LiveLaw Supreme Court Half-Yearly Digest 2026 - ARREST & BAIL

Administration of Justice – Guidelines on Procedural Timelines for High Courts – i. General Timeline - High Courts must endeavour to pronounce reasoned judgements promptly, within a maximum of 3 months from the date of reserving; ii. Personal Liberty & Bail - Extra promptitude must be shown in matters of personal liberty - Bail orders should preferably be pronounced and uploaded on the same day or the next day if reserved - Orders granting bail, suspension of sentence, or acquittal must be immediately communicated to jail authorities and Trial Courts for release on the same or next day; iii. Clarifications: If a judgement is reserved, clarifications from advocates must be sought within 7 days in criminal appeals/death references (where the appellant is in custody) and within 1 month in all other matters; iv. Operative Part & Reasoned Judgement - Where urgent orders are required to prevent irreparable loss, the operative part may be pronounced, but the reasoned judgement must be uploaded within 7 to 15 days - judgements pronounced in open court must be uploaded within 24 hours; v. Accountability & Monitoring - Automated monthly emails of pending reserved judgements must be sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court and the concerned Bench - If a judgement is delayed beyond 3 months, the Registrar General shall place it before the Chief Justice, who shall direct the Bench to pronounce it within 2 weeks, failing which the Chief Justice should re-assign the case to another Bench for a fresh hearing; vi. Remedies for Litigants - Parties can file an application for early judgement if it is not pronounced within 3 months of reserving - If the judgement remains unpronounced for 3.5 months, the party can apply to the Chief Justice for withdrawal and re-assignment of the case to another Bench for a fresh hearing - Similar remedies apply if a reasoned judgement is not uploaded within 15 days or 1 month respectively, after the pronouncement of the operative part. [Relied on Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985; Paras 12-24] Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604

Anticipatory Bail - Routine filing and entertainment of anticipatory bail applications in private complaint cases is unnecessary, as mere issuance of summons/process does not entitle the police to arrest the accused. Sessions Courts and High Courts have no jurisdiction to direct an accused to surrender before the trial court while rejecting an anticipatory bail application in a complaint case. The Court may reject the application but cannot compel surrender. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419

Anticipatory Bail - Successive Applications — Filing multiple anticipatory bail petitions in quick succession (e.g., three petitions within three months) after earlier dismissals, without any material change in circumstances, constitutes a clear abuse of process and reduces the extraordinary remedy of anticipatory bail to a mere gamble. Vasantha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 520 : 2026 INSC 513

Arrest - Supreme Court laid down following key points - i. Mandatory Written Communication: Supreme Court reiterated that the constitutional mandate of informing an arrestee of the grounds of arrest is mandatory for all offences under all statutes; ii. Procedural Non-Compliance: Even if grounds are explained orally at the time of arrest, they must be communicated in writing at least two hours prior to the production of the arrestee before the Magistrate; iii. Template Arrest Memos: A mere statement in a template arrest memo indicating that grounds were "explained" orally does not substitute for the requirement of furnishing written grounds; iv. Consequence of Violation: Any deviation from these principles renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the person to be set free. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Another (2026) 1 SCC 500; Paras 20-23] Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Arrests from Court Premises - Guidelines - The Supreme Court partially modified the High Court's directions issued in a suo motu petition concerning police arrests and use of force within court premises. 1. Definition of Court Premises – The Supreme Court upheld the definition provided by the High Court in Para 8.1, which includes not only courtrooms but also all lands, buildings, and structures (except residential quarters) used in connection with court proceedings during notified working hours or till the court is in session, whichever is later. 2. Power of Police to Arrest – The Supreme Court held that the High Court's restrictions in Para 8.2(iii) were “too restrictive”. It modified the same to provide that police personnel shall be at liberty to arrest a person or use necessary force in court premises in the following situations: - (a) To prevent the occurrence of a cognizable offence in court premises; - (b) To arrest the accused/suspect where, immediately on committing an offence, such person can be apprehended at the spot; - (c) To prevent any suspect/accused from hiding himself in court premises. 3. District Level Committee – The Court directed the inclusion of one additional police officer (nominated by the jurisdictional Inspector General of Police or Commissioner of Police) as a member of the District Level Committee constituted to address conflicts between lawyers and police. However, it was clarified that neither the State nor the District Level Committees have any power to dilute or interfere with the statutory powers and duties of police officers in the maintenance of law and order. The appeal filed by the Kerala Police Officers Association was accordingly disposed of. Kerala Police Officers Association v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 311

Articles 19 and 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 (erstwhile Section 149 CrPC) – Bail Conditions – Validity of bail condition directing the accused to not reside in the same building as the complainant – Restraint on Residence – Proportionality and Reasonableness – Grant of bail with conditions is a discretionary relief, and courts may impose conditions that impinge on fundamental rights in exceptional cases - a bail condition that effectively ousts an accused from their own residence causes serious curtailment of rights guaranteed under Article 21 and must strictly satisfy the tests of reasonableness, proportionality, and necessity - In the absence of clear and cogent material showing that a less restrictive measure would not suffice, such an severe restriction becomes punitive rather than preventive - Where the conclusion of the trial is nowhere in sight and a speedy trial appears to be a mirage, a continuous restraint on the accused's right of residence is disproportionately harsh, unreasonable, and uncalled for. [Paras 15, 16, 23 & 24] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Article 20(3) – Right Against Self-Incrimination – Anticipatory Bail – NDPS Act – Held that State cannot insist that an accused hand over his mobile phone as a condition for "cooperating with the investigation" if doing so forces the accused to incriminate himself - The Supreme Court held that while an appellant must join the investigation, the obligation to cooperate does not extend to a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Political Rivalry – A careful balance must be struck between the State's interest in ensuring a fair investigation and the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 - The criminal process must be applied with objectivity and circumspection to ensure that individual liberty is not imperiled by proceedings coloured by political rivalry - Where allegations and counter-allegations prima facie appear to be politically motivated, and the surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of political overtones, a higher threshold is required to justify the deprivation of personal liberty - If the tests enumerated for the grant of anticipatory bail are met, and the veracity of the allegations can be tested at trial, custodial interrogation is not warranted. [Paras 25, 26] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437 : 2026 (2) Crimes (SC) 184

Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial prisoner for nearly 9 years without conclusion of trial constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial. Bail must be granted in such cases, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439 : 2026 (2) Crimes (SC) 201

Article 32 – Enforcement of Fundamental Rights – Abuse of Criminal Process – Successive FIRs – The Supreme Court allowed a Writ Petition where the State registered multiple FIRs in quick succession to ensure the petitioner remained in custody despite being granted bail in earlier matters – Noted that such conduct by the prosecution established a conscious effort to keep the petitioner incarcerated, amounting to a violation of personal liberty. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 and Article 21 – Right to Legal Representation and Personal Liberty – Transfer of Criminal Case – The Supreme Court deprecated the acts of hooliganism and violence by the District Bar Association, Barabanki, where members passed a resolution to not represent the accused and physically assaulted the office of an advocate who filed a bail application - held that the denial of bail for over two months in a case arising from a trivial scuffle at a toll plaza was unjustified and violative of Article 21 – Noted that denial of bail to the petitioners and the curtailment of their liberty for a period exceeding two months is absolutely unjustified and violative of the Fundamental Right of Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India warranting exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 32 of the Constitution of India - To ensure a fair trial and proper legal representation - the Supreme Court directed the immediate release of the petitioners on bail and transferred the proceedings from Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi. Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 528 — Quashing of FIR — Duty of High Court to Decide on Merits - The Supreme Court held that when a petitioner seeks the quashing of an FIR, the High Court must consider the merits of the challenge based on available material and applicable law, rather than disposing of the petition with general directions to follow arrest guidelines or concluding it without addressing the underlying grievance - Once jurisdiction for quashing is invoked, the High Court should decide the matter "one way or the other" on its merits. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 5-8] Md. Mashood v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2026 INSC 259

Attendance of Accused during Appeal/Revision – Suspension of Sentence – Validity of requiring physical presence on every hearing date – The Supreme Court held that once a sentence has been suspended and bail has been granted by an Appellate or Revisional Court, it is "unwarranted" and "burdensome" to require the accused to be present on every date of hearing - Such a practice serves no purpose, as the jurisdictional magistrate remains empowered to secure the accused's presence should the appeal or revision eventually be dismissed - noted that even if the prevalent practice is driven by the terms of Form No. 45 (Schedule II of the CrPC/BNSS) regarding bail bonds, it does not justify mandatory attendance for proceedings that may remain pending for years. [Paras 6 - 8] Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Bail - An undertrial prisoner who has remained in custody for 9 years is entitled to bail as continued detention amounts to a gross violation of his fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Vickki Yadav @ Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 545

Bail - Cancellation of - A coordinate Bench of the High Court is not powerless to cancel bail granted by another coordinate Bench where the bail was secured by placing incorrect or wrong facts before the Court. If it comes to the notice of the Court that bail has been obtained by suppression or misrepresentation of material facts, it can always examine the matter and pass appropriate orders, including cancellation of bail. Suraj Mahananda v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 586

Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Violation of Conditions – Siphoning of Funds – Fabrication of Documents – Failure to Settle Claims – The Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner (Director of Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.) for blatant non-compliance with the primary condition of settling allottees' claims in the 'Grand Venice' project - that the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 50 Crores in his personal capacity as a pre-condition for bail - the petitioner sourced these funds from the Corporate Debtor (BIIPL) and related entities without any Board Resolution or compliance with Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 - Held, utilizing interest-free commercial benefits from the company to secure personal liberty lacks bona fides. Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310

Bail - Grant and Cancellation of – Successive Bail Application – Conduct of Accused and Parity - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 437/439 (corresponding to Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Grant of bail by High Court in a successive application after cancellation by the Supreme Court – Sustainability - An order granting bail that fails to engage with the prior bail-cancellation order of the Supreme Court, overlooks the contumacious conduct of the accused in absconding post-cancellation, ignores prima facie incriminating material (such as CCTV footage and recovery of weapons), and blindly applies the principle of parity despite distinct criminal roles, suffers from manifest error of law and perversity. [Paras 22-34] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526

Bail - Right to Speedy Trial - The petitioner was arrested on 07.03.2017 in a murder case involving Sections 147, 148, 149, 120-B, and 302 IPC - Charge sheet was filed and the case was committed to Sessions Court - Trial remained pending even after almost nine years of custody. The High Court rejected the bail application, relying on X v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 INSC 909, observing that once trial commences, bail should not normally be granted. The Supreme Court described the High Court's order as “very shocking” and “very disappointing”. The High Court misconstrued the judgment in X v. State of Rajasthan. The said judgment does not lay down an absolute rule against grant of bail after trial begins. The length of custody and delay in trial remain paramount considerations. Gravity of the offence cannot justify indefinite detention of an undertrial when the delay in trial is not attributable to the accused. The Court granted bail without awaiting the State's response, holding that the infringement of Article 21 was apparent on the face of the record. The petitioner was directed to be released on bail forthwith, subject to terms and conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court if not required in any other case. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439 : 2026 (2) Crimes (SC) 201

Bail – The Supreme Court, invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the release of a murder convict on bail who had already undergone more than 22 years of actual imprisonment. The High Court's order dismissing a jail appeal filed by a life convict on the ground of delay of 3157 days, without considering the merits, was described by the Supreme Court as “very disturbing”. When an appeal is filed through jail by a convict serving life sentence, the High Court should adopt a practical and sympathetic approach and, at the very least, condone the delay to afford an opportunity of hearing on merits. The High Court failed to consider that the appellant had already undergone over 12 years of sentence at the time of filing the appeal and that it was a jail appeal. The Court took note of the convict's satisfactory jail conduct for 22 years and the fact that he was never released on parole or furlough even once. The District Legal Services Authority was directed to assist the petitioner in filing an appropriate representation for remission of sentence under the applicable remission policy. The Supreme Court held that remanding the matter to the High Court at this stage (after 22 years) would be a futile exercise. The petitioner was ordered to be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹10,000/-. Arjun Jani @ Tuntun v. State of Orissa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 473

Bail conditions - the Supreme Court strongly deprecated and set aside bail conditions requiring accused persons belonging to Dalit and Adivasi communities to clean police station premises for two months. In Re Condition Being Imposed While Granting Bail, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 472

Bail Conditions vs. Final Civil Relief – A bail condition must be regulatory, not punitive or determinative. Ordering the sale of property as a condition for bail is in the nature of a final civil relief that affects property rights and cannot be sustained - Even if a counsel volunteers to sell property to secure bail, the Court should refrain from "tweaking" bail provisions to convert them into recovery proceedings. [Relied on Sumit Mehta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570; Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla Vs. State of Maharashtra (2020) 10 SCC 77; Mahesh Chandra Vs. State of U.P. (2006) 6 SCC 196; Paras 6 – 11] Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389

Bail Jurisdiction - While exercising jurisdiction under Section 483 BNSS, a High Court cannot issue general directions to trial courts regarding service of summons and execution of coercive processes, as such directions fall outside the limited scope of bail proceedings. Rambalak v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 527 : 2026 INSC 511

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Key Findings & Observations – i. Settlement Negotiations as Context - Supreme Court noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations; ii. Preceding Extortion Case - The appellant had previously filed FIR No. 1041/2025 against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations; iii. Sequence of Events - Supreme Court highlighted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple. [Paras 21-28] Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2026 INSC 373 : AIR 2026 SC 1995 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 263

Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Together Theory – Noted that prosecution's "last seen" theory failed due to significant inconsistencies and interpolations in police records regarding the date and time of the accused's prior arrest for a different matter - noted that the child allegedly went missing while the accused may have already been in police custody - Where the investigation is "botched" and "inept," leaving the chain of circumstances incomplete and failing to eliminate other hypotheses, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 5 SCC 509; Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872; Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (1954) 2 SCC 516; Paras 10-20] Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Convicts on Bail – Duty of Appellant – Supreme Court noted that convicts often neglect to cooperate with the court once their sentence is suspended - Appellants enlarged on bail have a responsibility to keep track of their appeals; they cannot blame the court or an Amicus Curiae for not raising specific grounds if they failed to engage with the proceedings for decades. [Relied on Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 20 SCC 196; Paras 17 - 23] Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257 : 2026 CriLJ 1869

Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial accused – Appeal against Delhi High Court order denying bail – Appellant in custody since June 4, 2019, with a combined incarceration of 8 ½ years in NIA and ED cases – Trial proceeding at a "snail's pace" with only 34 out of 248 witnesses examined so far – Held, prolonged detention where a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time results in undue curtailment of personal liberty under Article 21 – Stringent bail provisions in special statutes (UAPA/PMLA) cannot be used to incarcerate an accused indefinitely without trial – The rigours of such statutory provisions melt down when there is no likelihood of the trial completing in a reasonable time and the accused has undergone a substantial part of the sentence – Considering the appellant's advanced age (74 years), medical ailments, and bleak chances of early trial disposal, Supreme Court enlarged the appellant on bail subject to stringent conditions – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 18-20] Shabir Ahmed Shah v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Criminal Jurisprudence — Sentencing — Principle of Proportionality — Mitigating Circumstances — Reduction of Sentence to Period Already Undergone — Appeal confined strictly to the quantum of sentence - The appellant was convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for using a forged revenue document (Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika) to furnish surety/bail in judicial proceedings, and was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment on each count – Held that while offences involving forgery and the production of fabricated documents before a Court of law strike at the purity of the administration of justice and cannot be treated lightly, the sentencing process must remain central to the principle of proportionality - It cannot be reduced to a purely retributive exercise divorced from the factual matrix of the case and the overall circumstances of the offender - The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence pertained to the year 2014, and the appellant had endured the rigors of criminal proceedings for more than a decade - there were no subsequent criminal antecedents, the appellant was not a habitual offender, and the forgery was detected at the threshold stage during bail scrutiny, avoiding irreversible pecuniary or proprietary losses - Noting that the appellant had already undergone over two years of actual incarceration, the Supreme Court found it fit to modify the substantive sentence to the period already undergone while keeping the fine unaltered. [Relied on Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35; Paras 13-26] Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 639 : 2026 INSC 654

Criminal Law — Cancellation of Bail — Dowry Death - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Sections 85, 115(2), 352, 351(2) and 80 — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 - Section 118 [Erstwhile Section 113(B) of the Evidence Act] — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 — Serious Crimes Against Women — Principles governing grant/cancellation of bail - Egregious Error by High Court - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to a husband accused of murdering his wife for dowry, holding that the High Court committed an egregious error in exercising its discretion in favor of the accused given the serious nature of the crime – i. Presumption as to Dowry Death - The High Court erred by completely ignoring the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - In cases where a woman dies under suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage and faced continuous dowry harassment soon before death, the Court is mandated to presume that such person caused the dowry death; ii. Misreading of Facts & Evidentiary Value of FIR - The High Court's reliance on an alleged "delay in lodging the FIR" as a primary ground for bail was baseless and factually incorrect - The deceased died on 11.07.2024, and the FIR was promptly lodged the next day on 12.07.2024 - Even if a minor delay exists, it cannot independently justify releasing an accused on bail in a serious offense like dowry death; iii. Duty of Bail Courts: A bail court at any level must remain highly cautious to ensure its orders do not convey a message to society that courts take serious crimes against women lightly. [Relied on In Re: Enforcement and Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [2005] INSC 295; Paras 16-31] Mahesh Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 452 : 2026 INSC 440

Criminal Law – Cancellation of Bail – Principles for Interference – High Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction – Section 437 CrPC – Article 227 of the Constitution – The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court order that had cancelled an accused's bail after eight years based on hyper-technical procedural grounds - The High Court had ruled that the Magistrate's original 2018 bail order was "born in sin" because it only bore initials rather than a full signature, allegedly violating Rule 183 of the Calcutta High Court Criminal (Subordinate Courts) Rules, 1985 – Held - Rejection of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted must be dealt with on different bases - Bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering if supervening circumstances (such as interference with justice or absconding) render it no longer conducive to a fair trial - A procedural rule governing day-to-day functioning cannot override the substantive mandate of the CrPC unless a gross failure of justice is demonstrated - The High Court's interference after a lapse of nearly eight years on trivial grounds was "audaciously perverse". Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2026 INSC 367

Criminal Procedure – Grant of Bail – Judicial Discretion and Duty to Consider Material Evidence - The Supreme Court observed that while the judicial discretion to grant bail is wide, it must be exercised in a judicious, reasoned manner by adverting to the settled parameters, especially where accusations are grave - The High Court erred in isolating the omission in the inquest proceedings while completely ignoring vital material collected during the investigation - A specific overt act attributed to the accused in the FIR, the corroborative post-mortem report showing firearm injuries, the recovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused, and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, 2023 constitute material circumstances that cannot be brushed aside - Assigning reasons not in consonance with settled bail principles in serious offences renders the order unsustainable. [Paras 14-16] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527

Criminal Procedure – Remission / Premature Release – Rejection of Remission Proposal by Central Government – Investigation by CBI – Requirement of Concurrence – Speaking Order – Application of Mind – Parity – Reformative Theory of Punishment – Writ Petition challenging the letter dated 09.07.2025 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Union of India, which disallowed the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand for the premature release of the petitioner who had been incarcerated for over 22 years in a murder case investigated by the CBI – Held that i. Cryptic and Non-Speaking Orders Invalidation: The impugned letter issued by the MHA rejecting the remission recommendation was ex-facie non-speaking, cryptic, and failed to disclose any reasons for its disagreement with the State Government's proposal - Recording of reasons is an essential safeguard against arbitrariness, ensures transparency, and reflects due application of mind - Absence of reasons violates the principles of natural justice and frustrates the convict's right to seek effective judicial review; ii. Heinousness of Offence Not the Sole Ground for Denial: Denial of remission cannot rest solely on the gravity or heinous nature of the original crime - The heinousness of the offence stands exhausted at the stage of sentencing and judicial determination of punishment - Remission is a distinct executive function concerned with the present and the future specifically the prisoner's conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into society - Permanent incarceration under the shadow of a past worst act is impermissible in a liberal constitutional order; iii. Principle of Parity: Where a co-accused in the very same offence and incident has already been granted premature release after a lesser period of actual incarceration (17 years), denying similar consideration to the petitioner without any cogent, rational, and discernible distinguishing circumstances violates the constitutional requirements of fairness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14; iv. Futility of Remand: While a non-speaking order is ordinarily remanded for fresh consideration, a mechanical remand is unnecessary where the authority has already fully articulated its firm stand on merits before the Court - Relegating a convict who has served over 22 years to another round of administrative proceedings would prolong incarceration unnecessarily and fail the interests of justice - The impugned letter is quashed - The Writ Petition is allowed, and the petitioner (already on interim bail) is directed to be treated as prematurely released without requiring him to surrender. [Relied on Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121; Satish v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580; Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334; Paras 5 - 10] Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 501 : 2026 INSC 490 : AIR 2026 SC 2380 ; 2026 (2) Crimes SC 287

Criminal Procedure – Suspension of Sentence and Grant of Bail – Disproportionate Assets – Overlapping Allegations – Double Jeopardy – Appellant, a former Minister, was convicted for amassing assets disproportionate to known sources of income and illegal acquisition of tribal lands - Prosecution split the original case into two separate charge-sheets involving overlapping allegations and the same check period - Appellant contended that dual prosecution for identical allegations violates the right against double jeopardy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India - The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's sentence in the first case had already been suspended by the Court and that he had undergone substantial custodial incarceration in both matters - Held: Without expressing a final opinion on the merits of the overlapping allegations which must be decided by the High Court, the Court found it fit to grant bail - Bail granted subject to the appellant filing an undertaking within seven days of release to assist in the process of restoring illegally acquired tribal land to its original status. [Paras 13-21] Anosh Ekka v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 367 : 2026 INSC 357 : AIR 2026 SC 1907 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 133

Disciplinary Inquiry – Standard of Proof and Perversity – Administrative Law – Maxim “Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus” - While a Court does not typically act as an appellate authority over an inquiry report, it can interfere if the findings are "perverse," meaning no reasonable person would have reached such a conclusion on the available material – Held in this case, neither the complainant nor the stenographer (alleged to be the conduit for bribes) was examined, and the Public Prosecutor testified that the bail orders were proper- Held that Authorities should not ignore the long-standing reputation of an officer when evaluating a sudden allegation of "doubtful integrity" based on a mere hunch or hypothesis. [Relied on Sadhna Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2020) 11 SCC 760; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat (2016) 14 SCC 1; Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370; Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2019) 10 SCC 640; Paras 29-40] Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7 : (2026) 3 SCC 325

Disciplinary Proceedings against Judicial Officers – Removal from service based solely on judicial orders – Permissibility – Appellant, a judicial officer with 27 years of unblemished service, was removed for granting bail in four cases under the M.P. Excise Act without expressly mentioning the "twin conditions" of Section 59-A - Held: Merely because a judicial order is wrong, erroneous, or fails to refer to a statutory provision, it cannot be the basis for disciplinary action unless there is evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration - The High Court must exercise great caution and protect honest officers from unmerited onslaughts based on motivated complaints. Order of removal set aside with full back wages. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7 : (2026) 3 SCC 325

Fabrication and Fraud – Conduct of Petitioner – Supreme Court noted the inclusion of "GST" in an allotment agreement purportedly dated 15.04.2015, whereas GST was only introduced in 2017 - Held, such an inclusion is not a clerical error but points directly at the fabrication of documents to derive commercial benefits - Further, the petitioner engaged in "double allotment" and created third-party rights using fabricated stamp papers – Following the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the petitioner siphoned off approximately Rs. 74 Crores to entities controlled by his immediate family members (wife, daughter, and sons) - Held, such conduct during a moratorium is ex-facie impermissible and lends credence to allegations of committing similar offences while on bail - Due to intentional and established violations of bail conditions, the Court ordered the forfeiture of the entire Rs. 50 Crore deposit along with accrued interest - Rs. 5 Crores was directed to be transmitted to NALSA, and the remainder to the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) for IBC proceedings. [Relied on Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick and Ors, Civil Appeal Nos. 13779 and 13812 of 2025; P. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 15 SCC 211; Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Paras 65-80, 122-128] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310

Interim Relief – Grant of Interim Bail Pending Reference - Recognizing that the determination of the legal issues by a larger Bench may consume further time, the Supreme Court noted that the appellants cannot be made to suffer continued incarceration merely because an important question of law has arisen for authoritative settlement - Without expressing any opinion on the merits, the Supreme Court granted interim bail to the appellants for a period of six (6) months subject to stringent safeguards. [Paras 27 - 30] Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 533

Judicial Conduct – Appellate Court's handling of Non-Appearance – The Supreme Court expressed that it was "appalling and shocking" for an Appellate Court to insist on the appearance of an appellant on every date despite a suspension of sentence - If a counsel is not assisting or has been changed frequently, the appropriate course is for the Court to appoint an amicus curiae or allow the accused to make alternative arrangements, rather than immediately cancelling bail and issuing Non-Bailable Warrants (NBW). Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Judicial Discipline & Hierarchy of Benches — Benches of smaller strength are strictly bound by the decisions rendered by larger Benches - Smaller Benches cannot dilute, circumvent, or progressively hollow out the constitutional force of a larger Bench decision without expressly referring the matter to a larger Bench - Confessional statements or explanation memos made before the police are prima facie self-incriminating and strictly hit by the exclusionary rule of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - In the absence of any conscious possession or recovery of contraband/cash from the person or premises of the appellant, continuing indefinite detention solely based on the seriousness of the allegations is unconscionable, particularly when juxtaposed with abysmal conviction rates under the UAPA - High Court's order denying bail set aside; Appellant directed to be released on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 21-53] Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 298

Judicial Independence – Fearless Trial Judiciary – Role of High Courts – Held that fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary - High Courts, while exercising supervisory control, must ensure that judicial officers are not put through the ordeal of disciplinary proceedings for mere errors of judgment - The "lurking fear" of administrative action often leads trial judges to shirk their responsibility in bail matters, resulting in the flooding of High Courts and the Supreme Court with bail applications. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7 : (2026) 3 SCC 325

Judicial Monitoring – Systematic Pendency Data – Directives to High Court - To make the right to a speedy trial meaningful and real rather than illusory, the Supreme Court directed the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court to submit a comprehensive affidavit on oath detailing the statistics of pending cases before Judicial Magistrates and Sessions Courts, the functional and vacant strength of the judicial cadre, and categorized data regarding the period of custody undergone by undertrial prisoners awaiting bail. [Relied on Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2012) 2 SCC 688; State of Kerala v. Rasheed, (2019) 13 SCC 297; Paras 42 - 44] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473

Judicial Scrutiny of Bail Orders – Held that the High Court's decision to grant bail by dissecting medical evidence and questioning the "intent to kill" due to a gap between the assault and death (septicaemia) was found to be premature - Such detailed analysis is reserved for the trial - The presence of multiple injuries, including cerebral damage from blunt trauma, outweighed the "extraneous considerations" of pending civil litigation and lack of specific role attribution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 320; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172; Victim 'XX' v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) INSC 877; Paras 21, 22, 29 - 31] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 94 — Mandatory Procedure for Age Determination — The procedure for determining the age of a victim or juvenile is strictly governed by Section 94(2) of the JJ Act - Priority must be given to: (i) school/matriculation certificates, or (ii) birth certificates from local authorities - Medical age determination (ossification test) can only be resorted to in the absence of such documentary evidence – Held that the High Court erred in holding that medical reports could prevail over school records at the bail stage. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Matrimonial Litigation – Misuse of Courts – Perjury and Costs - Supreme Court criticized the practice of warring couples treating courts as "battlefields" to settle scores, noting that the parties had filed over 40 cases against each other - While disposing of all matrimonial disputes, the Court specifically directed that applications related to perjury (Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 BNSS) must continue, as no one can be permitted to "pollute the stream of justice" - imposed a token cost of ₹10,000 on each party for choking the judicial system with numerous litigations - Supreme Court emphasized that earnest efforts should be made for pre-litigation mediation and counselling - It observed that the immediate initiation of criminal proceedings often destroys any chance of reconciliation and leads to a "point of no return," especially if arrests occur. [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2024) 6 SCR 129; Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita, (2023) 3 SCR 552; Paras 11 – 15, 26-32] Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Bail — Prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay in trial — Grant of regular bail in commercial quantity case - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused charged under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c) and 29(1) of the NDPS Act for allegedly possessing nearly 22 kg of ganja (commercial quantity), primarily on the ground of delay in trial and the accused having already undergone more than one year of incarceration. Rajadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 462

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Criminal Antecedents Relevant - Previous involvements in similar NDPS offences are a strong indicator that the accused is likely to indulge in similar offences if released on bail, thereby failing the second condition under Section 37. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Co-accused Statements – Noted that the appellant was arraigned as an accused solely on the basis of a statement made by a co-accused (who was apprehended with 6.330 kg of Ganja) - noted that the actual complicity of the appellant is a matter to be thrashed out during trial - Supreme Court restored the bail and directed that the appellant be released on anticipatory bail by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-8] Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Prolonged Incarceration - Mere detention for a period of one year and seven months, where the accused faces a possible sentence of up to 20 years, does not by itself justify grant of bail on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when statutory restrictions under special enactments like the NDPS Act are in play. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Section 67 – Section 8 – Section 22 – Grounds of Arrest – Constitutional Mandate – Article 22(1) and Article 21 – The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of bail by the High Court and ordered the immediate release of the appellants due to the failure of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to provide written grounds of arrest - The appellants, medical professionals at a corporate hospital, were arrested following the recovery of 2000 Tramadol tablets - While the NCB claimed the grounds of arrest were orally explained and noted in a template-style arrest memo, the Court found this insufficient under established legal mandates - Supreme Court emphasized that providing written grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement to protect the fundamental rights of the arrestee. Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Sections 8, 21, and 22 – Drugs (Control) Act, 1950 – Sections 5 and 13 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Appellant sought anticipatory bail in a case involving the seizure of 710 bottles of cough syrup from a car registered in his name, though he was not named in the FIR - Noted that since the appellant had already joined the investigation and was cooperating within the limitations prescribed by law, custodial interrogation was not warranted at this stage - allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court's denial of bail, the Supreme Court directed that in the event of arrest, the appellant be released on terms fixed by the trial court, subject to compliance with conditions stipulated under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(b), 22(c), 25, 27-A, and 29 — Grant of Bail — Prolonged Incarceration vs. Seriousness of Offence — Prosecution's Intention to Examine 159 Witnesses — The petitioner was arrested on March 29, 2022, in connection with the recovery of approximately 2428 Kilograms of Mephedrone - Despite the seriousness of the crime, Supreme Court noted that the petitioner remained in judicial custody as an undertrial prisoner for over 3 years and 6 months - the charge was only framed on January 16, 2026, after the Court's previous intervention. Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 107

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Sovereignty over Personal Liberty in Drug Cases - In matters involving the supply of narcotic drugs, which constitute a war against the nation affecting public health and the national economy, the sovereignty of the country must prevail over the personal liberty of the accused. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Strict Compliance with Section 37 NDPS Act - While dealing with applications for bail in cases involving commercial quantities of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, courts are mandatorily required to satisfy the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 — i.e., (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Failure to record such satisfaction renders the order granting bail unsustainable. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37(1)(b)(ii) — Grant of Bail — Commercial Quantity — Twin Conditions Mandatory — Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 cannot blindly dilute statutory rigors - The recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section is a mandatory jurisdictional pre-condition and a sine qua non for granting bail in offences involving a commercial quantity - The right to a speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a precious constitutional right, but it must be read harmoniously alongside, and not in displacement or opposition to, the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPS Act - Prolonged incarceration during the pendency of a trial does not automatically entail relaxation or mechanical dilution of these statutory twin conditions - Orders granting bail without recording such explicit satisfaction stand completely vitiated and cannot be sustained. [Paras 9,10] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411 : AIR 2026 SC 2109 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 130

Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 22(c), 23, 28, and 29 — Bail — Commercial Quantity — Prolonged Incarceration — Parity — The Supreme Court granted regular bail to the appellant despite the seizure of a commercial quantity of contraband - noted that the appellant had been in custody for 4 years, 1 month, and 28 days - Relief was further justified on the grounds of parity, as an identically situated accused person traveling on the same flight had already been granted bail by the Court – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order denying bail and directed release on stringent terms, including the surrender of her passport. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127 : AIR 2026 SC 800

Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 364, 396, 201 read with Section 120B — Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 9, 27, 106, 114 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 100(4) — Circumstantial Evidence — Last seen together theory — Recovery of dead body and articles — Reversal of conviction by High Court upheld - The case of the prosecution entirely rested on circumstantial evidence - The High Court reversed the Trial Court's conviction and acquitted the accused persons on finding the chain of circumstances incomplete – Noted the following key points - i. Recovery of Dead Body - The alleged recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused was rightly doubted. At the time of arrest, the police had only received a missing report, yet the arrest memo pre-recorded offences under Sections 302, 394, and 201 IPC - independent witnesses were withheld, creating a serious dent in the prosecution's story - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal evidence. ii. Recovery from Accessible Places - The discovery of the vehicle (Bolero Jeep) allegedly at the instance of the accused was from an open road accessible to all and not from the exclusive possession of the accused, making it unreliable; iii. Last Seen Together - Evidence of 'last seen together' is a weak type of evidence. Conviction solely based on 'last seen' without other corroborative evidence is unsustainable - Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not shift the primary burden of proof, which always remains on the prosecution; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) of Articles: Recovered articles like a tape recorder and wrist watch were never subjected to a TIP under the applicable police rules. Identification of recovered articles directly in Court without a prior TIP is meaningless in the eyes of law and makes the recovery insignificant; v. Common Household Objects - Recovery of a towel without any connecting material (such as bloodstains) is wholly immaterial as it is a common household object – Held that to convict an accused on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove each incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, forming an unbroken chain that excludes every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. [Relied on Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716; Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1466) and Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2014) 4 SCC 715; Thammaraya & Anr. v. The State Of Karnataka (2025) 3 SCC 590; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC 71; Paras 29 – 32, 33-43] Pawan Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2026 INSC 539

Practice of the Court and Interests of Justice — Supreme Court observed that while the general practice is not to release a person sentenced to life imprisonment on bail, such practice cannot prevail if it operates to cause injustice - The underlying postulate of denying bail is that the appeal should be disposed of within a "measurable distance of time" - Keeping a person in jail for 5-6 years for an offence that may ultimately be found not to have been committed is a "travesty of justice" - Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Supreme Court noted that the right of appeal is a statutory right - Serious failure of justice ensues if an appellant remains incarcerated for over a decade only to have their appeal eventually succeed - Unless there are cogent grounds to the contrary, and where the delay is not attributable to the accused, the Court should ordinarily release the accused on bail if the appeal cannot be heard within a reasonable period. [Relied on Kashmira Singh vs. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 291; Paras 5-13] Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 45 – Grant of Regular Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – The Supreme Court granted bail to accused, emphasizing that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without the commencement of trial violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court observed that statutory restrictions under special acts like the PMLA cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention - Noted that the trial had not yet commenced and was only at the stage of scrutiny of documents - A significant delay of eight months was attributed to the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) due to its challenge of a procedural order by the Special Judge, which was later withdrawn - With 208 witnesses cited and over 63,000 pages of documents, there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future – Held that the appellant had joined the investigation on multiple occasions even prior to his arrest - found the ED's allegations of witness tampering and dissipation of properties to be "incredulous" and "untenable," as the appellant was in custody when these alleged events occurred, and no material link was established between the appellant and the entities involved in the property transfers – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791; Paras 15- 23] Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2026 INSC 12

Preventive Detention — Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 — Section 3 — Bootlegger — Maintenance of Public Order vs. Law and Order — Non-application of Mind — Failure to invoke ordinary laws of the land - Held: The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the activities of the appellant were prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" had no real basis - A bald and stereotypical averment that the appellant's activities are prejudicial to public order is legally insufficient - To invoke the stringent powers of preventive detention, there must be cogent material on record to demonstrate that the alleged activities disrupted public order, rather than just affecting 'law and order' - In the present case, despite five registered cases under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949, the Investigating Agency made no effort to arrest the appellant under ordinary criminal law, even though the offences are cognizable - Where a person can be effectively dealt with under the ordinary laws of the land, the invocation of preventive detention laws is unwarranted in the absence of cogent material showing a distinct breach of public order - the preventive detention order cannot be sustained and is quashed. [Relied on Arjun v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3718; T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1990) 2 SCC 456; Paras 12 - 14] Vidyawant v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 510

Preventive Detention – Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender Act, 1986 – Section 2(a), 2(f) and 3 – Detention of "Drug Offender" – Law and Order vs. Public Order - Subjective Satisfaction and Extraneous Factors - Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority manifested an intention to detain the detenu "at any cost" - held that preventive detention should not be used as an alternative to the ordinary criminal law or to "clip the wings" of an accused when the State fails to resist bail – Held that if the detenu violated bail conditions, the appropriate remedy was to seek cancellation of bail under ordinary law, which the State failed to do - Resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention to circumvent ordinary criminal procedure is unsustainable – Held that mere registration of three criminal cases involving "Ganja" does not automatically impact "public order" unless there is specific material showing the activities caused harm, danger, or a feeling of insecurity among the general public - The detention order failed to indicate how the detenu's acts were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as opposed to mere "law and order" - Law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed - Liberty cannot be jeopardized unless the case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute – Held that simply declaring the detenu a 'habitual drug offender' was not sufficient for preventive detention unless shown how detenu's actions specifically threatened public order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others 2023 INSC 788; Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar 1984 3 SCC 14; Paras 8-10] Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2026 INSC 41 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 161

Quashing of FIR – Validity of interim directions to follow arrest procedures – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Telangana which, while disposing of a petition to quash an FIR on the very first day, directed the Investigating Officer to follow the procedure under Section 35(3) of the BNSS (previously Section 41-A Cr.PC) and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines without hearing the defacto complainant. Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Right to Speedy Trial – Bail – Seriousness of Offence - Where an undertrial accused is incarcerated for a prolonged period and there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is infringed. In such cases, bail must be considered and ordinarily granted, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Sahil Manoj Machare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Section 118 BSA — Parameters for Granting Bail in Serious Offenses — The Supreme Court emphasized that while considering a bail application in cases of dowry death, the High Court must consider: (i) the nature of the crime; (ii) the prescribed punishment; (iii) the relationship between the parties; (iv) the place of incident; (v) the postmortem report; and (vi) the statutory presumption of commission of offense – Held that under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, if a woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death, the Court shall presume the person caused the dowry death. [Paras 15-20] Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. read with Section 43-D(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Extension of time for investigation — Right to Default Bail — Mandatory requirement of production and notice to the accused - The Supreme Court set aside the orders extending the time for completing the investigation and granted default bail to the accused - held that the initial order extending the time to file the chargesheet was passed without procuring the presence of the accused (either physically or virtually) and without giving him an opportunity of being heard or raising objections - This constitutes a gross illegality that violates the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that the extension of time for completing an investigation is not an empty formality - Any direction to extend the period for filing a chargesheet encroaches upon personal liberty and must be preceded by due application of mind by recording justifiable, cogent, and valid reasons - Extension orders passed in an absolutely mechanical or perfunctory manner merely noting that "investigation is still pending" are legally unsustainable - Since the first extension order was declared illegal and arbitrary, the subsequent chargesheet filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days could not defeat the right of the accused - The appellant's right to claim default bail stood crystallized upon the filing of his application under Section 167(2) CrPC before the chargesheet was submitted. [Relied on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484; Paras 24 - 36] Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : 2026 INSC 456

Section 168 BNSS – Statutory Obligation of Police to Prevent Offences – Shifting of Burden via Bail Conditions – Section 168 of the BNSS casts a vital, primary statutory duty squarely upon the police and the State to prevent the commission of cognizable offences - Imposing a bail condition that ousts the accused from their residence to maintain peace effectively shifts this preventive burden from the law enforcement machinery onto the accused, thereby weakening the State's core obligation to prevent crime - Courts must remind the police of their statutory obligations to ensure no one breaches peace, rather than relying on disproportionately restrictive bail conditions to achieve situational harmony. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi vs. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Paras 17-28] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Section 194 BNSS – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 174 – Scope and Purpose of Inquest Proceedings – Bail Parameters - The Supreme Court held that the scope of an inquiry under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. (now corresponding to Section 194 of the BNSS, 2023) is a preliminary enquiry of a limited and specific character, strictly confined to ascertaining the apparent cause of death - It is neither intended nor required to record a detailed account of the incident or register the names of the accused persons who might have caused the death - The High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference to grant bail to the accused merely because the informant and another panch witness had not made specific allegations against the accused during the inquest proceedings - Non-mention of the author of the crime in the inquest report cannot, by itself, be a valid reason to doubt the involvement of an accused who is subsequently named. [Relied on Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153; Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518; Paras 12-14] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527

Section 202 Cr.P.C. - Once a Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process (summons), the accused is only required to appear before the Court and participate in the proceedings. Police have no authority to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless the Court issues a non-bailable warrant along with or in place of summons. Even when a Magistrate directs a police inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. before issuing process, the police have no power to arrest the accused during the course of such inquiry. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419

Section 27 IEA – Recovery of remnants of deceased – Requirement of "Custody" – Information leading to a discovery is admissible under Section 27 only if it comes from a person who is in the custody of the police at the time the statement is made - In the present case, the Section 27 memorandum was drawn at 10:30 AM on 13.10.2018, whereas the formal arrest of the accused occurred later that night at 22:00 hrs - As the accused was not in police custody when the statement was made, the recovery cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 27. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Principles for Granting Bail to Accused Added via Section 319 – High Standard of Evidence Required - The Supreme Court held that when a person is added as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and subsequently arrested, the court considering a bail plea must apply a test higher than a mere prima facie case - The relevant consideration is whether there is "strong and cogent evidence" of complicity, rather than a mere probability - While this standard is shorter than the satisfaction required for a conviction if the evidence goes unrebutted, it is significantly higher than the standard required for framing charges against original accused persons - In exercising discretion for bail for an accused summoned under Section 319, the Court must weigh the nature of the offence, the quality of evidence against the newly added accused, and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering with evidence. [Para 13, 14] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36

Section 35 BNSS — Arrest — Mandatory issuance of notice for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years — Interplay between Section 35(1)(b) and Section 35(3) to 35(6) — Discretionary nature of arrest - Core Principles and Rulings – i. Rule of Notice vs. Exception of Arrest - The Supreme Court held that for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, issuing a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS is the rule, whereas effecting an arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b) is a clear exception; ii. Mandatory Checklist for Arrest - For an arrest to be legally justified in the specified category of offences, compliance with Section 35(1)(b)(i) (reason to believe) along with at least one condition mentioned in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non; ii. No Automatic Arrest on Non-Compliance - Even if an individual fails to comply with the terms of a notice under Section 35(3) or is unwilling to identify themselves, arrest is not a matter of course - The Investigating Agency must still form an opinion that the arrest is an objective necessity for the investigation; iii. Fresh Materials Required for Subsequent Arrest - If a police officer decides to arrest an individual after having already issued a notice under Section 35(3), such an arrest must be based on materials and factors that were not available at the time the notice was issued; iv. Judicial Scrutiny - Magistrates must not authorize detention in a casual or mechanical manner - They are required to peruse the report and checklist furnished by the police officer to ensure the necessity of arrest is justified under the statutory parameters. [Relied on Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, (1964) 3 SCR 71; Paras 20-33] Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : 2026 INSC 115

Section 362 Cr.P.C. - Bar on Alteration or Review of Signed Orders – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Patna High Court which had recalled its earlier grant of bail to the appellant - The High Court had reversed the bail order on the grounds of a clerical error by the Court Master, who recorded the petition as "allowed" despite the operative portion allegedly being "rejected" - The Supreme Court held that under Section 362 CrPC, no alteration or review of a signed judgment or order is permissible except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors – Noted that no such error justified the recall, rendering the High Court's action unsustainable in law. Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Section 432 Cr.P.C. (now Section 473 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Premature Release / Remission – Automation of Process – Automatic Triggering of Eligibility - It is the bounden obligation of the appropriate Government to consider the cases of all convicts for the grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the state policy - It is not necessary for the convict or their relatives to file a specific application for permanent remission; instead, the process must be automatically triggered and initiated a few months prior to their date of eligibility – Held that endorsing the implementation of the National Legal Services Authority's (NALSA) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of 2022, the Supreme Court directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to roll out the 'E-Prisons Early Release Processing Module' (developed by the NIC) as a pilot project in Central Jail, Agra, and District Jail, Lucknow to automate premature release processing, eradicate administrative delays, and eliminate the physical movement of files. [Relied on: In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 349; Paras 14 - 22] Surendra @ Sunda v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : 2026 INSC 414

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail — Absconding Accused — An absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail as a general rule - The power to grant pre-arrest bail to an absconder may only be exercised in exceptional cases where, upon perusal of the FIR and case diary, the Court is prima facie satisfied that the accusation is false or over-exaggerated - In the present case, the Accused remained untraceable for over six years, a reward was announced for his arrest, and he allegedly threatened a key witness; such conduct makes it an unfit case for the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 438. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail — Duration of Protection — The Supreme Court reiterated that once anticipatory bail is granted, it should not invariably be limited to a fixed period or restricted to the stage of filing a charge-sheet - The protection should ordinarily enure in favor of the accused without restriction on time and can continue until the end of the trial, unless specific facts or features necessitate a limited tenure. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905

Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory Bail – Held that where co-accused summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. have already been granted anticipatory bail and have been appearing regularly before the trial court, no case for cancellation is made out unless specific grounds for such cancellation are established by the State. [Para 15, 18, 19] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail – Non-Cooperation with Investigation – Scope of Section 438 CrPC / Section 482 BNSS – The Supreme Court held that the mere act of an accused not answering specific questions posed by the Investigating Officer (IO) does not automatically constitute "non-cooperation" with the investigation - Noted that if an accused has appeared before the IO pursuant to interim protection, the failure to provide specific answers is not a sufficient ground ipso facto to deny bail. Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Effect of Co-accused's Acquittal — The acquittal of co-accused persons during the period an accused was absconding does not automatically entitle the absconder to anticipatory bail on the ground of parity. In a trial against co-accused, the prosecution is not expected to adduce evidence against an absconding party; therefore, findings from that trial have no bearing on the absconder's independent trial - An accused cannot be permitted to "encash" on an acquittal achieved while they were making a mockery of the judicial process by fleeing. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112

Section 438 Cr.P.C. (Section 482 BNSS, 2023) — Impact of Charge-sheet — The mere filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not automatically terminate the protection granted under Section 438 Cr.P.C. - There is no restriction on granting or continuing anticipatory bail even after a charge-sheet is filed, as the primary objective is to prevent undue harassment through pre-trial arrest. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Dowry Death – Sections 103(1) and 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Appeal by the mother of the deceased challenging the High Court's order granting bail to the husband of the deceased – The deceased died within 1.5 years of marriage in suspicious circumstances with multiple external and internal injuries – Allegations of dowry harassment and threats by the accused prior to the death – High Court granted bail primarily noting the absence of criminal antecedents and the period of custody – Held: The High Court adopted a "mechanical approach" and failed to consider the gravity of the offence and the nature of the accusations – While criminal antecedents are a factor, they cannot outweigh the seriousness of a crime like dowry death where circumstantial evidence strongly points toward the accused – The Supreme Court emphasized that an appellate court can interfere with a bail order if relevant materials were ignored or the gravity of the offence was not considered. [Relied on P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211; Paras 14-27] Lal Muni Devi v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Condition of Upfront Deposit or Undertaking to Pay Arrears/Siphoned Amounts as a Pre-condition for Bail Deprecated - High Courts Must Decide Bail on Merits Rather Than Deferring Due to Non-Payment - The Supreme Court of India has reiterated that the practice of courts insisting on upfront deposits, or undertakings for such deposits, as a condition for considering a bail prayer on merits is improper - Such practices have the potential to derail the criminal justice delivery system by becoming a tool for complainants to extort settlements and forcing the accused to give up their right of defense - In the present case, the appellant was denied an extension of interim bail by the High Court solely because he failed to fulfill an undertaking to deposit the remaining balance of an alleged siphoned subsidy amount (approx. ₹4.10 crore), despite having already deposited over 50% of the amount - The Supreme Court held that – i. In offences under Section 409 IPC, there is no automatic presumption regarding the culpability of a Director; it must be established during the trial; ii. An inability to comply with a financial undertaking is not a valid ground to defer the consideration of a bail prayer on its merits, especially when the investigation is complete and the accused has already suffered significant incarceration; iii. The appropriate course for the High Court was to decide the regular bail application on its own merits rather than keeping the matter pending through repeated interim extensions tied to upfront deposits. [Relied on Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1571; Paras 11-14] Rakesh Jain v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 81

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Disclosure of Material Facts — Duty of the Accused: The Court emphasized that an applicant seeking bail has a "solemn obligation" to make a full, fair, and candid disclosure of all material facts, specifically criminal antecedents. Suppression of such facts constitutes "fraud on the court," attracting the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi(suppression of truth is equivalent to expression of falsehood). [Relied On Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha (2024) 4 SCC 432; Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate (2024) 6 SCC 401] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail — Doctrine of Parity — Non-application to History-sheeters — Noted that the High Court erred in blindly extending the principle of parity to the respondent based on the bail granted to co-accused without considering his specific and distinctive features, including his use of 8 to 10 aliases, forged Aadhaar cards, and a history of absconding – Noted that when there is a likelihood of offences being repeated or justice being thwarted, discretion must be exercised cautiously. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail – Foreign Nationals – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Financial Constraints in furnishing Surety –The Respondent, a 32-year-old Ugandan national, was granted bail by the High Court on 15.09.2025 in a case involving the NDPS Act - Despite the Trial Court reducing the surety amount progressively from ₹1,00,000 to ₹25,000, the accused remained in Tihar Jail for months due to her inability to furnish a solvent surety - Held: Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the right to life and personal liberty, applies equally to foreign nationals prosecuted in India - Once an accused has established a case for bail, financial difficulties or the inability to provide a solvent surety should not act as a barrier to their release - In cases where a foreign national cannot meet surety requirements due to financial constraints, they may be released on a personal bond and subsequently housed in a detention center to ensure they do not leave the country - Supreme Court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, emphasizing its universal application to any person within the territory of India, regardless of nationality. [Paras 4-13] Customs v. Faridah Nakanwagi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Judicial Discretion — Impact of Criminal History: While a history-sheeter is not automatically disentitled to bail, criminal antecedents are a significant factor in judicial discretion, especially when the allegations involve systematic and organized crime (e.g., educational fraud rackets) - that once an investigation is complete and a chargesheet is filed, transfer to a special agency like the CBI should only be directed in exceptional circumstances showing bias, mala fides, or involvement of high-ranking officials – Appeal allowed. [Relied On Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Babu and another (2012) 9 SCC 446; Paras 28-33, 35- 41] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Mandatory Disclosure Framework - To streamline bail proceedings and prevent abuse, the Court provided an illustrative disclosure framework(recommendatory) for all bail applications, which includes – i. Case Details: FIR number, sections, and maximum punishment; ii. Custody Status: Date of arrest and total period of incarceration; iii. Status of Trial: Stage of proceedings and number of witnesses examined; iv. Criminal Antecedents: Detailed list of all FIRs (Pending/Acquitted/Convicted); v. Previous Bail Applications: Details of all prior applications and their outcomes; vi. Coercive Processes: Whether the applicant was ever declared a proclaimed offender or issued Non-Bailable Warrants. [Para 49] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail — POCSO Act — Age Determination — Section 439 CrPC vs. Section 94 JJ Act — Mini-Trial at Bail Stage — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's directions mandating medical age determination tests in all POCSO cases at the commencement of investigation - held that while exercising bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, a High Court cannot conduct a "mini-trial" by entertaining challenges to the veracity of age-related documents or ordering roving inquiries. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused in the alleged multi-crore Andhra Pradesh liquor scam, invoking its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. Muppidi Avinash Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail Cancellation — POCSO Act — Heinous Offences — Allegations of Gang-rape of a Minor — Grant of bail by High Court without considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the statutory rigour under the POCSO Act, and the filing of the chargesheet — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail, observing that the exercise of discretion was "manifestly erroneous"- Noted that while the filing of a chargesheet does not preclude bail, the Court is duty-bound to consider the gravity of the offence and the material collected – Noted that the allegations involved repeated penetrative sexual assault under armed intimidation and blackmail via recorded acts, which have a "devastating impact on the life of the victim and shakes the collective conscience of society" - The High Court failed to apply settled parameters, including the vulnerability of the victim and the likelihood of witness intimidation – Held that the bail order was perverse, unreasonable, and ignored the relevant material – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak and another (2023) 13 SCC 549; State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad @ Rajballav Pd. Yadav @ Rajballabh Yadav (2017) 2 SCC 178; Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 559; Paras 12-18] X v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : 2026 INSC 44

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail Jurisprudence — Distinction between Annulment and Cancellation of Bail - The Supreme Court clarified that an appeal against the grant of bail (annulment) stands on a different footing than an application for cancellation due to post-bail misconduct - While courts are generally slow to interfere with liberty, a bail order is liable to be set aside if it is perverse, illegal, or based on irrelevant material, such as documents whose genuineness is the subject of the trial. [Relied On State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1702; Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince and another (2025) scc OnLine SC 2580; Paras 13-14, 16-19] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant and Cancellation of Bail – Unlawful Assembly (Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 IPC) – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Murder (Section 302 IPC) - Bail – Parameters for interference by Superior Court – Distinction between 'cancellation of bail' for misconduct and 'reversal' of an erroneous bail order – Supreme Court held that while cancellation under Section 439(2) CrPC (Section 483(3) BNSS) typically involves the accused misusing liberty, a superior court can reverse a bail order if it ignores relevant material, is based on extraneous considerations, or fails to consider the gravity of the offence. [Para 20] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant of Bail — Cancellation/Setting aside of bail order — Factors to be considered — Criminal Antecedents and Conduct — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the first respondent, a "habitual offender" and "career criminal" involved in large-scale cheating and forgery - held that while liberty is a cardinal value, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the potential threat to society and the economic well-being of its members. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant of Bail – Delay in Trial – Incarceration without trial amounts to punishment – The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant who had been in custody since April 13, 2024, for offenses under Sections 386, 307, 506, 120-B, 482, and 411 of the IPC, and Sections 25(6) and 27 of the Arms Act - Supreme Court observed that despite the prosecution proposing to examine 23 witnesses, none had been examined after almost two years of incarceration - Noted that when a trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future and the accused has undergone significant pre-trial detention, further detention is unnecessary as incarceration without trial amounts to punishment. [Paras 5-11] Pardeep Kumar @ Banu v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Scope of Bail Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction of a Court under Section 439 is limited to granting or refusing bail based on prima facie evidence - It is coram non judice for a bail court to issue general mandatory directions to investigating authorities that contravene express legislative intent - Determination of age is a matter of trial and not a "matter of course" step during bail proceedings. [Relied on Chandrapal Singh v. State of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine All 934); State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251; Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 13-19] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Section 439 Cr.P.C. (also Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 483) — Successive Bail Petitions — Material Disclosures and Candour - A court entertaining a successive bail petition under a special statute is strictly bound to refer to the fate of the earlier petition and explicitly record what change in circumstances justifies a fresh consideration - A petitioner invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court must approach it with clean hands and full candour - Merely mentioning past case numbers without explicitly disclosing their nature or the factum of their dismissal falls well short of the expected candour and is calculated to obscure rather than illuminate. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo and Another, (2024) 15 SCC 36; Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346; Paras 11 – 14] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411 : AIR 2026 SC 2109 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 130

Section 482 BNSS – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Noted that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion. Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2026 INSC 373 : AIR 2026 SC 1995 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 263

Section 482 BNSS – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Supreme Court observed that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion - noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations - The appellant had previously filed FIR against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations - Noted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court of Kerala's order - The appellant is to be released on bail in the event of arrest, subject to – i. Furnishing a cash security of ₹1,00,000/- with two sureties; ii. Complete cooperation with the ongoing investigation; iii. Non-interference with witnesses or evidence. [Paras 10-16] Shankar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2026 INSC 369

Section 482 BNSS (corresponding to Section 438 of CrPC) – Guidelines for Anticipatory Bail – Shifting of Burden – Scope of Judicial Discretion – The High Court erred in refusing anticipatory bail by shifting the burden of proof onto the accused to prove beyond doubt that the allegations made by him in a press conference were true - making observations regarding an offence under Section 339 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), without it being alleged in the FIR and merely on the oral statement of the Advocate General, is incorrect - Anticipatory bail cannot be denied on a rigid or inexorable rule; instead, courts must weigh multiple considerations, including the nature and seriousness of the charges, the context of events, the flight risk, and the possibility of tampering with evidence. [Relied on Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Pradip N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine 457; Paras 15 – 27] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437 : 2026 (2) Crimes (SC) 184

Section 483 BNSS (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 437/439) – Bail Conditions – Recovery Proceedings – The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of a Court while considering bail is limited to assessing whether an accused should be released pending trial and imposing conditions to ensure a fair trial - It does not extend to adjudicating civil rights or directing the recovery of alleged dues - held that neither the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 nor the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 enables a Court, at the stage of bail, to direct the sale of an accused's immovable property to settle alleged claims. Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389

Section 80(2) and 85 BNS — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Section 118 — Dowry Death — Grant of Bail — Sustainability of High Court Order — Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the husband in a dowry death case where the marriage lasted only three months and the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation – Noted that the High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offense and the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 113-B of the Evidence Act). Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Section 82 Cr.P.C. – Delay in Surrendering after Bail Cancellation – Effect of Pending Review Petition - The filing of a Review Petition before the Supreme Court does not operate as an automatic stay of a surrender direction - Evading arrest for 42 days, necessitating the issuance of a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) and initiation of proclamation proceedings under Section 82 CrPC, constitutes contumacious conduct that heavily weighs against the fresh grant of bail. [Para 26-27] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526

Sections 438 & 439 Cr.P.C. — Appeal Against Grant of Bail vs. Cancellation of Bail — The considerations for an appellate court assessing the correctness of a bail order are distinct from those governing an application for cancellation of bail - While cancellation is based on "supervening circumstances" (e.g., misuse of liberty), an appeal tests whether the original order was perverse, illegal, or unjustified at the time of its passing - the post-bail conduct of an accused is irrelevant when determining the legality of the initial grant of bail in an appeal – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 730; Sushila Aggarwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518; Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Paras 37-51] Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112

Settlement of Claims – Meaning of "Attempt to Settle" – Supreme Court clarified that Condition (viii) of the bail order required a real and effective resolution of claims, either through valid possession or refund - Mere execution of mediation agreements without implementation does not constitute compliance - The project remains incomplete, lacking essential services (lifts, water, fire safety NOCs), rendering any "notional possession" delivered to allottees legally invalid. Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310

Suspension of Sentence — Grant of Bail pending Appeal — Long Incarceration — Life Imprisonment — The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Orissa which had declined the suspension of sentence for an appellant convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act - The appellant had suffered incarceration for over 11 years while his appeal, filed in 2016, remained pending before the High Court. Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176

Trial Delay and Witness Management — Noted that the prosecution expressed intent to examine 159 witnesses - noted that even examining 50% of these witnesses would take a "pretty long time" and questioned the necessity of multiplying witnesses on the same issues – noted that the prosecution should focus on important witnesses to establish its case rather than prolonging the trial - While acknowledging the gravity of the NDPS charges, exercised its discretion in favor of the petitioner due to the overall delay and the age of pending cases in the Trial Court - Bail granted subject to terms imposed by the Trial Court and specific conditions including a travel restriction to Ankleshwar, Gujarat, and surrender of passport. [Paras 5-11] Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 107

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Section 43-D(5) — Constitution of India — Article 21 — Bail — Prolonged Incarceration — Judicial Discipline — Binding Nature of Precedents — Grant of bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges under the UAPA and the NDPS Act on the ground of prolonged incarceration and gross delay in the trial - The appellant was in custody for over 5 years and 11 months with more than 350 prosecution witnesses remaining to be examined - Restrictive statutory provisions under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA do not oust the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to grant bail where an undertrial's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 has been infringed - The rigors of statutory bail restrictions "melt down" when there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone is substantial - The legislative intent cannot invert the core constitutional relationship between personal liberty and detention - Even under stringent special statutes like the UAPA, "bail is the rule and jail is the exception". Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 298

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 10(a)(i), 10(a)(iv) and 38(1) – Criminal Conspiracy – Mistaken Identity – Appreciation of Evidence – Material Improvements – Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Conduct of Accused - Glaring contradictions, material improvements, and lack of Test Identification Parade (TIP) render the prosecution's identification of the accused wholly doubtful – Consequent conviction based on flawed identification cannot be sustained - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a Sri Lankan national convicted for offences under the UAP Act, 1967, the IPC, the Poisons Act, 1919, the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Passport Act, 1967 - The prosecution alleged that the appellant was the absconding accused named "Sri" (A-5) who had conspired to rejuvenate the banned LTTE organization by supplying cyanide capsules and equipment - The appellant maintained a consistent defense of mistaken identity, asserting his true identity as "Ranjan." - Key Principles Established by the Supreme Court – i. Material Improvements in Testimony Deconstruct Credibility - The star prosecution witnesses (PW-8 and PW-9) introduced the appellant's name ("Ranjan") as an alias for the absconding accused ("Sri") for the very first time during the current trial - Their complete silence on this aspect during the investigation and previous split-up trials of co-accused constitutes a substantive and material improvement that severely dents their credibility - Such deep-rooted improvements cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential lapses of memory; ii. Inapplicability of the Abuthagir Principle to Improvements - The principle that a mere belated disclosure of a fact by a witness cannot solely discard their testimony applies strictly to a delay in the examination of witnesses during investigation. It cannot be extended to cover cases featuring substantive material improvements over distinct prior judicial depositions; iii. Absence of Corroborative Material and TIP - Where the identity of an accused is heavily disputed and the accused is tied to an alias post-arrest, the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) combined with a complete lack of contemporaneous official or police records linking the two identities prior to the arrest invalidates the identification process; iv. Inconsistency of Innocent Conduct with Absconding Status - The open residence of the appellant at a registered refugee address for years and his active engagement with a foreign embassy to secure a visa and local police clearance are wholly inconsistent with the behaviour of an absconding accused fleeing a serious UAPA charge. [Relied on Vishwanatha v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 482; Para 47 – 61] Sri v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 521 : 2026 INSC 516

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 43D(5), 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 – Grant of Bail – Prolonged Incarceration vs. Statutory Bar – Constitutional Perspective under Article 21 – Role Differentiation in Conspiracy – Governing Principles for Bail under UAPA - emphasized that the "prima facie true" standard under Section 43D(5) does not reduce the judicial role to a mechanical acceptance of prosecution assertions, but requires a threshold inquiry of real content- i. Contextual Inquiry into Delay - that the constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt, but whether continued detention remains constitutionally permissible. This is "necessarily contextual" and includes factors like the nature of allegations, the trial's realistic trajectory, and causes contributing to delay – ii. Individualized Role Differentiation- Supreme Court rejected a "case-centric" approach in favor of an "accused-specific" one. It distinguished between those with "strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality" and those whose roles were "peripheral or episodic"- iii. Speedy Trial vs. Statutory Embargo - While recognizing the right to a speedy trial as a foundational guarantee under Article 21, the Court held that "delay simpliciter" does not automatically eclipse the statutory regime enacted by Parliament for special category offences. Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 32

Unlawful Assembly – Individual Role Attribution – Noted that the High Court erred in granting bail on the ground that the individual role or specific injury caused by each accused could not be ascertained - The Supreme Court clarified that where an offence is committed by an unlawful assembly, every member is equally responsible for acts done in furtherance of the common object - Under Section 149 IPC, the prosecution is not obligated to identify the specific weapon or injury attributable to a particular member at the bail stage. [Paras 27 - 30] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278