Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019 (Haryana) — Rules 2, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(f), 5(1)(g), 7, and 23 — Compassionate Appointment vs. Compassionate Financial Assistance — Structural Distinction — Applicability of Suspension Clause during Pendency of Criminal Proceedings – Held that Rule 23(1) Applies Exclusively to Financial...
Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019 (Haryana) — Rules 2, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(f), 5(1)(g), 7, and 23 — Compassionate Appointment vs. Compassionate Financial Assistance — Structural Distinction — Applicability of Suspension Clause during Pendency of Criminal Proceedings – Held that Rule 23(1) Applies Exclusively to Financial Assistance, Not Compassionate Appointment - The plain, unambiguous language and text of Rule 23(1), as well as its marginal heading, confine its operation strictly to "compassionate financial assistance" - It contains no express or implicit reference to "compassionate appointment" - Extending a provision textually confined to financial assistance to cover compassionate appointment would amount to judicial legislation rather than statutory interpretation - Purposive construction cannot be used to override unambiguous text or plug a perceived legislative gap - The Rules of 2019 maintain a meticulous and deliberate structural separation between the two forms of relief across all definitional, procedural, eligibility, and administrative domains - Rule 5(1)(a) defines financial assistance as a monthly monetary payment, whereas Rule 5(1)(b) defines compassionate appointment as public employment - The two are qualitatively distinct forms of relief - The omission of "compassionate appointment" from Rule 23(1) must be regarded as deliberate - Absence of Sequential Hierarchical Bar for Compassionate Appointment - Rule 5(1)(f) (defining family for financial assistance) utilizes a strict cascading sequencing mechanism using the word "failing" across multiple sub-clauses, creating a mandatory priority bar - Rule 5(1)(g) (defining family for compassionate appointment) merely lists eligible categories (widow/widower, children, dependent siblings) and completely omits any "failing" or conditional language - no absolute statutory bar prevents the consideration of a child's claim for compassionate appointment solely because the widow's claim has not been conclusively determined, particularly where the widow has explicitly renounced her claim - Constitutional Validity of Rule 23(1) Upheld within its Proper Domain - Rule 23(1) is constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution - It is a temporary, regulatory, and preventive measure not a penal one aimed at preventing a person criminally culpable for an employee's death from accessing the welfare scheme - The classification has a rational nexus with its object - its validity does not extend its applicability to the field of compassionate appointment, which it does not govern – The Supreme Court noted a significant anomaly in the Rules of 2019: the lesser form of relief (financial assistance) is suspended during criminal trials for the murder of the employee, while the substantially greater form of relief (permanent public employment) lacks a corresponding safeguarding provision - While the Court cannot rewrite the rules to rectify this lacuna, it is strongly desirable for the State Government to introduce appropriate amendments to bridge this legislative gap. [Relied on Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 329; M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Harpal Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2925; Paras 15-45] Atul Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2026 INSC 640
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC – Reversal of Concurrent Decrees on Irrelevant Considerations – Substitution of Relief Without Prayer or Consent – Permissibility – Held that the High Court cannot set aside a concurrent decree for mandatory injunction and compel the plaintiffs to accept monetary compensation in the absence of any prayer for damages/compensation made by the plaintiff or consent given by their legal heirs - The High Court committed a grave error by reversing the well-reasoned decrees of the Trial Court and first Appellate Court to direct the Executing Court to assess the value of an illegal construction for monetary compensation - Such a course is entirely unsupported by Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, because once a decree is set aside, no executable decree remains in the field for the Executing Court to act upon - a Second Appeal cannot be disposed of by answering hypothetical questions in favor of the defendants without properly formulating and adjudicating actual substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC - Impugned judgments set aside, and matters remanded to the High Court for fresh, expeditious disposal on merits - the Supreme Court explicitly held that modifying decrees and awarding monetary compensation without entering into the merits of the controversy or framing substantial questions of law is legally impermissible - The High Court's failure to adhere to this binding historical remand order in the same case structure forms the primary basis of the current reversal. [Relied on Rajat Kumar & Ors. v. S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 8203 of 2013 and 8281 of 2013; Paras 5, 6] Rajat Kumar v. S.D. Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 637 : 2026 INSC 648
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P.) - Jurisdiction of Consolidation Authorities vis-à-vis Registered Instruments – Void vs. Voidable Documents – While Consolidation Authorities are exclusively invested with powers to adjudicate claims and can choose to disregard a document that is void ab initio, they possess no jurisdiction or power to cancel or ignore a "voidable" document - A voidable document continues to remain valid and binding upon the Consolidation Authorities until and unless it is explicitly set aside or cancelled by a competent Civil Court. [Relied on Khursheed and Another vs. Shaqoor, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2929; Ram Sakal Singh vs. Mosamat Monako Devi, (1997) 5 SCC 192; Paras 46 – 49] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Complete Justice – Enhancement of Compensation – Permanent Disability – Paraplegia - Even though the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was not strictly appropriate as the vehicle was not the proximate cause of the accident, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 to prevent a person with life-altering, grievous injuries (total paraplegia with bladder and bowel incontinence) from being left in the lurch by another round of litigation - Finding the High Court's assessment technically restrictive and insufficient, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹25,00,000/- with interest from the date of the claim petition, keeping the original apportionment of liability undisturbed to serve the ends of justice. [Paras 12-15] Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2026 INSC 637
Constitution of India - Article 235 - The Registrar General of a High Court has no independent or suo motu authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer. The power of disciplinary control over judicial officers under Article 235 of the Constitution is vested collectively in the High Court, comprising the Chief Justice and the companion Judges. The Registrar General can act only as a delegate on behalf of the Chief Justice or a committee of Judges duly constituted by the Chief Justice. Any disciplinary action initiated without the approval or authorisation of the Chief Justice or such a committee suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity and is void ab initio. High Court of Uttarakhand v. Deepali Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 623
Constitution of India — Article 311(1) — Scope of Protection — Employees of Statutory Corporations/Public Sector Undertakings - The protection of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India providing that a member of a civil service or a holder of a civil post shall not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority applies strictly to persons holding civil posts under the Union or a State - Employees of a public sector company or corporation (such as MSEDCL) having a distinct legal personality independent of the Government do not hold a civil post merely because of government ownership or control - Their disciplinary competence is governed entirely by the internal Service Regulations of the Corporation and not by Article 311. [Relied on S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177; Paras 80-110] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the rejection of a nomination paper by the Returning Officer during an election process is not maintainable in view of the constitutional bar contained in Article 329(b). The proper and exclusive remedy for challenging the improper rejection of a nomination lies in an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, after the declaration of results. The Supreme Court cannot carve out exceptions based on the alleged “glaring”, “manifest”, or “arbitrary” nature of the rejection of nomination, as doing so would amount to rewriting Article 329 and creating an impermissible parallel jurisdiction between writ courts and election tribunals. The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the challenge regarding the non-disclosure of a private criminal complaint in Form 26 affidavit. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643
Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - The petitioner's nomination for Rajya Sabha from Madhya Pradesh was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that she failed to disclose a pending private complaint filed against her in a Court, despite receiving summons. The petitioner contended that disclosure was not required under Section 33A of the RP Act as no cognizance had been taken and no charge had been framed. She argued that the rejection was arbitrary and prevented a contested election. Article 329 imposes a clear constitutional embargo on judicial interference in electoral matters except through the mechanism provided by law (election petition). The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner to justify pre-result interference, holding that the cited observations do not dilute the bar under Article 329. Allowing writ jurisdiction in “glaring” cases while relegating others to election petitions would lead to splitting of jurisdiction and judicial overreach. The right to contest an election is a statutory right, not a fundamental right, reinforcing the inapplicability of Article 32. Writ petition dismissed as non-maintainable with liberty to the petitioner to file an election petition. No order as to costs. The Court clarified that it has not made any observation on the merits of the case. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b), Article 19(1)(c), and Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk and Access Demarcated Footpaths — Priority over Motorised Vehicles - The Supreme Court declared that the "Right to Walk" is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India - It is inextricably connected to life and is integral to the right to move freely throughout the territory of India - This right takes within its sweep the right to safe, comfortable, and well-demarcated footpaths alongside motorised roads, which must be treated as primary and take priority over the movement of motorized vehicles - Walking also embodies expressional, congregational, and associational rights. [Paras 20] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Constitutional & Administrative Law — Correlative Public Duties of Local Authorities — Maintenance of Pedestrian Infrastructure – The Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths carries a corresponding, enforceable legal duty upon public authorities - Wherever a road exists, there is a strict public duty to ensure a footpath is demarcated, constructed, and safely maintained - The primary duty-bearers responsible for provisioning and safeguarding this pedestrian infrastructure are Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities, and Panchayats. [Paras 7 - 10] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Constructive Res Judicata – Governing Principles - Constructive Res Judicata (Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC) applies not only to issues actually raised and decided but also to all grounds which might and ought to have been raised in the earlier proceedings. Parties cannot escape the bar by pleading negligence, inadvertence, or accident. The doctrine is a deeming fiction founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure that a litigant is not vexed twice over for the same kind of litigation. It applies equally to civil suits as well as writ petitions under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution. The expression “ought” in the phrase “might and ought” implies a higher threshold than mere possibility. It must be examined through the lens of reasonable diligence and the legitimate scope of the earlier litigation. Courts must ascertain whether the omitted ground properly arose from the dispute and whether a reasonably diligent litigant would have raised it. The applicability of constructive res judicata is fact-specific and not uniform. It depends on: The ambit and nature of the earlier proceedings; The nexus between the omitted ground and the controversy involved in those proceedings. A party who fails to raise a ground that might and ought to have been raised does so at their own peril. The requirements of “might” and “ought” operate cumulatively and without exception. Makardhwaj Ram v. Jagdish Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2026 INSC 636
Constructive Res Judicata – The dispute related to a 1960 family land transfer of 95.80 acres by Mahabir Rai in favour of his mother and son (appellant Makardhwaj Ram). Subsequent sales made by a power of attorney holder were challenged in two earlier suits, which were dismissed. When mutation proceedings were initiated in respect of the remaining land, the appellant filed a fresh suit for declaration of title and possession. The High Court dismissed the suit as barred by constructive res judicata, holding that the appellant ought to have asserted title based on the 1960 deed in the earlier suits. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's judgment, holding that there was no occasion for the appellant to seek a declaration of title over the larger parcel in the earlier suits, which were limited to challenging specific sale transactions. The ownership flowing from the 1960 deed was not in dispute in those proceedings. Applying constructive res judicata in these facts would cause an unduly harsh and inequitable result. The Court emphasised that in family property disputes, particularly long-pending ones, rigid application of technical rules without regard to surrounding facts and circumstances is inappropriate. Judges must understand the context and apply law equitably. Appeal allowed. High Court judgment set aside. Suit restored. Makardhwaj Ram v. Jagdish Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2026 INSC 636
Consumer Protection – Contract of Insurance – Privity of Contract – Third-Party Claim – Maintainability – Held that a contract of insurance is a personal contract strictly between the insurer and the insured - No third party can raise any claims under such a contract - Financier / Pledgee Claim – Failure to prove nature of agreement and surrender – The appellant/financier claimed that the insured had surrendered the vehicle to him, following which it was stolen from his custody - the appellant failed to produce documents proving the surrender, nor did he provide specific details of the theft (place, date, and time), which cast aspersions on his case - Even assuming the vehicle was surrendered, the financier cannot automatically be considered the owner of the vehicle - the insurance company cannot be compelled to indemnify a third-party financier when it was not a party to the contract/loan agreement between the financier and the insured, and had no notice of the same. [Paras 10-15] K. Prakashchand v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 634
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 12(4) - The Act creates a special adjudicatory mechanism for expeditious resolution of consumer disputes. A private contractual arbitration clause cannot override or defeat this statutory remedy. After admission of the complaint, the District Forum is statutorily restrained under the proviso to Section 12(4) from transferring the matter to any other court, tribunal, or authority, including an arbitral tribunal. The consumer cannot be driven out of the statutory forum merely because of an arbitration agreement. [Relied on: Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh, (2019) 12 SCC 751] T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 3 - The mere existence of an arbitration clause in a consumer agreement does not bar or oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora to entertain and adjudicate a consumer complaint on merits. Once a consumer complaint is admitted by the District Forum, it cannot be referred to arbitration, as the statutory remedy provided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is additional and not in derogation of other remedies. T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - The appellant filed a consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service due to delay in handing over possession of a residential flat. Despite admitting the complaint and issuing notice, the District Forum referred the matter to arbitration solely on the ground of the arbitration clause in the flat purchase agreement. This order was upheld by the State Commission and the NCDRC. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of all three Fora. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the District Forum to decide the consumer complaint on merits expeditiously, preferably within one year. T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633
Criminal Jurisprudence — Sentencing — Principle of Proportionality — Mitigating Circumstances — Reduction of Sentence to Period Already Undergone — Appeal confined strictly to the quantum of sentence - The appellant was convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for using a forged revenue document (Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika) to furnish surety/bail in judicial proceedings, and was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment on each count – Held that while offences involving forgery and the production of fabricated documents before a Court of law strike at the purity of the administration of justice and cannot be treated lightly, the sentencing process must remain central to the principle of proportionality - It cannot be reduced to a purely retributive exercise divorced from the factual matrix of the case and the overall circumstances of the offender - The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence pertained to the year 2014, and the appellant had endured the rigors of criminal proceedings for more than a decade - there were no subsequent criminal antecedents, the appellant was not a habitual offender, and the forgery was detected at the threshold stage during bail scrutiny, avoiding irreversible pecuniary or proprietary losses - Noting that the appellant had already undergone over two years of actual incarceration, the Supreme Court found it fit to modify the substantive sentence to the period already undergone while keeping the fine unaltered. [Relied on Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35; Paras 13-26] Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 639 : 2026 INSC 654
General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 24 – Continuation of orders/regulations issued under repealed and re-enacted provisions – Section 24 has no application where the existing rules or regulations are completely inconsistent with the newly re-enacted or substituted statutory provision - Subordinate legislation cannot override or fetter the plenary legislative power of Parliament to amend the principal Act. [Paras 76 - 83] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646
Interpretation of Statutes – Amendment by Substitution – Retrospectivity – "Pen and Ink" Theory – Mere use of the word "substitute" or "substitution" in an amending Act does not automatically make the substituted provision relate back to the date of enforcement of the original provision - Unless an express or implied legislative intent dictates otherwise, a substituted provision operates prospectively from the date it is introduced into the statute book. [Relied on Ram Narain v. Simla Banking and Industrial Company Limited, (1956) 2 SCC 75; Property Owners Association & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others, (2024) 18 SCC 1 (Para 43); Shamarao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, (1952) 2 SCC 1; Paras 38, 44, 46 & 52] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646
Interpretation of Statutes – Meaning of the phrase "May Be" / "May Be Made" – The expression "may be" is predominantly used with reference to the future rather than the past or present - In Section 59(d), the words "may be made" signify the legislative intent to exclude existing regulations - Any interpretation rendering the words "may be made" redundant or superfluous must be avoided. [Relied on Vijay Kumar Shukal v. Lakhpat Ram and Another, (1990) 4 SCC 246; Paras 72-74] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646
Interpretation of Statutes — Special or Local Law vis-à-vis General Law of Limitation — Exclusion of Section 5, Limitation Act — Principles restated — Held: While a special statute may prescribe a distinct period of limitation, that by itself does not automatically exclude the operation of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act - The exclusion must be founded on clear statutory language or a legislative scheme indicating that the prescribed limitation is absolute and incapable of enlargement - Section 9 of the Adhiniyam merely provides a thirty-day limitation period but lacks restrictive expressions such as "but not thereafter" or "not exceeding", nor does it provide a specific, limited grace period - The absence of such prohibitive language demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to insulate the enactment from the general law of limitation. [Paras 23-24] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669
Labour Law - An employer is entitled to send communications to the address furnished by the employee. If the employee changes his residence without informing the employer, he cannot take advantage of his own omission and raise a plea of non-receipt of notice. An employee who remains absent without authorization and fails to produce any documentary evidence in support of the alleged reason for absence (such as mother's illness) cannot justify such unauthorized absence on the basis of unsubstantiated oral assertions. Mere verbal intimation to a superior officer, without any written communication or leave application during the period of absence, is insufficient to explain prolonged unauthorized absence. Rifilis Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Arjun Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 636
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - The Supreme Court dismissed the State of Chhattisgarh's appeal as “absolutely frivolous” and imposed costs of ₹2 lakh on the State for re-litigating a settled issue and causing harassment to the landowners. The Court upheld the High Court's order directing the State to pay enhanced compensation at ₹5,380 per square metre along with statutory interest. State of Chhattisgarh v. Parikshit Singh Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 635
Motor Accident Compensation — Fatal Accident of a Minor Child — Recalculation of Loss of Dependency and Conventional Heads - In assessing the compensation for the death of a 5-year-old child caused by a speeding tanker, the High Court erred in reducing the MACT's award - Applying established legal principles for minor victims, the daily wage was assessed based on the skilled worker rates under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, evaluating annual income with a 40% addition for future prospects and a 50% deduction for personal expenses - Applying a multiplier of 18, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹11,44,628/-, distributed across loss of dependency, consortium, estate, and funeral expenses. [Relied on Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha, 2025 INSC 1244; In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 INSC 388; Lucknow Public School, Eldico v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 422; Paras 17-19] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Conventional Heads – Omission of Filial Consortium – The Tribunal and High Court failed to award any amount under the head of consortium - Held: The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation, and courts must ensure 'just compensation' is awarded even if a legitimate conventional head has been omitted below - The parents of the deceased unmarried son are entitled to filial consortium - Compensation enhanced by Rs. 40,000/- each to both parents (Total Rs. 80,000/-) – Held that the Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact returned by the Tribunal and the High Court unless such findings are shown to be perverse, manifestly erroneous, or based on no evidence. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and Others, (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 24-29] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Inordinate Institutional Delay in Motor Accident Claims — Guidelines for Expediting Claim Disposals — Adoptions of Summary Procedure – The Supreme Court took serious note of the regular feature of systemic, decades-long delay in the adjudication of motor accident claims at the High Court and Tribunal levels, noting an average pendency of 8 years in High Courts and 6 years in Tribunals - Since the Act is a piece of beneficial legislation, long pendency directly denudes its salutary values - Procedural Directives Issued – i. Mandatory Annexures with Claim Petitions - To eliminate repeated adjournments, claimants must strictly accompany petitions with explicit official proof of age (excluding Aadhaar card), formal disability certificates detailing functional impairment from competent doctors, authentic ITRs/salary slips for income claims, and certified medical bills; ii. Listing and Bench Management - Chief Justices of High Courts are requested to issue directives to list matters pending over four years based strictly on chronological order of institution and evaluate increasing the number of MACT roster benches; iii. Summary Procedure Enforcement - Under Section 169 of the Act, Tribunals are encouraged to adopt summary procedures to accelerate expediency - If a Tribunal chooses not to adopt a summary procedure, it must explicitly record reasons for the same. [Relied on Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197; Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 9 SCC 218; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 19-24] Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Introduction of "Loss of Domestic Care" as a Distinct Head - clarified that while 'Loss of Consortium' exclusively addresses the emotional aspects of loss (love, affection, companionship) under the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi, it fails to properly account for the economic lens of domestic contribution - To mitigate this systemic undervaluing, the Court directed that where a case involves the death of a homemaker, a composite sum of Rs.30,000/- per month shall be added under the head of 'Loss of Domestic Care' as a stand-in basic minimum monthly income (provided structural domestic conditions are met) - In cases where the homemaker is also part of the formal workforce, this component shall be in addition to their proven monthly income - This determination is subject to a 10% cumulative revision every three years. [Paras 12 - 20] Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 165(1) & Section 166 – Scope of "Arising out of the use of motor vehicles" – Liability for Natural Calamities / Act of God – Injury caused by the falling of a roadside tree/branch on a stationary vehicle parked to take shelter from rain – Held that for a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act to be maintainable, the motor vehicle itself must play an active role or be part of the proximate cause of the accident - While the term "use" has been liberally interpreted to include stationary or parked vehicles, the mere presence of a victim inside a stationary vehicle where the injury is caused entirely by an external natural event (like a falling tree branch during heavy rain) does not satisfy the requirement of proximate cause under the Act - The vehicle did not play an active role in the accident, as a pedestrian standing under the tree would have faced the same risk - It would be unfair to fasten liability upon the Municipal Corporation under the Motor Vehicles Act for an unfortunate natural occurrence that was not within the contemplation of the authorities. [Paras 10-13] Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2026 INSC 637
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Computation of Future Prospects — Calculation Error by High Court – Held that When an appellate court enhances the base monthly income of a claimant, the percentage towards future prospects must be calculated on the revised/recalculated income, rather than mechanically applying it to the lower income initially assessed by the Tribunal – Held that the claimant suffered an above-the-knee amputation, he will require continuous medical assistance, rehabilitation, and periodic replacement/maintenance of the prosthesis throughout his lifespan - The compensation under this head enhanced from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 2,00,000/-. [Relied on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 343; Paras 14-27] M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 641 : 2026 INSC 655
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 166 – Negligence vs. Contributory Negligence – Stationary Vehicle Hazard – A truck was left stationed in the middle of the road at 3:00 a.m. without parking lights, indicators, reflectors, or warning signs - A Wagon-R car rammed into the truck from behind - The driver and owner of the truck did not step into the witness box to substantiate their plea of tyre puncture - Held: The mere fact that a vehicle collides with a truck from behind cannot automatically lead to an inference of negligence or contributory negligence - A stationary vehicle occupying the road in the dead of night without any warning signs poses an evident hazard - In the absence of evidence from the truck driver, the adverse inference drawn by the Tribunal was justified - The proximate cause of the accident was the negligent act of leaving the vehicle unattended on the road without precautionary measures. [Paras 14-18] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Permanent Disability vs. Functional Disability — Enhancement of Compensation — Amputation of right leg above the knee — Claimant working as a mason — Assessment of loss of earning capacity – Held that while determining compensation in personal injury cases, the physical disability assessed by medical authorities cannot be mechanically equated with the loss of earning capacity or economic loss - The real test is the assessment of functional disability with reference to the specific nature of the avocation, profession, and age of the injured prior to the accident - Application to Case - The appellant, a 30-year-old mason, suffered a 70% physical permanent disability owing to the amputation of his right leg above the knee - The work of a mason is heavily manual and physically demanding, requiring the continuous use and support of both legs - Because of the amputation, the appellant completely lost his capacity to execute his specific livelihood/trade - Restricting his economic loss to 70% based purely on physical disability was unjustified. Consequently, the functional disability must be assessed at 100%. [Paras 20 - 30] M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 641 : 2026 INSC 655
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 166 & 168 – Just Compensation – Educational Profile and Future Prospects of a Student – Death of a 20-year-old bachelor pursuing Chartered Accountancy (Final) and undergoing articleship - The Tribunal departed from the actual proved stipend income and assessed the income at Rs. 55,500/- per month by factoring in his professional trajectory, educational progression, and imminent entry into the CA profession – Held that while compensation cannot be founded on pure speculation or salary benchmarks of unrelated professionals, the determination of 'just compensation' does not admit to mathematical exactitude - The forward-looking assessment made by the Tribunal sufficiently accounted for the professional potential of the deceased - Reducing the compensation payable to the parents at this stage on account of a technical overlap in methodology (adding 50% future prospects over a forward-looking multiplicand) would not advance substantive justice given the long passage of time since the accident. [Paras 19- 23] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & Section 168 — Just and Fair Compensation — Death of a Homemaker — Valuation of Unpaid Domestic and Caregiving Labour — Concepts of 'Loss of Consortium' vs. 'Loss of Domestic Care' — The Supreme Court introduced a new specific head called "Loss of Domestic Care" to overcome the inherent disadvantage faced by homemakers due to overly conservative notional income estimations – i. The Status of a Homemaker – Supreme Court observed that it is ironic to describe a homemaker as dependent on earning members when the household's functioning depends substantially on them - Elevating the terminology from "housewife" to "homemaker" and ultimately recognizing them as "Nation Builders", the Supreme Court emphasized that a homemaker's contribution is critical to human capital formation, social stability, and economic productivity. Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Statutory Limitations regarding Pedestrian Rights — Regulatory Framework Deficiencies - The Supreme Court observed that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (and its 1939 predecessor) is primarily built around the "vehicle" as its subject, making human/pedestrian interests merely incidental - While the Motor Vehicles (Driving) Regulations, 2017 impose general safety duties on drivers regarding vulnerable road users, they fail to recognize the fundamental right to walk or prioritize footpaths over motorized roads - The Parliament has not yet established a full-time regulatory body for motor transport or pedestrian safety under the Act. [Paras 6-14] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi) – Section 59(d) [as substituted by Amendment Act 67 of 1993] & Section 92, Section 95(1) – Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 – Disciplinary Authority – Competency of the Commissioner to dismiss a Category 'A' Officer – Interpretation of the phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" – The short question was whether the Commissioner was competent to inflict the punishment of dismissal upon a Category 'A' officer, given that the Schedule to the 1959 Regulations designated the 'Corporation' as the competent authority for Category 'A' posts – Held that consequent to the substitution of Clause (d) to Section 59 by Act 67 of 1993 (w.e.f. 01.10.1993), the Commissioner was designated as the disciplinary authority for all municipal officers and employees - The phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" explicitly refers to regulations framed after the date of the amendment (01.10.1993) and does not subject the statutory power to the pre-existing 1959 Regulations - The use of the future-oriented phrase "may be made" denotes futurity and prevents the 1993 statutory amendment from being tethered to older, inconsistent subordinate legislation - the Commissioner is the competent disciplinary authority to pass dismissal orders. [Paras 63-83] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646
Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) and False Memory Creation - Invocation of PAS in Bitter Custody Disputes – Duty of Caution - The Respondent-father raised apprehensions of the child being tutored, developing "parental alienation syndrome," and falling victim to "false memory creation – Held that Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) is a highly convoluted and intricate phenomenon that cannot be attributed or imputed to an individual parent routinely or routinely used as a straitjacket formula - Corroborating contemporary mental health developments, the Court observed that PAS is not a diagnosable clinical syndrome but rather a process of manipulation through "alienating behaviours." – held that the Courts must look at specific, identified behaviours found to have taken place within the individual family and must not prematurely label any parent as a promoter of such behaviour without proper, clear material evidence. [Relied on Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518; Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42; Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 231; Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 847; Paras 84-98] Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : 2026 INSC 638
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Mere refusal by a husband to talk to his wife for 13 days does not, by itself, constitute “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Differences and occasional non-communication are natural parts of marital life and cannot be treated as wilful conduct driving the wife to suicide unless supported by cogent evidence of persistent harassment or cruelty. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the husband under Section 498A IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged non-communication caused the wife's suicide. Jayesh Kanna v. Assistant Commissioner Law and Order (West), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 620 : 2026 INSC 615
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Strict Enforcement of PCPNDT Act - the PCPNDT Act must continue to be enforced with utmost strictness. Despite improvement in overall sex ratio, sex-selection practices and deep-rooted patriarchal preference for the male child persist in the country. Dilution of the provisions or leniency towards infractions cannot be countenanced. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Sex Ratio Data & Continuing Concern - While acknowledging improvement in sex ratio at birth (from 896 females per 1,000 males in 2015-17 to 918 in 2022-24 and NFHS-5 figures showing 929), the Court noted that it still remains below the biologically expected level (~950+). Several States continue to report below-national-average ratios. The progress was described as “incomplete and uneven” and only a “partial course correction.” The Court referred to the decline in India's ranking in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2025. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Societal Change Required - The Court observed that true equality and change in societal mentality — where the birth of a girl child is no longer considered a matter of concern — is still a distant goal. Government schemes such as Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, Sukanya Samriddhi Yojana, and others reflect continued efforts to combat systemic bias, but these do not warrant any relaxation in the enforcement of the PCPNDT Act. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Maintenance of Records under PCPNDT Act - Reaffirming the earlier judgment in Federation of Obstetrics & Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India, the Court held that non-maintenance or deficiencies in mandatory records (particularly Form F) is not a mere technical or clerical lapse, but a serious violation that serves as a springboard for the offence of female foeticide. Proper record-keeping is essential to prevent misuse of diagnostic techniques for illegal sex determination. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - The appellant-doctor faced prosecution under Section 23 of the PCPNDT Act for alleged violations of Sections 4(3), 5, 6, 29 and the Rules, due to deficiencies and blanks in Form F maintained at his sonography centre. The Supreme Court upheld the cognisance taken by the Judicial Magistrate and the refusal of the High Court to quash the proceedings, finding no merit in the challenge regarding the competence of the Appropriate Authority (District Civil Surgeon) or the nature of the violations. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The criminal proceedings against the appellant were allowed to continue. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Criminal courts cannot, by judicial directions, introduce a new procedural stage not contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) for the conduct of trials. The procedure for criminal trials, including prosecutions under the PC Act, must be strictly followed as laid down in the CrPC/BNSS read with the provisions of the PC Act. Courts cannot create an additional pre-charge stage for examining sanctioning authorities. Section 311 CrPC, being a general provision relating to inquiries and trials, cannot be interpreted to override or bypass the specific stages of trial prescribed in the Code, particularly the stage of framing of charges. A High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot rewrite the procedural law or issue directions that require all Sessions Courts/Special Courts to examine sanctioning authorities before framing of charge or commencement of trial. The Supreme Court emphasised that while the validity of sanction can be challenged at appropriate stages as per law (including under Section 19(4) of the PC Act), it does not warrant creation of a mandatory pre-trial examination procedure through judicial fiat. Directions issued by the High Court were accordingly set aside. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravi Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : 2026 INSC 650
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Demand of Bribe - Mere presence of a public servant at the place where a superior officer allegedly accepts a bribe is not enough to infer criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. The prosecution must establish a prior meeting of minds and a shared criminal intent through cogent and substantive evidence. In the absence of proof of demand of illegal gratification by the accused, conviction under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained. State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2026 INSC 568
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Ingredients of Criminal Conspiracy — Conspiracy cannot be inferred on the basis of suspicion or mere association. There must be clear material showing a meeting of minds to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. The offence is complete only when such a meeting of minds is established. The prosecution failed to produce any evidence of prior agreement or concert between the respondents and the principal accused. Mere presence during the alleged transaction does not establish the necessary mens rea for criminal conspiracy. Additionally, the withholding of the tape recording of the alleged demand justified drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution. The appeals were dismissed. State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2026 INSC 568
Privity of Contract – Notice to Insurer – Essentiality - Since the insurance company was neither made a party to the agreement between the appellant and the insured, nor was a copy of the agreement supplied to it, the insurer cannot be called upon to make good the loss suffered by the appellant - A letter of subrogation issued unilaterally by the financier without the execution/participation of the insured person is legally invalid – held that the principle in Sundaram Finance Ltd. regarding ownership under a hire-purchase agreement can only be applied when the precise nature of the executed agreement is clear. In the present case, the nature of the agreement/endorsement (whether it was a "Hire-purchase", "Hypothecation", or "Lease") was not clearly specified. [Para 10, 11, 12] K. Prakashchand v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 634
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Custody and Child Psychological Evaluation – Child-Centric Jurisprudence - Sections 24, 33(5), 36, and 39 – Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 12 – Psychological Evaluation of a Child Victim Intersecting with Custody/Visitation Disputes - The High Court modified its initial order for a single independent expert by constituting a four-member multi-layered panel of experts to evaluate a 10-year-old child victim for facilitating reconnection with the father, who is facing active criminal prosecution under the POCSO Act – Held that the High Court's approach suffered from a fundamental flaw as it failed to examine the detrimental impact that a multi-layered evaluative process conducted by numerous professionals could have on the psychological well-being of the child - Legal procedures involving child victims must remain child-sensitive, trauma-informed, and protective of their emotional security - The statutory framework of the POCSO Act, particularly the principle of minimum exposure under Section 33(5), consciously recognizes that repeated legal or forensic engagement carries a severe risk of "secondary victimisation" and "re-traumatisation" - While courts exercising parens patriae jurisdiction are not altogether precluded from seeking expert psychological assistance when POCSO allegations are pending, any such process must strictly adhere to the requirements of demonstrable necessity, institutional neutrality, proportionality, and minimum intrusion – The Supreme Court further emphasized that the emotional growth and welfare of a child are deeply intertwined with the parental subsystem - courts should focus on calling for psychological assessment reports of the parents themselves before subjecting the child to further forensic or clinical scrutiny - The impugned orders of the High Court were modified, and the matter was remitted to the Family Court to evaluate the parent's mental health first and coordinate with the child's existing therapeutic counsellor. [Paras 31, 41- 82, 85-93] Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : 2026 INSC 638
Public Services and Recruitment – Disclosure of Marks for Candidates Outside Zone of Consideration - The TNPSC challenged the direction to individual candidates to reveal the marks of those who failed to fall within the zone of consideration – Held that where a recruitment process has been heavily gridlocked in litigation for over five years, it is in the interest of justice and public interest to disclose individual marks to provide transparency and bring closure to the dispute, provided that the candidates are not granted copies of their physical answer sheets. [Relied on Joint Directors and Central Public Information Officer and Another v. T.R. Rajesh, 2018 INSC 179; Paras 20- 22] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645
Public Services and Recruitment – Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota – noted that the TNPSC contested the eligibility of candidates claiming the PSTM quota based on certificates issued by the Heads of their respective educational institutions, arguing for independent verification through the Directorate of Technical Education - Held: A certificate issued by the Head of the Institution certifying that the candidate pursued their education/diploma course in the Tamil medium is sufficient to act upon, especially when the recruitment notification did not prescribe any additional criteria or require a verification letter from the Directorate of Technical Education. [Paras 19-21] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645
Public Services and Recruitment – Selection Process – Experience Criteria – Retrospective Renewal of Workshop Approvals – Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota – Disclosure of Marks – Broad-based Level Playing Field - Workshop Experience Criteria & Retrospective Approval - Recruitment to 113 posts of Motor Vehicle Inspector-Grade II by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC) pursuant to a 2018 notification became heavily mired in litigation - The Division Bench of the Madras High Court directed a fresh recruitment exercise after verifying candidate experience in petrol and diesel fitted engines, and instructed the State to take a decision on granting retrospective renewals to the respective workshops where candidates gained experience – Held that the High Court's directions were cogent and legally sound - Due to the lack of a uniform policy regarding retrospective workshop approval, decisions left to the sole discretion of the Director were arbitrary - Candidates who gained experience at workshops acting on behalf of the Government, or whose renewal applications were pending, cannot be penalized for administrative delays beyond their control - Directing a conscious decision on retrospective renewal ensures a level playing field, bringing more meritorious candidates into a larger selection pool, which aligns with public interest - No vested right to appointment is created merely by inclusion in a previously revised selection list when the right to participate in the fresh process is preserved. [Paras 15, 16, 17] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645
Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 9 — Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 and Section 29(2) — Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to statutory appeals under the Adhiniyam — Condonation of delay — Held: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not excluded either expressly or by necessary implication from proceedings under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 - The appellate authority retains the discretion to condone delay in appropriate cases upon sufficient cause being shown. [Paras 25, 26] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669
Registered Sale Deed – Presumption of Validity and Genuineness – Minor discrepancies in Attestation – A registered sale deed carries a formidable presumption of validity, sanctity, and genuineness which cannot be lightly brushed aside on conjectures or insignificant peripheral variations - The heavy burden to dislodge this presumption rests on the challenger to prove fraud, coercion, or fundamental illegality - Unlike wills or gifts, attestation is not a statutory requirement for the execution or legal validity of a sale deed - minor variations in the description or residential details of an attesting witness, recorded decades after execution, cannot be treated as material contradictions striking at the root of the transaction or dislodging the statutory presumption. [Relied on Hemalatha (D) by LRs vs. Tukaram (D) by LRs and Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 106; Jamila Begum (Dead) Through LRs. vs. Shami Mohd. (Dead) Through LRs., (2019) 2 SCC 727; Rattan Singh vs. Nirmal Gill, (2021) 15 SCC 300; Paras 51- 59] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652
Remedies — Restitutionary Remedy vs. Motor Vehicles Act Claims — Independent Action for Rights Violation - The Supreme Court distinguished between claims arising out of motor accidents and the violation of pedestrian rights - If the fundamental right to walk on a demarcated footpath is violated due to the failure of state/local actors, citizens are fully entitled to invoke constitutional remedies or public law restitutionary remedies (such as under Sections 38–40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) against the defaulting local bodies - This restitutionary remedy is independent of, and distinct from, any statutory compensation claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [Paras 15 - 20] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Right of Appeal — Nature of Remedy — Fair Procedure — Externment Orders — Civil and Criminal Consequences — Held: A right of appeal is a substantive right and an integral component of fair procedure, particularly where the impugned orders (such as externment) entail serious civil and criminal consequences affecting the liberty, movement, livelihood, and reputation of a person - In the absence of an express legislative command to the contrary, an interpretation that preserves the appellate remedy and advances substantial justice must be preferred over a technicality that defeats it. [Relied on Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 13; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791; Paras 20-27] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669
Right to Information Act, 2005 — Section 24(4) — Exclusion of Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE) from RTI Purview — Validity of Notification — SPE Not an "Intelligence and Security Organisation – The Supreme Court held that the Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE) cannot be classified as an "intelligence and security organisation" within the meaning of Section 24(4) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 - the State Government's Notification dated August 25, 2011, to the extent that it sought to completely exclude the SPE from the application of the RTI Act, is excessive, does not conform to the parent statute, and is bad in law - The sphere of operation of the SPE under the MP Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 is strictly confined to investigating specified offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code (Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII) - It serves as an investigative arm to assist the Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt under Section 7 of the MP Lokayukt Evam Up-Lokayukt Adhiniyam, 1981, which only deals with complaints of corruption, misconduct, or malfeasance against public servants. Neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE is conferred with any jurisdiction or mandate relating to internal security or state/national intelligence - the principle of institutional parity with central intelligence or security organisations listed in the Second Schedule of the RTI Act does not apply. [Paras 13-22] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) - Persons who are forcibly made to consume acid and those who suffer internal injuries due to acid attack, even without external disfigurement, are included within the definition of 'acid attack victims' under the RPwD Act. Shaheen Malik v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 646
Service Law - Appeals by Group-A officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, and CISF seeking OGAS status and relief from promotional stagnation due to IPS deputation - Directions - Complete cadre review for all CAPFs within six months. Review and amend service and recruitment rules within six months with cadre officers' inputs. DoPT to decide on action taken reports within three months. Progressively reduce deputation posts up to SAG level within two years. [Relied: Union of India v. Harananda, (2019) 14 SCC 126] (Para 45) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779
Service Law - Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Whether CAPFs qualify as Organised Group-A Services (OGAS) for cadre-related matters, including cadre review and service benefits, and whether deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to CAPFs causes promotional stagnation for CAPF officers, necessitating reduction. Held, CAPFs are recognised as OGAS for all purposes, including cadre management and service benefits, as per DoPT OM dated 12 July 2019. All OGAS benefits must extend to CAPFs. Central Government directed to complete cadre reviews for all CAPFs and amend recruitment rules within six months to align with OGAS status. To address promotional stagnation, deputation posts up to Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) level to be progressively reduced within two years to enhance promotion prospects for CAPF officers. Ministry of Home Affairs to review service and recruitment rules with inputs from CAPF cadre officers within six months; DoPT to act on reports within three months. Deputation policies remain Central Government's prerogative, but CAPF officers' grievances regarding stagnation and recognition must be addressed to uphold morale. (Paras 43 & 44) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779
Service Law – Direct Recruitment – Recruitment Procedure – Primary Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Societies Limited Staff Service Rules, 2003 – Rule 3, Rule 14(a) & Rule 15 – Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984 – Section 36 – Validity of appointments challenged on the ground of non-compliance with amended Rule 3 due to the absence and lack of concurrence of the mandatory official members (Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Inspector Cooperative Societies, and District Manager, HAFED) in the Board of Directors (BOD) meeting finalizing the appointments – Held, that a public recruitment process can be split into three distinct stages: (i) notification/advertisement, (ii) method of selection (interview/written test), and (iii) final appointment by the competent authority - If the first two stages do not suffer from any fundamental defects (such as lack of publicity, fraud, manipulation, or appointment of unqualified candidates), the entire recruitment process cannot be rendered void ab initio due to a procedural loophole at the third stage - The requirement under Rule 3 regarding the presence and concurrence of non-elected official members is supervisory and salutary in nature, designed to ensure cross-checking and adherence to norms - The absence of such officials constitutes a curable procedural irregularity, not a fatal illegality going to the root of the selection - Candidates who entered service in good faith through an advertised, merit-based process cannot be made to suffer for institutional lapses or procedural omissions committed by the authorities - The third stage of the recruitment process is severable from the first two - The defect is rectifiable by directing the Cooperative Society to reconvene the BOD meeting in strict compliance with Rule 3 to re-examine the qualifications and recommendations of the selected candidates, without reopening the validly concluded initial phases of advertisement and interview - Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside and appeal allowed with directions. [Paras 20-22, 40-52, 60-64] Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2026 INSC 641
Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — De Novo Adjudication before Labour Court — Right to Fresh Post-Enquiry Show-Cause Notice on Quantum of Punishment - Where a domestic enquiry is found to be defective/perverse and the employer successfully proves the misconduct by leading independent evidence de novo before the Labour Court, the disciplinary authority cannot mechanically impose the penalty of dismissal by relying solely on the original show-cause notice that was founded upon the vitiated domestic enquiry - Even if the finding of misconduct attains finality, the regulatory mandate of an explicit post-enquiry notice (such as Regulation 88(j) of the MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations, 2005) requires a fresh application of mind by the disciplinary authority to the findings that ultimately survived the de novo adjudication - The delinquent employee must be given a fresh opportunity to show cause and plead mitigating or extenuating circumstances against the proposed punishment in light of the post-remand findings. [Relied on Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727; Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management, (1973) 1 SCC 813; Paras 38-56] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Service Law — Proportionality of Punishment — Doctrine of Proportionality — Dismissal from Service - Dismissal from service is the severest form of penalty which leaves a permanent stigma, impairs future public employment prospects, and devastates the employee and their dependent family members - The mere fact that a proved act falls within the broad head of "misconduct" does not mean dismissal must follow as a matter of course - Where the charges involve internal office indiscipline, insubordination, or minor tampering with office documents, but completely lack any element of financial misappropriation, corruption, moral turpitude, or proven pecuniary loss to the employer, a punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate for an employee with over two decades of unblemished service - The disciplinary authority must carefully evaluate mitigating factors such as length of service, age, past record, and the absence of dishonesty to examine whether a lesser penalty would meet the ends of justice. [Relied on Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, AIR 2010 SC 75; Paras 105-111] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Service Law — Quantum of Punishment — Amalgam of Penalties — Double Punishment for Single Misconduct - A disciplinary authority acts illegally and without jurisdiction if it creates an amalgam of separate substantive penalties for the same misconduct unless expressly authorized by the rules - Where an employee is visited with the ultimate penalty of dismissal, an additional direction in the same order treating the entire past period of suspension pending enquiry as a substantive "punishment" is impermissible and cannot operate as an independent or additional penalty - The monetary and service consequences of the suspension period must strictly be decided only in terms of the regulatory provisions governing regularizations (Regulation 88(a)(v)), which explicitly protect subsistence allowance already paid or payable. [Relied on Union of India v. S.C. Parashar, (2006) 3 SCC 167; Paras 84-89] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Service Law — Suspension — Prolonged Suspension and Entitlement to Subsistence Allowance — Continuous Reporting Conditions - Suspension is not an indefinite condition of civil and economic disability - Under the MSEDCL Service Regulations, any suspension continuing beyond six months mandates a formal review and recommendation by a higher authority - In the absence of an order on record reviewing or validly continuing the suspension beyond the initial six months, an employer cannot perpetually rely on a week-to-week office reporting condition to mechanically deny subsistence allowance for a prolonged suspension spanning nearly eleven years - While non-compliance with the reporting condition may be scrutinized for the initial regulatory period of six months, the employee is legally eligible for subsistence allowance for the remaining post-six-month period up to the date of final dismissal. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale, (1983) 3 SCC 387; O.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 328; Paras 58-73] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Discretionary Relief – Impact of Unexplained Delay / Laches in Filing Suit – Approaching Court at the Fag End of Limitation - For claiming an equitable relief like specific performance, the plaintiff's conduct must be beyond reproach - Merely filing a suit within the three-year statutory limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act is not enough - The plaintiff must approach the Court promptly and with diligence - An unexplained delay or waiting until the fag end of the limitation period to file a suit after a categorical refusal/breach by the defendant reflects a clear lack of continuous readiness and willingness, thereby disentitling the plaintiff to discretionary relief. [Relied on N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115; His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526; Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) by LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243; Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512; Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, (2024) 13 SCC 80; Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 311; Paras 35-42] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) – Financial Readiness – Evaluation of Financial Documents Generated Post-Suit - To establish financial readiness, the plaintiff must place reliable and acceptable evidence on record proving the availability of sufficient funds at the relevant time namely, within the contractually stipulated period or at the time of filing the suit - Financial documents, such as Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs), generated several years after the institution of the suit cannot be accepted as proof of financial readiness during the crucial interregnum between the agreement's execution and the suit's filing. [Paras 35-43] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) (Prior to 2018 Amendment) – Specific Performance of Contract – Continuous Readiness and Willingness – Nature, Burden of Proof, and Financial Capacity - The relief of specific performance is an equitable remedy rooted in discretion and governed by settled legal principles - Section 16(c) mandatorily requires a plaintiff seeking specific performance to explicitly aver and continuously prove both "readiness" (signifying financial capacity) and "willingness" (reflecting conduct and intent) from the date of the execution of the agreement right up to the date of the decree - Failure to satisfy these requirements disentitles the plaintiff to relief. [Paras 29-31] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651
Subordinate Legislation — Grounds of Challenge — Distinction from Plenary Legislation – Held that A piece of subordinate legislation does not enjoy the same degree of immunity as a statute enacted by a competent legislature. It can be validly challenged and struck down if it fails to conform to the parent statute under which it is made, exceeds the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act, or is contrary to any other law of the land - The Supreme Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal filed by the Special Police Establishment - maintained the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court directing the supply of information regarding the prosecution sanction process to the respondent - The Notification dated August 25, 2011, issued by the General Administration Department of Madhya Pradesh, was struck down to the extent that it excluded the SPE from the applicability of the RTI Act - The Supreme Court clarified that it did not examine the notification's validity regarding the State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences, which will continue to operate normally. [Relied on Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others (1984 INSC 231); State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. P. Krishnamurthy and Others (2006 INSC 177); Para 15-22] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644
Subordinate Legislation — Suo Motu Jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts — Striking Down an Invalid Rule/Notification in the Absence of Explicit Challenge or Prayers in Pleadings - The absence of a specific prayer or explicit pleadings challenging the validity of a piece of subordinate legislation (such as a government notification) does not deter a Constitutional Court from evaluating and declaring it invalid if it patently violates fundamental rights or exceeds the authority conferred by the enabling parent statute – Held that while suo motu powers to strike down subordinate legislation must be exercised sparingly and with caution, a writ court as the "sentinel on the qui vive" has the plenary duty to guard against breaches of law and logic. When a party relies heavily on an invalid notification to deny statutory rights (like information under the RTI Act), the Court can test its vires, provided a full and fair opportunity is afforded to the State to defend the legislation - In the present case, since the Advocate General and Senior Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh were heard extensively and allowed to file written submissions to justify the Notification's validity, the lack of an initial challenge by the writ petitioner before the High Court was not fatal. [Relied on Bharathidasan University and Another v. All India Council for Technical Education and Others (2001 INSC 454); Union of India and Others v. Manjurani Routray and Others (2023 INSC 787); Paras 8-11] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644
Succession Act, 1925 - An application for revocation of probate under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 filed in 2022 to revoke a probate granted in 1995 was barred by limitation. The limitation period under Article 137 begins to run from the date the applicant acquires knowledge (including constructive knowledge) of the grant of probate. Initiation of mutation proceedings pursuant to the probate and service of notice thereon in 2011/2013 constitutes constructive notice to the predecessors-in-interest of the respondents. Failure to inquire into the basis of such notice precludes a later plea of ignorance in 2019. A party receiving notice from a Court is expected to make reasonable inquiries regarding the same. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's order and restored the Single Judge's judgment dismissing the revocation application as time-barred. Dhiraj Dutta v. Anirban Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2026 INSC 602
Succession Act, 1925 - Revocation of Probate – Limitation – Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 applies - Where the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not prescribe any period of limitation for grant of probate or for filing an application for revocation of probate already granted, such proceedings are governed by the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a limitation period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. Dhiraj Dutta v. Anirban Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2026 INSC 602
Vested Rights & Equity – Long Unblemished Service – Vitiation Ex Post Facto - Equity & Proportionality – Appellants rendered more than a decade of continuous, unblemished service from 2014 onwards without any personal allegations of fraud, malpractice, or lack of eligibility – High Court invalidated appointments after 10 years based on internal procedural non-compliance – Supreme Court held that it is highly inequitable to deprive employees of their livelihood after long years of service due to institutional lapses over which they exercised no control - The interest of justice is served by treating the defect as curable and reviewing the third stage rather than directing a total invalidation of the recruitment process. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714; disctinguished from Ramjit Singh Kardam v. Sanjeev Kumar, (2020) 20 SCC 209; Paras 49-62] Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2026 INSC 641
Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Custody & Welfare of Captive Elephant - The Supreme Court directed the State of Kerala to immediately take over the custody of the captive elephant Raman (Kerala's tallest elephant) and house it in an appropriate rescue or rehabilitation centre. Courts “cannot be a mute spectator” in matters concerning the welfare of voiceless animals. Turning a blind eye to the commercial exploitation of animals, especially in violation of court orders and undertakings, would amount to failure in judicial duty. Jayakrishna Menon v. Krishnankutty, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625
Zamindari Abolition And Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P.) - Sections 154 & 163 (Prior to omission) – Restriction on transfer by a Bhumidhar – Nature of transfer violating ceiling limits – Void or Voidable – A transfer of holding made by a bhumidhar in contravention of the ceiling limits prescribed under Section 154 is not void ipso facto or void ab initio under the unamended statutory regime - Section 163 merely exposes the transferee to the consequence of ejectment contingent upon a suit filed by the Gaon Sabha - Till such action is taken by the Gaon Sabha within the prescribed limitation period, the transferee continues to validly enjoy the property - any transfer violating Section 154 is not void but merely voidable at the instance of the Gaon Sabha to the extent of the excess over the prescribed limit. [Relied on Kripashanker vs. Director of Consolidation and Others, (1979) 4 SCC 199; Paras 23-34] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P.) – Sections 166 & 167 (as amended by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982) – Prospective vs. Retrospective application – Accrued Rights – Amending Act which alters substantive rights or introduces a new disability/obligation in respect of transactions already accomplished is presumed to be prospective - The 1982 amendment expanding Sections 166 and 167 to declare all transfers in contravention of the Act as void with automatic vesting in the State introduced a substantive alteration in legal consequences - In the absence of an express or implied legislative intent, it cannot be applied retrospectively to invalidate a registered sale deed executed decades prior (in 1957) under the older regime where such transfer was merely voidable - Superimposing the amended framework retrospectively would create an irreconcilable statutory dichotomy and unsettling of vested rights. [Relied on Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 1; State of Kerala vs. Philomina, (1976) 4 SCC 314; Paras 36-42] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652