or directing the recovery of alleged dues - held that neither the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 nor the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 enables a Court, at the stage of bail, to direct the sale of an accused's immovable property to settle alleged claims. Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 – Section 116 / Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 112 – Paternity – Presumption of Legitimacy vs. Scientific Proof – DNA Test Report Already on Record and Finalized – Effect of – Held - The statutory presumption of conclusive proof of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act must yield to scientific proof where an accurate DNA test report is already available on record and has attained finality - While courts must generally exercise extreme caution and hesitation before ordering DNA tests to protect a child from the stigma of illegitimacy, the position changes when the test has already been conducted with the consent of the mother and remains undisputed - In such cases, the scientific fact overrides the legal presumption, and the alleged father cannot be held liable to pay maintenance to a child proven not to be his biological offspring - Held that when a conflict arises between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former - This squarely covers cases where the DNA test report is already on record and contradicts the statutory presumption - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, clarifying that since the DNA test had already been completed with the mother's consent and its findings were never disputed, the scientific truth must override the legal presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act - Expressing concern for the minor child's future, the Court additionally directed the Secretary of Women and Child Development, GNCTD, to monitor and ensure the child's well-being regarding education, healthcare, and nutrition - appeal dismissed. [Relied On: Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576; Paras 7-10] Nikhat Parveen @ Khusboo Khatoon v. Rafique @ Shillu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 406 : 2026 INSC 399
Circumstantial Evidence - Evidentiary value of co-accused confession - In cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of circumstances that unerringly points to the guilt of the accused and excludes every possible hypothesis consistent with innocence. The confession of a co-accused is of weak evidentiary value and cannot form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of strong and independent corroboration. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Civil Procedure & Precedents – Finality of Civil Court Decrees – Scope of Appellate Review - The Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in rendering observations to virtually unsettle a permanent injunction decree passed by a Civil Court way back in 1988, which had already attained finality after the Municipal Corporation's subsequent appeals were dismissed - The scope of adjudication before the Division Bench should have been strictly confined to the direction given by the learned Single Judge namely, to consider the prayer for incorporation of the plot in the layout plan and nothing beyond that. [Paras 24-34] Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389
Code Civil Procedure, 1908 – Prejudice caused by non-framing of issues – Specific Performance – Lack of Title – Held: The omission to frame issues can vitiate a trial if it causes prejudice to the parties - The test for prejudice is whether the parties had knowledge that a particular question was in issue and had the opportunity to lead evidence on it - In the present case, the trial court dismissed a suit for specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the defendant's title, despite no such issue being framed or pleaded - Since the appellant was never put to notice or given an opportunity to lead evidence on the question of title, the non-framing of issues caused significant prejudice - Held: To succeed in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must prove: (i) the existence of a valid contract; (ii) a breach of contract by the defendant; and (iii) the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform their part of the contract. [Relied on Balraj Taneja and Another v. Sunil Madan and Another (1999) 8 SCC 396; Paras 21-33] Pramod Shroff v. Mohan Singh Chopra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2026 INSC 378
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order II Rule 2 – Tests for Applicability – To invoke the bar under Order II Rule 2, the defendant must satisfactorily establish that: (i) the subsequent suit is in respect of the same cause of action as the previous suit; (ii) the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief for that cause of action; and (iii) the plaintiff omitted to sue for such relief in the earlier suit without the leave of the Court - The technical bar cannot be presumed based on inferential reasoning. [Relied on Mohammad Khalil Khan vs. Mahbub Ali Mian, 1948 SCC OnLine PC 44; Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine 82; T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467; Paras 6-8] S. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(a) – Order VII Rule 11(a), (b), and (c) — Rejection of Plaint — Cause of Action — Mini-trial — Undervaluation — Deficit Court Fees — Mandatory Opportunity to Cure Defect - Plaint disclosing a live and subsisting commercial dispute cannot be rejected at the threshold – Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to assess the enforceability of an unsigned document at this stage - The High Court erred in rejecting the plaint by undertaking a detailed examination of the enforceability of an unsigned Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) - At the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the Court must take the averments in the plaint in their entirety, along with the documents relied upon, to be true - It cannot test their correctness, weigh them against the defense, or assess the probability of success - Whether an unsigned MoA constitutes a concluded contract or is unenforceable for want of signatures is a matter falling squarely within the domain of trial. [Paras 18, 22 - 27 Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2026 INSC 402
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(b) & (c) – Rejection of a plaint for undervaluation or deficit court fee is not automatic – Statutory obligation on Courts to first afford an opportunity to the plaintiff to rectify the defect - The procedural mandate under clauses (b) and (c) of Order VII Rule 11 introduces a conditional, two-step process - The Court must first form an opinion regarding the insufficiency of the valuation or court fee, determine the correct valuation, and specify a timeframe for the plaintiff to correct it - Outright rejection of a plaint without providing a substantive opportunity to cure the defect is a manifest error of law - Deficiency in court fees does not render the suit non-maintainable at the threshold; it is a curable defect. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) & Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 Supp SCC 315; Paras 30-35] Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2026 INSC 402
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Statement in the Plaint – For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11(d), the Court must only look at the "statement in the plaint," which includes a meaningful reading of the averments and the documents appended thereto - The written statement or any other materials produced by the defendant are wholly irrelevant at this stage. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) vs. Order II Rule 2 – Rejection of Plaint – Distinction between "Bar to Sue" and "Suit Barred by Law" – The Supreme Court held that the application of Order II Rule 2 (relinquishment of part of claim or omission to sue for one of several reliefs) cannot be a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) - While Order VII Rule 11(d) applies when a suit is barred by an express or implied law (e.g., Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act), Order II Rule 2 pertains to the "right to sue" for specific claims or reliefs - A plea under Order II Rule 2 must be established by the defendant through evidence, requiring a comparative analysis of the plaints in the former and subsequent suits to determine identity of the cause of action. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 100 — Scope of Second Appeal — Interference with Findings of Fact - Findings of fact, howsoever erroneous or wrong, cannot be reopened, disturbed, or interfered with by the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC in the absence of a substantial question of law or a clear error of law, unless the findings stand completely vitiated for want of perversity. [Paras 30, 31-35] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 11 – Res Judicata – Dismissal at Threshold without Adjudication on Merits - Where an earlier application for cancellation of leases/pattas under Section 198(4) of the Abolition Act was dismissed at the threshold by the revenue authority on the sole ground that the execution of the leases had not been established/proved, without entering into the validity or legality of the pattas on merits, the principle of res judicata has no application to subsequent proceedings - For res judicata to apply, the issue must have been directly and substantially in issue and finally decided on merits in the previous proceeding. [Relied on Hinch Lal Tiwari vs. Kamala Devi and others (2001) 6 SCC 496; Jagpal Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others (2011) 11 SCC 396; Paras 34, 35, 36] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13(b), (c), (d), and (f) – Refusal to Enforce Summary Foreign Judgment: Even if a foreign court (English Court) is a court of competent jurisdiction by contractual agreement, its summary judgment is unenforceable in India under Section 44A if it fails the substantive tests of Section 13 - Denying leave to defend where triable issues exist violates procedural fairness [Section 13(d)]; failing to consider binding statutory conditions imposed by Indian regulatory authorities attracts Section 13(c); and enforcing a liability in direct breach of those statutory conditions brings the decree within the prohibition of Section 13(f). [Paras 85, 86, 87] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13(b) – Foreign Judgment 'On Merits' vs. Summary Judgment - A foreign decree cannot be regarded as having been rendered "on the merits" within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the CPC if it is passed without any investigation into the substantive issues or where a party is foreclosed from a full opportunity to defend despite disclosing bona fide triable issues - Adjudication by way of a summary procedure, which refuses leave to defend in the face of highly contested facts and statutory contemporaneous documents (such as audited Balance Sheets under the Companies Act), amounts to a premature adjudication that denies a fair trial. [Paras 41, 46, 52-86] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 2(9), Order XIV Rule 1, Order XX Rule 4(2) – Requirements of a valid judgment in ex parte proceedings – Framing of Issues vs. Points for Determination – Held: Although framing of formal issues is not mandatory under Order XIV Rule 1(6) where the defendant makes no defense, the court is still obligated to deliver a "judgment" as defined under Section 2(9) - A valid judgment must contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision as per Order XX Rule 4(2) - Simply granting a decree on default without resolving the controversy through reasoned findings constitutes a "material irregularity". Pramod Shroff v. Mohan Singh Chopra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2026 INSC 378
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47 – Jurisdiction of Executing Court – Power to modify decree – Held: The Executing Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree sought to be executed - It must execute the decree as it stands, without changing its terms or assuming the role of a trial court to substitute its own view - Even if the execution of certain portions of the land as per the decree is deemed "impracticable" due to unauthorized construction or third-party sales, these reasons are immaterial and do not authorize the Executing Court to alter the terms of a compromise decree. [Paras 24 - 30] Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2026 INSC 340
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439 (also Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 483) — Successive Bail Petitions — Material Disclosures and Candour - A court entertaining a successive bail petition under a special statute is strictly bound to refer to the fate of the earlier petition and explicitly record what change in circumstances justifies a fresh consideration - A petitioner invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court must approach it with clean hands and full candour - Merely mentioning past case numbers without explicitly disclosing their nature or the factum of their dismissal falls well short of the expected candour and is calculated to obscure rather than illuminate. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo and Another, (2024) 15 SCC 36; Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346; Paras 11 – 14] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154 — First Information Report — Delay in lodging FIR — Delay cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution's case - It merely puts the court on its guard to search for a satisfactory explanation - If the delay is explained or understandable within the totality of the circumstances, it is not fatal - In cases where witnesses face fear, threats, or require time to regain tranquillity after a traumatic event, a mere delay of a few hours does not weaken the prosecution. [Paras 9, 10] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 202 - Once a Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process (summons), the accused is only required to appear before the Court and participate in the proceedings. Police have no authority to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless the Court issues a non-bailable warrant along with or in place of summons. Even when a Magistrate directs a police inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. before issuing process, the police have no power to arrest the accused during the course of such inquiry. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) – Preventive Detention in Gold Smuggling – Upholdment of Detention Orders - Procedural Compliance - No right of legal representation before advisory board as of right - The Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA against an actress and her aide for their alleged involvement in organised gold smuggling activities. There was substantial compliance with procedural safeguards under Article 22 of the Constitution. The detenus were supplied with relied-upon documents within the prescribed time. Contents of electronic evidence, including CCTV footage, were duly displayed to them in prison. A detenu has no automatic right to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board. Such a right arises only if the detaining authority is represented by a lawyer, which was not the case in the present matter. The detention orders contained adequate reasons demonstrating the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction. A live and proximate link existed between the past smuggling activities (including multiple prior disposals of smuggled foreign-marked gold bars) and the necessity for preventive detention to prevent future prejudicial activities. Contentions regarding non-supply of documents, absence of imminent possibility of future smuggling, lack of subjective satisfaction, and violation of natural justice were held to be without merit. Priyanka Sarkariya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 380 : 2026 INSC 371
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21 and Article 142 — Environmental Law — Illegal Sand Mining — National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary — The Supreme Court took proactive measures against rampant illegal sand mining in the National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary, spanning the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh - Supreme Court emphasized that the protection of fragile ecosystems is a constitutional imperative and an integral facet of the Right to Life under Article 21 - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Court issued mandatory interim directions to curb environmental degradation and protect enforcement personnel from organized "sand mafias". In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136 – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Layout Sanction and Plot Incorporation – Title Disputes - The High Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot unnecessarily delve into or adjudicate upon the issue of title when it was never under dispute and the writ petition was filed for the limited purpose of seeking a direction to incorporate a plot into a colony's layout plan - A mere entry in the list of properties maintained by a Municipal Corporation cannot, by itself, constitute a valid proof of title over the subject land. Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389
Constitution of India – Article 21 and Article 142 – Right to Life and Safe Passage – Road Safety and Infrastructure Failures – Supreme Court took suo-motu cognizance of systemic negligence following fatal accidents in Phalodi (Rajasthan) and Rangareddy (Telangana) - Held: The 'Right to Life' under Article 21 is a positive mandate for the State to ensure a safe environment - Safety of commuters is an integral facet of the right to live with dignity - Recognizing that National Highways account for nearly 30% of road fatalities despite being only 2% of total road length, the Court issued comprehensive interim directions under Article 142 to address administrative lethargy and infrastructural gaps. In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 19 – Suo Motu Criminal Contempt – Impleadment of Judges – Professional Conduct of Advocates – Held: A person who merely furnishes information to the Chief Justice regarding contemptuous acts cannot be construed as a complainant, nor can such a person be regarded as a necessary or proper party in contempt proceedings - The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Bombay High Court's decision to initiate fresh suo motu contempt proceedings against an advocate for levelling serious, unsubstantiated imputations against a sitting Judge in a press conference and subsequent applications. Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390
Contract of Indemnity – Absolute Obligation – Distinguished between a contingent indemnity and an absolute obligation. Where a promisor incurs an absolute obligation (indicated by terms like "ensure"), it can be enforced without awaiting actual loss or the exhaustion of all appellate remedies - The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the Promoters were granted 30 days to deposit ₹15,86,17,808/- for the benefit of the Appellants. [Relied on Khetarpal Amarnath v. Madhukar Pictures, 1955 SCC OnLine Bom 73; Paras 16-28] VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361
Contractual Interpretation – Literal vs. Purposive Construction – Rule of Every Part – Supreme Court emphasized that every limb of a contract must be given meaning to avoid rendering any part otiose - A performance timeline for an "extreme scenario" (confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal) cannot be used to negate an unconditional obligation to protect a party from recovery at earlier stages of litigation - Purposive construction is unavailable when a plain, literal reading of all limbs together ensures an immediate enforceable obligation. VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361
Criminal Law – Cancellation of Bail – Principles for Interference – High Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction – Section 437 CrPC – Article 227 of the Constitution – The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court order that had cancelled an accused's bail after eight years based on hyper-technical procedural grounds - The High Court had ruled that the Magistrate's original 2018 bail order was "born in sin" because it only bore initials rather than a full signature, allegedly violating Rule 183 of the Calcutta High Court Criminal (Subordinate Courts) Rules, 1985 – Held - Rejection of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted must be dealt with on different bases - Bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering if supervening circumstances (such as interference with justice or absconding) render it no longer conducive to a fair trial - A procedural rule governing day-to-day functioning cannot override the substantive mandate of the CrPC unless a gross failure of justice is demonstrated - The High Court's interference after a lapse of nearly eight years on trivial grounds was "audaciously perverse". Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2026 INSC 367
Criminal Trial — Non-examination of Independent/Local Witnesses — Non-examination of independent villagers does not compromise the prosecution case, especially when societal realities show that common persons naturally hesitate to get entangled in thorny legal matters out of fear, particularly where a witness in a previous trial has already been gunned down. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614); Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand ((2003) 2 SCC 401); State of H.P. v. Gian Chand ((2001) 6 SCC 71); Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar ((2008) 12 SCC 173); Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622); Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab ((2019) 8 SCC 529); Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2024) 12 SCC 494; Para 12, 13] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Crucial Date for Adjudication — The bonafide requirement of a landlord must generally be assessed as of the date the eviction petition was filed - Subsequent events intervening during protracted litigation only overshadow the genuineness of the requirement if they are of such nature and dimension as to "completely eclipse" the need and cause it to lose significance altogether - The High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not examining whether the alleged subsequent event—the letting out of another room materially changed the ground of relief in light of the entire evidence on record - In the interest of justice, the proceedings were remanded to the Trial Court (Small Causes Court, Mumbai) for fresh adjudication - The parties were granted liberty to amend pleadings and lead further evidence to address the impact of subsequent events occurring during the pendency of the litigation. [Relied on Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh [2002 INSC 533]; Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand [(2004) 8 SCC 490]; Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001) 2 SCC 604]; Paras 6-10] Maria Martins v. Noel Zuzarte, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2026 INSC 376
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Precedential Value of High Court Decisions — Neera Singh vs. State (Delhi High Court) — Per Incuriam – Held - The observations in Neera Singh vs. State (2007), which suggested that police should register cases against parents who give dowry, are of no precedential value and are considered obiter dicta - That judgment was rendered in ignorance of the specific statutory protection under Section 7(3) of the DP Act and is, therefore, not good law. [Relied on Pooja Saxena vs. State and another (2010 SCC OnLine Del 3652); Surendra Singh Rathore (2025 INSC 248); Paras 13-21] Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2026 INSC 374
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 7(3) - Statutory Immunity against Prosecution for 'Giving' Dowry — Protection to 'Persons Aggrieved' – Held - Statements made by a wife or her family members (as aggrieved persons) regarding the giving of dowry, recorded during the investigation of an offence of 'taking' dowry, cannot form the sole basis for a counter-prosecution against them under Section 3 of the DP Act. Section 7(3) provides a statutory "shield of immunity" ensuring that such statements do not subject the aggrieved person to prosecution - A separate FIR for 'giving' dowry could only be registered if independent evidence is presented, rather than relying solely on the protected statements of the wife and her kin. Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2026 INSC 374
Environmental Protection — "Polluter Pays" Principle — Supreme Court directed State Pollution Control Boards to initiate time-bound proceedings for the assessment and recovery of environmental compensation from violators - This exercise must be scientific and transparent to ensure both restitution for ecological damage and effective deterrence. In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380
Equitable Consideration - Right to Appointment - Relief based on equitable considerations cannot be claimed as a matter of right to protect an inherently illegal selection that breaches essential threshold qualifications - Where a required minimum qualification (such as a specialized work experience external to the post) remains unfulfilled at the threshold, subsequent continuation in service or regularization under interim protections cannot substitute or cure the initial defect in eligibility - Participation in a selection process or fulfilment of eligibility conditions does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Where the selection process itself stands vitiated due to non-scrutiny of essential qualifications at the threshold, the appropriate course for the Court is to set aside the selection rather than substituting one illegality with another by directing the positive appointment of an unsuccessful or waitlisted candidate. [Relied on On substitution of qualifications: Zahoor Ahmad Rather and Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 404; Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v. University of Rajasthan and Ors., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 168; am Sarup v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1979) 1 SCC 168; Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Abahi Kumar and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 328; Paras 23-54] Himakshi v. Rahul Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400 : 2026 INSC 391
Essential vs. Preferential Qualification - Power to Relax & Exercise of discretion - A candidate who does not possess the prescribed minimum essential qualification cannot be treated as eligible merely on the strength of holding a higher academic degree or achieving a higher merit position - Preferential qualifications operate only within the zone of eligible candidates and cannot supplant, override, or dilute the primary requirement of essential eligibility - The existence of a statutory power of relaxation under Recruitment and Promotion (R&P) Rules does not imply it can be presumed or automatically applied - Any departure from prescribed eligibility criteria requires a structured, conscious, and reasoned exercise of discretion, which must be demonstratingly recorded in writing by the recruiting agency - In a public selection process, transparency and adherence to declared criteria are paramount. Himakshi v. Rahul Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400 : 2026 INSC 391
Evidence Act - Section 27 - Recovery and Identification of Articles - Delayed Recovery - The recovery of an incriminating article pursuant to a disclosure statement cannot be relied upon unless it is properly sealed and its identity is established through a reliable procedure. Mere calling of family members of the deceased to the police station for identification does not constitute a valid test identification parade. Such proceedings should ordinarily be conducted before a Magistrate after sealing the article to ensure credibility. A significant delay in recovery of the alleged incriminating article (in this case, 14 days) weakens the prosecution's case, particularly when the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Execution of Compromise Decree – Identity of Property – Held: Where a compromise decree clearly describes the portions of land falling into the shares of the parties, there is no dispute regarding identity - The Executing Court must strictly conform to the decree and ensure both parties fulfill their reciprocal obligations in pith and substance. [Relied on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 670; Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash (1977) 2 SCC 662; Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Ors. (1956) 1 SCC 75; Paras 27 – 30] Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2026 INSC 340
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) - Section 47 – Statutory Scheme Governing Enforcement vs. Initiation of Proceedings - There is a clear statutory and conscious distinction under Section 47 of FERA between the initiation of legal proceedings to determine liability and the subsequent taking of steps for the purpose of enforcing a judgment - While there is no absolute legal bar or prohibition for an Indian or foreign court to adjudicate and determine contractual liability, the actual enforcement or execution of such an adjudicated sum or decree is strictly subject to the regulatory regime of the State - Prior approval/permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is a sine qua non(mandatory condition precedent) before any steps can be set in motion for the execution of such a decree. [Relied on Alcon Electronics (P) Ltd. v. Celem S.A. of France, (2017) 2 SCC 253; International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265; IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., (2017) 1 SCC 568; LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644; Paras 33, 34, 73-81] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401
Government Grants Act, 1895 — Section 3 — Scope of Overriding Mandate — Wider Interpretation vs. Narrow Interpretation - Section 3 of the GG Act embodies a clear legislative mandate that every Government grant shall take effect according to its tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute, or enactment to the contrary - The expression "any rule of law, statute or enactment" is of the widest amplitude and admits of no restrictive construction - The approach which seeks to confine Section 3 merely to the exclusion of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TP Act), by reading it in a narrow or truncated manner, is incorrect - While Section 2 of the GG Act expressly excludes the application of the TP Act, Section 3 travels further and grants primacy to the conditions, limitations, and stipulations contained in the Government grant itself, elevating them to a position of supremacy over any general or statutory law. [Paras 51, 52, 53] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – General Rule on Fresh Cause of Action vs. Contextual Misuse— While a judgment or decree for money in favor of a financial creditor gives rise to a fresh cause of action to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, this principle does not operate in a vacuum - Every decree-holder who happens to be a financial creditor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to invoke the insolvency process in preference to execution - Whether the invocation of the IBC amounts to a misuse of the process or a recovery mechanism must be contextually examined based on the unique facts of each case. [Relied on Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran, (2025) 3 SCC 625; Tottempudi Salalith v. State Bank of India, (2024) 1 SCC 24; Para 31-33] Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 418 : 2026 INSC 410
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Civil Court Decree Execution – Primary Objective of the IBC vs. Debt Recovery Mechanism — The primary focus of the IBC is to ensure the revival and continuation of the corporate debtor as a going concern, protecting it from its own management and liquidation - It is a beneficial legislation and not a debt recovery mechanism for individual creditors seeking to enforce money decrees - Initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) purely to secure payment of individual dues, bypassing established civil execution remedies against a solvent and functioning company, constitutes an abuse of the process - The insolvency jurisdiction under the IBC is not designed to resolve intense disputes regarding the computation or quantum of a decretal amount. [Paras 19, 21 - 33] Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 418 : 2026 INSC 410
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - The Supreme Court expressed serious concern over inordinate delays by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in approving resolution plans under the IBC, terming the delay of nearly two years in the present case as “very unfortunate”. The Court observed that once a resolution plan is approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC), it is incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) to consider and approve the same in a timely manner. Prolonged inaction frustrates the core objective of the IBC of achieving time-bound completion of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). AVJ Heights Apartment Owners Association v. IIFL Finance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 392
Judicial Conduct – Adverse Remarks against District Judiciary – The Supreme Court condemned the practice of casting disparaging remarks or strictures against Judicial Officers in judicial orders - Power of superintendence under Article 227 should be a mechanism for "nurturing and guiding" rather than a "tool of oppression" - Supreme Court directed that the strictures against the Magistrate be expunged and recommended that all High Courts adopt an "in-house mechanism" (remark slips) for administrative follow-up on judicial infirmities instead of recording them in public judgments. [Relied on Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Paras 14-32] Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2026 INSC 367
Judicial Independence and Public Confidence – Judicial independence is a foundational feature of the Constitution - The strength of the judiciary lies in the confidence and trust reposed in it by the public - Reckless aspersions and unfounded allegations of lack of impartiality or improper motives against a sitting Judge strike at the foundation of judicial independence and diminish the credibility of the justice delivery system. Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390
Landlord and Tenant — Right of Eviction — Absence of Express Covenant - In the absence of any express stipulation or clause in the lease deed providing for re-entry or eviction on account of non-payment of rent, no such right can be inferred - The Government grant must operate according to its tenor, and its silence cannot be converted into a ground for forfeiture. In such cases, the lessor's/respondent's remedy is strictly confined to the recovery of rent/arrears in accordance with law. [Paras 55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406
Landlord-Tenant Dispute — Bonafide Need — Subsequent Events — Scope of Judicial Review under Article 227 — The Supreme Court set aside a Bombay High Court order that had dismissed a writ petition solely due to the plaintiffs' failure to file a rejoinder to an affidavit alleging subsequent events - held that a writ petition challenging the reversal of an eviction decree should not be dismissed on the narrow ground of "non-traverse" regarding additional material - While courts can take note of subsequent events, such events must be brought promptly, follow procedural rules (affording the opposite party an explanation), and have a material bearing on the right to relief. Maria Martins v. Noel Zuzarte, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2026 INSC 376
Maintenance – Computation and Jurisprudential Basis – Principles of Restitutio in Integrum - The Supreme Court examined the jurisprudential framework for computing and awarding compensation under the head of "Prosthetic Limb" in motor accident cases - Emphasizing the mandate of Section 168 to determine "just compensation", Supreme Court reiterated that while damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations or expected to be a windfall, they must represent equitability, fairness, and reasonableness, avoiding a pittance - Key Principles Established by the Court- i. Standard Formula for Prosthetic Replacement - Following its prior ruling in Chandra Mogera v. Santosh A. Ganachari & Anr. (2025) and Mohd. Sabeer @ Shabir Hussain v. Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (2022), the Court recognized a block of five (5) years as the reasonable replacement period for a prosthetic limb, with an assumed maximum life expectancy of 70 years for the claimant; ii. Governmental Rates Not Binding - The Court categorically rejected the abysmally low pricing slabs prescribed under Government Notifications - Grounded in the principle of restitutio in integrum (restoring the injured party to their original position as far as money can buy) , held that if the treatment or device chosen by the claimant is reasonable to meet their needs, the insurer/respondent cannot compel them to accept cheaper options or government-subsidized alternatives; iii. Requirement of Price Quotations - Supreme Court reiterated the mandatory directive from Chandra Mogera (supra)that any future claim for compensation under the head of a prosthetic/artificial limb must be accompanied by genuine price quotations from at least two or three service providers to enable tribunals to make an informed, actual cost assessment; iv. Assessment of Income Without Documentary Evidence - Relying on Ramachandrappa (2011) and Syed Sadiq (2014), the Court held that a claim for monthly income cannot be rejected merely due to a lack of documentary evidence if the claimed amount is reasonable considering the specific strata of income, year of the accident, and nature of employment (e.g., heavy vehicle driver). [Relied on Syed Sadiq v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2014) 2 SCC 735; Chandra Mogera v. Santosh A. Ganachari & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 12183/2025); Paras 25-35] Prahlad Sahai v. Haryana Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 407 : 2026 INSC 396
Maintenance – Determination of Quantum – Deduction of Loan Repayments from Gross Salary – Held, Primary and continuing duty of the husband to maintain the spouse cannot be subordinated to voluntary financial arrangements - Deductions arising out of financial commitments such as loan repayments, especially those contributing toward the creation of assets (capital investments), cannot be equated with essential or unavoidable expenditure - Such voluntary deductions cannot be permitted to substantially dilute the real earning capacity of the husband for determining maintenance. Deepa Joshi v. Gaurav Joshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 387 : 2026 INSC 370
Maintenance – Object and Standard – Held, Maintenance must not be illusory and should enable the wife to live with dignity and a standard commensurate with that enjoyed during the subsistence of the marriage - The determination must achieve a just balance between the earning capacity of the husband and the reasonable needs of the wife – Noted that Respondent, a Bank Manager with a gross monthly income of ₹1,15,670/-, was initially directed by the Family Court to pay ₹8,000/-, which was enhanced to ₹15,000/- by the High Court - Supreme Court, noting the improper weightage given to asset-generating deductions, further enhanced the maintenance to ₹25,000/- per month. [Relied on Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2008) 2 SCC 316; Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015) 5 SCC 705; Rajnesh v. Neha and Another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Paras 11-16] Deepa Joshi v. Gaurav Joshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 387 : 2026 INSC 370
Mandatory vs. Permissive Clauses – Requirement of Fresh Consent – Held: For a clause to be a valid arbitration agreement, it must disclose a determination and obligation to go for arbitration - Clauses that require or contemplate further/fresh consent of the parties at the time a dispute arises indicated by language such as "parties can" or "if they so agree" are merely agreements to enter into an arbitration agreement in the future and are not enforceable as binding mandates. Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384
Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Maharashtra) — Section 3 — Extension of Municipal Limits — Legislative Function — Jurisdiction of Civil Court Barred - The specification, determination, and alteration of municipal limits by the State Government under Section 3 of the MMC Act partakes the character of a legislative function - Its validity or legality cannot ordinarily be the subject matter of adjudication before a Civil Court by way of a suit seeking declaration and injunction - The existence of disputed questions of fact does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction where the subject matter of the dispute lies outside the domain of the Civil Court - A challenge to the inclusion of lands within municipal limits effected in exercise of statutory power under Section 3 of the MMC Act cannot be permitted to be raised belatedly after a lapse of several decades, as such power attains a degree of finality and cannot be unsettled in collateral civil proceedings. [Paras 35 – 40] Unchgaon Village Panchayat v. Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2026 INSC 405
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37(1)(b)(ii) — Grant of Bail — Commercial Quantity — Twin Conditions Mandatory — Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 cannot blindly dilute statutory rigors - The recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section is a mandatory jurisdictional pre-condition and a sine qua non for granting bail in offences involving a commercial quantity - The right to a speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a precious constitutional right, but it must be read harmoniously alongside, and not in displacement or opposition to, the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPS Act - Prolonged incarceration during the pendency of a trial does not automatically entail relaxation or mechanical dilution of these statutory twin conditions - Orders granting bail without recording such explicit satisfaction stand completely vitiated and cannot be sustained. [Paras 9,10] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411
Party Autonomy and Contractual Interpretation – Held: The written word is the foundation of legal obligation - To disregard the chosen language of the parties and impute a mandatory obligation where none was intended would compromise party autonomy - Since the respondent refused to refer the matter to arbitration and the clause provided a choice rather than a mandate, the High Court's dismissal of the Section 11 application is upheld. [Relied on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007) 5 SCC 719; Paras 7-13] Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302, Section 307, and Section 149 read with Section 120B — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Testimony of a Single Witness / Injured Witness — Conviction based on a solitary eye-witness is entirely permissible if the evidence is of 'sterling quality' - The law of evidence measures testimony by its quality, not quantity - The testimony of an injured witness rests on a higher pedestal because their presence at the scene is indisputable and they have withstood cross-examination - Minor differences between ocular evidence (eyewitness stating the victim was shot in the head) and medical evidence (postmortem showing entry at the back of the skull and exit at the nose) are immaterial as both consistently confirm the fatal injury to the head. [Paras 6 - 11] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302 and 376A - Appellate Jurisdiction to Correct Conviction - The case involved the gruesome rape and murder of a school headmistress whose body was found concealed in a bag. The prosecution's case against the respondent rested primarily on the alleged recovery of a black umbrella belonging to the deceased. The Trial Court had convicted the accused under Sections 302 and 376A IPC and awarded the death sentence. The High Court acquitted him of the major offences but convicted him under Section 201 IPC. The Supreme Court found serious lapses in the investigation regarding recovery and identification of evidence and held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State and upheld the acquittal of the accused. The Court also set aside the conviction under Section 201 IPC (causing disappearance of evidence) recorded by the High Court, even though the accused had not challenged the same. An appellate court is empowered to set aside an erroneous conviction in the interest of justice even in the absence of an appeal by the accused. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 494 & 34 – Bigamy & Common Intention – Liability of In-laws – To sustain a charge under Section 494 against relatives of the husband, the prosecution must prima facie establish an overt act, omission, or active facilitation in the performance of the second marriage ceremony - Mere inferential knowledge, passive awareness, or familial relationship with the husband does not automatically translate into a shared common intention or criminal liability under Section 494 read with Section 34 - Inherent powers exercised to quash the criminal proceedings against the father-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law as the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and charge sheet failed to prima facie disclose specific offenses against them. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; S. Nitheen and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2024) 8 SCC 706; Paras 21 - 28] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412
Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 498A & 34 – Cruelty – Generalised and Vague Accusations Against Relatives – The tendency to implicate all family members of the husband in matrimonial disputes without specific allegations of active involvement must be restricted - General statements of presence and encouragement, unsupported by concrete evidence or specific acts of demand, threat, or physical assault on any identifiable occasion, do not satisfy the legal threshold to sustain a criminal prosecution under Section 498A against the in-laws – Noted that allowing such proceedings to continue constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. [Paras 23 - 25] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412
Precedent — Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter Dicta - A judgment is an authority only for what it actually decides - The binding element of a judgment lies in its ratio decidendi, i.e., the principle of law which was necessary for the determination of the issue that directly arose for consideration and was consciously adjudicated upon - Observations which stray beyond the contours of the issue in question do not partake of the character of a binding precedent. [Relied on Pradeep Oil Corporation v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another, (2011) 5 SCC 270; The State of U.P. v. Zahoor Ahmad, AIR 1973 SC 2520 / (1973) 2 SCC 547; Tata Steel Limited v. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2015) 15 SCC 55; Union of India and Another v. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 204; Para 41-55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406
Professional Ethics of Advocates – An advocate, as an officer of the Court, has a heightened obligation to maintain the dignity of the legal profession and the institutional sanctity of the judicial process - Addressing a press conference to publicly voice allegations against a sitting Judge regarding a pending judicial controversy is wholly inconsistent with professional discipline - Grievances against judicial orders must be ventilated through established legal remedies, not through public commentary intended to sensationalize proceedings. [Relied on Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India (2018) 8 SCC 396; State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441; Paras 25-36] Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - The presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012 does not arise merely on the basis of the testimony of the child victim. The presumption applies only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the commission of the alleged sexual offence. Where the testimony of the child victim is unreliable, not fully credible, or suffers from material discrepancies, the presumption cannot be invoked on the strength of such statement alone. Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 401
Public Utility and Communal Lands – Protection and Non-Diversion - Lands meant for public utility and community purposes (such as khalihan and pasture lands) constitute material assets of the community, essential for maintaining ecological balance and public welfare - Such lands must be zealously protected, cannot be legitimately converted for private benefits through administrative manipulations or processes, and consolidation proceedings cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent statutory protections afforded to communal resources. [Paras 31-36] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (Maharashtra) — Section 149 — Bar of Jurisdiction of Civil Court — Planning Authority Actions - Where a public notice is issued by a Municipal Corporation in its capacity as a planning authority under the MRTP Act alleging unauthorized constructions and proposing demolition, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is expressly barred under Section 149 of the MRTP Act - Reliefs aimed at restraining a Corporation from exercising powers traceable to such statutory authority fall within the domain of public law and cannot be effectively adjudicated in a civil suit designed for the determination of private civil rights inter se parties. [Paras 36 - 43] Unchgaon Village Panchayat v. Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2026 INSC 405
Rent Control Act, 1958 (Delhi) — Section 3 & Section 14(1)(a) — Government Grants Act, 1895 — Sections 2 & 3 — Non-applicability of Rent Control Law to Government Grants - The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRC Act), being a legislation intended to regulate conventional tenancies arising under the general law, does not extend to nor govern a holding originating in and regulated by a Government grant - A grant made under the Government Grants Act, 1895 (GG Act) constitutes a legal relationship whose incidents and enforceability are governed exclusively by the tenor of the grant and the statutory protection inhering therein - Its legal character does not derive its content from ordinary landlord-tenant relationships under general law, but instead flows from the sovereign grant and the conditions embodied therein - eviction proceedings instituted against the Union of India under Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act for premises occupied under a perpetual lease deed originating from a Government grant are vitiated at their inception for want of jurisdiction. [Paras 45-55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406
Road Safety Directions – Parking and Encroachment – i. Prohibition on Unauthorized Parking: Heavy/commercial vehicles prohibited from parking on any National Highway carriageway or paved shoulder except at designated bays - Enforcement mandated via Advanced Traffic Management System (ATMS), GPS-timestamped evidence, and eChallans; ii. Encroachment Removal: Construction of new commercial structures within the Right of Way (ROW) prohibited with immediate effect - District Magistrates directed to remove existing unauthorized structures within 60 days; iii. Land Use Restrictions: State Governments to notify prohibition of land use change within 40 metres (residential) and 75 metres (commercial) from the highway mid-point; iv. Emergency Services: Deployment of BLS ambulances and recovery cranes at intervals not exceeding 75 km within 60 days; v. Wayside Amenities: Construction of truck lay-byes every 75 km, prioritized on the Amritsar-Jamnagar Highway - Amenities must include rest areas, food services, and first-aid; vi. Blackspots: Identification and publication of accident blackspots within 45 days, followed by installation of high-intensity LED lighting and speed cameras; vii. District Highway Safety Task Force: Constitution of task forces in every district within 15 days to conduct fortnightly reviews; viii. Monitoring: NHAI to conduct drone-based aerial surveys at least twice annually - MoRTH to report on the constitution of an Inter-State Highway Safety Coordination Committee within 60 days. [Relied on Gyan Prakash vs. Union of India and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1189; Paras 4-8] In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388
SARFAESI Act, 2002 — Section 13 — Recovery of Dues and Dispossession — Default by Educational Institution — Complete disregard for the rule of law and wilful disobedience of court orders — Eviction and Closure of School - Petitioners/borrowers, running an educational institution (Chaitanya Public School & Junior College), defaulted on a loan of approximately ₹5.06 crore from the secured creditor - Despite multiple undertakings, promises, and paying schedules submitted before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the High Court, and the Supreme Court, the petitioners failed to clear their dues - they engaged in "strong-arm tactics" and trespassed onto the secured asset after possession was legally transferred to the secured creditor - They also failed to cooperate with the court-appointed Administrator - The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners showed an extreme lack of solicitude for the rule of law and aggravated the contempt already committed - Balancing the interest of the students who had completed their final examinations, Supreme Court ordered the permanent closure of the school - Granted liberty to the secured creditor to seek police assistance from the Superintendent of Police, Kolhapur, to obtain peaceful, vacant possession of the premises for an auction sale - The secured creditor was also directed to obtain a fresh valuation report from a Government valuer to fix the reserve price for the auction - Due to the ordered closure, the appointment of the Administrator was recalled - The Special Leave Petition was dismissed with a cost of ₹1 lakh imposed on the petitioners. [Paras 10 - 19] Chaitanya Bahuuddeshiya Shikshan Prasarak Mandal v. Auxilo Finserve Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 416 : 2026 INSC 408
Service Law – Inquiry / Departmental Inquiry – Power to order de novo / fresh inquiry – Rule 10 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 – The Disciplinary Authority ordered a de novo inquiry against a Judicial Officer after rejecting an inquiry report that found only one out of eight charges proved - The High Court upheld this decision - Quashing the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that the expression "further inquiry" as mentioned in Rule 10(1) of the Rules does not mean a fresh or a de novo inquiry, but only a further inquiry - If the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the Inquiry Authority's findings, Rule 10(2) mandates it to record reasons for disagreement and record its own findings if the evidence on record is sufficient - A notice directing a de novo inquiry is completely impermissible under the mandate of Rule 10. [Relied on Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs Dilip Patilal Patel (C.A. No. 29/2004); Paras 10 - 12] Chandni Prateek Sharma v. High Court of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 420
Service Law – Recruitment – Basic Eligibility and Medical Fitness – Police Constable – Suppression of Material Facts / Suppressio Veri and Suggestio Falsi – Lack of eligibility goes to the root of the matter – An appointment wrongly made cannot be sustained once the factum of ineligibility comes to light – A candidate claiming parity or applying for consideration of their case for appointment must clearly disclose and spell out all material factors, including medical fitness - The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the State Public Services Tribunal which had interfered with the termination of a Police Constable who suffered from a 'knock knee deformity' - The respondent's initial selection in 2005 was cancelled in 2007 after a Medical Board found him medically unfit due to knock knees - After a series of litigations arising out of en-masse cancellations of the recruitment drive, the respondent sought and obtained provisional reinstatement in 2013 by claiming parity with another candidate (Nitin Kumar Upadhyay), without disclosing his own medical unfitness - Supreme Court observed that the respondent was well aware that his appointment had previously been cancelled on the very ground of being medically unfit - Failing to disclose this to the appointing authority amounts to deliberate suppression (suppressio veri and suggestio falsi) because such disclosure would have disentitled him from even being considered for the post - Supreme Court rejected the technical argument that the departmental proceedings incorrectly cited 'colour blindness' instead of 'knock knees' - It held that a technical defect in the charges does not permit a person with one disqualifying medical deformity to join service merely because they do not suffer from a different deformity listed in the notice - Lack of basic eligibility goes to the root of the matter, and an appointment wrongly made cannot be sustained once ineligibility on the relevant date comes to light. [Relied on Vishnu Vardhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1505; Paras 18-22] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajay Kumar Malik, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 399 : 2026 INSC 394
Service Law — Regularisation — Validity of State Notifications — Group 'B', 'C', and 'D' employees — Distinction between "Irregular" and "Illegal" appointments — The Supreme Court examined the validity of Haryana Government Notifications dated 16.06.2014, 18.06.2014, and 07.07.2014, which sought to regularise contractual/ad hoc employees – i. Validity of Notifications dated 16.06.2014 and 18.06.2014: Supreme Court held these notifications valid as they were intended to grant benefits to employees who were eligible under the 1996 policy but were left out due to its administrative withdrawal - Since these employees occupied sanctioned posts and met prescribed qualifications at the time of initial engagement, their appointments were "irregular" but not "illegal"- The High Court's quashing of these two notifications was set aside; ii. Invalidity of Notifications dated 07.07.2014: Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to strike down the 07.07.2014 notifications - These policies were found arbitrary as they sought to regularise employees engaged without any public advertisement or interview, and utilized a future cut-off date (31.12.2018), which bypassed regular recruitment processes. (Paragraph 21); iii. Protection under Article 142: Despite striking down the 07.07.2014 notifications, the Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to protect the services of those ad hoc employees who have already secured benefits and remain in service - to balance equity, such employees are to be placed at the lowest pay scale admissible to their posts. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) INSC 216; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) INSC 993; State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari (2010) INSC 469; Paras 18 – 25] Madan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2026 INSC 379
Service Law – Regularization of Ad Hoc Employees – Doctrine of Parity – Artificial Breaks in Service – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the Appellants' claim for regularization of services - The Appellants, appointed as peons and clerks on an ad hoc basis in 1995-96, were denied regularization by the State on the grounds of non-continuous service due to breaks ranging from 5 to 187 days - Supreme Court found that the State had regularized 46 other similarly placed employees who had service breaks ranging from 64 to 334 days periods significantly longer than those of the Appellants - held that the State cannot selectively deny the application of policy instructions to identically situated persons without cogent justification. [Para 17-19] Prem Chand v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Service Law – Transfer vs. Change in Cadre – Fundamental Distinction – The Supreme Court illuminated the clear and substantive legal difference between a "transfer" and a "change in cadre" - A transfer refers merely to a change in the place of posting of an employee within the same cadre or service, acting as an incident of service routinely exercised for administrative convenience without impacting seniority, rules, or substantive status - a change in cadre is exceptional, altering the very structural framework within which the employee's service, seniority, promotional avenues, and conditions are regulated, thereby requiring specific statutory authority or higher-level approval. [Para 7] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Specific Performance of Contract — Readiness and Willingness — Non-appearance of plaintiff in the witness box — Effect of — Adverse Inference and Rebuttal - Non-appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box to prove the plaint case gives rise to an adverse presumption that the case set up is incorrect - this adverse presumption is a rebuttable presumption - If the presumption is successfully rebutted by other cogent evidence on record, it would not be material or applicable - Where the plaintiff's Manager deposes about the entire transaction based upon personal knowledge, having worked with the plaintiff since the execution of the agreement, such evidence cannot be discarded and sufficiently corroborates the plaint allegations, thereby successfully rebutting the adverse inference. [Paras 41, 42 & 43] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339
State Apathy and Litigation Delay – Award of Costs – Mandate for Expeditious Disposal – Supreme Court expressed deep anguish over gross administrative apathy where an employee, eligible for appointment in 1997, had to litigate for nearly three decades (until 2026) to secure his rightful cadre allocation - Noting that the appellant spent 22 years fighting the State instead of being close to his cognitively disabled son for family support, the Court awarded exemplary costs of ₹1,00,000/- to be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh - to tackle the systemic issue of long-pending service disputes pushing employees close to superannuation, Supreme Court requested the Chief Justice of the High Court to ascertain such pending cases and distribute them across benches for expeditious disposal. [Paras 11, 12, and 13] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404
State Reorganisation – Cadre Reallocation Criteria – Exceptions for Medical Hardships – The broad principles governing the allocation of State cadre employees to successor States primarily include option, followed by domicile (Home District), and lastly by inclusion of the junior-most personnel in the reverse order of seniority - Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) guidelines carve out specific exceptions to facilitate allocation based on option for certain vulnerable classes, including handicapped persons and defined medical hardship cases - The exception for "Mental Illness" explicitly covers the employee or their "family" (which includes dependent children) - Where a candidate's child is cognitively challenged, the allocation must be governed strictly by the option exercised by the employee. [Paras 8, 9, and 10] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404
Succession Act, 1925 – Section 263 & Section 283(1)(c) – Revocation of Probate – Just Cause – Suppression of Material Facts & Non-issuance of Citations - The Supreme Court restored the order of the District Court revoking the probate of an unregistered Will, which had been granted to the testator's daughter - Supreme Court found that Respondent No. 1 had deliberately suppressed material facts and failed to implead necessary parties, including her two brothers (or their legal heirs) and the subsequent purchasers/alienees (Appellants) who had acquired rights over the suit property prior to the initiation of the probate proceedings - Pendente Lite vs. Prior Alienees - A clear distinction must be made between a transferee pendente lite and an alienee who acquires an interest in the testator's estate prior to the commencement of probate proceedings - An alienee who acquires an interest prior to the filing of the probate petition is an interested party entitled to special citations under Section 283(1)(c) of the Act - Just Cause for Revocation - Fraudulent suppression of material transactions (such as a registered sale deed executed by the testator during his lifetime after the alleged execution of the Will) and the intentional omission to cite parties who have a caveatable or slight interest in the estate constitutes a "just cause" under Explanation (b) and Illustration (ii) of Section 263 of the Act. S. Leorex Sebastian v. Sarojini, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : 2026 INSC 400
Succession Act, 1925 – Section 263 – Caveatable Interest – Entitlement to Oppose Probate - Any interest in the estate of the deceased, however slight, or even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle an aggrieved party to file a caveat, oppose a testamentary document, or seek revocation of probate if the grant was obtained without their knowledge or proper citations - A purchaser who acquires an interest from the legal heirs or from the testator himself during his lifetime falls within the ambit of a person "who ought to have been cited" under Illustration (ii) to Section 263. [Relied on Basanti Devi v. Ravi Prakash Ram Prasad Jaiswal, (2008) 1 SCC 26; Sunil Gupta v. Kiran Girhotra, (2007) 8 SCC 506; Seth Beni Chand v. Kamla Kunwar & Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 554; G. Gopal v. C. Bhaskar and Ors, (2008) 10 SCC 489; Paras 20-25] S. Leorex Sebastian v. Sarojini, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : 2026 INSC 400
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 52 — Doctrine of Lis Pendens — Validity of transfers pendente lite - Transfers of the suit land made by a party during the pendency of the litigation/appeal are governed by the principle of lis pendens - A transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void ab initio but remains subservient to the rights of the parties eventually determined by the court, and must abide by the ultimate decree passed in the litigation - if the decree of specific performance is ultimately maintained and executed via due process, the sale deeds executed by the defendants to third parties during the pendency of litigation are held to be non est. [Relied on Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 573; Rajesh Kumar vs. Anand Kumar and Others, (2024) 13 SCC 80; Bholaram vs. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414; Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 213; Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397; Paras 25-30, 45, 46] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 132 & Section 195 – Uttar Pradesh Land Records Manual – Paragraph Ka-155-Ka – Re-categorisation of Public Utility Land – Lack of Jurisdiction of Sub-Divisional Officer / Assistant Collector - The Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) / Assistant Collector lacks the statutory authority to alter the category of land from Category-6 (Public Utility / Communal Land) to Category-5 (Cultivable Land) under Paragraph Ka-155-Ka of the Manual - Clause (9) of Paragraph Ka-155-Ka merely prescribes the competent authority for making entries in the revenue records affecting the tenure rights and titles of already recorded khatedars (tenure holders) - It only contemplates a change in the classification or category of the khata (the tenure entry relating to the holder) and does not confer any jurisdiction to change the underlying physical or regulatory category of the land itself -The power to resume public utility land and change its classification rests solely with the State Government under Section 117(6) of the Abolition Act read with Section 77(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Code, 2006, subject to strict statutory safeguards - Subordinate revenue authorities cannot circumvent the express prohibition of Section 132 of the Abolition Act through the administrative expedient of changing revenue entries - What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly (Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum) - any agricultural pattas granted over public utility land on the basis of an unauthorized re-categorisation by an SDO are void ab initio. [Paras 28, 29, 30] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395