Supreme Court Weekly Digest April 24 - 30, 2026

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16, Section 16(5), Section 16(6), Section 34, and Section 37(2) – Maintainability of Section 34 application against rejection of Section 16 plea – When an Arbitrator rejects an application filed under Section 16(2) or 16(3) challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (such as on the ground of limitation), the aggrieved party cannot immediately file an application under Section 34 to set aside that order - The statutory drill under Section 16 dictates that upon rejection of a jurisdictional plea, the Arbitral Tribunal shall continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award - The party aggrieved by such rejection can only test its validity after the final arbitral award is passed, by moving an application under Section 34 against the final award - Piecemeal challenges impermissible – Entertaining a Section 34 application or a subsequent Section 37 appeal against a pre-award rejection order under Section 16(2) is erroneous, unsustainable, and does violence to the scheme of the Arbitration Act - Under Section 37(2), an appeal lies directly only if the Arbitrator accepts/upholds the plea of lack of jurisdiction and puts an end to the proceedings. [Distinguished from Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited vs. Bhadra Products (2018) 2 SCC 534; Paras 8 – 17] MCM Worldwide v. Construction Industry Development Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : 2026 INSC 425

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Threshold for Grant of Interim Relief - While the remedy is available, the threshold for granting interim relief under Section 9 will be higher in the case of an unsuccessful party - In rare and compelling cases, permitting such a party to invoke Section 9 prevents irreversible or irreparable prejudice and preserves the efficacy of the challenge proceedings - Courts must exercise care, caution, and circumspection while dealing with such applications. [Paras 49 - 60, 62] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 vs Section 36 — Post-Award Interim Relief to Unsuccessful Party — Maintainability - A petition under Section 9 of the Act at the post-award stage, by a party that has lost in the arbitral proceedings and has no enforceable award in its favour, is maintainable in law - Any party to an arbitration agreement, including an unsuccessful party, may invoke Section 9 at the post-award stage before the award is enforced - The statutory framework under Section 9, commencing with the expression "a party", draws no distinction between a successful and an unsuccessful party, and its meaning cannot be contextually modulated or varied depending upon the outcome of the arbitral proceedings. [Paras 29 - 33, 50-62] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 vs Sections 34 & 36 — Distinct Spheres of Operation - Sections 34 and 36 provide remedies against an award or a stay thereof, whereas Section 9 ensures protection of the subject-matter or the amount in dispute - The mere availability of recourse under Section 34 or a stay under Section 36(2) cannot operate as a bar to seeking protection under Section 9 - Denying interim relief under Section 9 would leave an unsuccessful party entirely remediless, with no forum available to protect the subject-matter even if the award is stayed and potentially liable to be set aside. [Paras 42, 43] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415

Bail - Right to Speedy Trial - The petitioner was arrested on 07.03.2017 in a murder case involving Sections 147, 148, 149, 120-B, and 302 IPC - Charge sheet was filed and the case was committed to Sessions Court - Trial remained pending even after almost nine years of custody. The High Court rejected the bail application, relying on X v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 INSC 909, observing that once trial commences, bail should not normally be granted. The Supreme Court described the High Court's order as “very shocking” and “very disappointing”. The High Court misconstrued the judgment in X v. State of Rajasthan. The said judgment does not lay down an absolute rule against grant of bail after trial begins. The length of custody and delay in trial remain paramount considerations. Gravity of the offence cannot justify indefinite detention of an undertrial when the delay in trial is not attributable to the accused. The Court granted bail without awaiting the State's response, holding that the infringement of Article 21 was apparent on the face of the record. The petitioner was directed to be released on bail forthwith, subject to terms and conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court if not required in any other case. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 – Statutory Obligation of Police to Prevent Offences – Shifting of Burden via Bail Conditions – Section 168 of the BNSS casts a vital, primary statutory duty squarely upon the police and the State to prevent the commission of cognizable offences - Imposing a bail condition that ousts the accused from their residence to maintain peace effectively shifts this preventive burden from the law enforcement machinery onto the accused, thereby weakening the State's core obligation to prevent crime - Courts must remind the police of their statutory obligations to ensure no one breaches peace, rather than relying on disproportionately restrictive bail conditions to achieve situational harmony. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi vs. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Paras 17-28] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 480(3) – the conditions stipulated under Section 480(3) BNSS are not applicable to non-bailable offences punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. Narayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 426

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 482 (corresponding to Section 438 of CrPC) – Guidelines for Anticipatory Bail – Shifting of Burden – Scope of Judicial Discretion – The High Court erred in refusing anticipatory bail by shifting the burden of proof onto the accused to prove beyond doubt that the allegations made by him in a press conference were true - making observations regarding an offence under Section 339 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), without it being alleged in the FIR and merely on the oral statement of the Advocate General, is incorrect - Anticipatory bail cannot be denied on a rigid or inexorable rule; instead, courts must weigh multiple considerations, including the nature and seriousness of the charges, the context of events, the flight risk, and the possibility of tampering with evidence. [Relied on Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Pradip N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine 457; Paras 15 – 27] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437

Brain Death Certification - Apnea Test - Supreme Court directs AIIMS to constitute an expert medical committee to examine alternatives to Apnea Test for Brain Death Certification. Dr. S. Ganapathy v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 449

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Execution of Compromise Decree — Power of Executing Court — Statutory vs. Equitable Valuation - An Executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree or substitute strict statutory valuation rules with general notions of fairness or sympathy - where parties have consensually agreed to a statutory benchmark (Guideline Value) via a compromise decree, the Judgment Debtor cannot later contest the calculation by attempting to re-classify the nature of the land to minimize compensation. [Paras 21 - 39] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VI Rule 17 — Amendment of Plaint — Bonafide Need of Landlord — Death of Landlord during Appeal — Power of Court to examine merits at the stage of amendment — Held: Whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case proposed to be set up will eventually succeed at the trial - While determining the permissibility of an amendment, the Court cannot go into the merits/demerits of the case - The factual truth of the subsequent pleadings is a matter to be considered on the merits of the claim and not at the stage of amendment. [Paras 15-18] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XIII-A Rule 3 — Limitation — Adjudication of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact via Summary Judgment — Held - Although limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact when foundational facts are contested, the Court can decisively address and determine the issue of limitation at the summary judgment stage if it rests on admitted and undisputed material on record - Forcing a matter to proceed to a full-fledged trial despite absolute clarity of the material on record contradicts the principle of proportionality and needlessly prolongs ripe litigation. [Relied on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K. S. Infraspace LLP and Another, (2020) 15 SCC 585; Swain v. Hillman, [2001] 1 All ER 91 (England and Wales Court of Appeal); Paras 60-65, 75, 76] Reliance Eminent Trading v. Delhi Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2026 INSC 436

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 25 — Power of Appellate Court to frame issues and refer them for trial — Held: Even if the Trial Court did not omit to frame or try the issue originally, the Appellate Court can always exercise power under Order XLI Rule 25 to frame an issue to determine any question of fact which appears essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits based on subsequent events (such as the amendment of the plaint). [Relied on Raj Kumar Bhatia Vs. Subhash Chander Bhatia, 2017 INSC 1240; Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Company, (2003) 3 SCC 524; Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders, 1975 INSC 75; Para 18] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI, Rules 97, 98, 99, and 101 – Execution Proceedings – Objection by Third Party / Family Member – Deliberate attempt to stall recovery – Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had permitted the mother of a Judgment Debtor (JD) to lead evidence to prove her claim of a share in a joint family property - Key Findings – i. Complete Code for Disputes - Order XXI, Rules 97, 98, 99, and 101 of the CPC constitute a complete code for resolving all execution-related disputes raised by a third party interested in the suit property without requiring a separate suit; ii. Feigned Ignorance and Delay - The objector (the mother) was a Director in the co-defendant Private Limited Company along with her son (the JD) - Supreme Court observed that she could not feign ignorance of the suit or the execution proceedings, especially when an attachment notice was conspicuously affixed to the property in 2017 where she claimed to reside - Filing an objection nine years into execution proceedings only when dispossession is threatened constitutes a deliberate attempt to stall recovery; iii. Lack of Prima Facie Basis - Speculative claims of co-ownership or purchases made from a "joint family business nucleus" cannot be entertained to lead evidence when structural facts and prior individual property transactions by the family members clearly contradict the claim. [Paras 5-8] Challani Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Kamal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 444 : 2026 INSC 426

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Cheating — Criminal Conspiracy — Forgery of Will — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings against Bona Fide Purchaser — Criminal prosecution against a purchaser of property for valuable consideration cannot be sustained merely because the vendor allegedly used a forged Will to establish ownership and execute the registered sale deed - To attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, there must be a fraudulent inducement by the accused causing the complainant to deliver property or part with valuable security - Where there is no privity of contract or allegation that the purchaser deceived or fraudulently induced the third-party complainant, no offence of cheating is made out against the purchaser - If a vendor sells a property by creating a false document of ownership, the person defrauded/aggrieved is the purchaser whose title lands in dispute, not a third party who is not a party to the deed - In the absence of any tangible material showing the purchaser's involvement in the fabrication of the Will or knowledge of the forgery, allowing the prosecution to continue against him would amount to a gross abuse of the process of Court - Proceedings qua the appellant-purchaser quashed. [Relied on Mohammed Ibrahim and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751; Paras 20 - 25] S. Anand v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2026 INSC 418

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 154 & Section 156(3) - Mandatory Duty to Register FIR — Non-Registration Remedied by Efficacious Multi-Tiered Architecture - Where information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC is mandatory, and the police hold no discretion to refuse it at the threshold - If the police fail or refuse to register an FIR, the CrPC provides a complete and comprehensive statutory architecture to address the grievance - The aggrieved person must first approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3), and if the grievance persists, invoke the wide supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) to order registration and monitor the investigation. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1 and Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 47-56, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) & Sections 196, 197 - Prior Sanction is NOT a precondition for directing registration of an FIR or conducting an investigation at the pre-cognizance stage - The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's view and ruled that the statutory requirement of obtaining prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 of the CrPC operates strictly at the stage of "taking cognizance" by a Court - It does not extend to the anterior, pre-cognizance stage of registering an FIR or directing a police investigation under Section 156(3) - An order passed by a Magistrate directing an investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to "taking cognizance" within the meaning of Section 190 of the CrPC - To condition the registration of an FIR upon prior sanction would invert the sequential statutory scheme and render investigative provisions unworkable. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 101-164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Schedule — Insertion of Order XIII-A to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Summary Judgment — Scope, Principles, and Guidelines — Held - The emergence of summary judgment under Indian procedural law represents a significant shift steering litigation toward factual certainty and judicial efficiency - Rule 3 of Order XIII-A empowers the Court to grant a summary judgment against a party if they have no "real prospect" of successfully succeeding on or defending the claim, and there is no other compelling reason why the matter should go to trial - A "real prospect of success" postulates a likelihood that is real and substantial, as opposed to being merely fanciful or speculative - While the Court should not conduct a "mini-trial" at this threshold stage, it is not required to take everything at face value and must assess the evidence actually available alongside the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be led at trial - Summary judgment is an exceptional power that cuts short the trial process and ought to be exercised when oral evidence and a full trial would serve no real purpose. [Paras 36, 43, 51 – 59] Reliance Eminent Trading v. Delhi Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2026 INSC 436

Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers & Judicial Review - Judiciary cannot create or expand criminal offences or prescribe punishments in the absence of legislative action - The Supreme Court held that the authority to enact binding general norms of conduct, formulate policy, and choose legislative responses falls squarely within the exclusive province of the Legislature - Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers embedded in the Indian Constitution, the functional demarcation between the organs is fundamental; one organ cannot usurp the essential functions of another - While Courts can fill interstitial gaps to protect fundamental rights when a absolute legislative vacuum or constitutional silence exists, they cannot supplant the legislative scheme or construct parallel regulatory regimes where the field is already fully occupied by substantive law. [Relied on SCWLA v. Union of India (2016) 3 SCC 680; Dr. Ashwini Kumar v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 585; Paras 25-98, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Constitutional Law – Writ of Continuing Mandamus - Continuing Mandamus cannot be issued in anticipation of future contingencies or to micro-manage executive functions - The device of "continuing mandamus" is a judicial innovation designed to secure compliance with a declared right against institutional inertia, rather than a substantive standalone writ remedy - It cannot be deployed to keep matters pending in anticipation of future contingencies or possible defaults that have not yet arisen - To assume executive failure in advance and maintain continuous judicial oversight would violate the principle of institutional comity, transgress the doctrine of separation of powers, and unconstitutionally reduce the Court's role to the "micro-management" of matters falling strictly within the executive domain. [Relied on Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 80 and National Federation of Indian Women v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 719 of 2023; Paras 65, 67, 69, 73, 75] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14 – Equal Treatment and Arbitrary Classification – Pendency of litigation cannot be a valid basis for classification - Denying engagement orders to candidates simply because litigation was pending against them as on the date of the closure of a government scheme, while issuing engagement orders to similarly situated candidates with no pending litigation, fails the twin-test of reasonable classification - Mere pendency of litigation is an extraneous circumstance and bears no rational nexus with the objective of maintaining educational standards. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Political Rivalry – A careful balance must be struck between the State's interest in ensuring a fair investigation and the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 - The criminal process must be applied with objectivity and circumspection to ensure that individual liberty is not imperiled by proceedings coloured by political rivalry - Where allegations and counter-allegations prima facie appear to be politically motivated, and the surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of political overtones, a higher threshold is required to justify the deprivation of personal liberty - If the tests enumerated for the grant of anticipatory bail are met, and the veracity of the allegations can be tested at trial, custodial interrogation is not warranted. [Paras 25, 26] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 227 — Scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction — Capacity as an Appellate Court Impermissible - The High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate or reweigh evidence/facts under Article 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction is a correctional jurisdiction meant to be exercised sparingly to set right grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse, or patent errors of law - It cannot be used to substitute a plausible and reasonable view taken by a subordinate court with an alternative interpretation merely because another view is possible. [Paras 31 - 36] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 19 and 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 (erstwhile Section 149 CrPC) – Bail Conditions – Validity of bail condition directing the accused to not reside in the same building as the complainant – Restraint on Residence – Proportionality and Reasonableness – Grant of bail with conditions is a discretionary relief, and courts may impose conditions that impinge on fundamental rights in exceptional cases - a bail condition that effectively ousts an accused from their own residence causes serious curtailment of rights guaranteed under Article 21 and must strictly satisfy the tests of reasonableness, proportionality, and necessity - In the absence of clear and cogent material showing that a less restrictive measure would not suffice, such an severe restriction becomes punitive rather than preventive - Where the conclusion of the trial is nowhere in sight and a speedy trial appears to be a mirage, a continuous restraint on the accused's right of residence is disproportionately harsh, unreasonable, and uncalled for. [Paras 15, 16, 23 & 24] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Constitution of India - Article 21-A & Article 142 – Right to Education vs. Complete Justice – The constitutional guarantee to provide education includes within its ambit the right to quality education - While invoking plenary powers under Article 142 to balance equities and accommodate merit-holders , the mandate of Article 21-A cannot be compromised - the state is at liberty to dispense with the services of teachers who fail to acquire mandatory minimum statutory qualifications within the prescribed grace period. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial prisoner for nearly 9 years without conclusion of trial constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial. Bail must be granted in such cases, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439

Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction of High Court — Interference with discretionary order of amendment — Held: In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal - It is not open to the High Court to review or reassess the evidence or material upon which the inferior court or tribunal passed the order - The supervisory jurisdiction is strictly confined to seeing whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction - The High Court transgresses its limitations if it enters upon the merits of the case set up in the amendment. [Paras 15, 16] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Constitution of India – Article 32 vs. Statutory Remedies - Extraordinary Jurisdiction under Article 32 cannot be routinely invoked to bypass efficacious statutory mechanisms - The Supreme Court clarified that while constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226 remain available as vital safeguards against the failure of statutory authorities, this jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature - It ought not to be invoked in a routine manner to bypass the comprehensive, multi-tiered remedies provided under the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 56, 61, 98] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Contempt of Court – Invocation of Contempt Jurisdiction - Demonstrated "hesitation" or failure to act despite knowledge of a cognizable offence is a sine qua non for invoking contempt - Where the Supreme Court has issued pan-India interim directions (orders dated 21.10.2022 and 28.04.2023) mandating suo motu registration of FIRs against hate speech infractions, the failure to register a case must stem from a willful default or standard of hesitation despite having active knowledge of the cognizable offence - In cases where a petitioner has not even approached the competent authorities or placed the relevant material before them by way of a complaint, a failure to act suo motu cannot ipso facto translate to willful disobedience or automatic contempt - Foundational facts demonstrating institutional awareness and subsequent inaction are a prerequisite. [Paras 156 - 160] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Multi-Accused Case — Distance between "May be" and "Must be" — The circumstance of "last seen together" does not by itself necessarily lead to an inference of guilt without further corroborative evidence establishing connectivity to the crime - Where the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act fails to link the accomplice appellants to any discovery, the prosecution is left solely with the "last seen together" circumstance - It is hazardous and unsafe to sustain a conviction for a serious offence like murder under Section 302 IPC exclusively on the basis of a singular, uncorroborated "last seen" circumstance - While the prosecution case "may be true", it falls short of the legal threshold that it "must be true" to justify a conviction. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Nagamma v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine; Lachhman Singh v. State, (1952) 1 SCC 362; Murli v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 417; Paras 43, 63 - 69] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417

Criminal Law — Cancellation of Bail — Dowry Death - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Sections 85, 115(2), 352, 351(2) and 80 — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 - Section 118 [Erstwhile Section 113(B) of the Evidence Act] — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 — Serious Crimes Against Women — Principles governing grant/cancellation of bail - Egregious Error by High Court - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to a husband accused of murdering his wife for dowry, holding that the High Court committed an egregious error in exercising its discretion in favor of the accused given the serious nature of the crime – i. Presumption as to Dowry Death - The High Court erred by completely ignoring the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - In cases where a woman dies under suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage and faced continuous dowry harassment soon before death, the Court is mandated to presume that such person caused the dowry death; ii. Misreading of Facts & Evidentiary Value of FIR - The High Court's reliance on an alleged "delay in lodging the FIR" as a primary ground for bail was baseless and factually incorrect - The deceased died on 11.07.2024, and the FIR was promptly lodged the next day on 12.07.2024 - Even if a minor delay exists, it cannot independently justify releasing an accused on bail in a serious offense like dowry death; iii. Duty of Bail Courts: A bail court at any level must remain highly cautious to ensure its orders do not convey a message to society that courts take serious crimes against women lightly. [Relied on In Re: Enforcement and Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [2005] INSC 295; Paras 16-31] Mahesh Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 452 : 2026 INSC 440

Criminal Law — Criminal Investigation — Delayed FIR and Scripted Investigation — Impact on Prosecution - Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 154, 161, 162, and 164 — Appreciation of Evidence — Fatal Investigation Flaws - An inept investigation or a scripted enquiry is fatal to criminal prosecution, having lethal consequences when there is a possibility of totally innocent persons being crucified - In a case involving a brutal homicidal attack on a public road, the Supreme Court noted that despite the police reaching the place of occurrence (P.O) immediately after the incident based on a General Diary (GD) entry, no First Information Report (FIR) was registered for two days - The FIR was eventually registered based on a written complaint by a close relative (PW1) who admittedly did not witness the incident but named 13 specific accused persons after due deliberation – Suprme Court observed that if eyewitnesses were available at the spot when the Investigating Officer (IO) arrived, the IO would have registered an FIR then and there rather than waiting for a delayed complaint - The high-handed and procedural lapses by the investigation department leave the crime unresolved. [Paras 11 - 22] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421

Criminal Procedure — Physical and Forensic Evidence — Failure to Produce Material Objects - Investigation Failures — Non-Forensic Examination and Non-Production of Material Objects - The prosecution's case rested heavily on the narrative that six people travelled with the deceased on four motorbikes - despite creating a seizure list detailing the vehicles, no document substantiating ownership was produced, nor were the physical motorbikes ever brought before the trial court to confront the witnesses - the weapons seized from the spot were never sent for forensic analysis, nor were they confronted to the eyewitnesses or the medical doctor who conducted the postmortem examination - The failure to collect blood spilled at the crime scene to match it with the victims further destabilizes the prosecution's foundation - In the absence of such corroborative links, the ocular evidence is rendered highly suspect. [Paras15 - 21] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421

Evidence Act, 1872 — Admission by Parties — Substantive Evidence Substantive admissions made by a party or their witnesses substitute the root-matter of the case. When consistent and unambiguous recitals are present in a primary document text (such as a foundation deed), they cannot be lightly brushed aside or disregarded on the mere ground that the contemporaneous person lacked personal knowledge. [Paras 26, 27] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Joint / Simultaneous Disclosures — Evaluation of Admissibility and Credibility — Joint or simultaneous disclosure statements taken from multiple persons in police custody are not per se inadmissible under Section 27, but they pose inherent practical difficulties regarding credibility and their distinct nexus with the discovery - The contents of a panchanama do not constitute substantive evidence; rather, what is stated by the panch witnesses in the witness box is substantive - Where the independent panch witness fails to depose a single word regarding the exact words or statements made by the specific appellants in his presence, and where the primary discoveries (weapon, vehicle, and ornaments) were exclusively at the instance of the principal accused, the safeguards of Section 27 are completely absent - In a case entirely based on circumstantial evidence, a joint discovery of the same spot/mental fact cannot be utilized against the co-accused appellants when it is impossible to determine which statement of a particular accused relates distinctly to the fact discovered. [Paras 49 - 68] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 101, 102 — Burden of Proof — Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction In a suit seeking a permanent injunction, the burden of proof lies solely upon the plaintiff who asserts the facts. The plaintiff must succeed entirely on the strength of their own case and cannot receive any strength from the weakness or deficiency of the defendant's case. A court cannot shift the onus of proof until the plaintiff has first discharged their legal obligation to establish a clear and sustainable claim. [Paras 32, 33, 34] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Evidence Act, 1872 — Witness Testimony — Credibility of Injured Eyewitness vs. Related/Chance Witness - Appreciation of Evidence — Injured Witness Credibility - The credibility of an injured eyewitness is a tad higher than an ordinary eyewitness who has merely seen the incident, as the very fact that the witness suffered an injury in the same transaction adds to its trustworthiness - when the prosecution projects certain individuals as 'injured eyewitnesses' but fails to produce any medical corroboration (such as a wound certificate or hospital intimation) to prove the injuries allegedly sustained during the transaction, their greater credibility is completely lost - Such an unproved assertion reduces them below the status of a chance witness and casts serious doubt on their very presence at the place of occurrence - while related witnesses cannot always be labeled as interested witnesses, their natural presence together on a public road cannot be presumed without explicit, credible evidence. [Paras 13 - 17] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421

Hate Speech & Preamble – Fundamental Values - Substantive meaning of 'Fraternity' and civilisational ethos of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' run fundamentally counter to Hate Speech - Supreme Court observed that the field of substantive criminal law addressing hate speech is fully occupied by existing statutory provisions (such as Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505 of the IPC/BNS), which penalise speech threatening communal harmony and public order - Hate speech is fundamentally antithetical to the core constitutional value of "Fraternity" enshrined in the Preamble and the Fundamental Duty cast under Article 51A(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Fraternity mandates a reciprocal obligation among citizens to respect the equal dignity of others - True citizenship cannot be reduced to a tool of exclusion or division based on an "us versus them" binary, which directly corrodes both the secular fabric of the Republic and India's civilisational maxim of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family). [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 and Section 6-A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, In Re (2024) 16 SCC 105. (Paragraphs 78, 80, 81, 86, 88, 95] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Reassessment Mechanism — Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) vs. Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) — Intervening Clarificatory Legislation with Retrospective Effect - Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 147, 148, 148A, 151A and newly inserted Section 147A — Income Tax Act, 2025; Sections 273(3), 279, 280 and 281 — Finance Act, 2026 (Act No. 4 of 2026) - Friction arose between the traditional reassessment procedure by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and the 'e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022' under Section 151A, which mandated a faceless mechanism - High Courts expressed divergent views: some held JAO and National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) exercise concurrent jurisdiction, while others quashed notices issued by JAOs, holding that authority vested exclusively with the faceless units - During the pendency of the appeals before the Supreme Court, Parliament enacted the Finance Act, 2026 (effective 01.04.2026), retrospectively inserting Section 147A into the IT Act with effect from 01.04.2021 - Section 147A explicitly clarifies that the "Assessing Officer" for the purposes of Sections 148 and 148A means and shall always be deemed to have meant an officer other than the NFAC or any faceless assessment unit - A corresponding amendment was made to Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 2025 - Since the High Courts primarily quashed the reassessment notices on the ground that JAOs lacked competence, and the statutory foundation of that view stands fundamentally altered by the retrospective amending legislation, the impugned judgments are set aside on this limited ground - The Supreme Court remitted the entire batch of matters back to the respective High Courts for fresh consideration - The Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the validity, scope, effect, retrospectivity, or applicability of the amended provisions, leaving all questions open - Assessees are granted liberty to amend their writ petitions within four weeks to challenge the validity of Section 147A of the IT Act or any consequential provision - Revenue is given three weeks thereafter to file written submissions - An interim stay on further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notices shall operate during the pendency of writ petitions before the High Courts, subject to conditions - High Courts are requested to decide the matters expeditiously, preferably by 30.09.2026. [Paras 14-27] Asst Commissioner of Income Tax v. Aristo Pharmaceuticals Private Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 436

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 7 and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Period of Limitation and Date of Default - The period of limitation for filing an application under Section 7 of the Code is three years and is strictly governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - The right to apply accrues on the date of default, which is the date when the corporate debtor's account is classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA), and not from any subsequent recovery proceedings. [Relied On: Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar, (2020) 15 SCC 1; Para 13] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Non-Disclosure of Guarantee in Financial Statements - Mere non-disclosure of a corporate guarantee in the financial statements or annual reports of the Corporate Debtor cannot deprive the beneficiary lenders from asserting their claim on the basis of such a guarantee - At the very highest, such an omission can only be treated as a default committed by the Corporate Debtor under company law, but it cannot legitimately defeat the recognition of a financial debt or status of a financial creditor under the Code. [Para 25] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Production of Documents at Appellate Stage - An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding - Documents relevant to deciding the lis (dispute)—such as corporate guarantees can be produced at the appellate stage before the NCLAT - Merely because such documents were not produced before the NCLT does not allow for any adverse inference to be drawn regarding their genuineness, provided their execution is otherwise established. [Para 27] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 5(8) – Financial Debt – Corporate Guarantee - A liability arising from a corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of "financial debt" under Section 5(8) of the Code - The amount of any liability in respect of a guarantee for money borrowed against the payment of interest constitutes a financial debt, making the beneficiary lenders eligible to be recognized as "financial creditors" - A guarantor incurs a coextensive liability with that of the principal borrower, which is fully enforceable in law. [Paras 22 – 31] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 62 – Interference with Concurrent Findings - While the Supreme Court does not routinely re-appreciate facts when the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception is carved out where the findings of fact are shown to be glaringly and manifestly perverse - Where the tribunals reject valid claims of a consortium of lenders by misinterpreting asset classification norms or ignoring established statutory verifications, the findings warrant interference under Section 62. [Relied on Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, IN RE, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Company, (1969) 1 SCC 597; China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. & Ors., (2025) 7 SCC 729; Para 15 - 26, 30] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 18 - Acknowledgment must be within the Limitation Period - An acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the 1963 Act can only renew or extend a limitation period if it is made before the original period of limitation has already expired - Any entry or admission made after the expiry of the limitation period does not ensure to the benefit of the creditor. [Relied On: Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2022) 9 SCC 364; Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr., (2021) 8 SCC 481; Reliance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Hotel Poonja International Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 352; Para 17] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 7 read with Section 18 - Admission of Claim by Resolution Professional (RP) / Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) does not extend Limitation - The admission of a claim by an IRP or RP is merely an administrative and clerical task performed under statutory duties to collate claims under Section 18 of the Code - The RP has no adjudicatory powers. Such admission amounts to a mere entry or recital of a debt and does not constitute a conscious and unequivocal acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - it cannot be used to extend the period of limitation. [Relied On: Swiss Ribbons Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 4 SCC 17; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 531; Para 16] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 — Sections 3(2)(b)(i), 3(3), and 5 — Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 — Rule 3B(c) — Constitution of India — Articles 21, 32, and 226 — Late-Term Pregnancy of Minor — Reproductive Autonomy and Decisional Autonomy as Fundamental Rights — Lack of Statutory Remedy No Bar to Constitutional Remedy - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and permitted the medical termination of the pregnancy - The Court laid down the following key propositions: i. Reproductive Autonomy under Article 21 - The right to make decisions concerning one's body and reproduction is an integral facet of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - No court ought to compel any woman, especially a minor child, to carry an unwanted pregnancy to full term against her express will - The choice of the pregnant woman must be prioritized over the interest of an unborn child or suggestions of giving the child up for adoption; ii. Statutory Limitations vs. Constitutional Remedy - A lack of remedy under a statute (such as the MTP Act) does not bar a constitutional remedy under Article 32 or 226 - The statute merely codifies a part of the constitutional remedy - When statutory limits are exhausted, Constitutional Courts must view the case through the lens of the pregnant woman's welfare and fundamental rights rather than adopting a prohibitory approach, which inadvertently drives women toward unsafe, illegal abortion centers; iii. Foetal Normalcy and Passage of Time - The invocation of foetal normalcy or the advanced duration of a pregnancy cannot be used to deny termination - Subordinating a woman's fundamental rights to the pathology of a fetus instrumentalizes her into a mere conduit - the passage of time does not extinguish reproductive choices, as delays often stem from systemic barriers, irregular cycles, lack of awareness, financial constraints, or fear; iv. Assessment of Mental Health and Distress - The absence of a clinically diagnosed psychiatric disorder in a Medical Board report does not negate the presence of severe emotional trauma, distress, or anguish - The minor's two suicide attempts demonstrated acute mental suffering that the law cannot ignore - Since the Medical Board found the minor physically fit for the procedure and she consented through her mother, the request could not be denied. [Relied on X v. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra & Others (Civil Appeal No. 827 of 2026); Paras 10-16] S v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Adjudication of Claims – Non-adjudication of Framed Issues – Validity of Driving Licence – Adverse Inference – Despite a specific issue being framed regarding whether the bus driver possessed a valid and effective driving licence, the Tribunal declined to adjudicate it on merits simply because it found the driver not responsible for the accident - The High Court also failed to return any finding on this material issue or address the fact that the driver did not enter the witness box despite filing a written statement - Held, once an issue is framed, it is incumbent upon the adjudicating forum to record a finding thereon, supported by reasons, as it bears directly upon the determination of liability and the rights of the parties - Non-adjudication of such a vital aspect amounts to an incomplete adjudication and undermines the legality of the award - This aspect assumed greater significance as the claimants explicitly pleaded that the driver was undergoing training under a senior driver at the relevant time - The impugned judgments set aside and the matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. [Paras 25 – 34] Parmila v. Rajender, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2026 INSC 420

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Adjudication of Claims – Determination of Negligence – Head-on Collision – Contributory Negligence – The Supreme Court expressed perplexity at the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court which completely absolved the bus driver (Respondent No. 1) of even any contributory negligence, placing the entire blame on the deceased car driver - Held, in motor accident cases, the determination of negligence must be founded upon a balanced and objective assessment of the conduct of all parties involved, particularly where the circumstances suggest a possible sharing of responsibility - The complete exclusion of contributory negligence in a head-on collision ordinarily warrants a careful scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances, including the manner of driving, the point of impact, and other attendant factors - The absence of a reasoned and comparative analysis of the respective actions of both drivers renders the conclusions susceptible to doubt. [Paras 23 - 26] Parmila v. Rajender, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2026 INSC 420

National Security Act, 1980 – Section 3 - The appellant was detained under the NSA following an incident of unauthorized digging and construction near Shree Krishna Janam Bhoomi and Dwarkadeesh Temple in Mathura, which led to the collapse of several houses, loss of three lives, and widespread panic. He was already in judicial custody when the detention order was passed. He made representations to both the detaining authority and the State Government, which were not promptly forwarded and considered. The State Government considered the representation only after approving the detention order. Even if a person is in custody, a detention order under Section 3 of the NSA can be passed if there is a reasonable apprehension that his release would lead to acts prejudicial to public order. However, the constitutional safeguard of expeditious consideration of the detenu's representation is mandatory and cannot be breached. The preventive detention order and its approval were quashed. The appellant was directed to be released forthwith. Sunil Kumar Gupta @ Sunil Chain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Preventive Detention – National Security Act, 1980 – Consideration of Detenu's Representation - A detenu's representation against a preventive detention order must be considered by the concerned Government at the earliest point of time. Belated consideration of the representation vitiates both the detention order and its approval. The Supreme Court set aside the detention order passed under the National Security Act, 1980, holding that the State Government's failure to consider the detenu's representation at the earliest opportunity rendered the detention illegal. The Court emphasized that the detaining authority is duty-bound to forward the representation to the State Government immediately, and any delay in its consideration amounts to a violation of the fundamental right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Sunil Kumar Gupta @ Sunil Chain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Property Law — Physical Possession vs. Underlying Title — Relief of Injunction Physical possession, such as cultivating crops, does not automatically equate to a valid underlying title of a land. Suit or relief of a permanent injunction cannot be treated under a superficial view if the underlying title itself is inherently defective or void. (See: Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, (1998) 2 SCC 642; P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar, (2024) 13 SCC 455; Rangammal v. Kuppuswami, (2011) 12 SCC 220; Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242) A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Rent Control and Eviction — Bonafide Requirement — Subsequent Events — Death of Landlord — Held: The proposition that on the death of the original landlord, the bonafide need comes to an end and the legal heirs cannot seek eviction on the basis of their need, cannot have a blanket application - It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. While rights are generally adjudicated as they existed at the commencement of the lis, courts are not precluded from taking cautious cognisance of subsequent developments to mould relief in accordance with law and current realities. [Para 17] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) read with U.P. Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 – Rule 8 – Mandate of Neighbourhood Schools to Grant Admission - Once the State Government scrutinizes application forms, prepares an allocation list, and forwards it to a neighbourhood school, the school has no option but to grant immediate admission to the allocated student - Schools cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the State Government or delay admission under the guise of examining a student's eligibility - While a school may make a representation to the concerned authority regarding any disagreement, it cannot wait for the outcome of such representation and must admit the student in the interregnum to prevent delays in securing the child's fundamental right to education under Article 21A of the Constitution. [Paras 7 – 14] Lucknow Public School v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2026 INSC 422

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 23 – Minimum Qualifications for Teachers – Clearing the Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) is not a mere procedural requirement but an essential component of the mandatory minimum eligibility criteria for any teacher appointment - Both new entrants and in-service teachers who do not possess the requisite NCTE qualifications must clear the TET within a time-bound manner as a pre-condition for regularization, continuation, or future promotion. [Relied on Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 INSC 1063; Paras 18-25] Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 6, 8, 9, 12, and Article 51A(k) of the Constitution – Positive Right to Elementary Education and Co-relative Duty Bearers - The identification of the right to elementary education as a positive right recognizes co-relative duties and identifies five distinct duty bearers responsible for its realization, reiterated the following: i. Appropriate Government: Obligated to establish and ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, with financial responsibilities shared between Central and State Governments (Sections 6, 7, and 8); ii. Local Authority: Obligated to ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, maintain records of children up to 14 years, and monitor admission, attendance, and completion of elementary education (Section 9); iii. Neighbourhood Schools: Obligated to provide free and compulsory education and admit children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups to the extent of at least 25% of the class strength (Section 12); iv. Parents/Guardians: Constitutionally recognized obligation to provide education opportunities to their child under Article 51A(k); v. Elementary School Teachers: Play the most crucial role in nation-building through the development of a student's mind and character. [Relied on Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2026 INSC 56); Paras 10-14] Lucknow Public School v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2026 INSC 422

Sentencing - Death Penalty - Directions - A. Trial Courts shall call for reports on aggravating and mitigating circumstances once the accused is convicted and prior to sentencing. B. High Courts must call for such reports at the admission stage of death reference if not obtained by the trial court. C. Reports must be comprehensive, duly verified, and furnished within a stipulated time. Parties must be given an opportunity to peruse the reports and make submissions. High Courts may call for a fresh report if the one submitted is inadequate. D. In every death sentence confirmation reference, the concerned Legal Services Committee shall provide a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two Advocates with minimum 7 years' practice, irrespective of private counsel being engaged. E. Each High Court shall maintain a dedicated panel of advocates for handling death reference matters. F. National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) shall frame guidelines for collection of mitigating circumstances, including socio-economic background, mental health, antecedents, and potential for reformation. Trained teams may be engaged for fieldwork. The Court expressed serious concern over the inadequate quality of legal representation and systemic failure in collecting mitigation evidence in death penalty cases, reiterating the principles laid down in Manoj & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC 35. The Supreme Court stayed the execution of the death sentence of the appellants and directed the State of Bihar to submit jail conduct reports, work performed, and psychological evaluation reports. This judgment aims to ensure a more structured, informed, and constitutionally compliant sentencing process in capital punishment cases. Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2026 INSC 424

Sentencing - Death Penalty - Reports on Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances - Mandatory Duty of Trial Courts - Duty of High Court - Constitutional Imperative - In all cases where the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, the trial court must, as a matter of course, call for reports on aggravating and mitigating circumstances immediately after conviction and before pronouncing sentence. If the trial court fails to call for such reports, the High Court shall mandatorily call for them at the stage of admission of the death sentence reference. Failure to obtain such reports at the earliest stage undermines the sentencing process, deprives courts of crucial material necessary for a balanced and reformative approach, and leads to avoidable delays at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court. Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2026 INSC 424

Service Law – Non-Stigmatic Reversion – "Unsatisfactory" Performance - Stigmatic vs. Non-Stigmatic Orders – Reversion or termination based on Annual Assessment Reports (AARs) characterizing a performance as "unsatisfactory" or "below average" does not cast a stigma - To amount to a stigma, the language used in the order must explicitly impute something over and above mere unsuitability for the job - Highlighting an employee's unsuitability or unsatisfactory work is merely an unexceptional assessment of performance and is not ex facie stigmatic. [Relied on Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, [2021] 1 SCR 51; State of U.P. and Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal, [2004] 3 SCR 337; Paras 14-19] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427

Service Law – Regularisation and Permanent Status – Non-compliance with Final Judicial Directions – Scope of Subsequent Proceedings – Model Employer Guidelines - Finality of Judicial Orders & Limited Scope of Subsequent Review - When a judicial direction (ordering the creation of posts and regularisation of casual labourers on a permanent footing) has attained finality up to the Supreme Court, the scope of consideration in subsequent proceedings is strictly confined to examining compliance with those directions - It is wholly impermissible for the High Court in a subsequent round of litigation to reopen the issue on merits, re-examine whether the services could be regularised, or rely on original selection defects to deny relief - The obligation of the State to act as a model employer flows directly from the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, which strikes at arbitrariness and mandates fairness, non-discrimination, and reasoned decision-making - The State cannot dilute final judicial mandates or treat a segment of its workforce especially those contributing indirectly to national endeavours of paramount importance with indifference or arbitrariness. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 10-29] R. Iyyappan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : 2026 INSC 431

Service Law – Reversion / Repatriation – Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion - Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 311(2) – ICAR functions as an autonomous Society whose recruitment and service conditions are governed by its own rules and bye-laws—hence, Article 311 is not attracted – A transfer, reversion, or repatriation is ordinarily an incidence of service and cannot per se be considered punitive - Judicial review of administrative discretion is narrowly confined to evaluating the decision-making process rather than the merits or fairness of the conclusion itself - It must strictly assess whether the action was arbitrary, irrational, tainted by mala fides, or colourable, particularly regarding whether it imposes penal or stigmatic consequences without due procedure - Allegations of mala fides must be supported by clear, cogent, and concrete material, and cannot be entertained merely on conjectures or the sequence of events. [Paras 9, 10, 11-16] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427

Stamp Act, 1899 / Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – Insufficient Stamping – Effect on Insolvency Claims - The defect of insufficient stamping of a document is curable in nature and does not go to the root of the validity of the instrument or render it void or unenforceable - The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State and is not intended to be used as a weapon by a litigant to defeat the cause of opponents - an insolvency claim cannot be rejected or negated merely because the underlying corporate guarantee is alleged to be insufficiently stamped or lacks payment under a specific state stamp legislation when executed in another jurisdiction. [Paras 28 - 32] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Statutory Interpretation — Executive Clarification During Litigation - The State Executive or Government cannot be impleaded at a belated stage to interpret its own statutory notification to influence a ongoing lis exclusively between private parties - The executive cannot be allowed to explain away or reinterpret a statutory instrument during litigation to the prejudice of a party. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329; Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97; Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181; Paras 33-36] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Statutory Interpretation — Literal vs Purposive Construction — Separation of Powers - Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe them in their natural, ordinary, and grammatical sense - Resorting to contextual or purposive interpretation to arrive at a meaning contrary to the plain language of a clear statute does violence to the text and constitutes a breach of the doctrine of separation of powers - Modulating the definition of "a party" based on the outcome of arbitration would amount to an impermissible judicial amendment. [Paras 33 - 56] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415

Wakf Law — Service Inam — Character of Property — Restriction on Alienation Lands granted as "service inam" for religious or charitable purposes partake the character of endowed property and are impressed with a public trust. Their alienability is completely restricted; individual holders and their successors-in-interest possess no transfer or alienable title. Any subsequent transfer is void ab initio, incapable of conferring a valid title upon purchasers. [Paras 13 - 25] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 — Section 55 — Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 2(xxiii) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 120-B, 284 and 289 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Non-compliance with Mandatory Special Procedure — Power Exercised Without Jurisdiction is Void Ab Initio - Key Legal Propositions held – i. Cognizance Under Special Statutes: Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 explicitly mandates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a statutory complaint filed by an authorized officer - A police report or chargesheet under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. (or corresponding provisions of the BNSS) cannot be treated as a statutory complaint - Cognizance taken on the basis of a police chargesheet for offences under the 1972 Act is legally impermissible and unsustainable in law; ii. Definition of Psychotropic Substance - Under Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act, 1985, a substance must be specifically listed in the Schedule of the Act to qualify as a "psychotropic substance" - The conscious omission of the legislature in not including "snake venom" or "antibodies to snake venom" in the NDPS Schedule means these substances cannot be construed as psychotropic substances - the recovery of snake venom antibodies does not warrant the invocation of the NDPS Act – iii. Jurisdictional Nullity and the Ripple Effect - When an initial action or investigation by an agency is undertaken in the complete absence of authority or statutory jurisdiction, the entire subsequent proceeding suffers from a fundamental illegality and is rendered void ab initio - Procedural irregularities can be cured, but an absolute lack of jurisdiction cannot be regularized or saved – iv. Double Jeopardy / Re-litigation on IPC Offences - Ingestion of allegations pertaining to Sections 284 and 289 of the IPC that were already the subject matter of an earlier complaint where a closure report was filed noting no cognizable offence or cruelty was established cannot form the basis of a subsequent criminal proceeding by a different agency lacking jurisdiction. [Relied On: State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655; Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526; Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1987) 1 SCC 533 (as emphasized in Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409); B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674; Paras: 14-40] Elvish Yadav @ Siddharth v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : 2026 INSC 329

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Statutory Compliance and Regulatory Oversight — Role of Central Zoo Authority (CZA) - Held: Consequent upon the CZA cancelling the "mini zoo" recognition of A.N. Jha Deer Park under Section 38H(6) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 due to persistent non-compliance and expiry of its license, continued retention of animals without statutory recognition is impermissible in law - based on the Central Empowered Committee's (CEC) scientific assessment, a maximum population of 38 deer (15 males and 23 females) may conditionally be retained at the park, strictly subject to formal approval, infrastructure upgrades, and continuous regulatory oversight by the CZA. New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419

Wildlife Protection and Conservation — Animal Welfare Protocols — Soft-Release Methodology and Guidelines - Held: Noting that previous translocations were conducted in an unduly harsh manner, Supreme Court directed that all future translocations must mandatorily follow "soft-release" protocols involving acclimatisation, telemetry collars for monitoring, and specialized prey transfer vehicles - The comprehensive draft guidelines on Animal Translocation prepared by the CEC must be examined and implemented by the MoEF&CC within six months, and shall be imparted statutory status. [Paras 3-11] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419

Wildlife Protection and Conservation — Translocation of Captive Animals — Ecological Carrying Capacity vs. Habitat Expansion – Held - The Supreme Court affirmed the translocation of surplus spotted deer (Axis axis) from A.N. Jha Deer Park, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, to the Mukundara Hills Tiger Reserve and Ramgarh Vishdhari Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan - Rejecting the petitioner's plea for expanding the existing precincts within Delhi , the Court observed that intra-park or inter-park relocation merely shifts, rather than resolves, fundamental management and ecological concerns like carrying capacity and population regulation - Wildlife species ought not to be confined to restrictive enclosures save in exceptional circumstances duly justified in law. New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419