Abuse of Process of Court — Imposition of Exemplary Costs- The machinery of justice cannot be deployed as a facility to settle personal scores or salvage reputations imperiled by the parties' own actions. Where both litigants engaged in suppression, embellishment, and afterthought, and consumed institutional time of disciplinary bodies and constitutional courts for eleven years, costs...
Abuse of Process of Court — Imposition of Exemplary Costs- The machinery of justice cannot be deployed as a facility to settle personal scores or salvage reputations imperiled by the parties' own actions. Where both litigants engaged in suppression, embellishment, and afterthought, and consumed institutional time of disciplinary bodies and constitutional courts for eleven years, costs of ₹5,00,000/- each imposed on both the complainant and the advocate to be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. [Paras 21 - 23]. Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddhiquee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2026 INSC 907
Advocates Act, 1961 — Appellate Jurisdiction / Disciplinary Proceedings — Enhancement of Punishment — Clean Hands Doctrine - A complainant seeking enhancement of punishment awarded to an advocate must approach the court with clean hands. Where the complainant suppressed material facts, engaged in dubious conduct during the subsistence of the professional relationship (such as strategizing to trap the opposing party rather than seeking pure legal advice), voluntarily appeared before the electronic media to ventilate the dispute, and allowed the discharge order of the main accused to achieve finality, no relief for enhancement of punishment can be entertained. [Para 15-20] Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddhiquee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2026 INSC 907
Advocates Act, 1961 — Section 35 — Principles of Natural Justice — Ex-Parte Allegation - Where an advocate entered appearance, filed a written statement, was represented by counsel, participated in the recording of evidence, and was aware of the ongoing disciplinary proceedings throughout its pendency, a subsequent plea alleging denial of a reasonable opportunity of hearing on the ground of non-service of notice of the final hearing at an updated address cannot be sustained. A party present throughout cannot be heard to allege absence, particularly when the litigant is himself an advocate. [Para 14]. Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddhiquee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2026 INSC 907
Advocates Act, 1961 — Section 35 — Professional Misconduct — Fiduciary Duty and Privileged Communications — Advocate going to the media against a former client — Scope of professional duty - An advocate cannot use information received in confidence against a client, and the circumstance that the client has subsequently turned into an adversary makes no difference. An advocate's professional duty is not conditional upon the client's continued good behavior towards the advocate. Even where an advocate is named in a First Information Report (FIR) by the client or subjected to media pursuit, the remedies lie in presenting their version before the investigating agency or initiating proceedings for defamation. An advocate is strictly prohibited from taking grievances to television channels, disclosing privileged communications, broadcasting recorded conversations with a former client, or publicly disparaging the client's case. [Paras 17-20]. Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddhiquee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2026 INSC 907
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) – Requirement of Foundational Facts in Show Cause Notice - Audit Objections and 'Call Book' Procedure - The extended limitation period of five years under Section 74 cannot be availed of by merely reciting statutory words mechanically - It requires more than mere lip service to the statutory provisions - The foundational facts leading to the inference of fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts must be expressly set out in the Show Cause Notice itself - A bland allegation that input tax credit was availed “without documentary evidence and suppress the facts”, bereft of foundational facts evidencing a deliberate device employed to evade tax, does not demonstrate an application of mind and invalidates the invocation of Section 74 - The fact that the Department contested audit objections before the Public Accounts Committee and placed the Show Cause Notice into the 'call book' (kept in abeyance) clearly indicates an absence of satisfaction on the part of the Assessing Officer regarding the alleged tax shortfall, mismatch, or suppression - issuing a subsequent notice to revive proceedings by proposing a 'protective demand' solely because statutory limitation is nearing expiry is impermissible, as the concept of protective demand/assessment is alien to the GST regime. [Relied on IN RE: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation [Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020; Paras 10 - 15] M/s Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2026 INSC 920
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) – Section 73 and Section 74 – Limitation Period – Invocation of Extended Period of Limitation – Requirements of Fraud, Willful Misstatement, or Suppression of Facts – Protective Demand - Subjective Satisfaction of Proper Officer - Proceedings under Section 73 or Section 74 can be initiated only upon the independent satisfaction of the Assessing Office - Even when audit objections or observations are raised (such as by the CAG), the Assessing Officer must enter his own satisfaction before issuing a notice - Under Section 74, the Officer must be satisfied not merely that a mismatch of ITC or short payment of tax occurred, but specifically that such mismatch or short payment was caused by reason of fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts - Under Section 73(10), the limitation period of three years is prescribed for the issuance of the adjudication order under Section 73(9), and not for issuing the Show Cause Notice - Under Section 73(2), the notice must be issued at least three months prior to the expiry of the time limit specified under Section 73(10). M/s Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2026 INSC 920
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order I Rule 8 — Inapplicability of Representative Suit / Class Action Principles to Inter Se Title and Apportionment Disputes Before Lok Adalat - Order I Rule 8 of the CPC presupposes a "community of interest" among the persons represented, wherein the interest of all is common and adequately protected by the representatives - It cannot be applied to proceedings where the very subject matter is an adverse, conflicting claim between the claimants themselves - The High Court erred in characterizing Lok Adalat awards as akin to a settlement in a class action suit under Order I Rule 8 - Treating rival claimants as a single class elides the very title dispute referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as rival claimants do not share a common adversary or a representative common interest. [Paras 47-50] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) read with Sections 168 & 169 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court — Beneficial Legislation - Under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) CPC, the Appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence if it requires the documents to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause - The MV Act is a beneficial, welfare-oriented legislation requiring summary procedure to determine "just compensation" - Where a newly married claimant (widowed within three months of marriage) could not immediately gather bank inquiry records and commercial IT invoices due to shock, trauma, and systemic banking delays, the High Court erred in rejecting the additional evidence application (I.A. No. 1 of 2024) solely on grounds of delay. Rejection overlooks substantial cause and prolongs 21 years of pending litigation - Additional evidence received on record. [Paras 23, 24, 25] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 100 – Scope of Second Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Section 100 confers a restricted jurisdiction upon the High Court, and a second appeal can be entertained only where it involves a substantial question of law - Concurrent findings of fact ordinarily cannot be disturbed unless they are demonstrated to be perverse or vitiated by an error of law - The existence of power to interfere where findings are demonstrably perverse cannot become a license to reappreciate evidence merely because another view of it is possible, or because the High Court considers a different inference preferable - Interference is warranted solely when there is a demonstrable error in the approach to the evidence, reliance on inadmissible material, omission of vital evidence, or a conclusion that no reasonable judicial mind could arrive at on the record - The High Court erred in overturning concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-execution of a relinquishment document and the date of knowledge by reappreciating evidence and mischaracterizing a non-attesting witness. [Relied on Bholaram v. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414; Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 262; P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar, (2024) 13 SCC 553; Paras 16-30] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 115 — Routine Grant of Stay of Trial disapproved - The Supreme Court deprecated the routine practice adopted by High Courts of granting stay of trial while issuing notice in revision petitions challenging interlocutory orders - Stay of trial ought to be eschewed unless the High Court, upon an examination deeper than prima facie, arrives at a finding that continuation of the trial would seriously and irreparably prejudice the outcome of the revision or adversely affect the parties. [Relied on Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC 65; High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 6 SCC 267; Paras 20–24]. Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt Ltd v Praharsh Corporation Pvt Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2026 INSC 925
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 115 & Order VII Rule 11 — Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction against Interlocutory Orders — Rejection of Plaint - Jurisdiction and Limitations under Section 115 CPC — Revisional Court cannot sit as an Original Court or examine extrinsic evidence - Section 115 CPC provides for revision against an order of a subordinate court against which no appeal lies and is essentially supervisory in nature to control the functioning of subordinate courts - Revisional jurisdiction is not a substantive right and is confined to: (a) exercise of jurisdiction not vested by law; (b) failure to exercise jurisdiction so vested; or (c) exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity - High Courts cannot treat a revision on par with an appeal or review evidence - While examining an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only the averments made in the plaint and documents annexed thereto must be looked into - Held, the High Court committed a jurisdictional illegality by donning the hat of the Trial Court, failing to point out any jurisdictional error committed by the Trial Court, and exceeding the permissible scope of inquiry under Order VII Rule 11 by rejecting the plaint on the basis of facts and documents not forming part of the plaint. [Paras 11–21] Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt Ltd v Praharsh Corporation Pvt Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2026 INSC 925
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125 — Interim Maintenance to Minor Children — Shared Obligation of Parents — Non-Monetary Contribution of Custodial Mother — Purely Arithmetical Division Impermissible - The mere fact that the mother is gainfully employed and earning an independent income is not, by itself, a sufficient ground to mechanically halve or dilute the father's liability to maintain their minor children - While the legal obligation to maintain children is shared by both parents, it cannot be apportioned on the basis of simple arithmetic alone - The custodial parent (mother) who attends to the day-to-day upbringing, personal care, and emotional needs of minor children while juggling professional employment makes a substantial and real contribution that cannot be quantified solely in monetary terms, often constituting the greater contribution. [Para 10-12] Sujata Kumari v. Rahul Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2026 INSC 896
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125 — Interim Maintenance to Minor Daughters — Quantum Assessment — Scope of Revisional Interference - Where the Family Court, after duly considering the income affidavits, lifestyle, socio-economic status of the parties, and the actual educational requirements of two school-going daughters (aged about 9 and 8 years), assessed interim maintenance at Rs. 30,000/- per month for each child (totaling Rs. 60,000/- per month), the High Court committed a manifest error in revisional jurisdiction by halving the award to Rs. 15,000/- per child merely on the footing that the mother is also a practising gynaecologist - Given that the respondent-father is a qualified consultant paediatrician earning at least Rs. 2,00,000/- per month, an interim maintenance sum of Rs. 60,000/- per month for both children cannot be termed excessive or unjust - The High Court's revisional interference was unwarranted, particularly when the main petition under Section 125 CrPC remains pending determination on merits - High Court order set aside; Family Court order restored. [Paras 9-14] Sujata Kumari v. Rahul Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2026 INSC 896
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Unexplained Delay in Lodging FIR - An inordinate and unexplained delay of five days in lodging the FIR, even after the surviving witness was rescued and had allegedly disclosed the identity of the accused to the investigating officer while bodies were already recovered, casts serious doubt on the prosecution case - Such unjustified delay in setting the criminal law into motion undermines the credibility of the investigation and opens the door to embellishments. [Paras 32-37] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 156(3) & Section 154 — Rejection of Section 156(3) Application does not bar subsequent registration of FIR — Doctrine of Res Judicata inapplicable to threshold rejection under Section 156(3) — Statutory duty under Section 154 - The rejection of an application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC by a Magistrate does not operate as res judicata or act as a bar to the subsequent registration of an FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the same or substantially similar allegations - An order passed under Section 156(3) CrPC is merely a judicial direction to the police to exercise plenary powers of investigation under Chapter XII - it does not entail an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determine the rights/liabilities of the proposed accused - such threshold rejection does not possess the finality required to attract the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings - the statutory duty of the police under Section 154 CrPC to register an FIR when information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence is furnished is independent and cannot be extinguished or curtailed by the prior rejection of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC. [Paras 27-43] Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2026 INSC 887
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 — Appeal against Acquittal — Double Presumption of Innocence — Interference by Appellate Court - An appellate court entertaining an appeal against an acquittal is bound to bear in mind that a double presumption of innocence operates in favor of the accused - first, the foundational presumption available under criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty; and second, the reinforcement and strengthening of that presumption upon securing an acquittal from the trial court - The appellate court can interfere with an acquittal only if the trial court's view was one that no reasonable court could have taken on the material before it, and not merely because an alternative plausible view exists - If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Para 22, 23] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Distinction Between Main Assailants Present at Spot and Conspirator Not Present — Circumstantial Evidence — Grant of Bail Affirmed - Where the co-accused (father of the prime accused) was admittedly not present at the spot when the fatal attack occurred and was implicated solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence of conspiracy and providing petrol under Section 109 IPC, his case stands on a materially different footing - Order of the High Court granting him regular bail affirmed. [Relied on Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 598; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar & Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 118; Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana & Anr., (2021) 6 SCC 230; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 172; Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129; Paras 26-40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 307, 323, 109, 504, 506 read with Section 34 — Grant and Cancellation of Regular Bail — Serious and Heinous Offences — Exercise of Discretionary Jurisdiction — Parameters and Duty to Assign Reasons - Discretion to grant bail in serious and non-bailable offences such as murder must be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of course - An order granting bail in grave crimes must reflect proper application of mind to the facts and material on record and must record justifiable, cogent reasons - An unreasoned, superficial, or perverse order of bail warrants interference and reversal by the appellate court - Where a bail order is devoid of reasons or assigns flimsy and untenable grounds, ignoring material circumstances regarding the gravity of the offence, premeditation, concerted action, and the specific role of the accused, the superior court is fully empowered to cancel the bail. [Paras 32–37] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Premeditated Murder by Setting Victim Ablaze — Common Intention — Bail Erroneously Granted on Flimsy Grounds — Cancellation of Bail - In a case where four accused persons launched a sustained offensive at night upon the complainant's house demanding an apology from his son, arrived together in a four-wheeler carrying a can of petrol, restrained and assaulted the victim, and set him on fire by pouring petrol and throwing a lit matchstick, the High Court and Trial Court erred in granting regular bail to Accused No. 4 (who recorded the incident) and Accused No. 3 (on grounds of parity) - The facts prima facie demonstrated prior preparation, concerted action, and premeditated common intention under Section 34 IPC to inflict grave harm - The reasoning of the High Court that Accused No. 4 merely recorded the incident and had no antecedents was flimsy and untenable in law - regular bail granted to Accused Nos. 3 and 4 cancelled; rejection of bail to Accused No. 2 (who drove the vehicle and acted as lookout) upheld. [Paras 29- 40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 406, 120B – Quashing based on settlement with the sole victim where dispute has civil flavour – Absence of consent of informant - The complainant/informant alleged that the accused forged a Power of Attorney of the landowner (Respondent No. 2), formed a partnership firm, and unlawfully got the land mutated in the firm's name, thereby depriving the informant of 7.50 acres of eucalyptus plantation allegedly given orally to him by Respondent No. 2 - the actual owner/victim (Respondent No. 2) entered into an amicable settlement with the accused, filed an affidavit admitting the validity of the partnership and mutation, and stated he had no grievances - The High Court declined to quash proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the informant was not a party to the compromise and offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC could not be compounded with a witness - Reversing the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court held: i. The High Court erred in conflating Section 320 compounding with Section 482 quashing; ii. Respondent No. 2 was the real victim of the alleged forgery and breach of trust. As the star witness had settled the dispute and affirmed the transactions, chances of conviction were bleak, and keeping the prosecution alive would be an exercise in futility and an abuse of judicial process; iii. The dispute predominantly bore a private and civil/commercial flavour with no wider repercussions on society; iv. The informant produced no documentary proof of title/interest in the land, nor showed that the accused had knowledge of any oral assignment - The informant could not block the quashing of proceedings when the real victim had settled all grievances. [Relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303; Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and Another, (2022) 9 SCC 321; Naushey Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., (2025) 4 SCC 78; Paras 39–49] Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 874 : 2026 INSC 928
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 & Section 154 — Scope of Interference at the Threshold — Quashing of FIR - At the stage of considering a plea for quashing an FIR under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is strictly concerned with whether the allegations contained in the FIR, taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence - The Court cannot embark upon a mini-trial or evaluate the veracity, evidentiary value, or defence version regarding the financial transactions, which fall entirely within the domain of investigation and trial. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2014) 2 SCC 1; S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 791; SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana and Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4046; Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2008) 2 SCC 409; Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another (2019) 17 SCC 1; Paras 40–48] Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2026 INSC 887
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 r/w Section 320 [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 528 r/w Section 359] – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings on Compromise/Settlement vs. Compounding of Offences – Locus of Informant vs. Victim to Authorize Settlement - Quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a compromise between an offender and the victim is conceptually distinct from compounding of offences under Section 320 CrPC - Compounding is strictly circumscribed by statutory provisions where power is guided solely by Section 320 CrPC, whereas the High Court's inherent power to quash proceedings is guided by whether the ends of justice warrant such exercise and whether continuing proceedings would amount to an abuse of the legal process - "Victim" [Section 2(wa) CrPC / Section 2(y) BNSS] and "complainant/informant" are two distinct legal connotations - A complainant/informant need not necessarily be the victim, as even a stranger can set criminal law into motion - To seek quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of an amicable settlement, it is only the real victim (i.e., the person who has suffered loss or injury due to the alleged offence) who can authorize a settlement, and not an informant who has suffered no injury - Disastrous consequences would follow if informants who are not victims are permitted to compromise disputes while the actual victim is left in limbo. [Paras 28–36]. Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 874 : 2026 INSC 928
Constitution of India – Article 20(1) – General Clauses Act, 1897 – Definition of "Offence" – Ex Post Facto Law and Legality - Reiterating the maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (no crime or punishment without a penal law), the Court observed that Article 20(1) bars conviction unless there is a violation of a "law in force" at the time of commission of the act - Under criminal jurisprudence, an "offence" means an act or omission made punishable by law - In the absence of an offence created within the four corners of the U.P. Act itself, an individual cannot be subjected to trial or enhanced penal exposure merely based on an administrative Gang Chart. [Paras 36 – 52]. Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894
Constitution of India — Article 226 — Alternative Statutory Remedy — Exhaustion of Remedies vs. Maintainability & Entertainability — Flagrant Violation of Natural Justice and Lack of Jurisdiction - The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition challenging the ex parte externment order on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory appellate remedy under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam – Held that the self-imposed restriction of exhausting an alternative statutory remedy does not bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction where the impugned order has been passed in flagrant breach of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction - Relegating the appellant to an appeal under Section 9 in the face of an egregious violation of mandatory statutory safeguards and total lack of review jurisdiction demonstrated an abject failure on the part of the High Court to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. [Paras 16-27] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926
Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 226 & 227 — Scope of Certiorari Jurisdiction — Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact — Error of Law Apparent on Face of Record — When Justified - A finding of fact recorded by a lower court, arbitrator, or tribunal without any supporting evidence or by ignoring material documentary evidence is perverse and amounts to an error of law apparent on the face of the record, making it amenable to judicial review and vulnerable to correction under a writ of certiorari - Certiorari jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate in nature; the writ court will not re-appreciate evidence or correct a mere error of fact - if findings of fact are based on “no evidence”, or purely on surmises and conjectures, or where the overwhelming weight of evidence does not support the finding, such perversity constitutes an error of law entitling the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari and set aside concurrent orders. [Paras 12 - 15] Shri Prakash Narain Sharma v. Burmah Shell Co-Operative Housing Society, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 873 : 2026 INSC 927
Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - The Supreme Court had, vide its Judgment dated 20.05.2025 in All India Judges Association v. Union of India(Judgment under Review), restored the mandatory requirement of a minimum 3 years' practice at the Bar to be eligible to appear for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination - On review and clarification petitions, the Court examined the disproportionate impact and hardship caused to law graduates, women, and marginalized candidates due to the abrupt restoration of the 3-year practice rule - Held (per Surya Kant, CJI. and Augustine George Masih, J) - While the institutional necessity for prior exposure to court functioning before assuming judicial office is neither unreasonable nor displaced, the 3-year practice requirement cannot be applied in a manner that abruptly excludes candidates who arranged their careers under the pre-existing regime - The judgment under review stands modified to balance practical readiness with intellectual merit by prescribing a phased transitional model and a restructured post-transitional framework. Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904
Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - Dissenting Opinion (Per K. Vinod Chandran, J.) - No Ground for Review - There is no error apparent on the face of the record to warrant reviewing the well-considered judgment restoring the 3-year practice requirement - Impracticability of the Two-Year Training Model - Requiring candidates to undergo two years of post-selection training/clerkship on half-pay prejudices recruits, creates unviable financial and administrative burdens on the exchequer, and leaves courts undermanned - making confirmation contingent on the subjective satisfaction of a High Court Judge creates arbitrary hurdles and results in disparate classes of recruits - Distinction from Civil Services - Judicial service cannot be equated with executive services like IAS/IPS; judicial officers exercise unhindered adjudicatory discretion from day one without hierarchical supervisory control over their judicial decisions - Courtroom practice is irreplaceable by pre-service training. [Paras 4-10] Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904
Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - Key Holdings & Scheme Framed By Majority – i. Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued after 20.05.2025 up to 31.03.2027) - Deemed Practice Exemption - All law graduates are eligible to apply without having to satisfy the 3-year actual bar practice requirement. Candidates are deemed to have completed one year of active practice, and no separate Certificate of Practice is required for this deemed period - Two-Year Training & Clerkship Model - Selected candidates shall be designated as "Trainee Judicial Officers"and must complete - Compulsory 1 year of intensive training at the State Judicial Academy (treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar) with fixed emoluments equal to half the salary of a Judicial Magistrate First Class - Compulsory 1 year of structured Law Clerkship (6 months under a Principal District/District and Sessions Judge or Higher Judicial Service Member, and 6 months under a sitting High Court Judge), also treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar - Confirmation: Trainee Judicial Officers shall be appointed to regular cadres carrying full pay scales only upon a satisfactory, reasoned evaluation report submitted by the supervising High Court Judge - ii. Post-Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued on or after 01.04.2027) - 1-Year Actual Practice Mandatory: Candidates must possess at least 1 year of actual practice in the District Courts, verified through a Certificate of Practice showing recorded presence and participation in effective judicial proceedings - Subsequent Training: Selected candidates must undergo 1 year of institutional training at the State Judicial Academy, followed by 6 months of Law Clerkship in District Courts and 6 months of Law Clerkship under a sitting High Court Judge - iii. Higher Legal Education Not Countable as Practice - The duration spent pursuing higher legal education (LL.M., etc.) cannot be counted towards the mandatory practice requirement, as it does not foster the requisite familiarity with courtroom processes and practical court functioning - iv. Operation & Review of the Scheme - The scheme shall operate for five years, following which empirical data regarding its efficacy, recruitment quality, and officer performance shall be placed before the Supreme Court for reconsideration. [Relied on Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481; All India Judges Association v. Union of India (Judgment under Review / 6th AIJA Case), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184; Paras 58–80] Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 — Section 58(3) — Reference on Difference of Opinion — Scope of Jurisdiction of Third Member / Referee Bench — High Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution - Scope of Referee Member's Jurisdiction under Section 58(3) - the course to be adopted by a referee Bench/Member is to return the reference with answers to the points referred to the referring Bench to enable it to dispose of the matter based on the majority opinion - where the referring Bench did not delineate the specific point(s) of difference but formulated broad questions requiring examination of the entire evidence on merits, the referee member taking a common-sense approach to answer the reference and decide the appeal along the lines of the concurring companion member is not a jurisdictional illegality warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution - The objection as to the strict scope of reference in such circumstances is merely technical - When questions referred go to the very root of the complaint and are inseparable from the evidence on record, requiring a survey of the entire gamut of material and rival contentions, the referee member deciding the appeal on merits based on the majority opinion reflects a permissible common-sense approach. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok, (2013) 5 SCC 1; Paras 14-23]. Askari Hussain v. Dinesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 871 : 2026 INSC 929
Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 (Delhi) — Sections 61 & 76 — Claim for Membership and Allotment of Plot — Presumption vs. Cogent Evidence — Equitable Considerations - Where material documentary evidence established that the original claimant had resigned from the membership of the Society in 1951, his shares had been transferred, and his subsequent application for membership in 1952 was specifically rejected, the Arbitrator and the Co-operative Tribunal erred in ignoring such core documents and drawing an unwarranted presumption that the claimant continued to remain a member throughout his lifetime merely because his name appeared on certain lists or in a suspense account - The Delhi High Court, therefore, did not exceed its supervisory writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 in quashing the concurrent cryptic awards/orders passed by the Arbitrator and the Tribunal, which were bereft of reasoning and suffered from patent perversity - equitable considerations warranted non-interference with the High Court's decision, as senior/prior eligible claimants could not be bypassed in favour of a person who was not a valid member. [Relied on General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and others v. Sri Giridhari Sahu and others, (2019) INSC 1020; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others, 1954 INSC 122; Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and another v. Bikartan Das and others, 2023 INSC 733; Distinguished from Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010 INSC 422; Paras 8 - 17] Shri Prakash Narain Sharma v. Burmah Shell Co-Operative Housing Society, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 873 : 2026 INSC 927
Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Panchsheel Principles — Incomplete Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - In a case solely dependent on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence, which taken together must form a complete chain of events pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused and leaving no reasonable ground for any hypothesis consistent with innocence - Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute for legal proof - An adverse inference or mere suspicion drawn from an accused's explanation regarding his absence or absconding cannot substitute for cogent evidence completing the chain of circumstances - The presence of missing links in the chain of circumstances entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt and acquittal. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172; Anil Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67; Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC 603; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45; Paras 27- 30] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Customs Act, 1962 – Sections 13, 45(1), 45(2), and 45(3) read with Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 – Sections 42 and 43 – Liability to pay customs duty on pilfered goods – Notification approving Port Trust as custodian – Validity – Overriding effect of Section 45(3) - The saving clause under Section 45(1) of the Customs Act ("save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force") does not bar the Commissioner of Customs from notifying and approving a Major Port Trust as a "custodian" of imported goods unloaded in a customs area - The liability of a Port Trust under Section 43 of the Major Port Trusts Act is fundamentally distinct from the liability created under Section 45(3) of the Customs Act - The former regulates the civil, compensatory liability of the Board as a bailee towards the owner of the goods under Sections 151, 152, and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and is conditional upon the issuance of a receipt under Section 42(2) - In contrast, Section 45(3) imposes an independent and absolute statutory liability on the approved custodian to pay customs duty to the Revenue in respect of goods pilfered while in its custody, safeguarding the Revenue since Section 13 absolves the importer from such liability - The non obstante clause in Section 45(3) ("notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force") overrides the provisions of the Major Port Trusts Act as well as the saving clause in Section 45(1) - the Notification dated 11.10.2000 issued by the Commissioner of Customs (Import) approving Mumbai Port Trust as the custodian under Section 45(1) is valid and intra vires - liability under Section 45(3) cannot be fastened retrospectively for pilferage that occurred prior to the date of approval/notification under Section 45(1). [Paras 3 – 7] Union of India v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2026 INSC 919
Environmental Law — Civil Procedure / Environmental Adjudication — Interim Orders — Nature and binding effect — Erroneous treatment of interim findings as final - Held, interim orders are by their very nature provisional and not based on a comprehensive appreciation of evidence - When an interim order is passed "without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties," a court or tribunal is legally bound to re-test its preliminary findings after affording parties full opportunity to lead counter-material and rebut allegations - The NGT committed a grave procedural error by treating its prima facie interim order (which imposed Rs. 5 crores environmental compensation) as conclusive and binding on the sole ground that the appellant complied with it and did not prefer an appeal against it - Compliance undertaken two days prior to an event under compelling circumstances cannot operate as an estoppel or confer finality upon an unreasoned interim order - Treating interim findings as final without independent enquiry vitiated the entire subsequent proceedings. [Paras 33–36] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Environmental Law — Evidence and Expert Reports — Evidentiary value of solitary satellite imagery vs. contemporaneous material - Held, expert committee reports and visual inspections cannot be accepted uncritically when they suffer from patent contradictions and somersaults - A solitary satellite image obtained from Google Earth cannot override independent, contemporaneous evidence and previous official inspection reports demonstrating that the river floodplains were already in a dilapidated and degraded state with accumulated construction debris prior to allotment - Judicial bodies must critically evaluate expert reports against surrounding contemporaneous record rather than according them mechanical acceptance. [Paras 30–50] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Environmental Law — National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 — Section 15 and Section 17 — "Restoration" vs. "Rehabilitation" — Scope of Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 15 — Distinction between ecological restoration and ecological rehabilitation - Held, the National Green Tribunal fell into error by equating the distinct legal and ecological concepts of "restoration" and "rehabilitation" - Restoration refers to a process whereby an affected area is simply brought back to its original pre-existing state, irrespective of how optimum that original state was - In contrast, rehabilitation refers to complete reparation of the affected area to make it fully functional and capable of rendering optimum ecological services - While rehabilitation is an ideal end goal, its execution falls squarely upon the State under the Public Trust Doctrine and the principle of intergenerational equity - The statutory mandate under Section 15 of the NGT Act is confined to relief, compensation, and restitution/restoration of the environment to its original state - Where the expert committee itself admitted that the pre-event ecological status of the site could not be ascertained and original baseline conditions were unknown, ordering full-scale ecological "rehabilitation" and directing the project proponent to bear the cost of constructing a public biodiversity park amounted to burdening the appellant with developing something it never destroyed, thereby exceeding the Tribunal's statutory jurisdiction under Section 15. [Paras 44–48] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Environmental Law — National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 — Section 17(3) — "No-Fault Liability" and "Polluter Pays Principle" — Essential preconditions for invocation — Causation and establishment of a causal link - Held, the NGT erroneously applied the principle of "no-fault liability" under Section 17(3) of the NGT Act - Section 17(3) applies strictly to accidents involving environmental hazards (such as gas leaks or chemical spills) - While the "Polluter Pays Principle" is a permanent facet of Indian environmental jurisprudence and finds legislative manifestation in Section 17, its application is fundamentally contingent upon: (i) proof of actual, real damage, and (ii) the establishment of a direct causal link between the actions of the project proponent and the resultant environmental degradation - A person must first be proven to be a "polluter" before absolute liability can be fastened - In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the appellant caused damage beyond the pre-existing dilapidated condition of the site, the reversal of the burden of proof and holding the appellant liable on a no-fault basis was wholly unsustainable. [Paras 51–53] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Environmental Law — Role of Public Authorities — Precautionary Principle & Public Trust Doctrine — River Yamuna Floodplains - The Supreme Court deprecated the conduct of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in granting permissions to hold large-scale events on the active floodplains of River Yamuna - Held, DDA acted in breach of the Precautionary Principle and the Doctrine of Public Trust reposed in it as the custodian responsible for the conservation and ecological maintenance of the river floodplains - since the event had concluded and general directions for floodplain rejuvenation were already operating under prior judgments, DDA was directed to carry out rehabilitation from its own funds and refund the ₹5 crores compensation to the appellant. [Relied on Manoj Misra v. Union of India & Ors. (NGT Original Application No. 06 of 2012; Paras 40–56] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(e) & Section 114 Illustration (g) – Presumption of Regularity of Official Acts – Non-examination of Material Witness - The statutory presumption of regularity under Section 114(e) extends solely to the regularity of official procedure and does not extend to conclusively proving the bona fides or legality of the underlying private transaction on which the official order is based - an adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) does not follow automatically from the non-examination of an available party/witness (such as the widow) where the acquisition of knowledge of hostile action is independently established through contemporary documentary evidence. [Para 28-30] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 118 — Child Witness — Evaluation and Corroboration — Rule of Prudence — Tutoring - While there is no inflexible statutory bar preventing conviction based on the testimony of a competent child witness, seeking independent corroboration is a well-established rule of prudence - A child witness of tender age, lacking maturity of understanding, is an easy prey to tutoring; thus, the evidence must be evaluated with great care and circumspection - Where the child witness (aged 4.5 years at the time of the incident and examined 4 years later) was residing with a police constable and expressly admitted in his cross-examination to having been tutored by the Station House Officer prior to deposing, his testimony cannot form the sole basis of conviction - where the child's account of being strangulated with a rope and burnt with acid is falsified by medical evidence and humanly unnatural conduct is attributed, insisting on corroboration is imperative and the trial court's rejection of such evidence cannot be considered unreasonable. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 21; Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177; Paras 24, 25, 26] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Recovery Evidence — Hostile Panch Witnesses and Inordinate Delay - Recovery of incriminating articles (clothes and an empty acid bottle) made six months after the incident from an open/accessible dump site at the instance of the accused loses its evidentiary value when independent seizure witnesses turn hostile and testify that they merely signed blank papers without knowing the contents - The evidentiary integrity of the recovery is further compromised when articles allegedly buried 6 feet deep under rocks for months show no traces of mud, earth, or water residue, raising a serious possibility of planting and creating a fatal breach in the prosecution case. [Paras 30, 31, 32] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899
Gangsters Act vs. Preventive Detention Laws (U.P.) – Lack of procedural safeguards – Comparison with MCOCA and GUJCTOC - Unlike the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) and Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015 (GUJCTOC) which specifically define and penalise substantive offences such as "organised crime"— the U.P. Gangsters Act creates no offence - While operating in effect like a preventive detention mechanism by prolonging pre-trial custody up to a year, the U.P. Gangsters Act lacks the constitutional and statutory safeguards inherent to preventive detention (such as Advisory Board review, time-bound representations, and strictly monitored executive satisfaction) - The trial before the Special Court becomes a foregone conclusion based mechanically on the Gang Chart. [Relied on Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.R. Kishore, (2023) 15 SCC 339; Union of India & Anr. v. Ganpati Dealcom Private Limited, (2023) 3 SCC 315; Mahipal Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2014) 11 SCC 282; S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India & Anr., (1954) 1 SCC 586; Paras 38-57] Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894
Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Sections 2(b), 2(c), 3, 7, 23 – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Constitution of India, Article 20(1) – General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 3(38) – Absence of substantive offence – Principle of Nulla Poena Sine Lege – Punishment for mere status – Subordinate legislation cannot create an offence - The Supreme Court held that the U.P. Gangsters Act, 1986 is "stillborn" as it completely fails to create a substantive crime or penalise any specific act or omission - The enactment merely provides definitions of 'gang' and 'gangster' under Section 2 and directly prescribes punishment under Section 3 without defining an actionable offence - Indulgence in activities under Section 2(b)(i) to (xxv) is already penalised under independent penal statutes, and the Act impermissibly punishes a person for their executive-determined "status" rather than an actus reus created by the statute - The subordinate Rules of 2021, by prescribing a Gang Chart procedure to determine such status, exceed the rule-making powers under Section 23 of the Act - Creation of an offence is an essential legislative function that cannot be delegated to executive ipse dixit. [Paras 21- 59]. Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 & Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (IR Code) — Legal Impact on Section 2(j) of the ID Act — Status of Bangalore Water Supply as an interpretive guide for future enactments - The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act 46 of 1982) was never notified by the Central Government and thus remained inchoate without acquiring operative legal force - The IR Code, 2020, which came into force on 21.11.2025 repealing the ID Act, constitutes an independent legislative scheme - The provisions and definitions under the IR Code must be interpreted on their own terms, text, and statutory context - Bangalore Water Supply shall not be regarded as the sheet anchor for interpreting the definition of "industry" under the IR Code. [Paras 81, 279–284, 287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (Dissenting / Separate Concurring in Result) - Reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply was wholly unnecessary and the reference itself was unjustified - The Five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh misinterpreted an apparent factual distinction between Jagannath Kondhare and Pratamsingh Parmar as a legal conflict - With the ID Act having been repealed w.e.f. 21.11.2025 and replaced by the IR Code, embarking upon an interpretive re-engineering of Section 2(j) is an entirely academic exercise - In an era of post-1991 Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG), an expansive definition of "industry" as articulated by Krishna Iyer, J. and concurred with by Beg, C.J. and Chandrachud, C.J. (constituting a clear 5:2 majority) remains vital to safeguard vulnerable workmen against imbalances in bargaining power - The ratio and Triple Test in Bangalore Water Supply require no modification or dilution whatsoever. [Paras 1.1–1.4, 3, 4, 12.1–12.6, 17.1–17.8, 18.3–18.11, 19.1–19.8]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Per Dipankar Datta, J., on behalf of himself and Ujjal Bhuyan, J. - Constitution of India — Article 145(5) — Jurisprudential Precedent and Bench References — Maintainability and Effect of Repeal - A Bench of lesser quorum cannot question the substantive soundness of a decision delivered by a larger Bench (Bangalore Water Supply, 7-Judges) merely because of divergent subsequent opinions - Doubting the correctness of an expansive interpretation that has settled industrial relations across the nation disrupts the bedrock principle of certainty - With the enforcement of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 on 21.11.2025 and the repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, settled rights of workmen in pending legacy proceedings cannot be destabilized by rewriting or reading down Bangalore Water Supply under the guise of calibrating the Triple Test. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; State (NCT of Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Trimurthi Fragrances Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2024) 20 SCC 709]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J. - Practice and Procedure — Maintainability of Reference to Larger Bench — Stare Decisis and Res Judicata — Doctrine of Judicial Discipline - A preliminary objection to maintainability raised on the ground of res judicata (citing Coir Board (II) which earlier declined a reference) and stare decisis is untenable - Res judicata applies to determinations in personam arising from a specific cause of action, not to pure questions of law or reference of legal precedents - A Five-Judge Bench, being superior in strength to a Three-Judge Bench, was fully competent to refer doubts to the Chief Justice of India for placing before a larger Bench - Institutional prudence and the necessity of bringing finality to decades of conflicting jurisprudence override procedural technicalities. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673; Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293; Trimurthi Fragrances Private Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2024) 20 SCC 709; State (NCT of Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Paras 90–96, 110–116, 118–127, 131–138]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Constitution of India, Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 — Per Joymalya Bagchi, J. - Sovereign Functions Exception — Government Welfare Schemes and Bottom-rung Employees - A blanket exclusion of government welfare departments and schemes from Section 2(j) is unconstitutional and offensive to the equality code under Article 14. A gardener, driver, clerk, or maintenance employee does not perform a different species of physical or operational labour simply because their payslip bears the seal of the State - The sovereign functions exemption must strictly remain confined to the inalienable, non-justiciable core of Statehood (such as defense, foreign affairs, coinage, administration of justice, and legislative enactment) - Extending "sovereign immunity" to developmental or socio-economic welfare schemes strikes hardest at vulnerable daily-rated and precarious workers who most require industrial protection - The Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply embodies the constitutional vision of social justice and correctly brings such employment within the statutory shield. [Relied On: Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675; Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Definition of "Industry" — Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 — Scope, calibration, and prospective effect of reformulation — Commercial character restored as an essential element - The Seven-Judge Bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply erred to the extent of completely discarding the rule of noscitur a sociis, leading to an overly expansive construction that decoupled the definition of "industry" from its traditional economic and commercial underpinnings - The inquiry had erroneously shifted almost entirely toward the presence of an employer-employee relationship, relegating the functional nature and character of the activity to the background - Held (per Majority — Surya Kant, C.J.I., Satish Chandra Sharma, Alok Aradhe, and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ.) - (i) While the core framework of the Triple Test has largely stood the test of time, it required calibration and refinement - The test ought to be reformulated to require: (a) systematic activity; (b) organized through cooperation between employer and employee; and (c) the production, distribution, or provision of goods or services possessing a discernible commercial character that is analogous to trade or business to satisfy material human wants and wishes - (ii) The absence of a profit motive remains irrelevant; an enterprise may have a commercial character without an intention to maximize profits - (iii) However, to avoid prejudice and instability, this refined formulation operates purely prospectively and remains our considered opinion/hypothesis for future guidance - All matters currently pending before Labour Courts, Tribunals, High Courts, and the Supreme Court under the ID Act shall continue to be governed and decided strictly in accordance with the Triple Test as laid down in Bangalore Water Supply. [Paras 216–220, 230–236, 246–250, 274–278, 287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Sovereign Functions Exception and State Welfare Activities — Applicability to Government Departments - Welfare schemes and socio-economic activities undertaken by the State or its instrumentalities in furtherance of Directive Principles under Part IV and Fundamental Rights under Part III cannot be presumed to automatically constitute an "industry" simply because they involve organized employment - Governmental undertakings must be evaluated on their true substance and functional character rather than mere form - Where functions are governed by separate constitutional/statutory frameworks (e.g., Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution) or lack an analogy to trade or commerce, they stand outside Section 2(j) - public utility services and substantially severable units carrying on commercial-type operations within government departments remain amenable to Section 2(j). [Paras 261–287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897
Interpretation of Statutes – Non Obstante Clause vs. Saving Clause - A non obstante clause operates to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing laws that is inconsistent with the new enactment - It cannot cut down clear terms of an enactment, and must be understood to operate according to its plain grammatical construction or as clarifying the whole position incorporated ex abundanti cautela - The words "any law for the time being in force" include provisions within the very enactment in which those words appear. [Relied on Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369; Dominion of India v. Shrinbai A. Irani, AIR 1954 SC 596; Paras 6, 7] Union of India v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2026 INSC 919
Land Acquisition — Determination of Entitlement — "Enjoyment Survey" Has No Legal Sanction — Mere Physical Possession Cannot Substitute Legal Title - An "enjoyment survey" conducted to record the state of physical occupation on the acquired land has no statutory basis under the law for determining entitlement to compensation - Such a survey merely captures physical occupation at the time it is conducted and is incapable of examining legal title, lawful right, or the nature of possession (e.g., assignee, permissive possessor, encroacher, or trespasser) - Public funds disbursed towards land acquisition cannot be released merely to a person found in physical possession or who is the most vocal or visible before authorities; it must be paid to the person legally entitled in accordance with law - Apportionment based solely on an enjoyment survey is unsustainable in law. [Relied On Gudala Pentamma v. State of Telangana, 2026 SCC OnLine TS 6654; Kottamula Mallaiah v. State of Telangana, W.P. No. 2118/2023; Paras 40-44] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 29, 30, and 31 — Apportionment of Compensation — Reference to Civil Court — Modes of Resolving Apportionment Dispute - There are only two modes under the statutory scheme to resolve disputes regarding the apportionment of compensation - (i) under Section 29, where persons interested arrive at an agreement among themselves; and (ii) under Section 30, where in the absence of an agreement, the Collector refers the dispute to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction for adjudication - An agreement under Section 29 strictly requires the concurrence of all persons interested - A partial or truncated consensus involving only some claimants cannot take effect as an agreement under Section 29, as those excluded remain in dispute -Making a reference under Section 30 is an explicit acknowledgment by the Collector of a prima facie dispute as to title and apportionment, which the Collector is not empowered to adjudicate - Once compensation is deposited in Court, the Collector/acquiring body exits the arena, and the dispute survives solely between the rival claimants. [Relied On Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 51; Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, (2003) 3 SCC 128; Paras 28-46] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888
Land Law - Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 — Section 3 & Section 4 — Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 — Section 2, Section 3 & Section 6 — Companies Act, 1956 — Winding up and Liquidation — Summary proceedings for eviction / resumption of land — Bona fide dispute of title — Long, settled, and uninterrupted possession - Summary Eviction Cannot Be Resorted to Where Bona Fide Dispute as to Title Exists - When there is a serious, genuine, and bona fide dispute regarding title and ownership over land tracing back several decades on the basis of registered title deeds, mutation entries, and long, uninterrupted possession (including conversion to industrial use and operation of a functional factory), the State Government cannot unilaterally determine title in its own favour or resort to summary eviction/resumption proceedings under Section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977. Circar Paper Mills Ltd. v. District Collector, Nellore Distt., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 868 : 2026 INSC 924
Land Law - Appropriate Remedy is a Properly Constituted Civil Suit - Custody of Company Court & Official Liquidator - Questions of complicated or disputed title over immovable property cannot be adjudicated summarily under summary eviction statutes, in writ proceedings under Article 226, or before the Company Court conducting an auction sale of properties in the custody of the Official Liquidator - The proper recourse for the State to establish title in such cases is by way of a properly instituted civil suit - Where the Official Liquidator takes possession of properties under the orders of the Company Court, the property comes into the custody of the Court - The State cannot sit back in slumber and later stall auction proceedings or claim summary resumption without establishing its title in a competent forum - The Division Bench of the High Court erred in summarily setting aside the confirmation of the auction-sale - Allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court held that the title and uninterrupted possession were traceable back to 1920 under registered deeds, mutations, and industrial sanctions - Following Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao, where a bona fide and genuine dispute regarding title exists, the Government cannot unilaterally assert title and invoke summary eviction - The order of the Division Bench was set aside, the Single Judge's confirmation order revived, and the connected writ petitions restored for fresh consideration in accordance with the law. [Relied on Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another, (1982) 2 SCC 134; Paras 12–20] Circar Paper Mills Ltd. v. District Collector, Nellore Distt., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 868 : 2026 INSC 924
Land Revenue Code, 1959 (Madhya Pradesh) – Section 117 – Revenue Entries / Mutation – Effect on Title - Settled law dictates that an entry in the revenue record neither creates nor extinguishes title; it exists essentially for fiscal purposes - An order of mutation passed by a Naib Tehsildar cannot operate as a conveyance or relinquishment of proprietary rights merely by substituting names in the revenue register - The civil court remains fully competent to determine underlying title, which a revenue entry merely follows rather than creates - The statutory presumption of correctness attaching to a revenue entry under Section 117 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 is a rebuttable evidentiary presumption and not a presumption of title, which can be displaced by evidence showing the absence of lawful divestment or relinquishment. [Relied on Sawarni v. Inder Kaur and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 223; Paras 21, 22] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 — Section 19(5) read with Regulation 17(2) of National Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalat) Regulations, 2009 — Validity and Enforceability of Lok Adalat Award — Mandatory Requirement of Signatures and Consent of All Disputing Parties - A Lok Adalat award is binding only on the parties who entered into a settlement accepted by both sides - Under Regulation 17(2) of the NALSA (Lok Adalat) Regulations, 2009, an award must bear the signatures of the parties to the settlement - Where a dispute regarding title and apportionment under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is referred, individual awards passed by the Lok Adalat without recording terms of compromise among the rival claimants, and without the presence or signatures of all disputed title holders, are invalid, non-binding, and void against non-signatory claimants - Lok Adalat awards drawn as if the dispute were merely between the Land Acquisition Officer/acquiring body and an individual interest-holder cannot extinguish or resolve the inter se title disputes of rival claimants. [Relied On Vasant Nanaji Patre v. Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5305/2025; Paras 37-52;] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888
Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 58 & 100 – Suit for Declaration of Co-ownership by Succession – Starting Point of Limitation – Co-owners and Plea of Ouster - The starting point of limitation cannot be fixed merely by identifying the date on which a revenue mutation entry was recorded - In law, the possession of one co-owner is ordinarily treated as possession on behalf of all, and a co-owner in possession does not acquire adverse title merely by continuing in possession - Ouster between co-heirs requires an open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the other co-heir; mere exclusive possession is insufficient - Where a suit is substantially for declaration of co-ownership by succession, partition, and separate possession, and not directly founded upon a challenge to a revenue order as the source of title, the limitation runs from the date when the right to sue actually accrued upon knowledge of adverse claims/threat to title (such as a public notice to sell), rather than the date of an unnoticed mutation order. [Relied on P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, (1956) 2 SCC 759; Paras 24-26] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Contributory Negligence — Topographical Scene Sketch / Site Map - A rough sketch or site map prepared post-accident cannot be read in isolation or used as the exclusive foundation to apportion contributory negligence against the driver of a smaller vehicle in the absence of corroborative ocular testimony - The resting position of a lighter vehicle on a site map post-collision cannot automatically lead to an inference that it was being driven on the wrong side or caused the impact, as a collision with a heavy, speeding vehicle naturally pushes or drags the smaller vehicle forward - The contact point between vehicles is determinative, not the ultimate drag marks - The High Court's attribution of 50% contributory negligence to the deceased car driver solely based on the car's resting spot on the sketch was set aside and 100% sole negligence of the KSRTC bus driver restored. [Relied on Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2018) 5 SCC 656; Sunita & Ors. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 486; Paras 20 - 22.1] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Assessment of Notional Income — Skilled IT Entrepreneur — Just Compensation - Fixation of notional income at Rs. 20,000/- per month for a qualified Mechanical Engineer who obtained specialised software certifications in Oracle and Visual Basic and successfully transitioned into an IT entrepreneur running a proprietorship executing corporate software contracts in Bangalore was excessively low - Relying on corporate purchase orders, bank inquiry records, and business invoices from 2003 to 2005, the deceased's base monthly income at the time of death in October 2005 assessed realistically at Rs. 70,000/- per month - After standard statutory tax deductions, addition of 40% towards future prospects, 1/3rd deduction towards personal expenses, and applying multiplier of 17, total compensation enhanced from Rs. 7,17,634/- to Rs. 50,81,876/- along with 6% interest per annum payable solely by the State Road Transport Corporation. [Paras 26-30] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 166 and 168 — Proof of Negligence — Evidentiary Value of Criminal Investigation Records vs. Criminal Court Acquittal - Police investigation records, including the First Information Report (FIR) and the final charge-sheet, constitute valid, admissible, and reliable prima facie evidence to establish rash and negligent driving in Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) proceedings - The subsequent acquittal of the offending driver in a criminal case particularly an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt does not eclipse or displace tortious liability under the MV Act - Criminal trials and civil motor accident claim adjudications operate in distinct realms - the standard of culpable rashness under Section 304A IPC is significantly higher than that of actionable negligence under the law of torts, which is governed strictly by the touchstone of preponderance of probability rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt - The High Court committed an error apparent in reversing the Tribunal's finding of sole negligence against the bus driver by predominantly relying on his criminal court acquittal and the non-examination of the claimant in the criminal trial. [Relied on ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajani Sahoo & Ors., (2025) 2 SCC 599; Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi & Anr., (2023) 13 SCC 510; Geeta Dubey & Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3779; Paras 20-22] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Criminal Procedure – Overlapping Offences under PCPNDT Act and Substantive Penal Law (IPC/BNS) – Dual-Track Procedure - The statutory bar against police investigation under the PCPNDT Act applies solely to offences proscribed under the special statute and does not circumscribe or impede the independent statutory power and duty of the police to register an FIR and investigate distinct cognizable offences disclosed under general penal laws (IPC/BNS), even if they arise from the same or a connected transaction. [Paras 10 - 11, per Sanjay Karol, J.] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Sections 17, 17(4), 17A, 27, 28, 30; Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 – Rule 18A(3)(iv); Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 4(2), 5, 154, 173, 190(1); Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 4, 5, 175, 225 – Interplay between Section 27 and Section 28 of PCPNDT Act – Investigation and Cognizance - Registration of an FIR and independent police investigation into offences exclusively punishable under the PCPNDT Act is legally impermissible - The mere classification of offences as cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable under Section 27 does not authorize the police to investigate them or displace the specialized enforcement machinery established under the Act - The Appropriate Authority (AA) appointed under Section 17 is the sole competent authority statutorily empowered under Section 17(4) and Section 17A to investigate violations and institute criminal complaints - Rule 18A(3)(iv) of the PCPNDT Rules, 1996, which mandates that the police shall not be involved in investigating cases under the Act “as far as possible,” possesses statutory force and vests discretion in the AA to seek police involvement strictly in an ancillary, supplemental, or aiding capacity under its supervision - The police have no independent investigative authority qua PCPNDT Act offences - A competent Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence under the PCPNDT Act on the basis of a police report/charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC - Section 28 contains an absolute, mandatory, and prohibitory jurisdictional bar which restricts taking of cognizance exclusively to a written complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority (or its authorized officer) or by a person/social organization after giving the statutory 15 days' notice. [Paras 10 – 11, per Sanjay Karol, J.] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Sections 17(4), 17A, 27, 28, 30; Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Rules, 1996 – Rule 18A(3)(iv); Indian Penal Code, 1860 / Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – Interface between Appropriate Authority and Police in Connected Transactions – Guidelines: (Per Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J, Concurring / Supplementary Opinion) - When offences under both the PCPNDT Act and the IPC/BNS emanate from the same connected transaction, the existence of a common factual transaction does not merge the distinct statutory routes – i. Information Disclosing Only PCPNDT Offence - Where information received at a police station discloses solely an offence under the PCPNDT Act or Rules, police cannot commence an independent investigation; they must make an appropriate station diary entry and transmit the information and material without delay to the notified Appropriate Authority – ii. Mixed Offences (PCPNDT + IPC/BNS) - Where the allegations disclose ingredients of both a PCPNDT violation and an independent cognizable offence under IPC/BNS, the police may register an FIR and investigate the IPC/BNS offence only - The PCPNDT component must simultaneously be communicated to the Appropriate Authority - Overlap of facts, premises, or records does not authorize the police to investigate the PCPNDT offence itself; iii. Discovery During Ongoing Investigation - If police unearth PCPNDT violations while lawfully investigating an IPC/BNS offence, they must promptly notify and place the relevant material before the Appropriate Authority - Police cannot use the general penal offence as a gateway to investigate the PCPNDT component - if the Appropriate Authority uncovers an independent IPC/BNS offence during its inquiry, it must promptly transfer that material to the jurisdictional police without stalling its own PCPNDT proceedings; iv. Supplemental Nature of Police Assistance - Police assistance under Section 30(1) (such as protection, tracing accused, digital or forensic support) can only be rendered upon a specific request by the Appropriate Authority - Such assistance is purely supplemental, must be recorded in the file/diary, and can neither result in an independent police investigation nor culminate in a police charge-sheet for offences under the Act; v. Pith and Substance Test - Neither agency shall assume jurisdiction merely because two offences arise out of the same factual matrix - The controlling question is whether the essential ingredients of the offence fall within the agency's lawful field. [Paras 1–13 of Supplementary Opinion per Kotiswar Singh, J.]. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Special Law Overriding General Law - The PCPNDT Act is a special and socially beneficial statute that overrides general procedural provisions of the CrPC/BNSS - The rule laid down in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. mandating registration of an FIR upon receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence does not confer boundless jurisdiction on the police where a special regulatory statute excludes their role - The preliminary inquiry/hurdle permits ascertaining whether the police possess jurisdiction at the threshold - Where two provisions in the same statute appear discordant such as Section 27 (cognizable nature) and Section 28 (cognizance only upon complaint) they must be harmoniously construed - The classification in Section 27 merely reflects the gravity of the offences and denies police the power to grant bail; it cannot be interpreted to supersede the leading, prohibitory, and jurisdictional command of Section 28 or reduce the specialized complaint machinery to a futility. [Relied on Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674; Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Para 10, 11] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Appellate Jurisdiction / Criminal Trial — Standard of Proof — Material Contradictions - Variance between the complainant's statements in the corruption trial and earlier depositions in collateral proceedings regarding the demanded amount, coupled with disobedience of the trap-laying instructions given by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, creates serious doubt regarding the foundational fact of demand - the conviction cannot be sustained. [Paras 10–19] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 19(1)(c) — Validity of Sanction — Authority Competent to Remove - Cognizance under Sections 7 and 13 cannot be validly taken without previous sanction from the authority competent to remove the public servant from office - For a substantively appointed Talati-cum-Mantri under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, the competent authority to remove is the District Development Officer (DDO) - Sanction granted by the Deputy District Development Officer (Dy. DDO) is defective and invalid, notwithstanding that the initial ad-hoc appointment was made by the Dy. DDO. [Para 17] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) — Timing of Payment — Work Already Executed - Payment made after the delivery/issuance of the requested document casts serious doubt on the allegation of bribe demand - Where an income certificate was already prepared and handed over to the complainant before any money was allegedly passed to the peon, it cannot be assumed ipso facto that such payment was made pursuant to an illegal demand - The defence that the amount was handed over on the eve of a festival (Eid) was held to be probable. [Relied On State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 INSC 736; Paras 16 - 18] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), and 20 — Proof of Demand and Acceptance — Statutory Presumption - The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act comes into play only after the prosecution proves the foundational fact of demand beyond reasonable doubt - Mere recovery of tainted money from an accused, in the absence of proof of demand, cannot sustain a conviction - Where the initial demand by Accused No. 1 (Talati-cum-Mantri) was doubtful due to material contradictions, Accused No. 2 (Peon) made no demand, and both stood acquitted of the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC, mere recovery of ₹20/- from Accused No. 2 cannot resurrect the prosecution's case or attract the presumption under Section 20. [Relied On N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 3 SCC 687; Paras 10 – 18] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction – Effect on Public Employment – Termination/Dismissal based on conviction – Scope of non-obstante clause - Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 does not obliterate or wash away a criminal conviction, nor does it preclude the employer from taking disciplinary action or removing a public servant based on the conduct leading to conviction - Release of a convict on probation is primarily intended for reformation and rehabilitation, but does not confer a right to continue in service - The words "shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law" in Section 12 refer to statutory disqualifications under other general or special enactments and do not override constitutional provisions, including the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution - an employee cannot claim reinstatement merely because the criminal court released them on probation or directed that the conviction would not affect their service career. [Paras 17-21] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 22 – Quashing of Proceedings – Settlement Agreement and Mutual Consent Divorce – Relinquishment/Waiver of Monetary and Maintenance Claims – Subsequent DV Proceedings Constitute Abuse of Process – Absence of Fresh Cause of Action - Where a wife has voluntarily entered into a Settlement Agreement relinquishing all monetary claims, including maintenance allowance, followed by an affidavit reiterated before the Family Court obtaining a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869, the initiation or continuation of subsequent proceedings under the DV Act based on alleged acts predating the settlement constitutes an abuse of the process of law - Once monetary claims stand extinguished under a valid compromise, their revival through subsequent proceedings cannot be permitted, especially when no fresh cause of action has arisen post-divorce and no formal legal proceedings have been instituted to declare the settlement void or set aside the divorce decree on grounds of alleged duress or coercion - Mere bald averments of coercion or lack of maintenance consideration cannot invalidate a settlement executed voluntarily by educated parties cognizant of their rights. [Paras 8 – 15]. Reji Baby v. Subi Mary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2026 INSC 918
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Settlement Agreement – Non-Signatory Major Child – Right of Major Daughter to Claim Monetary Reliefs Independent of Parents' Settlement - A settlement agreement executed solely between husband and wife does not bind a major child who is not a party to the agreement - While quashing the DV proceedings initiated against the husband on the basis of the wife's waiver, the Supreme Court clarified that the daughter (who attained majority prior to the settlement and was not a signatory) cannot be held to have waived her rights to monetary claims and remains at liberty to institute fresh proceedings seeking monetary reliefs against her father in accordance with law. [Relied on Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 587; Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705; Paras 14, 15] Reji Baby v. Subi Mary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2026 INSC 918
Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 — Application of Principles in Avtar Singh - The case of a candidate who deliberately suppresses pending criminal cases despite having knowledge falls squarely under paragraph 38.7 of Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471, empowering the employer to cancel candidature or terminate service - Subsequent acquittal in the criminal proceedings does not wipe out or condone the initial act of deliberate suppression (suppressio veri or suggestio falsi) committed at the time of submitting the verification form - Candidates who suppressed pending criminal proceedings cannot claim parity with candidates who were acquitted prior to filling up the verification form, nor with those reinstated pursuant to specific High Court directions or after an objective case-by-case evaluation of triviality - Distinction drawn from cases where acquittal occurred prior to filling up the attestation form (Pawan Kumar v. Union of India), or cases involving long service and civil suits for damages (SPO/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab). [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 471; distinguished from Pawan Kumar v. Union of India & Anr., (2023) 12 SCC 317; Paras 19–29] Bappa Barai v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2026 INSC 882
Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 — Rules 52 and 67 — Suppression of Criminal Antecedents — Deliberate Concealment in Attestation Form — Termination / Discharge from Service — Parity Claim - Non-disclosure and deliberate suppression of pending criminal cases at the recruitment stage warrants discharge from service - Where candidates for the post of Constable in RPF/RPSF deliberately answered "NO" in the verification/attestation form despite pending criminal cases against them, such deliberate suppression by itself assumes significance - The candidate has no unfettered right to continuity in service when the statutory mandate under Rules 52 and 67 of the RPF Rules, 1987, the Employment Notice, and the Attestation Form clearly provide for discharge/termination on grounds of false declaration or suppression of material information. [Paras 13 – 21] Bappa Barai v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2026 INSC 882
Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 5(a) & 5(b) — Inapplicability of Grounds — Subjective Satisfaction Must Rest on Objective Material – Held that invocations of Section 5(b) require reasonable grounds to believe that the person is engaged or about to engage in offences involving force or violence, or specified offences under Chapters XII, XVI, or XVII of the IPC (or Sections 506/509 IPC) - Allegations of circulating offensive social media videos affecting religion (corresponding to Chapter XV IPC) do not satisfy the statutory threshold of Section 5(b) - Even under Section 5(a), an order of externment seriously infringes upon fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution and cannot be passed routinely, on mere ipse dixit, or solely because criminal cases are registered - The competent authority must arrive at a bona fide subjective satisfaction based on objective materials disclosing a discernible nexus to the apprehending mischief - An order lacking demonstrable reasons or objective material cannot pass muster. [Relied on Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121; Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95; Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 14 SCC 707; Paras 29 - 34] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926
Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 5(a), Section 5(b), and Section 8 — Scope and Procedure for Externment — Mandatory Requirement of Prior Notice and Hearing — Absence of Review Jurisdiction — Quashing of Externment Order Passed Ex Parte Upon Reopening Closed Proceedings - The District Magistrate had initially closed externment proceedings initiated against the appellant with a warning, taking note of his acquittal in previous cases - upon registration of fresh FIRs (one under the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and another under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 / SC/ST Act) and a report by the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate recalled/reopened the closed proceedings and passed an ex parte order of externment banishing the appellant for one year without issuing a fresh notice or affording an opportunity of hearing while the appellant was in judicial custody – Held under Section 8(1) of the Adhiniyam, informing the proposed externee in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him and granting a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation are indispensable conditions precedent for the exercise of power under Sections 3 to 6 - An order passed in derogation of these mandatory requirements stands vitiated and is void ab initio - Under Section 8(4) read with Section 8(5), an ex parte order can lawfully be passed only when the person fails to execute a security bond for attendance or fails to appear before the District Magistrate during the inquiry - Save and except these express statutory contingencies, the statute does not authorize the District Magistrate to dispense with notice or hearing and proceed ex parte - An administrative authority has no inherent power to review, recall, or reopen its earlier order unless specifically empowered by statute - The District Magistrate possessed no jurisdiction to recall the closure order; any alleged breach of a prior warning or receipt of a fresh police report could not clothe the authority with review jurisdiction, but instead statutorily mandated following the procedure prescribed under Section 8 afresh. [Paras 18 - 25] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926
Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Absence of Notarization/Attestation Endorsement in Form-25 Copy Supplied to Respondent - The absence of the endorsement of attestation/notarization on the copy of the Form-25 affidavit served on the returned candidate is not fatal to the maintainability of the election petition under Section 81(3) read with Section 86 - The word 'copy' under Section 81(3) does not mean an absolutely exact replica, but one so true that nobody can misunderstand it - The test is whether the variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person - Where the original affidavit filed before the Court has been duly affirmed before a Commissioner of Affidavits/Notary, the omission of such endorsement in the copy served does not mislead the returned candidate - It merely calls for verification by the High Court from the original record. [Paras 21–25] Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury v. Kripanath Mallah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2026 INSC 915
Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Scope of Section 86 vs Section 83 - Section 86 mandates peremptory dismissal of an election petition only for non-compliance with Sections 81, 82, or 117 - A defect relating to the affidavit of corrupt practices under the proviso to Section 83(1) does not attract summary dismissal under Section 86 - Even if Form-25 read with Rule 94A is found to be defective upon verification of the original record, it only warrants striking off the allegations of corrupt practices; the High Court must proceed to try and decide any other independent grounds on merits. [Relied on Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore and Others, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 129; F.A. Sapa v. Singora, (1991) 3 SCC 375; Paras 21 – 26] Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury v. Kripanath Mallah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2026 INSC 915
Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Sections 81(3), 83(1)(c) proviso, and 86 — Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, Rule 94A & Form-25 — Election Petition — Attestation of Copies — Defect in Form-25 Affidavit Copy supplied to Returned Candidate — Dismissal in Limine — Maintainability - Attestation under Section 81(3) - Section 81(3) requires every copy of the election petition to be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy - No particular form of attestation is prescribed; what is required is that the election petitioner signs at the foot of each page, taking responsibility that the copy served is a true copy - The use of different rubber stamps—such as 'attested to be true copy' on some pages and 'certified to be true copy' on others—conveys the same meaning and does not invalidate the election petition. [Paras 20-24] Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury v. Kripanath Mallah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2026 INSC 915
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(1)(r) and Section 3(1)(s) — Expression "in any place within public view" — Essential ingredients — Offence occurring inside an enclosed room without public presence - To constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the alleged intentional insult, intimidation, or caste-based abuse must occur at a place "within public view" - The requirement of "public view" depends upon whether the alleged utterance was made in circumstances where members of the public could witness or hear it - If the occurrence takes place within the four corners of a wall where members of the public are not present, it cannot be deemed to have occurred at a place within public view - The mere fact that an incident occurred inside a school premises does not automatically satisfy the statutory requirement of "within public view" when the site plan and material on record demonstrate that the occurrence was confined to an enclosed room having no window or public access, and where witness statements merely establish their presence in the school building but do not place them inside the room or indicate that they heard or witnessed any caste-based utterances - general and vague allegations of caste-based abuse without specific attribution of caste-based slurs or words to the accused do not prima facie make out offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) - Proceedings quashed to the extent of offences under the SC/ST Act. [Relied on Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 INSC 132; Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710; Paras 9 - 19] Ramkrishna Chauhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 837 : 2026 INSC 895
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Rules 8(6), 9(3), and 9(4) – Possession-cum-sale notice – Shortfall in Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) – Whether deposit of EMD is an essential condition of eligibility rendering the auction sale void in case of a shortfall – Held, requirements in a tender/auction notice fall into two categories - (i) essential conditions of eligibility requiring strict adherence, and (ii) ancillary or subsidiary conditions intended to achieve the main objective, from which deviation is permissible if it causes no substantial prejudice - The clause requiring bidders to submit EMD is non-statutory and incorporated merely to filter out non-serious bidders - Where the auction purchasers made an initial minor shortfall in the EMD amount but deposited the mandatory 25% of the total bid price on the very date of the auction in full compliance with Rule 9(3), any anterior shortfall in the EMD pales into insignificance - Such non-conformity caused no prejudice or injustice to the borrower or other bidders, and the bid cannot be invalidated - held, where the delay in depositing the remaining 75% balance sale consideration under Rule 9(4) occurred due to pending litigation initiated by the borrower and the Bank had deferred the date in writing, the deposit made immediately upon dismissal of the borrower's proceedings is valid - The Bank was directed to refund the surplus sale proceeds along with 7% per annum interest to the borrower for failing to keep the surplus amount in an interest-bearing account. [Relied on Om Prakash Sharma v. Ramesh Chand Prashar & Ors., (2016) 12 SCC 632; Bakshi Security & Personnel Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Devkishan Computed Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 446; Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation & Ors. v. Anoj Kumar Agarwala & Ors., (2020) 17 SCC 577; National High Speed Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Monte Carlo Ltd. & Anr., (2022) 6 SCC 401; National High Speed Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Monte Carlo Ltd. & Anr., (2022) 6 SCC 401; B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 548; Paras 19–24]. Lakshmi Mohan v. Airtech Projects Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 851 : 2026 INSC 909
Service Law – Chhattisgarh State Universities Service Rules, 1983 – Rule 10 – Finality of Commission's Decision on Eligibility – Scope of Reassessment/Verification by Appointing Authority - Under Rule 10 of the Service Rules, 1983, the decision of the Public Service Commission regarding the eligibility of a candidate is final and binding - The Appointing Authority cannot usurp or supplant the constitutional and statutory domain of the Commission by undertaking an exhaustive, subjective, or de novo inquiry through an independently constituted expert committee to redetermine eligibility on materials already scrutinised by the Commission - The power of the Appointing Authority to verify documents before issuing an appointment order is strictly confined to – i. Checking the genuineness and authenticity of certificates/documents (e.g., detecting fraud, forgery, or impersonation); ii. Detecting fundamental, patent, and demonstrable deficiencies in eligibility without an exhaustive inquiry; iii. Evaluating new materials brought to its notice that clearly establish ineligibility - If the Appointing Authority entertains any doubt or reservation concerning a candidate's eligibility, it cannot unilaterally declare the candidate ineligible; it is duty-bound to refer the matter back to the Commission with reasons for its view - An administrative stipulation in a recommendation letter requiring "verification and satisfaction regarding eligibility" cannot dilute or override the statutory finality attached under Rule 10 - Held, the inquiry report dated 28.06.2023 constituted by the State was unsustainable in law and liable to be ignored. [Relied On Ram Ashray Yadav (Dr), Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission, In Re, (2000) 4 SCC 309; Ram Kumar Kashyap v. Union of India, (2009) 9 SCC 378; Paras 51-68] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902
Service Law – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Distinct Eligibility Criteria - Eligibility criteria for appointment by direct recruitment and appointment by promotion are distinct and governed by separate requirements under the rules - A candidate's eligibility for direct recruitment cannot be determined or evaluated with reference to the statutory criteria prescribed for promotion. [Para 66] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902
Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Degree Obtained Through Open University / Distance Education Mode – Prospective Operation of Executive Orders Modifying Equivalence – Saving of Existing Rights - Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016 – Sections 25 (Explanation 1(b)) & 54 – Pre-foundation and Foundation Courses offered by Open Universities – Equivalence to SSLC and Higher Secondary (+2) Courses – Validity of Degrees Obtained Under Prior Prevailing Norms – Noted that Degrees obtained through open university/distance education mode following the two-year foundation course under G.O. Ms No. 528 dated 18.05.1985 (which held the field for over 24 years) cannot be invalidated retrospectively for the purpose of promotion - The cutoff date for declaring pre-foundation and foundation courses as not equivalent to SSLC and +2 is 20.11.2017, being the date of notification of G.O. Ms No. 144 - Persons who acquired such qualifications prior to 20.11.2017 are fully protected, and the invalidity applies only prospectively. [Paras 46–50] R.J. Gajendra Kumar v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 853 : 2026 INSC 911
Service Law – Relief & Directions – Non-issuance of Appointment Order – Consequential Benefits - Where a candidate was duly recommended by the PSC, reaffirmed as eligible by the Commission, and unlawfully denied regular posting due to an invalid de novo departmental inquiry, the candidate was entitled to be appointed to the post of Registrar against an available vacancy - The Supreme Court directed the State to issue an appointment order within three weeks, according the appellant parity of service benefits and seniority from the date co-selectees were appointed, though arrears of pay prior to the date of provisional appointment (10.04.2023) were disallowed. [Paras 67 - 70] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902
Service Law – Selection vs. Appointment – Public Service Commission – Right of Recommended Candidates - Mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a select list or a recommendation by the Public Service Commission does not confer an indefeasible or vested right to appointment - Selection only confers a right to fair, non-arbitrary, and equitable consideration for appointment - While appointment pursuant to the Commission's selection is the norm, the Appointing Authority retains ultimate discretion to decide whether or not to appoint - this executive discretion is not absolute or untrammelled; it must be informed by valid, germane, and non-arbitrary reasons supported by the record and the governing statutory rules - When a challenge is mounted against the denial of appointment to a selected candidate, the burden rests on the State/Appointing Authority to justify its decision with cogent reasons. [Relied On Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47; State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220; Commissioner of Police v. Umesh Kumar, (2020) 10 SCC 448; Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2025) 2 SCC 1; H. Mukherjee (Dr) v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 250; Asha Kaul (Mrs.) & Anr. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 573; Paras 43 – 68] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902
Service Law – Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016 – Saving Clause under Section 54 of 2016 Act - Challenging Feeder Cadre Eligibility at Subsequent Promotion Stage Not Permissible - Section 25 (Explanation 1(b)) of the 2016 Act which prescribes a degree obtained after SSLC and Higher Secondary (10 + 2 + 3 pattern) came into effect on 14.09.2016 and cannot adversely affect degrees obtained prior thereto in view of the savings contained in Section 54 - Explanation 1(b) nowhere mandates that the degree must be acquired through a regular physical course rather than distance education - Where an employee has been promoted to and regularized in a feeder cadre post (Tourist Officer) and has served uninterruptedly for nearly 15 years without any challenge to the said appointment, the employer cannot rake up the validity of his initial entry/feeder cadre eligibility at the time of considering his case for promotion to the next higher post (Assistant Director of Tourism) - Appeals allowed - The judgment and order of the Division Bench dated 06.06.2023 and the Review Bench order dated 18.11.2024 are set aside - The judgment of the Single Judge dated 16.08.2021 is restored, holding the appellant eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Director of Tourism. [Relied on P. Thavam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 6177; Chandrakala Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 3 SCC 129; Annamalai University v. Secretary to Government, Information and Tourism Department, (2009) 4 SCC 590; Paras 23-55]. R.J. Gajendra Kumar v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 853 : 2026 INSC 911
Service Law – Termination/Discharge based solely on Pendency of Criminal Case – Illegality and Violation of Natural Justice – Subsequent conviction does not cure initial invalidity - Discharge or termination of an employee serving the police force for over a decade solely on the ground of the pendency of a criminal case, without affording an opportunity of hearing or conducting an enquiry, is arbitrary, unlawful, and unsustainable in law - A subsequent conviction recorded against the employee at a later date cannot cure or validate the fundamental illegality that vitiated the discharge order at the time it was passed. [Paras 24-26] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 14 – Civil Suit for Reinstatement – Constitution of India – Article 142 – Compensation in lieu of Reinstatement - A civil court, bound by the procedural rigours of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot grant a decree for reinstatement in service in view of the bar contained in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the remedy lies only in claiming damages - where a public servant was subjected to an illegal discharge solely due to pending criminal proceedings and denied procedural justice, the Supreme Court exercised its plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice by directing the State to pay lump-sum compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh) in lieu of reinstatement. [Relied on Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank, (2010) 8 SCC 573; Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan, (2007) 9 SCC 86; DIG of Police v. P.R.K. Mohan, (1997) 11 SCC 571; Paras 24-27] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 34 Proviso – Maintainability of Suit – Non-seeking of Cancellation of Revenue Mutation Entry - The proviso to Section 34 requires a plaintiff seeking a declaration of legal character or right to seek further relief where available, aiming to preclude bare declarations when consequential relief is available and necessary - A suit seeking a declaration of co-ownership along with partition, separate possession, and a permanent injunction does not attract the bar under the proviso to Section 34 - The relief of cancellation of a revenue mutation entry is not equivalent to a declaration of title - Once a civil court determines that an inherited title has not been extinguished, the mutation entry itself cannot impede the declared title, and the absence of a specific prayer for cancellation of the mutation order is not fatal to the maintainability of the suit. [Para 27] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900