Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 187 – Police Custody and Remand – Extent of Window for Police Custody – Absolute Outer Limit Cannot Be Imposed By Courts – The Supreme Court observed that Section 187(2) and (3) of the BNSS enlarges the window during which police custody (not exceeding 15 days in the aggregate) may be sought, allowing it to be taken...
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 187 – Police Custody and Remand – Extent of Window for Police Custody – Absolute Outer Limit Cannot Be Imposed By Courts – The Supreme Court observed that Section 187(2) and (3) of the BNSS enlarges the window during which police custody (not exceeding 15 days in the aggregate) may be sought, allowing it to be taken in parts during the first 40 or 60 days of detention - This legislative change was specifically intended to address situations where fresh facts or discoveries emerge later in the investigation - imposing an absolute, non-extendable outer limit on custody by courts runs counter to the statutory object of the provision. [Paras 20-24] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 38 – Right of Arrested Person to Meet an Advocate During Interrogation – Ongoing Presence of Counsel Not Mandated – The Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 38 of the BNSS guarantees the right of an accused to meet an advocate of their choice during interrogation, but it does not contemplate the continuous, ongoing physical presence of the advocate for the entirety of each interrogation session - While the court can regulate the manner and distance of the advocate's presence to prevent interference, an unqualified entitlement to continuous presence travels beyond the scope of Section 38. [Paras 22-24] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 & Section 146 – Impleadment vs. Devolution of Interest – Constructive Res Judicata - Although Order I Rule 10 CPC (joinder of proper/necessary parties ab initio) and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC (devolution of interest pendente lite) govern distinct situations, their procedural scope overlaps when determining whether a transferee pendente lite should be brought on record - Once an application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC filed by a transferee pendente lite is conclusively decided on merits against them, a subsequent application under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC predicated upon the exact same registered sale deed and interest is barred by the principles of res judicata - Litigants cannot re-agitate a settled issue merely by switching the specific statutory provision. [Relied on Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1218; B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 860] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXII Rule 10 & Section 146 – Transferee Pendente Lite – Impleadment in Cross-Objections – Fresh Cause of Action - The bar of res judicata does not extend to proceedings/cross-objections where no prior application for impleadment was instituted - Where the main appeal is dismissed for non-prosecution and the transferors fail/refuse to seek its restoration while the opposing party restores the cross-objections concerning the assigned suit property, a material change in circumstances and a fresh cause of action arises - Since the transferor loses interest and the threat of collusion exists, the transferee pendente lite is entitled to be impleaded under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC to safeguard their acquired rights in the cross-objections. [Relied on: Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397; Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon, (2005) 11 SCC 403; Paras 27-38] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 11 & Explanation IV – Res Judicata – Interlocutory Orders – Erroneous Findings of Fact - The doctrine of res judicata applies to subsequent stages of the same proceeding if a question or issue has been decided at an earlier stage - An judicial decision, whether right or wrong, binds the parties unless it relates to a matter of jurisdiction - Where an earlier application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC was adjudicated and dismissed on merits, the findings carry binding effect upon the parties even if based upon an erroneous consideration of facts. [Relied on Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613; State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 319; S. Ramachandra Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao, (2024) 17 SCC 361; Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 1; Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1218; Distinguished on Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman, (1996) 6 SCC 424] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125(1) & Section 125(4) — Interim Maintenance — Adultery as a Defense — Adjudication of Application under Section 125(4) as an Interlocutory Stage - Section 125(4) CrPC — Pendency of Section 125(4) application per se does not bar interim maintenance — Ground of adultery raised under Section 125(4) must be decided after interim maintenance order and before final adjudication — Deferring adjudication of adultery to final disposal is unsustainable - Section 125 is oriented towards social justice, secular in character, and summary in nature to prevent vagrancy and destitution - An application for maintenance is stage one of the proceedings, wherein interim maintenance may be awarded under the second proviso to Section 125(1) - An application filed under Section 125(4) constitutes stage two, and its decision determines whether the case reaches final maintenance under Section 125(1) - If a husband files an application under Section 125(4) alleging adultery, the Court cannot defer its determination to the stage of final adjudication - Adultery, if proved, disentitles the wife to maintenance; hence, the Section 125(4) application must be decided in the interregnum after the order granting interim maintenance and before the final adjudication of the main maintenance petition - If the evidence presented along with the Section 125(4) application ex-facie/on first blush establishes adultery or if the fact is admitted, interim maintenance becomes a non-starter or will be stopped, and the main application will be dismissed - Where the evidence requires proof in accordance with law, interim maintenance will continue during the intervening period while the Court undertakes a review of the evidence to conclusively decide the Section 125(4) application. [Paras 15 - 20] Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2026 INSC 778
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 374 (corresponding to Section 415 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - BNSS) - Maintainability of Appeal — Reversal of Acquittal by Appellate Court — Conviction Recorded for First Time by Sessions Court in Appeal — Whether Second Appeal Lies to High Court - Held: An appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 415 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) is not maintainable before the High Court against a judgment of conviction recorded by a Sessions Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction and reversing an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court - Right of Appeal is a Creature of Statute - The right of appeal is neither an inherent nor a natural right, but a substantive statutory right - It can exist only where it is expressly conferred by law. Under Section 372 CrPC (Section 413 BNSS), no appeal shall lie except as provided by the Code - In the absence of an express statutory provision, no second appeal can be inferred or judicially created on considerations of equity or perceived hardship - Interpretation of Expression "on a trial held by" - The phrase "on a trial held by" under Section 374 CrPC refers strictly to the court which itself conducted the original trial proceedings commencing from the framing of charges and culminating in the judgment and sentence - A Sessions Court exercising appellate powers under Section 378 CrPC / Section 419 BNSS is exercising appellate jurisdiction, not trial jurisdiction - The doctrine that an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings does not transform an appellate court into a court conducting a trial - The decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Arun Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, holding that an appeal lies under Section 374(2) CrPC against a first-time conviction by a Sessions Court in an appeal against acquittal, does not lay down the correct law and is hereby overruled - The only statutory remedy available to an accused convicted for the first time by an appellate court is to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 read with 401 CrPC (Sections 438 read with 442 BNSS) - Where a conviction is recorded for the first time by an appellate court reversing an acquittal, the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 401(1) CrPC (Section 442(1) BNSS) is expected to adopt a more liberal approach and undertake a searching examination of the correctness, legality, and propriety of the conviction, as the accused has not had the benefit of a statutory appeal against such conviction. [Relied on National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi and Another, (2010) 12 SCC 599; Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752; Parvinder Kansal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 19 SCC 496; Jamin and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 330; Paras 27–32, 34–36, 38–39, 53–57, 60–61] Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2026 INSC 770
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 451 & 457 — Interim Custody of Vehicles — Registration Certificate vs. Actual Possession & Financial Undertaking - Interim custody under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC is not an adjudication of title, but a judicial mechanism to prevent decay and misuse of seized property - Registration Certificate (RC) is evidentiary and relevant, but cannot act as an inflexible or sole rule overriding admitted possession, ongoing operational control, and financial obligations borne by another party - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order granting interim custody of the subject vehicles to the respondent company instead of the appellant/ostensible owner in whose company's name the vehicles were registered -The Supreme Court observed that while the registration certificates stood in the name of the appellant's company, criminal proceedings alleging misappropriation of company funds to purchase those vehicles were pending against him - the vehicles were seized from the operational site of the respondent company, the loan EMI instalments were paid from the respondent company's accounts, and an undertaking executed by the appellant permitted the respondent company to retain and operate the vehicles. [Paras 27, 30, 32–37] Krishnan Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2026 INSC 748
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 451 & 457 — Nature and Scope of Judicial Discretion - The power of the Court to order interim custody under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC is a judicial function to be exercised judiciously and expeditiously based on reason and justice - The Supreme Court makes only a prima facie assessment regarding who is best entitled to interim possession and does not adjudicate civil title or ownership. [Relied on N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, (1979) 4 SCC 1; Paras 27-30, 32-38] Krishnan Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2026 INSC 748
Constitution of India — Article 14 — Non-Arbitrariness, Equality, and Fairness in Executive Actions — Denial of Refund for Unutilized Additional FSI Premium — Arbitrary Classification - The refusal of the State/Town Planning Authorities to refund the premium paid for unutilized additional Floor Space Index (FSI) for a residential/group housing project on the ground that statutory regulations only permit refund for specific categories (such as educational institutions, medical institutions, and star category hotels) or specific regions (such as Mumbai) is patently arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14 - The principle of non-arbitrariness and duty to act fairly, justly, and reasonably under Article 14 pervades every State action, including executive decisions and contractual/regulatory matters. [Paras 11–18] Prasad Pandurang Tapkir v. Assistant Director of Town Planning, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2026 INSC 683
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Safegards Against Custodial Torture – The investigating agency is bound by the inherent constitutional safeguards under Article 21 to ensure that the accused is not subjected to any threat, inducement, coercion, physical assault, or third-degree methods during custodial interrogation - Named investigating officials and jail authorities remain jointly and severally responsible for the safety and physical well-being of the accused. [Paras 20-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744
Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Disputed Questions of Fact — Efflux of Time & Remediless Claimants - Where a writ petition challenging non-payment of compensation for injuries/death caused by stray cattle was filed in 2010 and remitted after 15 years, the High Court's Division Bench erred in setting aside the Single Judge's award solely on the ground of “disputed questions of fact” and relegating the claimants to a Civil Court - The Supreme Court held that after such an extraordinary efflux of time, relegating the claimants to a civil suit would leave them completely remediless - On this short ground alone—i.e., the passage of time—the impugned High Court judgment warranted interference and adjudication on merits in the interest of justice. Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774
Constitution of India – Article 311(2) – Protection of Civil Servants – Termination of Confirmed Employees Without Departmental Enquiry – Permissibility - The Supreme Court held that the termination of services of confirmed government servants through a simpliciter administrative order, without conducting a departmental enquiry, is a manifest violation of the procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution – The Supreme Court emphasized that confirmation in service is not a mere administrative formality; it confers a substantive status carrying an enhanced security of tenure and constitutional protection - Even if an allegation exists that the initial appointments were irregular or illegal (e.g., made against vacancies in excess of those advertised), the protected status acquired by the civil servants cannot be undone by an administrative order bypassing the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2) - The holding of an inquiry remains the constitutional rule, and the executive cannot dispense with it at its convenience unless the case strictly falls within the narrowly tailored exceptions under the second proviso to Article 311(2). [Paras 14-21] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743
Constitution of India — Article 32 — Maintainability of Writ Petition challenging Executed Clemency/Remission Powers - Exercise of Clemency Powers — Judicial Review vs. Judicial Appeal - When the President under Article 72 or the Governor under Article 161 has exercised the constitutional power of clemency/remission modifying a sentence, the Supreme Court cannot sit in appeal over such executive decision under Article 32 - The constitutional powers under Articles 72/161 are separate, distinct, and unaffected by statutory powers under Section 432 CrPC - The scope of judicial review of clemency orders passed by the President or Governor is extremely limited and constrained only to grounds such as non-application of mind, mala fides, extraneous considerations, exclusion of relevant material, or absolute arbitrariness - In the absence of such established grounds, a petition under Article 32 seeking further modification of a clemency order passed by the President/Governor is misdirected and not maintainable. [Relied on Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767; Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. (2006) 8 SCC 161; Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107; Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989) 1 SCC 204; Paras 6 – 18] Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2026 INSC 764
Constitution of India — Articles 48 & 51-A(g) — Animal Welfare — Stray Cattle Menace & Compassion for Living Creatures - Directive Principles of State Policy (Article 48) impose a duty on the State to organize agriculture/animal husbandry and prevent cattle slaughter - Under Article 51-A(g), it is the fundamental duty of every citizen to have compassion for living creatures, which in its wider fold embraces cattle spoken of in Article 48 - Stray cattle roaming on public roads cause severe accidents leading to human casualties and unnecessary pain and suffering to animals. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534; Animal Welfare Board of India v. Union of India, (2023) 9 SCC 322; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 176; Paras 11-16] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774
Constitution of India — Compensation — Stray Cattle Attack/Accidents — Quantum Determination & Pre-2020 Ambiguity - While the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 principles cannot be applied as a universal rule in every non-vehicular stray animal accident case, claimants facing pre-2020 incidents (prior to quantified statutory schemes like the Punjab Bye-Laws, 2020/2023) are entitled to an equitable lump-sum compensation evaluated on the specific attending facts of the case - Considering the prolonged litigation and severe injuries sustained, the Supreme Court awarded a lump sum compensation of ₹15,000,000 (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs) to the appellant. [Para 21-25] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774
Constitution of India — Directives / Guidelines Issued to Centre and States on Stray Bovines - Implementation of Laws - All States must strictly implement their respective cattle preservation, protection, and stray control statutes in letter and spirit - Compensation Mechanism - Centre and States/UTs are advised to frame rules or enact necessary amendments to establish a clear mechanism for awarding compensation in accidents caused by bovines/cattle (covering both pedestrian and vehicular accidents) - Mandatory Tagging: Tagging of all animals must be mandated with a 12-digit code to enable digital tracking, link to health/vaccination records, and identify owners who abandon them - Regulated Abandonment / Safe Transfer - Owners choosing to let go of cattle after their economic utility diminishes must ensure safe transfer to recognized shelters/gaushalas, accompanied by an official receipt and database updates - Nodal Officers - Corporations/Departments must depute dedicated Nodal Officers to oversee tagging, digitization of records, and smooth operation of animal shelters. [Paras 19 - 26] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 338 — Powers and Functions of National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) — Nature of Orders / Directives — Recommendatory vs. Adjudicatory Powers — Scope of Civil Court Powers under Article 338(8) - The Supreme Court reiterated that the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) established under Article 338 of the Constitution of India is a constitutional body with a recommendatory and advisory role, but it does not possess adjudicatory powers - The NCSC cannot take over the functions of a court or an adjudicatory tribunal to pass mandatory orders or grant consequential service benefits such as directing the payment of arrears. Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755
Constitution of India, 1950 — Interpretation of "Rights and Safeguards" - Under Article 338(5)(b), the duty of the NCSC to inquire into specific complaints regarding the deprivation of "rights and safeguards" does not confer an independent enforcement mechanism - The words "rights and safeguards" must be read together as a bundle - The provision of safeguards is a function of the Legislature, and the NCSC's role is merely to monitor, evaluate, record factual findings, and make recommendations to the Union or State Government for effective implementation - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that the directions issued by the NCSC demanding the employer to pay service arrears to the employee within 30 days were beyond its constitutional powers and non-est in law. [Relied on All India Indian Overseas Bank SC and ST Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 606; Collector v. Ajit Jogi, (2011) 10 SCC 357; Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633; Paras 9-14] Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755
Constitution of India, 1950 — Limited Scope of Civil Court Powers - The powers of a civil court granted to the NCSC under Article 338(8) are limited strictly to procedural matters required for facilitating an investigation or inquiry (e.g., summoning persons, discovery of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits) - The use of the word "namely" in Article 338(8) underscores the restricted scope of these powers - Such procedural powers do not convert the NCSC into a civil court, nor do they grant it the authority to pass final adjudicatory orders, issue temporary or permanent injunctions, or grant binding reliefs. [Paras 9 – 11] Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Apportionment of Liability Among Joint Tortfeasers - The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) correctly apportioned the overall liability as 70% on the Lift Maintenance Contractor/Manufacturer (OTIS) (primary operational & maintenance failure), 25% on the Maintenance/Facility Management Agency (MES) (failure of oversight, non-maintenance of registers, and leaving the machine room accessible), and 5% on the Premises Occupier (RAW) (residual administrative oversight failure). [Relied on Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 27; Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266 (1889); Paras 33–34] Otis Elevator v. Rashmi Handa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2026 INSC 756
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Comprehensive Maintenance Duty & Negligence - The elevator manufacturer and maintenance contractor (OTIS), having exclusive technical knowledge and contractually undertaking comprehensive maintenance to keep lifts in sound condition, owes a heightened duty of care - Where the contractor was repeatedly put on notice regarding persistent breakdowns, knew that voltage fluctuations necessitated a voltage stabilizer for safe operation, but failed to follow up, halt lift operations, or impart emergency rescue training to site personnel, it cannot evade primary liability - Failure to produce contractually mandated maintenance/attendance registers also invites an adverse inference. [Paras 26-34] Otis Elevator v. Rashmi Handa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2026 INSC 756
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Distinction Between 'Cause of Action' and 'Cause of Accident' - Held, while a technical investigation report may pin human error (e.g., manual release of mechanical brakes via a Brake Release Key during an emergency rescue) as the immediate cause of an accident, the Supreme Court must look at the broader chain of events establishing the cause of action when determining deficiency in service - A persistent, unrectified mechanical/electrical breakdown that sets off the rescue operation cannot be treated as an isolated or standalone event to absolve the maintenance contractor of liability. [Paras 24–28, 30-32] Otis Elevator v. Rashmi Handa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2026 INSC 756
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Section 2(1)(g) / Section 21 — Deficiency in Service — Elevator Maintenance and Public Safety — Heightened Duty of Care & Liability of Joint Tortfeasors - Public Law Rationale & Nature of Passenger Elevators: Elevators, as modes of vertical transportation, function as common carriers in urban spaces - Since passengers exert no control over the conveyance and rely entirely on automation or operators, a heightened duty of care akin to common carriers is legally required to safeguard vulnerable users - In cases of accidents caused by lift malfunctions in public spaces, the manufacturer, operator, and owner/occupier are joint tortfeasors jointly and severally liable to compensate the victim at the first instance - Inter se contractual liabilities are to be apportioned separately without delaying relief to consumers. Otis Elevator v. Rashmi Handa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2026 INSC 756
Cooperative Central Bank Employee Service (Employment, Terms and their Working Conditions) Rules, 1982 / Chhattisgarh Ke Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Karmachari Seva (Niyojan, Nibandhan, Tatha Unki Karya Sthiti) Niyam, 1982 — Rule 5(3)(a) — Deletion of Rule — Power to Amend Statutory Rules — Effect of Non-Tabling of Rules Before Legislative Assembly — Executive Instructions vs Statutory Authority – Held - i. Power to Amend Rules — Applicability of Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 55(1) The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, possesses the statutory power under Section 55(1) of the 1960 Act to frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment in cooperative societies - Applying Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the statutory authority conferred to frame rules inherently includes the power to amend, alter, vary, or rescind such rules - The deletion of Rule 5(3)(a) of the Niyam, 1982 by the Registrar was a valid exercise of statutory rule-making power and was not a mere executive instruction – ii. Nature of Laying Requirement — Mandatory vs. Directory - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 95(3) Section 95(3) mandates that all rules made under the Act shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly - in the absence of any prescribed statutory consequences or penalty for non-laying, the provision is directory and not mandatory - Non-compliance with the laying procedure does not invalidate the rules or defeat the statutory exercise of power by the Registrar – iii. Exercise of Power — Nomenclature and Style of Order - Where a statutory power exists and is validly exercised, the style, nomenclature, or format of the notification (e.g., being styled as a "circular" or letter) does not denude or weaken the statutory authority enabling the act - A wrong reference or improper nomenclature does not vitiate the action if it can be justified under an existing power – iv. Setting Aside Promotion After Long Passage of Time - Where an employee continued to function on a promotional post for 13 years during the pendency of litigation, and the promotion was made pursuant to a valid exercise of statutory power, setting aside such promotion was erroneous - The appellant is entitled to restoration of status, protection of seniority, promotional benefits, and 50% back wages. [Relied on K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1; State of M.P. v. Hukum Chand Mills Karamchari, (1996) 7 SCC 81; Kiran Devi v. Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board, (2021) 15 SCC 15; Paras 10-16] S.P. Chandrakar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 743 : 2026 INSC 769
Court Fees Act, 1870 — Section 8 — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), 26, 28, and 54 — Appeal Challenging Statutory Benefits — Liability to Pay Ad Valorem Court Fee - An appeal preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, before the High Court, challenging solely the grant of statutory benefits such as the additional amount under Section 23(1-A), solatium under Section 23(2), and statutory interest under Section 28 attracts ad valorem court fee under Section 8 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount sought to be avoided - Statutory additions under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), and statutory interest under Section 28 do not constitute collateral or independent claims; they form an intrinsic, integral, and inseparable component of the composite "compensation" awarded under the decree of the Reference Court - An appeal seeking the deletion or reduction of any such statutory component is in substance an appeal seeking modification of the decretal compensation - payment of a fixed court fee is legally impermissible. [Relied on Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh and others, (1995) Supp (3) SCC 25; Sunder v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211; Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika, (1991) 4 SCC 212; Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457; Paras 17-26] Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Ltd. v. S.P. Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 751 : 2026 INSC 773
Criminal Procedure – Custodial Interrogation – Audio-Visual Safeguards and Videography During Transit – While affirming that continuous audio-visual recording and CCTV coverage during actual questioning sessions are salutary safeguards to protect both the accused and the investigating agency, the Supreme Court clarified that an inflexible mandate to continuously videograph every minute of road transit (e.g., over long distances between jail and the interrogation centre) is unworkable in practice due to logistical limitations like signal loss, battery, and security considerations - The requirement stands satisfied by recording actual interrogation sessions and discovery/recovery proceedings. [Paras 20-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — 2021 Office Memorandum (OM dt. 07.07.2021): Held to be ULTRA VIRES and QUASHED - Issued as an administrative order, it provided a perpetual, open-ended parallel route to regularize non-compliant projects upon payment of capped compensation - An executive instruction cannot alter, supplant, or dilute delegated legislation (the 2006 Notification) - It fails the test of proportionality and Article 14 as it treats unequal's equally by equating compliant and non-compliant proponents without establishing a supervening public interest. [Paras 68 - 80] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2026 INSC 761
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Application of Article 142 and Prospective Quashing -To protect supervening public interest (e.g., hospitals, public infrastructure, AIIMS Odisha, airports, slum rehabilitation projects) and resolve legal uncertainty resulting from conflicting interim orders, the quashing of the 2021 OM is made prospective - All ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM remain valid - All pending applications filed under the 2017 Notification/2021 OM shall be taken to their logical conclusion in accordance with law - No fresh applications for post-facto EC under these instruments shall be entertained. [Relied on Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 499; Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati (2020) 17 SCC 157; Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 615; Paras 77-80] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2026 INSC 761
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Distinction Between Notification (Delegated Legislation) and Office Memorandum (Executive Instruction) - 2017 Notification (S.O. 804(E) dt. 14.03.2017) - Held that It is delegated legislation promulgated under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2)(v) read with Rule 5(3)(d) of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 - It carved out a narrowly tailored, time-bound, closed-ended amnesty/violation-management mechanism for projects non-compliant as on its date - It satisfies the tests of reasonable classification under Article 14 and proportionality under Article 21 of the Constitution. [Paras 50, 63, 64, 66, 80] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2026 INSC 761
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Section 3, Section 5, Section 15 — Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 — Office Memorandum dated 07.07.2021 — Ex Post Facto Environmental Clearance (EC) - Mandatory Nature of Prior EC Regime - The requirement of obtaining prior Environmental Clearance (EC) under the EIA Notification, 2006 is mandatory - The core philosophy of the notification ("look before you leap") encapsulates the precautionary principle - A project proponent commencing construction, expansion, or process without prior EC acts in breach of a non-negotiable statutory prerequisite - Such an unauthorized act is void ab initio, and penal consequences (whether criminal or civil penalties under the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023) do not automatically purge or condone the breach. [Paras 34 - 80] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2026 INSC 761
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 65B (Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) — Electronic Records — Admissibility & Regulation of Private Investigators - Electronic Evidence & Private Investigators — Admissibility subject to Section 65B mandatory certification — Lack of legislative regulatory framework for Private Detective Agencies highlighted - Photographs, audio, or video evidence (including those procured via private investigators) are electronic records - Under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, 1872, mandatory certification is a condition precedent to admissibility - Oral evidence cannot substitute this statutory requirement -Admissibility requires relevance to the matter in issue, identification of voice/source, and proof of accuracy by ruling out tampering or morphing - The Code of Criminal Procedure does not recognize private investigating agencies. Concerns regarding individual privacy, data protection, authenticity/morphing of evidence, and lack of regulation/grievance redressal mechanisms for private detectives were raised - The Supreme Court directed copies of the judgment to be forwarded to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, and the Chairman, Law Commission of India, to consider framing appropriate rules/regulations. [Relied on Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Meghalaya, (2000) 8 SCC 323; R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1; Paras 21-24] Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2026 INSC 778
Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 61, 64 & 65 — Proof of Official Documents — Primary vs. Secondary Evidence - Unless conditions enumerated under Section 65 of the Evidence Act are pleaded, present, and proved, an official document must be proved by primary evidence - Secondary evidence cannot be admitted without sufficient and satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the original primary source - Mere oral evidence or uncorroborated letters claiming technical error/data loss cannot override contradictory documentary record entries produced from official custody - The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH), Government of India, and state transport departments are suggested to undertake awareness campaigns through various mediums regarding the necessity of holding valid driving licences, streamline issuance and renewal procedures, regulate driving schools, and make licensing tests accessible in regional languages. [Relied on Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar, (2022) 15 SCC 572; Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 781; Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 169; Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board v. Penjarla Vijay Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2915; Paras 11 - 20]. Reliance General Insurance v. Om Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2026 INSC 767
Limitation / Delay and Laches — Request for Refund vs. Administrative Inaction - Where an applicant seeks a refund of paid statutory charges/premium within three years of payment, the subsequent inaction, delay, or internal administrative movement of files by state authorities cannot be attributed to the applicant to deny relief on the ground of delay and laches - The Appellants are held entitled to a refund of the premium paid towards additional unutilized FSI (₹30,46,290/-), subject to a deduction of 10% (₹3,04,629/-) towards administrative charges - The Respondents are directed to refund the balance sum of ₹27,41,661/- along with simple interest @ 7% per annum from the date of deposit until the date of actual payment, within two months. [Relied on E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, (1974) 4 SCC 3; Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 212; Ajay Hasia and Others v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 72; Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293; Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan and Others, (2023) 2 SCC 643; Para 11-15, 20] Prasad Pandurang Tapkir v. Assistant Director of Town Planning, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2026 INSC 683
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 2(28), 2(34) & 39 — Motor Vehicle — Public Place — Reach Stacker — Exemption from Definition of Motor Vehicle – Held - 1. Inland Container Depot (ICD) is not a “Public Place”: An Inland Container Depot (ICD) being a custom-bonded area under Section 7 of the Customs Act, 1962, where access is restricted only to authorized personnel, does not constitute a "public place" under Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Members of the general public cannot claim entry to such premises as a matter of right - 2. “Reach Stacker” is excluded from the definition of “Motor Vehicle”: A Reach Stacker—a heavy machine operating on wheels designed exclusively to lift and stack shipping containers within restricted/enclosed industrial areas—does not qualify as a "motor vehicle" under Section 2(28) of the Act - Since it exceeds maximum permissible road weight limits, lacks general road safety features, requires reinforced surfaces, and is used solely in confined spaces, it falls under the exclusionary second part of Section 2(28) (a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or enclosed premises) - 3. Registration Requirement: Where transport authorities certify that a machine is a special type adapted for enclosed premises and does not fall within Section 2(28), non-registration under Section 39 is not a mere omission or violation, but a consequence of it not being a "motor vehicle". [Relied on Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 48; Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1974) 2 SCC 777; Goodyear India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 752; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Ltd. v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; distinguished from Natwar Parikh & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 7 SCC 364; Western Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 11 SCC 613; Paras 11-15] Container Corporation of India v. Rishi Ranjan Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 740 : 2026 INSC 763
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 3, 5 & 149 — Driving Licence — Non-renewal/Expired Licence — Breach of Policy Conditions — Liability of Insurer — Pay and Recover - Where a driving licence had expired and remained unrenewed for a substantial duration (between 2007 and 2010) covering the date of the accident, the High Court erred in blindly relying upon oral testimony and an official letter alleging technical loss of data without corroborative official records - Secondary evidence cannot replace primary documentary evidence unless foundational circumstances under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are pleaded and established - The owner owes a duty to verify that the driver holds an effective driving licence and takes reasonable care to get it renewed upon expiry - Failure of the owner to produce evidence of checking the licence or taking steps for its timely renewal amounts to a breach of policy terms, exonerating the insurer from ultimate liability - applying the doctrine of 'pay and recover', the Supreme Court directed the insurer to satisfy the compensation award first and recover the same from the driver and owner. [Paras 10–12, 14–18]. Reliance General Insurance v. Om Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2026 INSC 767
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 45 & 53 [Corresponding to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — Sections 2(17) & 4] — Sentence of Imprisonment for Remainder of Natural Life — Validity & Constitutionality - Sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission (special category sentence) in lieu of death penalty is valid and constitutional - Section 53 read with Section 45 IPC explicitly contemplates life imprisonment as imprisonment for the rest of the natural life of the convict (i.e., until their last breath) - The judicial substitution of death penalty with life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission in select "rarest of rare" cases is well-founded and does not violate constitutional or statutory rights. [Paras 9-12] Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2026 INSC 764
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197 – Role of Sanctioning Authority - The sanctioning authority must independently apply its mind to the materials placed before it without acting under external force, coercion, or political dictate - Granting sanction upon reconsideration on identical material especially under political pressure—vitiates the sanction order and amounts to an abuse of process. [Relied on Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622; State of H.P. v. Nishant Sareen, (2010) 14 SCC 527; Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 53; State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92; Paras 8-13] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Grant or Refusal of Sanction – Reconsideration / Review of Order Refusing Sanction – Power of Review – Scope and Standard of Evaluation - No Express Power of Review - Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 does not contain any express provision regarding review or reconsideration of the matter by the sanctioning authority once the power to grant or refuse sanction has already been exercised – i. Review on Same Material Impermissible - A mere change of opinion per se on the exact same material is completely impermissible and cannot form the ground for reviewing an earlier order that refused to grant sanction – ii. When Review is Permissible - A review of an order refusing sanction is permissible only when fresh materials are collected by the investigating agency, which were not available at the earlier instance, provided there is a proper application of mind to such new materials – iii. External Pressure and Extraneous Dictates Vitiates Sanction - Sanction for prosecution is a statutory safeguard designed to protect innocent public servants from frivolous, vexatious, and unsubstantiated allegations - The decision-making process under Section 19 cannot be influenced by political dictates, extraneous considerations, or pressure exerted by higher authorities (such as the Chief Minister's office); iv. Standard of Evaluation by Sanctioning Authority - If the administrative/sanctioning authority itself expresses reasonable doubts and suspicions regarding the demand of bribe, the trap laid, or the recovery of money, sanction ought to be declined - Where two views are reasonably possible on the materials produced, the view exonerating the officer should be taken. [Paras 7 - 12] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act) (Maharashtra) — Development Control Regulations — Refund of Premium for Unutilized FSI - Where an applicant pays premium for additional FSI for a proposed residential group housing construction but subsequently abandons the project and converts the development plan to plotting without utilizing the extra FSI, the State cannot retain the premium on the pretext of a lack of express provision in the regulations - Differentiating between unutilized additional FSI for commercial/institutional projects and residential projects for the purpose of granting a refund lacks rationale and logic - In fact, premium for residential housing impacts end homebuyers directly and stands on a higher or equal footing. [Paras 11-20] Prasad Pandurang Tapkir v. Assistant Director of Town Planning, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2026 INSC 683
Service Law – Ad Hoc Promotion – Seniority – Consultation with Public Service Commission – Directory Nature of Statutory Consultation - Uttaranchal Civil Services (Executive Branch) Rules, 2005 – Rule 24(1), Rule 24(4) Proviso – Uttaranchal Public Service Commission (Limitations of Functions) Regulations, 2003 – Regulation 5(a) – Ad hoc promotion – Counting of continuous ad hoc service within quota for computing seniority – Requirement to consult Public Service Commission for extension of ad hoc service beyond one year under Regulation 5(a) is directory and not mandatory – Held – i. Non-consultation with PSC does not invalidate appointment: Non-consultation with the Public Service Commission does not invalidate an ad hoc promotion or render the service non-est, especially when the default is attributable solely to the State's inaction over a period of time – ii. No fault of employee: Appointees have no control over the State's failure to refer ad hoc promotions to the Public Service Commission; the State cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong/default to deprive promotees of their statutory rights – iii. Entitlement to Seniority: Where promotees were appointed on an officiating/ad hoc basis within their prescribed quota through a duly constituted DPC and continued uninterruptedly till regularisation, they are entitled to the benefit of the Proviso to Rule 24(4) to count their entire continuous officiating service towards inter-se seniority - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the promotee officers and held that 19 vacancies were available in the promotee quota for the recruitment year 2007–2008, establishing that the promotees were promoted within their prescribed quota – The Supreme Court held that the requirement under Regulation 5(a) of the 2003 Regulations to consult the Public Service Commission for continuing ad hoc appointments beyond one year is directory in nature - the failure of the State to seek consultation cannot disentitle the promotee officers to the benefit of the proviso to Rule 24(4) of the 2005 Rules - The promotee Deputy Collectors are entitled to the benefit of regular appointment with effect from 01.10.2007 (the date of initial ad hoc promotion) and to count their continuous officiating service for seniority. [Relied on Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor, 1945 SCC OnLine FC 7; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, (1957) 2 SCC 759; Suraj Parkash Gupta & Ors. v. State of J&K & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 561; Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 715; P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas & Ors., (2025) 4 SCC 127; Paras 28–38] State of Uttarakhand v. Jagdish Chandra Kandpal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 739 : 2026 INSC 759
Service Law — Back Wages and Arrears on Re-Fixation of Scale - Where the original judgment quashing the discharge order directed reinstatement with all consequential benefits but restricted back wages to 50%, the financial arrears resulting from the retroactive grant of Selection Scale and Super Time Scale must also be computed by giving effect to the 50% back wages limitation for the period the officer remained out of service. [Relied on Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; Central Bank of India v. Dragendra Singh Jadon, (2022) 8 SCC 378; R.K. Jibanlata Devi v. High Court of Manipur, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 178; Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 9 SCC 566; Para 40-43] High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Abhay Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2026 INSC 762
Service Law – Equity and Fairness – Absence of Fraud or Wrongdoing by Employees – The Supreme Court highlighted that where no allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, or mala fides is leveled against the employees, and they merely participated in a regular recruitment process on merit, it would be wholly inequitable to penalize them for any alleged irregularities attributable solely to the appointing authority - Depriving employees of their livelihood after years of service and formal confirmation, in the absence of any wrongdoing on their part, lacks justification. [Paras 30-33] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743
Service Law — Grant of Selection Scale / Super Time Scale — Consequential Benefits on Reinstatement — Non-Availability of ACRs Due to Illegal Discharge — Effect of Employer's Own Wrong - Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Rules 49 and 50 — Grant of Selection Scale and Super Time Scale to District Judges — Absence of Requisite ACRs - Employer Cannot Take Advantage of Its Own Wrong - When an employee/judicial officer is wrongfully discharged/dismissed from service and subsequently reinstated with all consequential benefits including continuity of service and seniority, the employer cannot deny career progression benefits (such as Selection Scale or Super Time Scale) merely on the ground of non-availability of the requisite number of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) for the period during which the officer was unlawfully kept out of service - Assessment on Available Valid ACRs - In circumstances where ACRs are short of the required number due to no fault of the employee, or where certain ACRs are uncommunicated/invalid, the employee's entitlement to promotion or higher pay scale must be assessed afresh on the basis of the remaining available valid ACRs, rather than rejecting their claim altogether - Uncommunicated ACRs (such as the ACR for the year 2015 recorded after the discharge order) cannot be relied upon to the detriment of the judicial officer while determining their entitlement to pay scales or career advancement. [Paras 30- 41] High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Abhay Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2026 INSC 762
Service Law – Orissa District and Subordinate Courts' Non-Judicial Staff Services (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008 – Provision (5) of Appendix-A – Appointment Against Anticipated Vacancies - The Supreme Court observed that under Provision (5) of Appendix-A appended to the 2008 Rules, the District Judge is explicitly empowered to make appointments from the merit list not only against "existing vacancies" but also against "vacancies that have occurred or may occur" within a period of one year from the date of the first appointment - This provision enables the District Judiciary to fill anticipated vacancies promptly for administrative efficiency and continuity without undertaking a fresh recruitment process each time - Where the candidates were selected through a regular recruitment process, continuously discharged their duties against sanctioned posts, and were subsequently confirmed in service, the authorities cannot subsequently argue that the appointments were void ab initio or outside the sanctioned cadre. [Paras 25 - 29] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 - Sections 11(1)(b), 13, 14, 29 & 34 – Nature of TRAI's Power – Enforcement of Statutory Regulations vs. Adjudication of Disputes - A statutory direction issued by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to a Multi-System Operator (MSO) to ensure compliance with the Telecommunication (Broadcasting & Cable Services) Interconnection Regulations is a regulatory and administrative action, not an "adjudication" of a dispute - Adjudication involves a true judicial determination presupposing a lis or controversy, resulting in a binding declaration of rights - Merely calling upon an entity to follow statutory safeguards (such as the procedure for disconnecting signals under the Interconnection Regulations) does not decide an underlying commercial dispute, award damages, or mould reliefs - such directions or preparatory show-cause notices do not trespass upon the exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction vested in the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) under Section 14 of the Act. [Paras 14 - 18] Telecom Regulatory Authority of India v. Polimer Cable Network, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : 2026 INSC 742
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 - Sections 29, 34 & Chapter IV – Regulatory Enforcement Mechanism – Limitations on TRAI - While TRAI is empowered to issue directions to secure compliance with subsisting regulations and can record a prima facie finding of non-compliance for the limited purpose of enforcement, it cannot act as a judge in its own cause - Upon non-compliance, TRAI's role is strictly confined to that of a complainant under Section 34 before a competent criminal court (not below a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or a Chief Judicial Magistrate of the First Class) - TRAI cannot itself adjudge the guilt, levy, or recover the fine stipulated under Section 29 - Final and binding adjudication of inter se contractual rights, counterclaims, and damages remains the exclusive province of the TDSAT. [Paras 17 - 19] Telecom Regulatory Authority of India v. Polimer Cable Network, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : 2026 INSC 742
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 - Sections 36(1) & 36(2) – Scope of Regulation-Making Power - The power vested in TRAI under Section 36(1) to make regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act is wide, pervasive, and general - It is subject only to the provisions of the TRAI Act and the rules framed under Section 35, and it is neither controlled nor restricted by the specific illustrative topics listed in Section 36(2) or by Sections 11, 12, and 13. [Relied on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 222; Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 188; Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare, (2002) 5 SCC 685; S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591; Paras 15 - 19] Telecom Regulatory Authority of India v. Polimer Cable Network, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : 2026 INSC 742