Administrative Law — Extraordinary Jurisdiction — Article 142 Powers - The invocation of extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice is contextual and cannot be exercised mechanically - The Supreme Court will not invoke Article 142 to protect the services of irregularly or illegally appointed teachers at the cost of the students' future and...
Administrative Law — Extraordinary Jurisdiction — Article 142 Powers - The invocation of extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice is contextual and cannot be exercised mechanically - The Supreme Court will not invoke Article 142 to protect the services of irregularly or illegally appointed teachers at the cost of the students' future and the integrity of public employment streams. [Para 27-32] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691
Administrative Law — Rules of Business under Article 166 of the Constitution — Financial Implication and Deemed Consent - A delegated legislation/notification enhancing royalty rates approved by the Chief Minister (who is also the Minister-in-Charge of Mining) cannot be invalidated for want of explicit approval from the Council of Ministers or formal concurrence from the Finance Department, especially when there is no evidence of disagreement by the Finance Minister - In matters involving the collective responsibility of the Council, where a decision is taken by the Chief Minister at the helm, a deemed consent of the Finance Minister can be inferred under the peculiar facts and circumstances. [Paras 51-63] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690
Advocates Act, 1961 — Sections 35 and 36 — Professional Misconduct — Exclusive Jurisdiction of Bar Councils — Autonomy and Self-Regulation — Held: The legal profession is sui generis(unique in nature) and cannot be equated with traditional commercial professions - The independence of the Bar, secured by the principle of self-regulation ("peers must regulate peers"), is an inextricable feature of the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law - Under the statutory scheme of the Advocates Act, 1961, the power to investigate, adjudicate, and punish an advocate for professional misconduct or negligence vests exclusively in the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India - Parallel adjudicatory mechanisms or unilateral blacklisting by external agencies like banks or banking associations are legally excluded - If a bank believes an advocate is guilty of misconduct, its appropriate remedy is to place the material before the competent State Bar Council. [Paras 30 - 36] Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16 — Doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz — Joinder of Non-Signatories — Group of Companies Doctrine — The determination of whether a non-signatory is a veritable party to an arbitration agreement involves a complex inquiry of factual, circumstantial, and legal aspects - True effect must be given to the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz under Section 16, which empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including intricate determinations of whether a non-signatory is bound by the agreement. [Relied on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Another (2005) 8 SCC 618; Deep Industries Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. and Another (2020) 15 SCC 706; unjab State Power Corporation Limited v. Emta Coal Limited and Another (2020) 17 SCC 93; Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd. and Another (2024) 4 SCC 1; M/s Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. M/s Sunflag Iron and Steel Company Limited 2026 INSC 566; Paras 21- 32] Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2026 INSC 701
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16, Section 5, and Section 34 — Constitution of India — Article 227 — Maintainability of Revision Petition against Arbitral Tribunal's order rejecting jurisdictional challenge — Extent of Judicial Intervention — The High Court is not justified in entertaining a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order of the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting an application under Section 16 of the Act (seeking deletion from the array of parties as non-signatories) - The statutory scheme of the Act mandates minimal judicial interference during ongoing arbitral proceedings - The remedy against the rejection of a Section 16 application strictly lies under Section 34 of the Act after the pronouncement of the final award. Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2026 INSC 701
Arms Act, 1959 – Section 25(1-B)(a) and Section 26 – Offence of possession of unlicensed firearms – Requirement of Conscious Possession – Mere recovery of firearms and incriminating articles from the house of the accused is not sufficient to establish guilt unless the prosecution proves that the accused had conscious possession and dominion over the articles – Coercive possession or possession under threat of life cannot be termed as "conscious possession” – Held - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment which set aside the concurrent findings of conviction recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court against the house owner - The prosecution established that four extremists took shelter in the respondent's house at 4:00 a.m., and upon a police raid at 6:00 a.m., three of them fled, leaving behind a country-made stein gun, ammunition, and other articles - The respondent offered an explanation that he had no option but to allow the articles under pressure and threat to life from the extremists - Accepting this explanation, the Supreme Court observed that if incriminating material is kept in a house due to grave fear or threat to life, it cannot be deemed as "conscious possession." - Coercive possession under threat cannot form the sole criteria to record a finding of guilt. [Relied on Francis Xavier Salemao vs. State Through Public Prosecutor, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 1261; Paras 10-12] State of Jharkhand v. Jagdish Lakra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2026 INSC 686
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Section 35-A — RBI Guidelines on Caution List — Scope of Caution List vs. Professional Negligence — Held: The Caution List mechanism maintained by the IBA under RBI guidelines is strictly intended to operate in cases involving fraud, dishonesty, criminality, or deliberate facilitation of fraudulent activity affecting the banking system - It is not designed to address cases resting merely on alleged negligence or errors of professional judgment - Fraud inherently imports mens rea and deliberate intent - An erroneous legal opinion or omission in title verification, absent dishonest intent, cannot be elevated to fraud - While a bank is free to disengage a panel counsel contractually, it has no power or jurisdiction to issue a sector-wide public declaration targeting an advocate's competency - the inclusion of the appellant's name in the Caution List solely on account of professional negligence is illegal and unsustainable. [Paras 25 – 35] Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 187(3) - Non-supply of charge sheet to accused not a ground for default bail - When a charge sheet is filed within the prescribed statutory period, the mere non-supply of its copy to the accused does not entitle the accused to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS. Held, Section 187(3) BNSS provides for default bail only where the investigating agency fails to file the charge sheet within the stipulated time. Non-supply or non-delivery of a copy of the charge sheet to the accused after it has been filed within time does not constitute a ground for granting default bail. The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court rejecting the accused's plea for default bail in a CBI case involving large-scale cyber fraud (approx. ₹3.81 crores) registered under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Information Technology Act, 2000. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 649 : 2026 INSC 666
Civil Procedure & Jurisprudence — Interim Orders — Stay Of Operation Vs. Quashing Of An Order - There is a distinct legal difference between the quashing of an order and staying its operation - While quashing restores the original position before the order was passed, a stay merely makes the order inoperative from the date of the stay without wiping it out from existence - Where the High Court's judgment striking down a recruitment Act was stayed by the Supreme Court, it created a legal vacuum where neither the original Act nor the transitional notifications could operate independently - Any public employment appointment made by managing committees after the date of the stay order (14th March 2016) without seeking express permission or leave from the Supreme Court is ex-facie illegal and invalid. [Relied On Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1; Paras 40 - 42] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VIII Rule 5 & Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 58 – Doctrine of Non-Traverse – Non-examination of Plaintiff - Where the plaintiff sues on the basis of intestate succession, and the primary facts regarding her status as the legally wedded wife and sole surviving Class I heir are not traversed or specifically denied by the defendants in the written statement, they stand admitted - Facts admitted need not be proved, and the non-examination of the plaintiff or any witness of fact on her behalf cannot be a ground to dismiss the suit. Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXIII Rule 3 — Compromise of Suit — Absence of Express Authorisation to Counsel — Validity of Consent Decree — Mandate of Law post 1976 Amendment — A compromise decree must strictly adhere to the mandatory requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC - Post the 1976 Amendment, a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties to prevent false and frivolous pleas - While a counsel or duly authorized representative is permitted to sign a compromise decree on behalf of the client, such an act requires an express authorization or the existence of exigent circumstances - An advocate should not act on implied authority to conclude or surrender the substantial legal rights of a client without clear instructions - In the absence of express authorization in the Vakalatnama or evidence of exigent circumstances, the "voluntary" aspect mandated by Order XXIII Rule 3 cannot be established, rendering the resulting compromise contrary to law. [Paras 4, 5] Krishna Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2026 INSC 662 : AIR 2026 SC 3116
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Scope of Second Appeal – Interference with Findings on Will The question of whether suspicious circumstances surround the execution of a Will and whether they have been satisfactorily explained is essentially a question of fact - The phrase "satisfying the conscience of the Court" does not convert a question of fact into a question of law. Where the final court of fact (First Appellate Court) evaluates real and germane suspicious circumstances to discard a Will, the High Court exceeds its jurisdiction under Section 100 by interfering with such well-reasoned findings of fact. [Relied on H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma & Ors. (AIR 1959 SC 443); Rani Purnima Debi & Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb & Anr. ((1962) 3 SCR 195); Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur ((1977) 1 SCC 369); Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti and Ors. ((1990) 1 SCC 266); Shivakumar & Ors. v. Sharanabasappa & Ors. ((2021) 11 SCC 277); Mansinghrao Yeshwant Rao Patil & Ors. v. Ramchandra Govindrao Patil & Ors. (1954 SCC OnLine SC 96); Paras 32 – 70] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Jurisdictional Error and Perversity – The High Court commits a manifest jurisdictional error and its findings are rendered perverse when, under Section 100 of the CPC, it fails to test the legality of a reversal by the First Appellate Court and instead builds a new legal edifice by suo motu invoking statutory provisions (like Section 43 of the ToP Act) or factual premises (like interchange of boundaries) that were never pleaded, proved, or advanced by the parties, while simultaneously ignoring material admissions made by the plaintiff. [Paras 38, 39, 40, 41] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 100 & Order XLII Rule 2 — Mandate to Formulate Substantial Questions of Law — The formulation of a substantial question of law is a mandatory condition precedent for admitting, maintaining, and entertaining a second appeal on merits under Section 100 of the CPC - The High Court cannot hear and decide a second appeal on merits or reverse the judgment of the First Appellate Court without expressly formulating such question(s) of law - A judgment delivered without satisfying this mandatory requirement stands vitiated in law. [Paras 23-27] R. Veronica v. Rudrayani Devaki, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : 2026 INSC 703
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 151 — Inherent Powers — Recall of Fraudulent Compromise Decree — Delay and Limitation — The law of limitation cannot be utilized as a shield to defeat substantive rights or to perpetuate an illegality that is contrary to law - Where a compromise decree is obtained by fraud and without the signature or authorization of an affected party, the Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC to set aside the decree for the ends of justice. While a delay of 28 years (1994 to 2022) is egregiously large, the strict rule of limitation may be given a go-by based on the specific facts of a case, especially where basic facts are heavily contested and the affected party's rights are directly compromised without due process. Issues in such a partition suit require adjudication through a full trial. [Relied on Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, (1988) 1 SCC 270; Som Dev v. Rati Ram, (2006) 10 SCC 788; Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 373; Para 6] Krishna Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2026 INSC 662 : AIR 2026 SC 3116
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 96 & Order XLI Rule 31 — Scope and Powers of First Appellate Court — Necessity of Reasoned Judgment — Reversal of Trial Court Judgment - The First Appellate Court is the final court of fact and is vested with a valuable right to re-hear the entire case on both questions of law and fact - When reversing a judgment of the Trial Court, the Appellate Court is bound to apply its mind, evaluate the evidence independently, and record clear, cogent, and succinct reasons for its disagreement rather than passing a cryptic order - A judgment that merely extracts the Trial Court's reasoning and brushes it aside by asserting that the lower court failed to understand the dispute violates the well-established principles governing first appeals - Reason is the lifeblood and heartbeat of every judicial conclusion, serving as a deterrent against arbitrary actions and ensuring public confidence in the justice delivery system. [Paras 5-10] Lakshmi v. Gopi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2026 INSC 709
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Legislative Intent – Metamorphosis from Old Code (1898) to New Code (1973) – Abolition of Full-Fledged Magisterial Inquiry at Committal Stage – Held - Following the recommendations of the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India, full-fledged committal inquiries were recognized as a waste of time and effort that resulted in inordinate delay - Under the existing Code, the role of the committal Magistrate has been completely metamorphosed and absolutely constricted to a "narrow inspection hole" - The evidence can only be taken after the framing of the charge, which is the exclusive domain of the Court of Session under Section 228 after evaluating the materials under Section 227 - Requiring witnesses to depose about the same set of facts twice (at the pre-committal stage and during the trial) is neither mandated by law nor serves any useful purpose. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568; Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 516; Paras 9-15] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 190, 465 & 482 – Wrong Section mentioned in Cognizance Order – Curable Defect – Remedial Scope of Chapter XXXV CrPC – Remand - The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), whereas the election was governed by the State legislation (Gujarat Municipalities Act) under which the penal provisions stood omitted, thereby attracting the controlling provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - The appellant argued this was a jurisdictional error vitiating the proceedings - Held: The error in taking cognizance under a wrong section is a curable defect under Section 465 CrPC, provided the Court has the competence and power to take cognizance under the correct sections - Cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the person - Chapter XXXV of the CrPC aims to prevent technical irregularities which do not go to the root of the matter or occasion a failure of justice from delaying trials at a pre-trial or inquiry stage - Filing a false affidavit in an electoral process is an offence against society at large - Order of the High Court modified; matter remanded to the Magistrate to take cognizance afresh under the appropriate provisions of the IPC and proceed in accordance with law. [Relied on Pruthvirajsinh Nodhubha Jadeja v. Jayeshkumar Chhakaddas Shah, (2019) 9 SCC 533; Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 19 SCC 62; Paras 11- 14] Chandrikaben Kishor Dafda v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 650 : 2026 INSC 665
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 209 and Section 244 – Committal Proceedings – Requirement of Pre-Charge Evidence in Complaints Involving Offences Exclusively Triable by the Court of Session – Constricted Role of the Magistrate – Held - The High Court erred in holding that a Magistrate must record pre-charge prosecution evidence under Section 244 of the CrPC even when the offence is strictly and exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - The scheme of the modern CrPC has consciously done away with the lengthy pre-committal inquiry and evidence gathering that existed under the old 1898 Code - The primary mandate of the Magistrate under Section 209 is merely to inspect and see whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - In performing this administrative act, no evidence needs to be taken, and the Magistrate is forbidden from applying their mind to the merits of the case to determine whether an accused needs to be added or subtracted. [Paras 8 - 13] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 227 & 228 — Scope of Examination at the Stage of Charge Framing / Discharge - Held: At the stage of framing charges or considering discharge, the Court is strictly required to look only at the materials collected during the investigation that form part of the police report under Section 173(2) CrPC – Noted that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the prosecution's material is true and evaluate whether it creates a "grave suspicion" of the accused's involvement - A full-scale mini-trial, evaluation of defense materials outside the police report, or application of the standard of proof required for a final conviction is impermissible at this stage. [Paras 20, 21, 31-45] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1)(b) & 218 – Cognizance and Consolidated/Split Trials – Primacy of the Court – Superior Officer's Intervention - The Superintendent of Police (S.P.) directed a charge sheet to be filed against only two accused who were in custody and ordered further investigation against the remaining fifteen accused despite the initial report finding offences made out against all seventeen - Held: The S.P.'s directive to split the investigation and halt the charge sheet against specific individuals was without authority - an invalid investigation does not nullify the subsequent cognizance or trial unless it results in a miscarriage of justice - The formation of an opinion on whether an accused must be placed on trial is the exclusive prerogative of the Investigating Officer, while the ultimate authority to accept a closure report, reject it, or take independent cognizance on the disclosed material rests solely with the Court. Multiple committal orders or separate final reports can be consolidated into a single trial or adjudicated via split trials at the discretion of the Court, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. [Paras 10-19] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order VIII Rule 1, Order VIII Rule 6A(3), Order VIII Rule 6G, Order VIII Rule 10 — Filing of Written Statement to Counter-Claim in Commercial Suits — Mandatory Outer Time Limit of 120 Days Applicable to Plaintiff - The Supreme Court held that the mandatory time frame of 120 days prescribed under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) applies mutatis mutandis to the filing of a written statement by a plaintiff in response to a counter-claim raised by a defendant in a commercial suit. AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 - Interplay between Order VIII Rule 6A(3) and Rule 6G CPC - While Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC enables the Court to fix a time frame for the plaintiff to respond to a counter-claim, the absence of such a direction does not leave the plaintiff free to file it at any time - By virtue of Order VIII Rule 6G CPC, the rules relating to a written statement filed by a defendant are made applicable to a written statement filed in answer to a counter-claim - the temporal outer limit of 120 days applies strictly to the plaintiff's reply to a counter-claim. On the expiry of 120 days, the right to file the written statement to the counter-claim stands forfeited - Denying the application of the 120-day outer limit to a counter-claim response would defeat the very object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which is aimed at the speedy and timely resolution of high-value commercial disputes. [Paras 27- 33] AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Order XI Rule 1 and Rule 5 (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) read with Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Production of additional documents at the stage of plaintiff's evidence – Application of the 'Reasonable Cause' test – Held: The strict timelines and rigours prescribed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CCA) cannot be watered down on the ground of evidence being voluminous or because certain facts allegedly emerged during cross-examination - A stop-and-go or piecemeal approach to the production of documents in commercial suits cannot be countenanced - When leading evidence, a plaintiff is expected not only to produce all relevant documents in their possession but also to properly anticipate the questions that may be put to its witnesses by the opposite side - If a party fails to establish a 'reasonable cause' or justifiable explanation for the subsequent discovery and non-disclosure of documents that were already within its possession at the time of filing the suit or during a previous round of additional evidence, leave to file such additional documents cannot be granted. [Paras 12, 13] Levitate Mobile Technologies v. Standard Chartered Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 658 : 2026 INSC 674
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Section 13(1A) and Section 13(2) — Maintainability of Appeal — Orders under Order VIII CPC - An appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, lies only against those orders that are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC, or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Since an order passed under Order VIII CPC (such as refusing leave to file a belated written statement) is not appealable under Order XLIII CPC, an appeal against such an order is not maintainable. [Relied on SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and others, (2019) 12 SCC 210; BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234; Kandla Export Corporation and another v. OCI Corporation and another, (2018) 14 SCC 715; Paras 34-37] AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 15 – Applicability to Pending Suits – Held: The provisions of the CCA apply strictly to pending cases transferred under Section 15 - The statute makes its retroactive application abundantly clear by mandating under Section 15(3) that upon the transfer of a suit or application of a specified value to the Commercial Division or Court, the procedures of the CCA shall strictly apply - The only exception carved out by the legislature against such a transfer is where the judgment has already been reserved. [Relied on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP, (2020) 15 SCC 585; Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1; Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B., (2021) 13 SCC 7; Paras 13-16] Levitate Mobile Technologies v. Standard Chartered Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 658 : 2026 INSC 674
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Pleadings and Prayers – Mending/Moulding of Reliefs – Technicalities cannot trump substantive justice - The Single Judge of the High Court granted relief of reinstatement under Section 47 of the PwD Act, 1995, even though the respondent's writ petition skeletal pleadings and prayers were limited to claiming a 100% disability pension – Held that while High Courts must generally confine themselves to pleadings and prayers to prevent judicial overreach and surprise, this is not an inflexible rule - Article 226 is a reservoir of equity meant to reach injustice wherever it is found - Where the record clearly evinces a suitor's legal entitlement to wider relief, but less is claimed due to ignorance, bona fide mistake, or poor drafting, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant appropriate relief, especially when the opponent seeks to use procedural technicalities to shield its own statutory breach. [Paras 37 – 43] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689
Constitution of India - Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction over Arbitral Tribunals — Narrow Band of Perversity/Patent Lack of Inherent Jurisdiction — A foray to the writ court under Article 227 against the dismissal of a Section 16 application by an arbitrator is permissible only if the order suffers from a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction - Such a patent lack must be so perverse that it stares one in the face and requires no argument whatsoever - Before entertaining such petitions, High Courts must record a prima facie finding regarding the patent lack of inherent jurisdiction after hearing the rival parties - In the absence of a manifest jurisdictional defect, interlocutory judicial interference is unwarranted and contrary to legislative policy. Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2026 INSC 701
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 432, 433 and 433-A – Remission Policy – Applicability and Inter-se Hierarchy of Constitutional vs. Statutory Remission Policies – The State of Haryana's 'Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002' (dated 12.04.2002) is a policy framed under the constitutional powers of the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution, identical to the 1993 Policy - A subsequent statutory policy framed by the Executive under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, such as the 2008 Premature Release Policy, cannot override or dilute the benefits of a prior constitutional policy under Article 161 - A statutory policy cannot supersede the constitutional power vested in the Governor. [Paras 9-16] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Sector-wide Caution List — Nature of Function Test vs. Formal Character of Respondent — Held: A writ petition under Article 226 challenging the inclusion of a professional's name in the Indian Banks' Association (IBA) Caution List is maintainable - The High Court erred in dismissing the petition on the narrow ground that the IBA is not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 - The judicial focus has shifted from the formal character of the body to the nature of the function performed and the effect of the impugned action on legally protected rights - The maintenance of a sector-wide Caution List possesses a sufficient public law character and operates as an industry-wide adverse accreditation that directly impacts an advocate's fundamental right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670
Constitutional Law — Article 30(1) & Article 16 — Minority Rights Vs. Public Exchequer Accountability - Minority educational institutions do not possess an absolute right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution to burden the public exchequer through a completely non-competitive, opaque selection process - Government aid without financial accountability is constitutionally unsustainable - Clause 6 of Notification-I, which permitted a "10% Management Quota" for appointments without wide public advertisements, is unconstitutional and an anti-thesis to the mandate of equality and equal opportunity enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [Para 35-39] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691
Criminal Jurisprudence – Remission – Liberal Policy Principle – If a more liberal remission policy prevails on the date of consideration of a life convict's case for premature release, or if the short-sentencing policy existing on the date of conviction offers an honest expectation of release, the convict must be given the benefit of the more liberal policy - The appellant, convicted under Section 302 IPC in 2009, is entitled to have his case considered under the beneficial 2002 Policy instead of the more stringent 2008 Policy. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216; Paras 10 - 16] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667
Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Defence Evidence – Hypothesis of Innocence - Trial courts must bestow equal attention and weight to defence evidence as they do to prosecution evidence - There is no legal baseline to approach evidence led by the accused with inherent distrust or scepticism - If the defence introduces a deeply probable hypothesis of innocence that establishes reasonable doubt, the absolute benefit must inure to the accused - To travel from the realm of "may be true" to "must be true," the prosecution's journey must be strictly paved with legal, reliable, and unimpeachable evidence. [Relied on Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107; H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1954) 2 SCC 934; Banwari v. State of U.P., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 98; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1957) 1 SCR 953; Para 34-39] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695
Customary Law (Oraon Tribe) – Succession and Inheritance – Right of Daughter and Son-in-law (Ghardamad) – Scope of Article 136 of the Constitution of India and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Facts: The dispute pertained to ownership claims over the landed property of one Sukhu Oraon (grandfather), who had three sons: Dhungru, Ledura, and Bhoula - The Plaintiff (Sukhu, second son of Dhungru) claimed ownership over the entire ancestral land - The claim was resisted by Defendant No. 1 (Budhain, daughter of Bhoula) and Defendant No. 2 (Punai, husband of Budhain) on the ground that Ledura (who died issueless) had adopted Punai as his ghardamad (resident son-in-law) and that the properties were partitioned via a deed dated February 27, 1975 - The Munsif Court, First Appellate Court, and the High Court of Jharkhand concurrently dismissed the plaintiff's suit, accepting the ghardamad relationship - Held, concurrent findings of fact are not generally interfered with unless exceptional circumstances exist, such as the finding being perverse, based on no evidence, built on inadmissible evidence, ignoring material circumstances, or resulting in a miscarriage of justice - Held, the party alleging a custom must strictly prove its existence, long usage, certainty, and reasonableness - General observations cannot replace strict proof required under Section 48 of the Evidence Act, 1872 - Held, under the prevalent customary law of the Oraon community, daughters do not have a right of inheritance and are only entitled to maintenance if there is no son - While the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in the property of his father-in-law is established, it must be duly adopted by the last male owner or his widow - In the present case, Punai was the husband of Bhoula's daughter (Budhain) but was allegedly adopted as a ghardamad by the uncle-in-law (Ledura) - Customary law does not recognize or permit an uncle-in-law to adopt his niece's husband as a ghardamad - Held, relying upon authoritative scholarly works (The Oraons of Chotanagpur by S.C. Roy), in the absence of a son, an appropriately adopted ghardamad, or other direct male descendants, the property of an issueless Oraon male devolves upon the nearest male agnate - the plaintiff (nephew) is entitled to succeed to the property - The partition/lease deed executed between the niece and the uncle-in-law is non-est and irrelevant to the title - The High Court erred in failing to answer the formulated substantial question of law regarding the uncle-in-law's capacity to adopt a ghardamad merely on the count of concurrent findings below - Merely observing that there is no established bar against such adoption does not satisfy the requirements of Section 100 CPC - The onus was on the defendants to prove such a custom existed. [Relied on Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217; Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95; Ramachandran v. Vijayan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3384; Paras 6-13] Bejla Oraon v. Kali Das Oraon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2026 INSC 672
Doctrine of Waiver – Statutory Rights – Elements of Waiver – Onus of Proof - The Appellants argued that the respondent waived his rights under Section 47 of the PwD Act by consciously limiting his claims to disability pension and receiving terminal benefits – Held that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and requires proof of three elements: (i) existence of a right, (ii) clear knowledge of that right, and (iii) voluntary relinquishment despite such knowledge. Mere silence, delay, or inaction does not amount to waiver - The senior officers of the establishment were under a duty to apprise the visually impaired employee of his statutory safeguards rather than assuming he voluntarily chose to forgo them - Waiver of a statutory right is heavily disfavoured when the statute serves a public welfare policy. [Paras 46-68] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689
Election Law – Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 – Gujarat Municipalities (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 1994 (as amended in 2005) – Rule 7A – Filing of False Affidavit – Disclosure of assets owned solely by the spouse – Interpretation of Grammatical Construction and Punctuation - The appellant-candidate challenged the criminal proceedings initiated against her for suppressing the landed properties owned by her spouse in the election affidavit filed during the 2015 Municipal elections - The appellant contended that Rule 7A(1) only required disclosure of properties owned by candidates themselves or jointly with their spouse, excluding properties solely owned by the spouse - Held: Rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court observed that the text of the declaration requires details of the assets of "myself, my spouse and dependents" - The 'comma' employed after the word "myself" is a listing comma serving a structural and grammatical function to separate items in a series - The word "of" applies equally to "myself", "my spouse", and "dependents" - The sentence must be read collectively, making it mandatory for the candidate to disclose properties owned solely by the spouse as well. [Paras 9-12] Chandrikaben Kishor Dafda v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 650 : 2026 INSC 665
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Recovery of weapon and incriminating articles – Failure to affix lac seals at the spot – Total absence of blood at the alleged site of crime – Fatal to prosecution case – The prosecution relied on the recovery of a blood-stained grinding stone (alleged murder weapon) and clothes at the behest of Accused No. 1 - Held, the alleged articles were recovered from a public area accessible to anyone and, crucially, were not sealed at the spot - In the absence of link evidence to prove articles were kept in a sealed condition until they reached the Chemical Analyzer, the reports hold no evidentiary value as the possibility of tampering/planting cannot be ruled out - the complete absence of blood on the mattresses or pillows in the house completely contradicts the narrative that the deceased was bludgeoned to death in his bed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Tulshiram Bhanudas Kambale v. State of Maharashtra, 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 227; Salim Akhtar alias Mota v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2003) 5 SCC 499; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Maghavendra Pratap Singh Alias Pankaj Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 12 SCC 401; Paras 27, 28, 29] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 Proviso — Applicability to Registered Sale Deeds — Interpretation of Proviso — Scope of "Specific Denial" — A registered sale deed does not require compulsory attestation under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 68 of the Evidence Act applies exclusively to documents that are mandatorily required by law to be attested - neither the main section nor its proviso applies to a registered sale deed - There is no requirement in law to examine an attesting witness to prove a sale deed, even if it contains signatures of marginal witnesses - The High Court erred in expanding the proviso to include a registered sale deed and in holding that an executant must specifically deny the document by way of a separate suit or counter-claim rather than a written statement - The proviso to Section 68 cannot create an independent rule or travel beyond the main provision to cover documents not requiring compulsory attestation by law. [Relied on Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others, (2020) 19 SCC 57; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 INSC 693 / (2001) 3 SCC 179; Bayanabai Kaware v. Rajendra s/o Baburao Dhote, (2018) 1 SCC 585; Rohitash Kumar & Ors. vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 451; Paras 31- 46] R. Veronica v. Rudrayani Devaki, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : 2026 INSC 703
Evidence Act, 1872 / Civil Law – Burden of Proof – Declaration of Title – A plaintiff seeking a declaration of title must succeed strictly on the strength of their own case and not on the perceived weakness of the defense - Title over an immovable property cannot rest on surmises, probabilities, or conjectural comparisons of boundaries by courts in the absence of solid revenue records, village maps, or expert evidence. [Paras 23-42] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705
Foreigners Act, 1946 — Section 9 — Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 — Constitutional Law — Articles 14 and 21 — Principles of Natural Justice — Audi Alteram Partem — Fairness in Quasi-Judicial Adjudication — Standard Operating Procedure for Ex Parte and Effectively Ex Parte Proceedings before Foreigners Tribunals - Key Legal Propositions & Ratio Decidendi – i. Nature of Statutory Burden vs. Obligation of Lawful Adjudication - While Section 9 of the Foreigners Act,1946 shifts the onus of proof onto the proceedee to establish that they are not a foreigner, this statutory burden cannot be interpreted to mean that the Foreigners Tribunal is relieved of its own obligation to conduct a lawful, fair, and objective adjudication - The statutory burden operates strictly within a legal process; it does not replace the legal process itself - The absence or non-appearance of a proceedee cannot mechanically be treated as a substitute for an objective examination of the material and evidence placed before the Tribunal by the State [Para 12, 16]; ii. Procedural Safeguards & "Main Grounds"- Under Paragraph 3(1) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964,the expression "main grounds" holds significant statutory weight and requires the State to disclose the essential material basis on which the allegation is founded, rather than serving a bare assertion or undefined suspicion - An opportunity to reply and lead evidence becomes illusory if such grounds are not clearly apprised to the proceedee [Para 13, 17, 18]; iii. Duties of the Tribunal in Ex Parte Proceedings - Even when a proceedee fails to appear despite the recorded service of a notice, the Foreigners Tribunal, acting as a quasi-judicial body, cannot render a mechanical declaration - It is duty-bound to satisfy itself that the notice was lawfully served, examine the "main grounds”, independently evaluate the evidence produced by the State (via the concerned Superintendent of Police), and record a reasoned opinion containing a concise statement of facts and conclusions as mandated under Paragraph 3(16) of the 1964 Order [Para 14, 15, 32]; iv. Constitutional Protections Extended to Non-Citizens - The fundamental protections of equality before the law (Article 14) and the protection of life and personal liberty (Article 21) use the terminology "any person" and "no person" respectively, ensuring their availability to every individual within the territory of India, including those whose citizenship status is under dispute - The process of determining nationality carries grave civil consequences (such as detention, deportation, and statelessness) and must strictly satisfy the constitutional thresholds of fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness as established under the Maneka Gandhi principle [Para 18, 20, 21, 23]; v. Role of the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction - The Foreigners Tribunal is the primary statutory adjudicatory forum designed to evaluate complex factual inquiries relating to ancestry, lineage, electoral records, and public documents - Where a proceeding before the Tribunal was ex parte, the High Court under Article 226 should not substitute the statutory mechanism by becoming the first forum for the factual appreciation or testing of such vital citizenship documents - The appropriate legal course is a conditional remand to the primary forum - Acknowledging the grave consequences of a foreigner declaration, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the Foreigners Tribunals, granting a one-time final opportunity to the appellants to contest the references on merits - The matters were conditionally remitted to the respective Tribunals with a direction to conclude the fresh, uninfluenced adjudications within six months, subject to the strict cooperation of the proceedees. [Relied on Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 554; National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 742; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557; Paras 35, 36, 37, 38-54] Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 672 : 2026 INSC 694
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 22 – Applicability to Agricultural Land – Preferential Right of Co-heirs – Constitutional Validity and Legislative Competence of Parliament – Held The preferential right given to a Class-I Hindu heir under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) is fully applicable even if the immovable property in question is agricultural land - Key Legal Principles – i. Nature of the Right - The right of pre-emption under Section 22 of the HSA is, in its pith and substance, an incident of succession and not a regulation of transfer simpliciter - It is intrinsically and inseparably linked to succession among Class-I heirs, acting as a qualification placed by Parliament so that family properties are retained within the family - The right lives and dies with the succession relationship and cannot be invoked by strangers, tenants, or distant blood relations; ii. Legislative Competence of Parliament - Parliament possesses complete legislative competence to enact Section 22 of the HSA regarding agricultural land under Entry 5 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution - Unlike Item 7 of the Concurrent List under the Government of India Act, 1935 (which expressly excluded agricultural land), the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the exclusionary clause from Entry 5 of List III - Entry 5 is unqualified and covers intestacy and succession to all forms of property; iii. Doctrine of Pith and Substance - Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, the dominant character of Section 22 falls squarely within Entry 5 of List III (Succession) - It does not regulate the formalities or conditions of a transfer under Entry 6 of List III ("transfer of property other than agricultural land") or Entry 18 of List II - The mere fact that a proposed transfer triggers the right does not alter its fundamental character as a succession provision; iv. Distinction between Atam Prakash and Babu Ram - There is no conflict between the rulings in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana (1986) and Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh (2019); Atam Prakash struck down Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, because the wide array of entitled relatives (including tenants and co-sharers without succession ties) violated Article 14 by lacking a reasonable classification based on agnatic succession - Section 22 of the HSA restricts its scope exclusively to Class-I co-heirs inheriting from a common intestate - Atam Prakash dealt with consanguinity-based pre-emption under a different statutory context and did not strike down the concept of pre-emption itself, nor did it consider Section 22 of HSA – held that where a petition under Section 22 of the HSA is instituted prior to the actual execution of a sale deed to a third party, it perfectly satisfies the requirement that the right of pre-emption applies to an alienation that is "about to happen" - There is no subsequent legal requirement for the plaintiff to challenge the completed sale deed separately, as the transaction was carried out in the teeth of an active, pending enforcement of a preferential right. [Relied on Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, (2019) 14 SCC 162; Vaijanath v. Guramma, (1999) 1 SCC 292; Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 88; Paras Paras 7-13] Mahinder v. Puran Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 675 : 2026 INSC 698
Information Technology and Adjudication – Directions to the Bar Council of India - To ensure accountability, the Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India (BCI) to constitute a dedicated committee to deliberate on the issue of advocate members submitting fake and hallucinated AI-generated material as law precedents - The BCI is mandated to prescribe guiding principles to prevent such occurrences and outline corresponding disciplinary actions for violations. [Paras 9-13] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668
Information Technology and Adjudication – Human-in-the-loop and regulatory imperative - While acknowledging the transformative capabilities of AI technology in easing workloads and aiding efficiency, the Supreme Court asserted the necessity of maintaining absolute human control over adjudication with a human in the loop at every stage - Legal professionals and adjudicating bodies must remain cautious against delegating core thinking processes to AI, as it can insidiously compromise judicial reasoning – The Supreme Court emphasized that managing AI hallucinations requires systemic implementation through Public Policy and enforceable Rules and Regulations, coupled with conscious Bar-Bench coordination. [Paras 5-10] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668
Information Technology and Adjudication – Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) – Verification of Precedents – Zero-Tolerance Policy - Zero-tolerance for AI-generated fake precedents - The Supreme Court declared a strict zero-tolerance mode for the Bar as well as the Bench regarding producing, citing, or using AI-generated precedents without thorough verification - Citing such fake or hallucinated judgments without verification amounts to professional misconduct on the part of an advocate - it is a serious lapse if a judge relies on such fabricated material as precedents to support a judicial determination. [Paras 10-12] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668
Information Technology and Adjudication – Validity of decisions based on hallucinated material - Any decision passed by a Court or an adjudicating authority that is based on fake, non-existent, or hallucinated AI material is considered "no decision in the eyes of the law." - This holds true irrespective of whether the hallucinated material had a direct or indirect bearing on the final decision-making - Such decisions fundamentally violate the sanctity of adjudication, subvert the rule of law, and are liable to be set aside entirely even if only an iota of fake material enters the decision-making process. [Paras 7 - 17] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Reliance on Non-Existent Precedents by NCLT & NCLAT – Order Set Aside - Adjudication tainted by fake citations - Where the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitted a Section 7 application based on its own research containing fake and non-existent AI-generated citations, and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) subsequently failed to scrutinize and detect the errors, the entire judicial process stood tainted - the Supreme Court set aside the orders of both the NCLT and NCLAT, restoring the Section 7 application to its original number for a fresh disposal on merits within a stipulated timeline, ordering the parties to maintain a status quo in the interim. [Relied on M. Subramaniam v. S. Janaki, (2020) 16 SCC 728; 2020 SCC OnLine SC 341; V.S. Dempo & Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Communications Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 176; Sarbjit Singh v. Union Bank of India, (2022) 7 SCC 464; Paras 13-20] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668
Insolvency Law – Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 – Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 – Interplay and Equivalence – Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993; Section 19(22) & 19(22A) – Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) prior to the 2016 Amendment – Whether an Insolvency Notice can be issued based on a DRT Recovery Certificate – Held - Strict Construction of Insolvency Statutes - The Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 is a statute fraught with the grave consequence of “civil death” for an individual sought to be adjudged an insolvent - its provisions must be subjected to strict judicial interpretation - Recovery Certificate is not a "Decree" or "Order" - In terms of Section 9(2) of the Insolvency Act, an act of insolvency is committed only when a creditor obtains a “decree or order” for the payment of money against the debtor - The expressions "decree" and "order" must be understood in the light of the definitions contained in Section 2(2) and Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - A recovery certificate issued by the DRT under the pre-amended RDB Act cannot be strictly equated to a civil court's "decree" or "order" for the purposes of issuing an insolvency notice - Prospective Nature of the 2016 Amendment - The insertion of sub-section (22A) into Section 19 of the RDB Act via the 2016 Amendment which explicitly deems a DRT recovery certificate to be a "decree or order of the Court" for initiating insolvency or winding-up proceedings constitutes a clear legislative recognition that such an equivalence did not exist prior to the amendment - Since the amendment has not been given retrospective effect, any recovery certificate issued prior to 2016 cannot form the legal foundation for an insolvency notice - To rule otherwise would unacceptably amount to supplying a casus omissus - Rights Crystallize on the Date of Institution - It is a foundational tenant of processual jurisprudence that the rights and liabilities of litigants stand crystallized on the exact date of the commencement of the legal action - A claim or action that was fundamentally untenable when the suitor entered the portals of the court cannot become tenable simply due to a subsequent statutory development or a fortuitous event occurring during the pendency of the appeal unless explicitly made retrospective. [Relied on Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322; Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 726; Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Tek Chand Dolwani, (1953) 1 SCC 621; Paras 11-24] H.D.F.C. Bank V. Kishore K. Mehta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 665 : 2026 INSC 688
Judicial Discipline & Restraint — Adverse and Disparaging Remarks against Lower Judicial Officers - The practice of passing sweeping generalisations or disparaging remarks against Trial Judges and directing them to undergo training merely because their reasoning is perceived as erroneous is highly deplorable - Proper freedom, independence, fearlessness, and professional competence of lower judicial officers must be strictly protected against undue interference - Judicial pronouncements must strictly exhibit sobriety, moderation, fair play, and reserve - Robes carry immense power, and adverse remarks must not be passed lightly or in ordinary circumstances as they jeopardize judicial independence and deter officers from carrying out their duties. [Relied on Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India, (1969) 3 SCC 868; State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596; Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519; CCT v. Shukla & Bros., (2010) 4 SCC 785; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496; State of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 22; State of Punjab v. Shikha Trading Co., (2023) 20 SCC 113; Para 8-12] Lakshmi v. Gopi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2026 INSC 709
Judicial Review — Fiscal and Economic Policy — Test of Arbitrariness - Enhancement of the rate of royalty and dead rent cannot be termed arbitrary or suffering from non-application of mind if it is based on comparative materials, such as rates prevailing in neighbouring States - Courts will not sit in appeal over fiscal policies or mathematically scrutinise the exact quantum of increase, provided it satisfies the test of Wednesbury unreasonableness and does not breach statutory intervals. [Paras 39-41] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690
Judicial Review — Fiscal and Economic Policy — Test of Arbitrariness - Key Legal Principles Established Or Reiterated - statutory trumps contractual silence – i. terms of a mining lease must yield to the statutory rules governing the lease - omission of a statutory rule's text within a lease deed does not efface its binding authority; ii. constitutional trust over minerals - minerals are held by the state in trust for the people - the state is obligated to ensure that their exploitation subserves the public interest, including securing appropriate revenue for the public exchequer; iv. significance of the chief minister's imprimatur - financial decisions impacting the state must have the involvement, approval, or at least the knowledge of the chief minister to reflect collective responsibility and maintain the constitutional scheme under articles 154 and 163. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. J.K. Synthetics Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 518; MRF Limited v. Manohar Parrikar, (2010) 11 SCC 374; D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, 1986 Supp SCC 20] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Sections 15, 18(3), and 19(1) – Mandate of Section 19(1) for Children's Court upon committal – Held that the word 'may' occurring in Section 19(1) must be read as 'shall' - Passing a reasoned order under Section 19(1) by the Children's Court determining whether a child in conflict with law (CICL) needs to be tried as an adult or as a child is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality - Without such an order, the Children's Court cannot assume jurisdiction to proceed with a Sessions trial. Sagar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2026 INSC 692
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 – Rule 13 – Trial of Juvenile as an Adult without Section 19(1) determination – Effect of Non-compliance – Held: Even if a preliminary assessment under Section 15 is duly conducted by the Juvenile Justice Board, the failure of the Children's Court to independently apply its mind and pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) strikes at the very root of the protective framework - The distinct statutory differentiation between a Sessions trial (for adults) and a summons inquiry (for children) makes this step substantive - Non-compliance vitiates the entire trial - Since the appellant has crossed 24 years of age and spent over six years in incarceration, a meaningful retrospective assessment is unfeasible; hence, the conviction and sentence are set aside - Direction to Trial Courts – Held that all Children's Courts across the country, upon receipt of records transferred under Section 18(3), must first take cognizance and immediately pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) after due application of mind before taking any further steps in the trial. [Relied on Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 15 SCC 678; Thirumoorthy v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, (2024) 12 SCC 307; Paras 10-15] Sagar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2026 INSC 692
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Ecological Character and Deemed Forest - The mere existence of trees or vegetation on a portion of the acquired land does not ipso facto elevate its status to a "forest" or "deemed forest" - Unless the relevant statutory planning framework or Master Plan recognizes the land as forest land at its inception, a subsequent proliferation of vegetation cannot be permitted to subvert an expert planning framework or derail a public infrastructure project. [Relied on Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, (1976) 3 SCC 719; State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471; Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552; Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 45; Paras 84-89] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Eminent Domain, Choice of Land, and Excess Acquisition - The determination of which land is suitable and the precise extent of land required for a public project falls squarely within the domain of the expert planning authorities exercising the power of eminent domain - In the absence of manifest arbitrariness, mala fides, or demonstrable error, courts must exercise judicial restraint and refrain from substituting their own opinion for that of the executive - Landowners cannot dictate which parcels of land the State should acquire or resist acquisition merely by pointing out alternative feasible governmental lands. [Paras 76-82] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nature of LAO's Report and Recording of Reasons - The LAO, while submitting a report under Section 5A, acts as an administrative authority and not a judicial or quasi-judicial body - The report need not be a detailed, speaking order in the judicial sense - The inclusion of the phrase "objections are not being considered" in the concluding portion of the report must be read contextually to mean that the objections were considered on their merits but did not deserve acceptance in view of the paramount public purpose - Brevity of reasons is not synonymous with an absence of reasons, and a concise report does not vitiate the proceedings. [Paras 38-64] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Prior Survey and Publication - Section 4(2) of the Act uses the expression "Thereupon", which unequivocally demonstrates that the statutory power to enter and survey kicks in only after the publication of the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) - The statute does not mandate a comprehensive survey or prior newspaper publication as a condition precedent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification. [Paras 70-75] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Section 5A – Scope and Compliance of Mandatory Right of Hearing - Substantial Compliance vs. Flagrant Violation - The right to object under Section 5A(1) followed by an oral hearing under Section 5A(2) flows directly from the twin principles of natural justice and due process - this mandatory safeguard is not a mere ritual - Where landowners appeared on multiple dates but chose to remain absent on the date fixed for filing a rejoinder, and subsequently maintained silence for over a month until the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) forwarded the report, the landowners, by their own conduct, abandoned their right of hearing - They cannot subsequently complain of a denial of hearing - A mere error or indiscretion by the LAO in not granting an additional date of opportunity to an absent party does not amount to malice in law and cannot invalidate the acquisition. [Paras 38-52] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Key Legal Principles & Findings – i. Presumption of Constitutionality of Subordinate Legislation - There is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality and validity of subordinate legislation - The burden lies heavily on the challenger to displace this presumption by showing a lack of legislative competence, violation of fundamental or constitutional rights, or manifest arbitrariness; ii. Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development - The scope of "regulation of mines and mineral development" under List I Entry 54 of the Seventh Schedule, and implemented through the MMDR Act, is wide. The fixation of rates of royalty under Section 9 read with the Second Schedule falls squarely within this regulatory domain – iii. Distinction Between Measure of Levy and Nature of Levy - The standard or measure adopted to quantify a levy is a matter of legislative policy and convenience - The standard does not need to be contoured along the lines that define the character of the levy itself - The inclusion of royalty, DMF, and NMET in the "sale value" (as a measure to compute ASP) does not alter the ad valorem nature of the royalty levy under Section 9; iv. Regulatory Measures to Prevent Tax/Revenue Evasion - Legislative and subordinate rule-making bodies possess the competence to design and enact measures/fictions specifically aimed at suppressing price manipulation, under-invoicing, and revenue evasion - Regulatory data showed that some miners deployed clever stratagems (such as showing nil or very low despatches when ex-mine prices were high, and vice versa) to artificially depress the ASP and keep their premium and royalty payouts down. Hence, loading royalty, DMF, and NMET onto the sale value is a valid regulatory antidote to check evasion and arrive at a fair mineral value; v. No Article 14 Violation (Comparison with Coal Disallowed) - Miners of iron ore cannot claim discrimination by comparing themselves to coal miners (where statutory dues are excluded from actual price calculations) - Coal has a distinct price mechanism (the National Coal Index based on notified PSU prices and imports) and has historically been subject to a public sector monopoly, whereas iron ore prices are determined by highly competitive, private-sector market forces prone to under-invoicing - Comparing coal with iron ore is akin to comparing apples and oranges; v. No Violation of Article 19(1)(g) / Public Interest Over Individual Hardship - The restriction imposed is reasonable and proportional - Individual hardship cannot override a regulatory measure designed in the larger public interest to prevent substantial losses to the state exchequer - The grundnorm is "Salus populi suprema lex" (regard for the public welfare is the highest law), and private rights must cede to public interest. [Relied On State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. P. Krishnamurthy and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 517; Sardar Baldev Singh v. CIT, Delhi & Ajmer, [1961] 1 SCR 482; Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India and Another, (2024) 10 SCC 1; Ralla Ram v. Province of East Punjab, 1948 SCC Online FC 9; Union of India & Ors. v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. and Others, (1984) 1 SCC 467; Hingir-Rampur Coal Co., Ltd. and Others v. State of Orissa and Others, [1961] 2 SCR 537; Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen, [1965] 1 SCR 909; Union of India and Another v. A. Sanyasi Rao and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 465; State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] SCR 597; Paras 61-64, 72-78, 87-102]. Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 664 : 2026 INSC 679
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Section 15(1), 15(3) — Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964 – Rules 10 and 21 — Power of State to Revise Royalty and Dead Rent — Implied Conditions in Statutory Leases - The lack of an express provision in a mining lease deed for fluctuating or revised rates of royalty and dead rent does not preclude the State Government from increasing these rates during the subsistence of the lease - A mining lease is a statutory grant, and the liability to pay royalty and dead rent remains dynamic and subject to revisions validly made under the statutory rules - The requirement to comply with the statutory regime constitutes an implied condition inherent in the lease deed. [Paras 24 – 30, 42-50] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Section 9, Second Schedule (Entry 24) – Minerals (Other than Atomic and Hydro Carbons Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016 – Rule 38, Rule 42 – Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017 – Rule 45(8)(a) – Constitutional Validity of Explanations to Rule 38 (2016 Rules) and Rule 45(8)(a) (2017 Rules) – Inclusion of Royalty, DMF, and NMET in Sale Value for ASP Calculation – Held - The Explanations appended to Rule 38 of the 2016 Rules and Rule 45(8)(a) of the 2017 Rules which bar the deduction of royalty, District Mineral Foundation (DMF) payments, and National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) payments from the "gross amount" when computing the "sale value" for the determination of Average Sale Price (ASP) are constitutionally valid - They do not violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, nor are they ultra vires Section 9 of the MMDR Act. Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 664 : 2026 INSC 679
Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1964 (Punjab) — Form-L (Clause 19) — Interpretation of "No Interest" Clause on Security Deposit — Two Limbs of a Clause to be Read Harmoniously - Clause 19 of Form-L consists of two interdependent limbs: (i) the security deposit shall carry no interest, and (ii) it shall be refunded within three months from the date of expiry or sooner determination of the contract - The correct interpretation is that the deposit earns no interest during the currency of the contract and up to the stipulated period for refund - The State cannot retain interest-free money in perpetuity - If the State fails to refund or adjust the security deposit within three months from the date of determination of the contract, the contractor becomes entitled to interest for the period of delay beyond the specified three months - The High Court erred in declaring Clause 19 as unsustainable in law and granting interest from the initial date of deposit. [Relied on National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises And Another, (2003) 7 SCC 410; Shri Hanuman Cotton Mills and Others Vs. Tata Aircraft Limited, (1969) 3 SCC 522; Venkataraman Krishnamurthy And Another v. Lodha Crown Buildmart Private Limited, (2024) 4 SCC 230; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd, (2013) 5 SCC 470; Shree Ambica Medical Stores v. Surat People's Coop. Bank Ltd., (2020) 13 SCC 564; Paras 23-31] State of Haryana v. Jai Durgaa Finvest, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 671 : 2026 INSC 678
Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1964 (Punjab) — Rule 33 and Form-L (Clause 19) — Security Deposit — Entitlement to Interest — Contractual Terms vs. Judicial Interpretation — Writ Jurisdiction - The function of the Court in contractual matters is to interpret and enforce the agreed terms, not to rewrite them, howsoever reasonable a substituted term may appear to be - In commercial contracts where parties stand on an equal footing and accept unambiguous terms with free will and open eyes, they cannot later assail a clause as unconscionable or oppressive merely because it proves to be onerous. State of Haryana v. Jai Durgaa Finvest, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 671 : 2026 INSC 678
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & 168 — Just and Fair Compensation — Determination of Annual Income — Assessment based on Income Tax Returns (ITRs) — Distinction between Salaried and Self-Employed Individuals — Held, there can be no hard and fast formula for computing the annual income of a deceased person/claimant - ITRs, being statutory documents, serve as an important reference point - For salaried individuals, only the ITR of the previous year is sufficient to showcase the annual income from salary, as the financial impact of recent promotions might only reflect in that year - for self-employed individuals or those carrying out their own business, the average income specified in the ITRs of up to the previous three years should be taken as the reference point, owing to fluctuations in business income - In cases where ITRs are filed after death or income fluctuates, surrounding circumstances such as the nature, geographic location, category, growth pattern, and potential growth of the business, as well as instances of initial negative income, must be taken into consideration. [Paras 11 - 20] Rashmirekha Tripathy v. Sriram General Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 654 : 2026 INSC 661
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Just Compensation — Fundamental Objective — The objective behind the claim process under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to grant 'just and fair compensation' - Compensation is a rough estimate to ease the financial burden on dependents, aiming to place them in nearly the same financial position as if the victim had lived their natural span of life, without being arbitrary, niggardly, or a source of profit. [Relied on V. Pathmavathi and Ors. v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. (2026 SCC OnLine SC 158); Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2013) 9 SCC 65; Anant v. Pratap and Anr. (2018) 9 SCC 450; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur (2021) 11 SCC 780; Rajjo and Ors v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors. 2022 SCC Online SC 1699; Paras 18-24] Rashmirekha Tripathy v. Sriram General Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 654 : 2026 INSC 661
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 201 read with Section 34 – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence – Accused caught red-handed transporting dead body – Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were intercepted by the police at 5:00 a.m. while riding a motorcycle carrying a bundle from which a human foot was protruding - The bundle contained the dead body of the deceased, and the motorcycle silencer plate had bloodstains matching the blood group of the deceased - Held, the physical reality of the accused transporting the deceased victim's tied body undeniably establishes that they knowingly caused the evidence of the commission of an offence to disappear with the explicit intention of screening the offenders - The conviction and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year sustained. [Paras 35 - 40] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 read with Section 34 & Section 120B – Murder and Criminal Conspiracy – Circumstantial Evidence – Golden principles governing circumstantial evidence – Broken chain of events – The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove that the wife (Accused No. 1) along with her lover (Accused No. 2) and others conspired to murder the deceased - Held, the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - There was no positive legal evidence proving a reciprocal love affair/motive, the "last seen" theory was found weak and unreliable, and the call detail records directly contradicted the prosecution's narrative - Suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof - The acquittal of the accused persons for the charges of murder and criminal conspiracy upheld. [Paras 19-39] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 – Murder – Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Ante-timed FIR – Post-investigation document - The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of conviction passed by the Trial Court and the High Court, extending the benefit of doubt to the surviving accused appellants - The prosecution failed to establish the time and manner of the occurrence beyond a reasonable doubt - Key Legal Principles Highlighted – i. Delay in Forwarding FIR to the Magistrate - Effect of Unexplained Delay - While a mere delay in transmitting the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 157 CrPC is not automatically fatal in isolation, it assumes immense significance when there are serious allegations of ante-timing, ante-dating, and manipulation - Cumulative Assessment - Where such delay is accompanied by other grave investigative lapses and suspicious attendant circumstances, it ceases to be a mere procedural irregularity - The delay must be assessed cumulatively to test the authenticity and spontaneity of the prosecution's narrative; ii. Investigative Lapses and Unnatural Conduct - Failure to Secure Dead Body - The dead body of the deceased remained lying abandoned at the place of occurrence throughout the intervening night despite the police station being merely miles away and the police having arrived at the spot on the night of the incident - Such inaction, alongside the total lack of interest by family members to guard the body, is entirely inconsistent with ordinary human behavior and standard police procedure - Delayed Inquest and Post-Mortem: Inquest proceedings were postponed to the next morning, and the post-mortem examination was delayed by nearly 48 hours without any plausible justification - Contradictions in Police Records: The complainant (PW-1) explicitly denied that certain relatives accompanied him to the police station - the contemporaneous General Diary entry recorded their arrival, striking at the very genesis of the prosecution case. [Relied on Pala Singh v. State of Punjab (1972) 2 SCC 640; Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala (2022) 8 SCC 440; Paras 44-64] Deo Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 680 : 2026 INSC 707
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 304B & 498A – Dowry Death and Matrimonial Cruelty – Standard of Proof – Evaluation of Exculpatory Dying Declaration and Defence Evidence - Conviction of the husband reversed - The prosecution failed to present independent witnesses from the neighborhood to substantiate the generalized and bland allegations of a continuous ₹50,000 dowry demand - the defence effectively dismantled the prosecution's narrative by producing substantial documentary proof of significant joint financial investments, medical receipts showing immediate specialized treatment provided by the husband, and call records demonstrating prompt notification to the bride's family - The exculpatory dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, combined with the absolute lack of a post-mortem or medical forensic analysis of the burn patterns, created a compelling probability of an accidental fire rather than homicide or suicide. [Paras 27-35] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Section 47 – Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 – Medical Invalidation vs. Statutory Protection – Mandatory duty of the employer to accommodate employees acquiring disability during service - The Respondent, enrolled as a Constable (Driver) in the CRPF in 1985, developed a severe ophthalmic condition in 1996 resulting in permanent visual impairment - He was medically invalidated from service via an order dated March 11, 1998, without being considered for an alternate posting - Held: Section 47 of the PwD Act, 1995 casts an unqualified, absolute, and mandatory statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee who acquires a disability during service - The employer is legally bound to shift the disabled employee to another post with the same pay scale and benefits, or adjust them against a supernumerary post until superannuation - The appellants failed to act as a model employer by converting a welfare provision into a dead letter. [Paras 74, 75] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Section 47(2) Proviso – Exemption Notification dated 10th September 2002 – Prospective Application – Exemption does not validate past statutory breaches - The Appellants relied on a Government of India notification dated September 10, 2002, issued under the proviso to Section 47(2), exempting combatant personnel of Central Para Military Forces (including CRPF) from the application of Section 47 – Held that Delegated legislation and exemption notifications taking establishments out of the purview of beneficial social legislations are ordinarily prospective and must be strictly construed - The notification contained no express words or necessary implications to apply retrospectively - The respondent's ouster occurred in 1998 when Section 47 applied to the CRPF with full force - A subsequent exemption notification cannot operate retrospectively to legitimise an act that was void ab initio. [Paras 55 – 60] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689
Pleadings and Reliefs – Pleadings are foundational to a claim – A court cannot grant a relief or decide a case on grounds entirely outside the pleadings of the parties without a proper amendment of the plaint – Held, no amount of evidence on a plea not put forward in the pleadings can be looked into to grant any relief. Relief premised on a case not pleaded cannot be sustained in law. [Relied on Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Nagappa Chettiar, (1953) 1 SCC 456; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491; Paras 18-22] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705
Precedent – Doctrine of Per Incuriam – Conflict between Three-Judge Bench and Co-ordinate Bench Decisions – The judgment in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021) 9 SCC 292, which held the 2002 Remission Policy to be of purely statutory origin and superseded by the 2008 Policy, runs counter to the controlling three-judge Bench precedent in State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216 - Since the 1993 and 2002 policies are identical regarding the source of constitutional power under Article 161, Raj Kumar (supra) is declared per incuriam as its ratio is irreconcilable with the larger Bench decision in Jagdish (supra) – Held that a Bench of lesser strength cannot dissent from the view taken by a Bench of larger strength. [Paras 14 -18] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667
Professional Accountability & Legal Reforms — Performance Audit of Bar Councils — Continuing Legal Education (CLE) & National Legal Academy (NLA) — Held: The right of self-regulation must withstand scrutiny on transparency and institutional effectiveness - The Bar Council of India (BCI) is directed to undertake a comprehensive performance audit of its disciplinary mechanisms and those of State Bar Councils to tackle systemic delays and pendency - to maintain high professional standards, the BCI is directed to institutionalize Continuing Legal Education (CLE) for enrolled advocates and constitute a team to evolve the establishment of a National Legal Academy (NLA) for post-enrolment structured learning and capacity building. [Relied on Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702; Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases, (2024) 8 SCC 430; Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P., (2023) 4 SCC 1; Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (2024) 9 SCC 606; S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 177; Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (2024) 9 SCC 606; Paras 45-60] Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670
Property Law / Property Maxims – Nemo dat quod non habet – Derivative Title – No person can convey a better title than he himself possesses. A derivative title cannot outvalue the title from which it is derived. If the original owner never conveyed a specific survey number, subsequent purchasers cannot acquire or convey title to that distinct property merely by executing a unilateral rectification deed. [Para 33] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 176 — Failure to Report Offence — Statutory Duty of Institutional Staff — Meaning of "Knowledge" — Discharge At Stage of Framing Charges - Held: The High Court and the Trial Court erred in discharging the alleged Headmistress on the premise that a lack of physical/medical signs of sexual assault gave her a bona fide reason to believe no offence occurred - The phrase "has knowledge that such an offence has been committed" under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act cannot be restricted to direct sensory knowledge or eye-witnessing of the crime; it statutorily includes awareness derived from credible information - When a child victim directly reports an incident of sexual assault to an authority figure or caregiver - it constitutes "credible information" and satisfies the requirement of "knowledge" under the Act. [Paras 45 - 59] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19 & 21 — Scope of Institutional Enquiry Prior to Reporting — Mandate of Prompt Reporting - Held: The POCSO Act does not contemplate or permit any parallel institutional investigation or verification exercise by school authorities to determine the veracity of a child's complaint before reporting the matter to the police - Any such independent sifting of facts or questioning with an aim to discard a complaint defeats the statutory objective. Investigation must strictly follow the reporting of the incident, not precede it, as delays or unauthorized physical verifications can cause crucial biological and circumstantial evidence to disappear. Prompt reporting is a sine qua non for the effective implementation of the Act. [Paras 45, 46-56] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19 & 21(3) — Liability of Co-Accused and Minor Intermediaries — Direct vs. Indirect Information - Held: Criminal liability for the failure to report under Section 21 is confined to those individuals who received the credible information directly from the victim - Other teachers, staff members, or office-bearers who did not receive a direct complaint and acted on a cautionary approach based on the primary authority's assessment cannot be automatically prosecuted for a criminal conspiracy to suppress information or for causing disappearance of evidence under Section 201 IPC in the absence of cogent material - furthermore, by virtue of Section 21(3), minor intermediaries (such as the victim's sister, friend, or the school Head Girl), being "children" under the Act, are expressly exempted from criminal liability for non-reporting. [Paras 60, 61, 63, 64] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675
Public Employment & Labour Law — Regularisation Of Service — Binding Nature Of Larger Bench Decisions - Claims of regularisation in public service cannot be entertained when the initial appointment is rooted in fundamental breaches of recruitment procedures or made against non-existent/un-sanctioned posts - Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the principle of stare decisis dictates that the strict ratios laid down by Larger Benches regarding public employment regularisation bind all courts unequivocally - Co-equal or smaller benches adopting liberal views confined to specific facts cannot dilute or contradict these established Larger Bench precedents. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1; Distinguished: Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 909; Paras 24 - 31] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691
Rent Control Act, 1958 (Delhi) – Distinction from the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980: An essential distinction exists between Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Section 9 of the Acquisition Act, 1980. Under the latter, a scheme becomes effective only after being placed before Parliament and undergoing potential modifications, making it legislative in character - a scheme under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act is merely placed before Parliament and remains administrative - judicial precedents governing legislative bank mergers do not apply to schemes under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act - Held: The components of Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 stood fully satisfied as the original tenant parted with possession and ceased to exist, and PNB occupied the premises without the written consent of the landlord - The judgment of the High Court setting aside the eviction decree was set aside, and the eviction decree passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal was restored. [Relied on Parasram Harnand Rao v. Shanti Parsad Narinder Kumar Jain, (1980) 3 SCC 56; Singer India Ltd. v. Chander Mohan Chadha, (2004) 7 SCC 1; Bhairon Sahai v. Bishamber Dayal, (2017) 8 SCC 492; Paras 13 - 21] British Motor Car Company v. Hindustan Commercial Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 660 : 2026 INSC 671
Rent Control Act, 1958 (Delhi) – Section 14(1)(b) – Protection of tenant against eviction – Sub-letting, assignment, or parting with possession without written consent of the landlord – Statutory Amalgamation of Banks – Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 45 – i. Factum of Parting with Possession via Amalgamation: The appellant-landlord leased premises to Hindustan Commercial Bank (HCB) - a Gazette Notification issued under Section 45(7) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, HCB was amalgamated with the Punjab National Bank (PNB), whereby the original tenant (HCB) ceased to exist and all its rights, liabilities, and assets including the tenancy rights vested in PNB without the written consent of the landlord; ii. Irrelevance of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Transfer: Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is of wide amplitude and encompasses every mode by which possession or tenancy rights are transferred from the original tenant to another entity - The provision does not draw any distinction between voluntary and involuntary transfers, nor does it carve out an exception for transfers executed pursuant to a scheme of amalgamation or to secure compliance with law - The reasons necessitating such a transfer are wholly immaterial; iv. Nature of Amalgamation Scheme under the Banking Regulation Act: The scheme-making process under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is strictly administrative in nature and not legislative - Merely because a scheme framed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is sanctioned by the Central Government and placed before both Houses of Parliament does not elevate it to a statutory enactment capable of overriding the non-obstante provisions of Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. [Paras 11-18] British Motor Car Company v. Hindustan Commercial Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 660 : 2026 INSC 671
SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — "Risk Disclaimer" and "Due Diligence Advisory" as Shields - Investors who choose to invest in mutual funds do so at their own risk and peril under the statutory disclaimer - Committing a regulatory breach to allegedly avert a market loss for investors is not a valid justification for departing from the mandatory regulatory mandate, nor does it absolve the asset management company (AMC) or trustees of liability - The Trustee Company (holding unitholders' funds in a fiduciary capacity) and its Senior Executives/Directors are bound to independently assess and ensure that the course of action adopted by the Asset Management Company (AMC) is in strict adherence to the extant regulations and in the interest of unitholders - They cannot merely "beeline" or concur with the AMC's unauthorized commercial decisions - SEBI levied monetary penalties on the AMC, the Trustee Company, and its senior executives for lack of due diligence, unauthorized extension of maturity dates, and failure to make timely disclosures to SEBI and unitholders - The Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) upheld the penalties while setting aside the AMC's fee disgorgement - The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeals, upholding the findings of regulatory infractions, and imposed exemplary costs on the AMC and Trustee Company. [Relied on Chairman, SEBI v. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361; Para 34, 40-42, 52-55] Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 662 : 2026 INSC 681
SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — Collective Wrong No Defense (Negative Equality)- A market participant cannot seek shelter under the alleged regulatory violations of other participants to justify its own breach, nor does the existence of other violations elsewhere absolve a party of its own liability - Negative equality is not a recognized principle in law; a collective wrong remains illegal, regardless of numbers. [Para 28] Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 662 : 2026 INSC 681
SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — Regulations 25(16), 33(4), 39(1), and Fifth Schedule — Mutual Funds — Close-ended Schemes — Mandatory winding up on maturity — Lack of due diligence in investments — Extension of maturity dates of underlying debt securities beyond the scheme maturity date to avoid immediate defaults — Regulatory compliance vs. Commercial gains - Key Legal Propositions & Reliances – i. Statutory Compliance is Consequence-Neutral - The statutory and regulatory framework designed by SEBI is consequence-neutral - The regulatory regime is strictly established to enforce compliance, irrespective of whether the deviation or breach eventually results in a commercial gain or loss to the investors - The commercial wisdom behind a conscious breach of the regulatory framework, even if done bona fide to protect investors or resulting fortuitously in gains, is beyond the pale of appellate scrutiny under Section 15Z of the SEBI Act, 1992; ii. Imposition of Penalty on Contravention - Penalty is attracted the moment a contravention of a statutory obligation under the SEBI Act or the Regulations is established - The intention (mens rea) of the defaulting parties is wholly irrelevant unless the language of the statute explicitly indicates otherwise. [Relied on Chairman, SEBI v. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361Paragraph 25-35] Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 662 : 2026 INSC 681
SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — Winding up and Redemption of Close-Ended Schemes - Under Regulation 33(4) read with Regulation 39(1) of the 1996 Regulations, a close-ended scheme must be fully redeemed and wound up at the end of its maturity period - The only legal exception is a "roll-over" of the scheme, which strictly requires prior disclosure of all material details to the unitholders, filing with the Board, and obtaining the express written consent of the unitholders - Any unilateral extension of underlying debt assets (such as ZCNCDs) beyond the maturity of the close-ended schemes without a statutory roll-over constitutes a brazen and indefensible breach of the regulations. [Paras 23 - 33] Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 662 : 2026 INSC 681
Service Jurisprudence – Principle of 'No Work, No Pay' – Inapplicability when non-employment is created by the Employer – Held that where an employee is illegally ousted or denied alternative employment mandated by a social welfare statute, the employer cannot take shelter behind the principle of 'no work, no pay' - The situation of non-employment being entirely the creation of the appellants, the respondent is entitled to full restitution, back wages, interest, and costs. [Relied on Kunal Singh v. Union of India & Anr. (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board (2008) 1 SCC 57; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India (2023) 2 SCC 209; Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India (2017) 16 SCC 186; Distinguished: Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh (2015) 4 SCC 421; Para 79-81] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689
Service Law – Promotion – Selection Criteria and Assessment Process – Role of Expert Committees – CSIR Scientists Recruitment & Promotion Rules, 2001 (as amended by Circular dated 01.06.2011) - Interpretation of Rules — Averaging of Marks - The respondent challenged his non-selection for promotion to the post of Senior Scientist - The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and the High Court allowed the claim by interpreting Paragraph 3(b) of the CSIR Circular dated 01.06.2011 to mean that the final suitability score must be calculated by taking the mean/average of the marks obtained in the Annual Performance Reports/Performance Mapping Scheme (APRs/PMS) and the marks awarded on the 'Work Report' - Held: Setting aside the concurrent findings of the CAT and the High Court, the Supreme Court ruled that such an interpretation amounts to adding words to a statutory provision, which is impermissible in law unless there is an accidental omission or an absolute deprivation of meaning - Paragraph 3(b) of CSIR Circular merely mandates that the assessment must be based on both the APR/PMS and the Work Report of the residency period, but it does not prescribe any method of averaging the two scores - In the absence of specific statutory provisions or mathematical instructions governing the division of marks, the method and degree of weight given to the 'Work Report' versus the 'APR/PMS' fall exclusively within the functional domain of the Assessment Committee, which comprises domain experts - The Supreme Court emphasized that for a scientist, the complexity of research captured in the 'Work Report' is of paramount importance, and expert panels must be granted requisite latitude to evaluate suitability objectively without judicial interference, provided there are no allegations of mala fides. [Relied on Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87; Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, (1988) 2 SCC 513; Paras 24-34] Director General, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. Anil Earnest, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 661 : 2026 INSC 677
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 26 – Non-participation of original transferor – A rectification deed executed unilaterally by a subsequent vendor without the participation or consent of the original executant/transferor is legally incompetent to alter the subject matter of the original conveyance or divest the rights flowing from subsequent grants/partitions - Transferees deriving title under an instrument cannot lawfully alter the subject matter of a conveyance executed by another person without the predecessor's concurrence. [Paras 26-35] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 26 – Rectification of Instruments – Scope and Competence of Rectification Deed – A rectification deed cannot, in the guise of correcting an error, substitute the very subject matter of a prior conveyance or alter the essential transaction itself – Held, Section 26 embodies a limited equitable jurisdiction to rectify the expression of a concluded bargain inaccurately reflected due to fraud or mutual mistake; it does not substitute one bargain for another. [Paras 30, 31] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705
Succession Act, 1925 – Section 63 – Effect of Factual Recitals and Illiteracy - Registration Act, 1908 – Sections 34, 35, 58 and 60 – Uninitialed Cuttings in Registration Endorsement - Where an illiterate testator executes a Will by thumb-mark, the presence of material recitals found to be factually incorrect (such as wrong descriptions of relationship and false claims of cohabitation/maintenance) raises a serious doubt as to whether the testator was aware of the contents or understood the disposition - Although the registration of a Will is optional, uninitialled cuttings/alterations at the back page of the Will where the Sub-Registrar records the endorsement (such as striking off the original presenter's name and replacing it with the testator's name) destroy the presumption of validity arising from registration - Such defects deprive the propounder of the benefit of proving that the text was duly read over and admitted by the testator before the registering officer. Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669
Succession Act, 1925 – Section 63 – Execution of Wills – suspicious circumstances – Illiterate Testator and Unnatural Disposition - The burden to prove a Will lies heavily on its propounder - The exercise is not confined merely to proving the signature and attestation under Section 63 of the Act, but extends to satisfying the judicial conscience of the Court that the testator executed the Will with free will, fully understanding the nature and effect of the disposition - Disinheriting a caring wife (the sole Class I heir) in favour of a non-relative is an unnatural disposition that raises a legitimate suspicion, requiring a cogent explanation from the propounder. Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669
Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 59 & 63 — Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 45, 47, 67 & 68 — Proof of Genuineness of Will — Duties of Appellate Court - Adjudication on the validity and genuineness of a Will requires specific statutory compliances, including proving the signature of the testator, evaluating the testimony of at least one attesting witness, and establishing that the testator was of sound mind, understood the nature/effect of the dispositions, and signed out of free volition - An Appellate Court tasked with determining the validity of a Will cannot overturn the Trial Court's findings without discussing these statutory aspects on the touchstone of evidence led by the parties. [Para 11] Lakshmi v. Gopi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2026 INSC 709
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 43 – Doctrine of Feeding the Grant by Estoppel – Inam Lands – Applicability – The doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel or principles relating to the re-grant of Inam lands enuring to the benefit of an earlier alienee can only be invoked when it is established as a foundational fact that the property subject to the earlier transfer and the property subsequently re-granted are one and the same - When the identity of the suit property itself is left in doubt, the legal consequences flowing from Section 43 of the ToP Act do not arise for consideration. [Distinguished N. Venkateshappa v. Munemma, (2016) 4 SCC 147; Para 29] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705