SUPREME COURT HALF YEARLY DIGEST 2025

BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023, (BNSS) and The CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, (CrPC)

Section 2(1)(h). Complaint

Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. - Definition of Complaint - Judicial vs. Executive Magistrate - As per Section 2(d) of CrPC, a complaint refers to an allegation submitted orally or in writing to a Magistrate with the intent to invoke legal action under the Code. The Magistrate must be a Judicial Magistrate capable of taking cognizance of the case. Judicial Magistrates are entrusted with judicial functions, including the power to try cases and punish offenders, while Executive Magistrates primarily perform administrative and executive functions, such as maintaining public order. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Sections 2(d), 195 Cr.P.C. – Whether a complaint filed before an Executive Magistrate qualifies as a complaint under Section 195 CrPC for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 186 IPC. Held, a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) read with Section 195(1)(a) of the CrPC must be filed before a Judicial Magistrate, not an Executive Magistrate, as the latter lacks the authority to take cognizance of offences or try cases. (Para 19) B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 2(1)(y). victim

Sections 2(wa), 372, 378 (4), 378 (6) CrP.C. - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Dishonour of Cheque - Special Leave to Appeal - Appeal against order of acquittal – Victim's right to appeal - Whether an appeal would be maintainable under the proviso to section 372 of CrPC against an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a private complaint under section 138 by treating complainant in such a proceeding as a victim under section 2(wa) CrPC – Held, a complainant in a cheque dishonour case for the offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is a “victim” within the meaning of section 2(wa) of CrPC. The complainant can proceed as per the proviso to section 372 CrPC. Complainant need not invoke section 378(4) CrPC and could file appeal as 'victim' as per section 372 proviso. (Para 7.11) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 2 (wa) Cr.P.C. – Victim – Held, 'victim' has been defined in broad manner as to include a person who has suffered any loss or injury - It includes not only the person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of any act or omission for which the accused person has been charged but also includes his or her guardian or legal heir- which means that the definition of victim is inclusive in nature. (Para 6.3 - 6.6) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 2 (wa) Cr.P.C. - Accused means a person against whom there is an accusation or a person on trial - Accused of any offence would include in its ambit only a person against whom formal accusation relating to commission of offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in his prosecution. (Para 7.2, 7.3) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 2 (wa), 2 (d) Cr.P.C. – Victim – Complainant - Statutory Right - Distinction between Complainant and Victim – Held, if a complainant is not a victim and the case is instituted upon a complaint, then section 378(4) CrPC requires seeking special leave to appeal. If the Complainant is also a victim, they can choose to proceed under proviso to section 372 CrPC, which provides right to appeal as a victim without the need for special leave. Appeals allowed. (Para 3, 7.11, 7.12, 9) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 35. When police may arrest without warrant.

Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 9 - Arrest of the Accused - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Nonexamination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 14 Feb 2025 [Evidence] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312

Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 392, 397 and 411 - Arms Act, 1959; Section 25 – Arrest of the Accused - Robbery - Recovery of Weapons - In cases of robbery by unknown persons, where the accused are not known to witnesses, meticulous examination of evidence is crucial. Courts must scrutinize: (a) how the investigating agency identified the accused; (b) the manner of arrest; (c) the identification process; and (d) the discovery/recovery of looted articles. Mere proof of robbery is insufficient; credible evidence linking the specific accused to the crime is essential. (Para 13 & 14) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341

Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Arrest of the Accused - Identification evidence, particularly dock identification, must be scrutinized rigorously, especially in night-time incidents. (Para 22 & 23) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341

Section 47. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail.

Section 50 Cr.P.C. - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : AIR 2025 SC 1388 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Section 84. Proclamation for person absconding.

Section 82 Cr.P.C. is aimed at securing the presence of an accused in court. Once the purpose is achieved or the accused is acquitted, the proclamation can be quashed. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2025 SC 511

Section 82 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 174A - Proclaimed Offender Status - Whether the status of a "proclaimed offender" under Section 82 Cr.P.C. subsists if the accused is subsequently acquitted of the offence for which the proclamation was issued. Whether the subsistence of a proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is necessary for authorities to proceed against an accused under Section 174A IPC. A complaint was filed in 2010, and the appellant was declared a proclaimed offender in 2016 for non-appearance in court. The appellant was later acquitted of the main offence but faced charges under Section 174A IPC for failing to comply with the proclamation. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition to quash the proceedings, leading to the present appeal. Held, the status of a proclaimed offender under Section 82 Cr.P.C. does not automatically cease upon acquittal in the main offence. However, if the accused is acquitted, the necessity for securing their presence in court is nullified, and the proclamation can be quashed. Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence. Prosecution under this section can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is no longer in effect. However, if the accused is acquitted in the main offence, the court may consider this as a ground to close proceedings under Section 174A IPC, depending on the circumstances. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court's judgment and all criminal proceedings, including the FIR under Section 174A IPC. The appellant's status as a proclaimed offender was also quashed. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2025 SC 511

Section 94. Summons to produce document or other thing.

Section 91 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 24 - Entitlement to Unrelied Documents - Whether an accused under the PMLA is entitled to access a list of unrelied upon documents and statements collected by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) during investigation but not relied upon in the prosecution complaint. Held, an accused under the PMLA is entitled to a list of statements, documents, material objects, and exhibits not relied upon by the ED. This ensures the accused has knowledge of such materials to apply for their production under Section 91 CrPC (Section 94 BNSS) at the defence stage. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in allowing such applications, denying them only in exceptional circumstances due to the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA. (Para 30, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 91 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 45 - Production at Bail Stage - At the bail stage under Section 45 PMLA, the accused can invoke Section 91 CrPC to seek production of unrelied upon documents. The ED may object if disclosure prejudices ongoing investigations, but courts may deny production only if satisfied that disclosure would harm the investigation. (Para 52, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 144. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents

Section 125 Cr.P.C. - Refusal to Grant Maintenance - The Family Court erred in relying on a compromise deed filed before a 'Court of Kazi' to hold the appellant-wife responsible for the marital dispute, as the deed contained no admission of fault by the wife. The Supreme Court also rejected the Family Court's assumption that a second marriage precludes dowry demands, deeming it speculative and legally untenable. The Supreme Court set aside the Family Court's findings and directed the husband to pay Rs. 4,000 per month as maintenance to the appellant from the date of filing the maintenance petition. [Paras 14 & 15] Shahjahan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2025 INSC 528

Section 125 Cr.P.C. – Maintenance – Whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting – Held, a woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her second husband, even if her first marriage was not legally dissolved. A formal decree of dissolution is not mandatory. If the woman and her first husband mutually agreed to separate, the absence of a legal divorce does not prevent her from seeking maintenance from her second husband. The right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband. (Para 17 & 18) N. Usha Rani v. Moodudula Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2025 INSC 129

Section 125 (4) Cr.P.C. - Interpretation of - Whether a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, is absolved of paying maintenance to his wife under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if the wife refuses to comply with the decree and return to the matrimonial home? Held, a wife's refusal to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically disqualify her from claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The refusal must be assessed in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, including whether the wife had justifiable reasons for not returning to the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to provide social justice and prevent destitution. A decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically bar a wife from claiming maintenance if she has valid reasons for refusing to return to her husband. This judgment clarifies that the mere existence of a restitution decree does not override a wife's right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court must examine the facts of each case to determine whether the wife's refusal to comply with the decree is justified. The ruling reinforces the protective intent of maintenance laws in ensuring the financial security of women. Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2025 INSC 55 : AIR 2025 SC 644 : (2025) 3 SCC 33

Section 173. Information in cognizable cases.

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302 r/w. 149, 217, 218 - Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Sections 3(2)(i), 4 - Honour Killing - Police Misconduct - Evidence Fabrication - Whether the convictions of police officers for fabricating evidence and neglecting duties along with nine others were justified. Held, Police officers delayed FIR registration despite knowledge of the murders, used caste-based abuses against the family, violating Section 154 CrPC and the Lalita Kumari judgment. Inspector fabricated an extra-judicial confession, falsely implicating four Dalits and four Vanniyars in the FIR to shield the real culprits from the Vanniyar community. The case gained media attention, leading to the FIR being filed nine days after the crime. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions for neglecting duties, disobeying the law, and fabricating evidence to falsely implicate Dalits. The Court identified the primary orchestrator of the false FIR, deliberately protecting Vanniyar culprits and targeting innocent Dalits in an offence punishable by death. The convictions of nine others for the honour killing were also upheld. The Court emphasized the mandatory duty to register an FIR under Section 154 CrPC and condemned caste-based abuses and evidence manipulation targeting the Dalit community. (Para 74) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576 : AIR 2025 SC 2545

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - A preliminary inquiry is not mandatory under the Act for initiating a corruption case against a public servant. The absence of a preliminary inquiry does not justify quashing a case against a public servant solely on that ground. (Para 12 & 16) State of Karnataka v. Sri Channakeshava H.D., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2025 INSC 471

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – A public servant accused in a corruption case has no inherent right to a hearing prior to the registration of an FIR. (Para 14) State of Karnataka v. Sri Channakeshava H.D., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2025 INSC 471

Section 173 (3) BNSS - Preliminary inquiry must be conducted before lodging the FIR, if the offences alleged are dealing with speech and expressions. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 679

Section 173 BNSS - Police Duty and Preliminary Inquiry - Under Section 173(1) of the BNSS, registering an FIR is mandatory for cognizable offences, but Section 173(3) allows a preliminary inquiry for offences punishable between 3 and 7 years to ascertain a prima facie case. Here, the police failed to exercise this discretion, which could have protected the appellant's rights. Police, as part of the State under Article 12, must respect constitutional ideals. The Court criticized the lack of sensitization among police regarding Article 19(1)(a) and urged training programs. (Para 30) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 679

Section 154 and 174 Cr.P.C. - Mental Health - Student suicides in Higher Educational Institutions - The recurring instances of student suicides in Higher Educational Institutions, including private educational institutions, serve as a grim reminder of the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the existing legal and institutional framework in addressing mental health concerns of students on campuses and to prevent the students from taking the extreme step of committing suicides. These tragedies underscore the urgent need for a more robust, comprehensive, and responsive mechanism to address the various factors which compel certain students to resort to taking their own lives. In light of the concerns expressed above, a National Task Force to address the mental health concerns of students and prevent the commission of suicides in Higher Educational Institutions is being constituted. (Para 69) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : 2025 INSC 384

Section 154 and 174 Cr.P.C. - Registration of FIR - Suicide occurring on campus – Responsibility of maintaining the safety and well-being of students rests heavily on the administration of every educational institution. Therefore, in the event of any unfortunate incident, such as a suicide occurring on campus, it becomes their unequivocal duty to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with the appropriate authorities. Such action is not only a legal obligation but also a moral imperative to ensure transparency, accountability, and the pursuit of justice. Simultaneously, it is incumbent upon the police authorities to act with diligence and responsibility by registering the FIR without refusal or delay. This ensures that due process of law is upheld, and a thorough investigation can be conducted to uncover the truth and address any underlying causes. The harmonious discharge of these duties by both educational institutions and law enforcement agencies is essential to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies and to preserve trust in societal institutions. In a given case, failure on part of the administration of any educational institution may be viewed strictly. (Para 47) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : 2025 INSC 384

Section 154 and 174 Cr.P.C. - Abetment of Suicide - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Section 18A – Student suicides due to academic pressure, caste discrimination, and harassment - Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 when information discloses a cognizable offence, such as abetment of suicide or caste-based atrocities, without scope for preliminary inquiry unless exceptional circumstances apply; police cannot limit action to Section 174 inquiry into cause of death. Inquiry under Section 174 is restricted to ascertaining apparent cause of death (suicide, homicide, etc.) and cannot substitute for investigation into alleged cognizable offences under Section 154; premature closure of case as suicide without FIR registration disapproved. FIR registration for offences under SC/ST Act is obligatory without preliminary inquiry; allegations of caste-based discrimination and harassment in educational institutions mandate investigation. (Section 22, 34 & 40) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : 2025 INSC 384

Section 154 and 174 Cr.P.C. - When an informant approaches the police with information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the police owes a duty to promptly register an F.I.R. and initiate investigation in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC. The police authorities are not vested with any discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry to assess the credibility of the information before registering the F.I.R. Any such practice would be contrary to the established principles of criminal law. (Para 34) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : 2025 INSC 384

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - Registration of FIR - Cognizable Offence - Preliminary Inquiry – Scope of - the landmark decision in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) does not create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. The Lalita Kumari decision reaffirmed "the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. (Para 12) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2025 INSC 350 : AIR 2025 SC 1940 : (2025) 4 SCC 818

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - Registration of FIR - Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving him. Such a direction would not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the CrPC but would also amount to judicial overreach. As rightly observed by the High Court, courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law. (Para 14) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2025 INSC 350 : AIR 2025 SC 1940 : (2025) 4 SCC 818

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - In the present case, the allegations against the appellant pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office. Such allegations fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences, and there exists no legal requirement for a preliminary inquiry before the registration of an FIR in such cases. The appellant's contention that successive FIRs have been registered against him with an ulterior motive is a matter that can be examined during the course of investigation and trial. The appellant has adequate remedies under the law, including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs under Section 482 CrPC, the right to apply for bail, and the right to challenge any illegal actions of the investigating authorities before the appropriate forum. (Para 13) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2025 INSC 350 : AIR 2025 SC 1940 : (2025) 4 SCC 818

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - Permissibility of Registering a Second FIR - Under what circumstances can a second FIR be registered for a distinct offence arising from related or separate circumstances? Held, while a second FIR for the same offence is impermissible, a second FIR for a distinct offence is permissible. The Court outlined the following circumstances under which a second FIR can be registered: 1. When the second FIR is a counter-complaint or presents a rival version of facts related to an earlier FIR. 2. When the two FIRs differ in scope despite arising from the same circumstances. 3. When investigation reveals the earlier FIR to be part of a larger conspiracy. 4. When new facts or circumstances come to light through investigation or related persons. 5. When the incident is separate, regardless of whether the offences are similar or different. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to quash a second FIR, which alleged a broader bribery scheme involving a Bio-fuel Authority official, as it was distinct in scope from the first FIR concerning a specific bribery incident. The Court emphasized that quashing the second FIR would hinder investigation into widespread corruption, against the interest of society. (Para 9, 10) State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2025 INSC 248

Sections 173, 176 BNSS - High Court's direction to register FIRs based on statements before Justice Hema Committee regarding sexual exploitation in Malayalam cinema - The appellant challenged the High Court's order directing the registration of FIRs, noting that statements recorded by the Justice Hema Committee disclosed cognizable offences, requiring the SIT to act under Section 173(3) of BNSS. Held, under Section 176 of BNSS, police are obligated to investigate upon receiving information about a cognizable offence, and no injunction can restrain this process. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals, granting petitioners liberty to approach the High Court for their grievances. (Para 16) Sajimon Parayil v State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 182 : 2025 INSC 171 : (2025) 6 SCC 538

Section 154 Cr.P.C. – Death of Informant - Admissibility of FIR Contents – Nexus Requirement - Held, Contents of an FIR lodged by a deceased informant are inadmissible in evidence unless corroborated and proved, particularly if the informant's death is natural and unrelated to the complaint. For an FIR to be treated as substantive evidence, the informant's death must have a connection to the complaint. If the informant dies a natural death, the FIR's contents cannot be proved through the investigating officer. (Paras 30, 34) Lalita v. Vishwanath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2025 INSC 173

Section 154 Cr.P.C. – Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 - Dying Declaration - FIR as Evidence - Role of Investigating Officer - The investigating officer can only identify signatures on the FIR and confirm its registration details (date and police station). The officer cannot prove the FIR's contents unless it qualifies as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. (Paras 30, 34) Lalita v. Vishwanath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2025 INSC 173

Section 154 Cr.P.C. – Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32, 145, 154 (3), 157 - FIR Admissibility - An FIR is not substantive evidence by itself unless it falls under Section 32 (dying declaration) or is used to corroborate/contradict the informant's version under Sections 157 or 145 of the Evidence Act. (Paras 30, 34) Lalita v. Vishwanath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2025 INSC 173

Section 154 Cr.P.C. Penal Code, 1860; Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide - Appeal against the acquittal - The informant (deceased's father) died naturally before the trial, and the Court found the Trial Court erred in allowing the investigating officer to prove the FIR's contents. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's reversal of the Trial Court's conviction, citing insufficient evidence for abetment of suicide and improper use of the FIR. (Paras 30, 34) Lalita v. Vishwanath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2025 INSC 173

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 r/w. 34 - Murder - Conviction and Appeal - The Court reiterated the principle that concurrent findings of fact by two courts should not be interfered with unless there is a grave miscarriage of justice or manifest illegality. The recovery of weapons (axe and iron pipe) and the medical evidence supported the prosecution's case, even though some witnesses turned hostile. While the Court upheld the appellants' involvement in the assault, it found that the intent to kill was not conclusively established. The death resulted from cumulative injuries, and the appellants did not have a clear motive or premeditation. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and sentenced the appellants to the time already served, with a fine imposed for the benefit of the deceased's family. Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2025 INSC 47 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3148 : (2025) 3 SCC 378

Section 175. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case

Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A and 19 - Whether prior sanction under Section 17A of the 1988 Act is required when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC? In a case involving former Karnataka Chief Minister, the Supreme Court refrained from deciding the above question, as the issue is already under consideration in a pending reference (Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora). The Court directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for tagging with the reference, citing judicial discipline. (Para 20) B.S. Yeddiyurappa v. A Alam Pasha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2025 INSC 515

Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - Court Judgments – Retrospective Application – The Supreme Court reiterated that court judgments are inherently retrospective unless explicitly stated to operate prospectively. Unlike legislative laws, which are prospective unless specified otherwise, judicial interpretations apply retroactively. Prospective operation is used to avoid undue hardship or unsettling long-settled matters. In Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287 the Court mandated affidavits for complaints under Section 156(3) CrPC to curb frivolous filings, but clarified this requirement applies prospectively. Complaints filed before the judgment cannot be rejected for lacking an affidavit. (Para 3, 4) Kaniskh Sinha v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 259 : 2025 INSC 278

Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) - Preliminary inquiry not mandatory before fir registration against public servant – Issues - 1. Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registering an FIR against a public servant under the PC Act. 2. Whether a source information report can substitute for a preliminary inquiry in corruption cases. Held, a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory before registering an FIR against a public servant under the PC Act when the source information discloses a cognizable offence. The accused has no vested right to demand a preliminary inquiry. While a preliminary inquiry may be desirable in certain cases to ascertain the commission of a cognizable offence, its necessity depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The scope of such an inquiry is limited to determining whether the information prima facie reveals a cognizable offence, not to verify its truthfulness. A detailed source information report, as in this case, can serve as a substitute for a preliminary inquiry. The High Court's decision to quash the FIR was set aside, and the FIR under Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) of the PC Act was restored. (Para 24) State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2025 INSC 229

Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) - Reliance on Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. was misplaced, as it does not mandate a preliminary inquiry in corruption cases but allows discretion based on case-specific facts. The source information report, providing a comprehensive breakdown of the respondent's assets and income discrepancies, was sufficient to act as a preliminary inquiry. Preliminary inquiries aim to prevent unnecessary harassment while ensuring genuine allegations are not stifled arbitrarily. The State's appeal was allowed, the High Court's order quashing the FIR was set aside, and the FIR was restored. (Para 19) State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2025 INSC 229

Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - The Court discussed the changes introduced by the BNSS, which codify judicial safeguards to prevent misuse of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. BNSS mandates Magistrate to hear police officer on refusal to register FIR, ensures reasoned order. Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2025 INSC 139 : AIR 2025 SC 970

Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - The appellant, a police officer, challenged the order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class directing the registration of an FIR against him under Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 of the Penal Code (IPC) based on a complaint filed by a practicing advocate. The High Court rejected the appellant's application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. affirming the Magistrate's order. Whether the Magistrate mechanically ordered police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. without proper application of mind. The scope and prerequisites for invoking Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and the judicial discretion of the Magistrate. Held, Magistrates must apply their minds before directing police investigation. The order should not be mechanical, and the Magistrate must ensure that the complaint discloses cognizable offences. The Court highlighted the need for affidavits and prior applications to the police before invoking Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate. The Court held that no cognizable offence was made out, and the continuation of the investigation would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The appeal was allowed, and the investigation was quashed. Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2025 INSC 139 : AIR 2025 SC 970

Sections 156(3) and 200 Cr.P.C. - Vicarious Liability - Directors or officials of a company cannot be held vicariously liable for the company's illegal actions unless there is a specific statutory provision imposing such liability and evidence of their personal involvement in the offending conduct. Mere association with the company, authorization of acts, or supervisory roles does not suffice to attract vicarious liability. Specific allegations attributing a particular role or conduct to the director, beyond routine corporate duties, are essential. When jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the CrPC, the Court concerned should remain vigilant & apply its mind carefully before taking cognizance of a complaint of the present nature. (Para 11 & 15) Sanjay Dutt v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2025 INSC 34

Section 156, 195 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 186, 353 - Non-Cognizable Offences - Requirement of Magistrate's Approval for Investigation - Safeguards under Section 195 CrPC – Quashing of FIR under Sections 186 and 353 IPC - Police cannot investigate non-cognizable offences without prior approval from a Judicial Magistrate, as a safeguard to balance the coercive powers of the police and protect citizens' liberty, as per Section 156 CrPC. For non-cognizable offences under Section 186 IPC, a written complaint by the public servant to a Judicial Magistrate is mandatory for taking cognizance. Complaints to an Executive Magistrate are invalid. Section 353 IPC requires proof of assault or criminal force to deter a public servant, not mere obstruction. Absence of such elements renders the charge unsustainable. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR and criminal proceedings against the appellant, holding that: Cognizance under Section 186 IPC was illegal due to the absence of a valid complaint by the public servant to a Judicial Magistrate. The FIR under Section 353 IPC lacked allegations of assault or criminal force, making it unsustainable. The criminal proceedings were quashed due to non-compliance with procedural safeguards under Section 195 CrPC for Section 186 IPC and lack of essential ingredients for Section 353 IPC. (Para 9) B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 176. Procedure for investigation

Section 157 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302 r/w. 149 - Explosive Substances Act, 1908; Section 5 - The appellants challenged the FIR's timing, alleging it was ante-timed and contained interpolations. They argued that the prosecution's case was fabricated, with inconsistencies in witness testimonies and improper investigation. They contended that the recovery of weapons and the inquest report were flawed, and the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The State defended the High Court's judgment, asserting that the evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and medical reports, sufficiently established the guilt of the convicted accused. Held, minor contradictions in witness testimonies do not render them unreliable. It upheld the principle that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) does not apply in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Court found the testimonies of eyewitnesses credible and consistent, corroborated by medical evidence and weapon recovery. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the investigation was flawed, stating that defective investigation alone cannot lead to acquittal if other evidence supports the prosecution's case. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld. Edakkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : 2025 INSC 28 : AIR 2025 SC 444 : (2025) 3 SCC 273

Section 180. Examination of witnesses by police

Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Statements of an accused recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be used against a co-accused at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail. Such statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, are subject to the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, and lack evidentiary value against co-accused at the bail stage. (Para 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Section 161, 315 Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 - Exculpatory statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. have limited evidentiary value, usable only for contradicting or re-examining the maker under Section 145 of the Evidence Act or Section 315 Cr.P.C., if the accused testifies. Such statements cannot be used against a co-accused due to lack of credibility and inability to be tested by cross-examination. (Para 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 161, 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - Excise Policy scandal involving allegations of favoritism towards liquor brands, causing ₹3,000 crore loss to the state. The accused challenged the High Court's denial of anticipatory bail, which wrongly relied on co-accused statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court dismissed the accused's bail plea but criticized the High Court's reliance on inadmissible Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements. Courts must distinguish between witness and accused statements and apply Evidence Act provisions strictly at the bail stage. (Para 14, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 161, 162 Cr.P.C. Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 - Admissibility of Investigating Officer's testimony based on statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Held, the testimony of an Investigating Officer relying solely on witness statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is inadmissible as substantive evidence under Section 162 Cr.P.C., as such statements lack evidentiary value and can only be used to contradict witnesses during trial. While police officers may be competent witnesses for recoveries of physical evidence under Section 27, their testimony cannot be used to substantiate witness statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to prove motive, conspiracy, or preparation for a crime. (Para 26, 48) Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : 2025 INSC 657

Sections 161, 162 Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 - The High Court reversed the trial court's acquittal of the accused, relying on the Investigating Officer's testimony based on statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to address deficiencies in the prosecution's case. The trial court had rejected this evidence due to the bar under Section 162 Cr.P.C. Held, the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations, as all witnesses turned hostile, and the Investigating Officer's testimony, based solely on Section 161 statements, was inadmissible. (Para 26, 48) Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : 2025 INSC 657

Sections 161, 162 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 84 & 302 - Murder - Plea of Insanity - Absence of Motive - The Supreme Court reduced the conviction of a mother, who killed her daughters (aged 3 and 5), from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, imposing a maximum sentence of 10 years. The appellant's claim of acting under an "invisible influence," coupled with her behavior—shouting during the act, crying afterward, and not fleeing— suggested an impaired mental state, possibly temporary insanity. Although the insanity defense under Section 84 IPC was not fully accepted due to insufficient medical evidence, the absence of motive in such a grave offense supported the plea, raising doubts about mens rea. Noting the appellant had served 9 years and 10 months, the Court ordered her release. Trial courts were directed to proactively seek truth under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in cases involving bizarre, inexplicable acts or claims of mental instability, especially when temporary unsoundness of mind is suggested. Courts must consider that rural, less-educated individuals may not articulate mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) precisely, and such pleas should not be dismissed summarily. Lack of motive and erratic behavior may cast reasonable doubt on intent, warranting careful evaluation to ensure justice in grave offenses. (Para 33, 36, 39, 50, 58, 64) Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2025 INSC 577 : AIR 2025 SC 2370

Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Delay in recording an eyewitness's testimony would not draw an adverse inference against the prosecution's case if the delay is adequately explained. (Para 21) Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2025 INSC 387

Section 161 Cr.P.C. – Held, Trial Court failed to follow the proper procedure for contradicting prosecution witnesses with their Section 161 CrPC statements. The portions of a witness's prior statement used for contradiction must be formally proved through the investigating officer and marked as evidence by the trial judge. Merely reproducing contradicted portions in brackets without proof is erroneous. Such portions should be marked (e.g., AA, BB) and cannot form part of the deposition unless duly proved. Consequently, the impugned judgments were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 11) Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2025 INSC 209 : AIR 2025 SC 943 : 2025 Cri LJ 1268 : (2025) 3 SCC 680

Section 161 and 162 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 r/w. 34 – Murder - Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Material omission on part of the Investigating Officer in not conducting a TIP of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend. Every piece of relevant fact needs to be sewn via the golden thread of duly proved circumstances, in order to ultimately formulate the fabric of guilt. (Para 24 & 25) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 161 and 162 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 r/w. 34 – Murder - Circumstantial Evidence - In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards the accused person's guilt. The chain of incriminating circumstances must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. (Para 14) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 161 and 162 Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 - Disclosure statements and subsequent recoveries - The Investigating Officer failed to provide the exact words of the accused, neglected to exhibit the statements or recovery memorandums, and did not establish a clear connection between the accused and the recovered articles. Procedural irregularities, such as the absence of sealing or test identification, further weaken the evidentiary value of the recoveries. (Para 20 & 21) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 161 and 162 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Extra-Judicial Confession - Circumstantial Evidence - Credibility - Extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence and require rigorous scrutiny. They must be voluntary, truthful, and inspire confidence. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances. Extra-judicial confessions require corroboration by other evidence. (Para 16 – 19 & 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 161 and 162 Cr.P.C. Extra-Judicial Confession - Credibility and Voluntariness - The credibility of the witnesses testifying to the confession is crucial. Confessions made in a doubtful mental state lack voluntariness and reliability. (Para 19) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 161 and 162 Cr.P.C. - Material Omissions and Contradictions - Significant omissions in statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that contradict courtroom testimony, undermine credibility. Such omissions can be considered contradictions under the explanation to section 162 of the Cr.P.C. (Para 21 & 22) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 161 and 162 Cr.P.C. - Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for credible evidence. Convictions must be based on evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 24) Evidence Law - Benefit of Doubt - If the evidence is weak and lacks credibility, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. (Para 24 & 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 161 and 162 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - The accused was convicted of murdering his live-in partner. The conviction was primarily based on extra-judicial confessions to witnesses. The accused's mental state was questioned, and there was a lack of corroborating physical evidence. Material omissions were noted in witness statements. Therefore, the conviction was overturned. (Para 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 186, 353 - Omission of crucial facts in the First Information Report (FIR), which are later introduced through witness statements under Section 161 CrPC, indicates an afterthought and raises doubts about the case's credibility. An FIR, while not an encyclopedia of all incident details, must disclose the nature of the alleged offence to avoid being quashed. The Court quashed criminal proceedings against the appellant under Sections 186 and 353 of the IPC, finding no allegations of criminal force or assault (essential for Section 353) in the FIR, only obstruction (Section 186). Subsequent inclusion of Section 353 allegations in Section 161 CrPC statements was deemed an afterthought, as vital facts known to the complainant were not mentioned in the FIR. Taking cognizance by the Trial Court was flawed due to the absence of Section 353 ingredients in the FIR and witness statements. The Court emphasized a clear distinction between “creating obstruction” (Section 186) and “assault” or “criminal force” (Section 353), noting that equating disturbance with assault amounts to an abuse of the legal process. Criminal proceedings against the appellant were set aside as the FIR and witness statements lacked the necessary ingredients for Section 353 IPC. Criminal proceedings quashed; cognizance by the Trial Court held vitiated. (Paras 25-27, 32) B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 193. Report of police officer on completion of investigation.

Section 173 Cr.P.C. - Whether the prosecution can produce documents omitted from the chargesheet after its submission. Held, the prosecution may produce documents inadvertently omitted from the chargesheet, whether collected before or after the investigation, provided there is no prejudice to the accused. Procedural lapses in submitting evidence can be rectified post-chargesheet without invoking Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. In this case, the prosecution's omission to produce Compact Discs (CDs) referenced in the supplementary chargesheet was deemed bona fide, and their production was allowed as they were not new evidence. The accused retained the right to challenge the CDs' authenticity during trial. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the decisions of the Special Court and High Court. (Para 11 & 15) Sameer Sandhir v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : AIR 2025 SC 2689 : 2025 INSC 776

Section 173 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail – Investigation was completed and the charge sheet was filed - Investigating Officer did not arrest the petitioner during the investigation phase, and the Court had issued summons for the petitioner's appearance. The Court expressed disapproval of the practice in Uttar Pradesh where arrests are made post-charge sheet filing and cognizance by the Court, deeming it illogical. The Court held that once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the accused should appear before the trial court and furnish bail. Musheer Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 83

Section 194. Police to enquire and report on suicide, etc.

Section 174 Cr.P.C. – Scope of - Investigation under Section 174 is limited in scope and is confined to the ascertainment of the apparent cause of death and should not be equated with investigation into cognizable offences under Sections 160 and 161 of the CrPC respectively. The procedure under Section 174 of the CrPC is for the purpose of discovering the cause of death and the evidence taken is very short. The police's closure of the cases as suicides after Section 174 inquiries was premature and bypassed due process. (Para 22 & 40) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : 2025 INSC 384

Section 215. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence

Sections 195, 2(d), 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 186 and 353 – Quashing of FIR – Cognizance of offence under Section 186 IPC impermissible on police report – Section 195 CrPC mandates complaint by aggrieved public servant or superior – No allegation of assault or criminal force under Section 353 IPC – Appellants' actions lacked mens rea for obstruction under Section 186 IPC – Prosecution deemed vexatious and mala fide – Criminal proceedings quashed – Appeal allowed. (Para 28, 32, 34) Umashankar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 551 : AIR 2025 SC 2571 : 2025 INSC 653

Section 195 (1) Cr.P.C. - A complaint under Section 195 (1) Cr.P.C. must be filed before a Judicial Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate. A complaint addressed to an Executive Magistrate, such as a City Magistrate, does not fulfill the statutory requirement for cognizance under Section 195(1) CrPC. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 218. Prosecution of Judges and public servants

Section 197 Cr.P.C. - Police Act, 1963 (Karnataka); Section 170 - Prior sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act is required to prosecute police officers even for acts exceeding their authority, as long as a reasonable nexus with their official duties existed. (Para 38 & 39) G.C. Manjunath v. Seetaram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 399 : 2025 INSC 439 : (2025) 5 SCC 390

Section 197 Cr.P.C. - Concept of deemed sanction - Absence of prior sanction – Held, there is no concept of 'deemed sanction' under Section 197. The Court rejected the argument that failure to grant sanction within a stipulated time results in deemed sanction, as contended by the complainant and prosecution based on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 889 and Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64. The Court distinguished Vineet Narain, noting it dealt with CBI and CVC procedures, not Section 197 CrPC, and did not support deemed sanction. In Subramanian Swamy, guidelines suggesting deemed sanction after a time limit were noted, but the Court emphasized that such a concept is not statutorily incorporated in the CrPC. The Court highlighted that the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), introduces deemed sanction under Section 218(1), allowing prosecution if sanction is not granted within 120 days, but this does not apply to the CrPC. The absence of valid sanction vitiated the criminal proceedings, leading to the quashing of the chargesheet, summoning order, and subsequent trial court actions against the appellant. The initiation of criminal proceedings without a valid sanction under Section 197 CrPC is invalid, and the concept of deemed sanction does not exist under the CrPC. The proceedings against the appellant were quashed due to the lack of sanction, which was expressly denied by the competent authority. (Para 30 - 32) Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 249 : AIR 2025 SC 1308 : 2025 INSC 267

Section 223. Examination of complainant

Section 200 Cr.P.C. - Recording the complainant's statement on oath under Section 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality. The object of recording the complainant's statement and witnesses, if any, is to ascertain the truth. The learned Magistrate is duty-bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth. The examination is necessary to enable the Court to satisfy itself whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. After considering the complaint, the documents produced along with the complaint, and the statements of the complainant and witnesses, if any, the learned Magistrate has to apply his mind to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC. The corresponding provision under the BNSS is Section 227. Setting criminal law in motion is a serious matter. The accused faces serious consequences in the sense that he has to defend himself in the trial. (Para 10) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355 : AIR 2025 SC 1857 : 2025 INSC 399

Section 200 Cr.P.C. - Suppression of Material Facts - It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court. (Para 11) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355 : AIR 2025 SC 1857 : 2025 INSC 399

Section 200 Cr.P.C. - While filing a complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. (Para 21) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355 : AIR 2025 SC 1857 : 2025 INSC 399

Section 200 Cr.P.C. - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Reply to the Statutory Notice - This was a case where very material documents in the form of two letters addressed by the appellant were suppressed in the complaint and the statement on oath under Section 200. In the statement on oath, the respondent-complainant vaguely referred to a 'false notice reply', but a copy of the reply was not produced by the respondent along with the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint. Complaint and cognizance order set aside, leaving civil remedies open. (Para 20 - 23) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355 : AIR 2025 SC 1857 : 2025 INSC 399

Section 225. Postponement of issue of process.

Section 202 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860, Sections 499 and 500 – Defamation – Allegation of article implying auction of counterfeit artworks – Held, the complaint lacked specific allegations against the Editorial Director and revealed procedural irregularities, including the Magistrate's failure to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC before issuing summons. No evidence established reputational harm or auction-related loss due to the article. General or vague allegations without specific details are insufficient to summon the accused. Absence of witness examination to prove reputational damage and the futility of prolonged litigation, given the auction occurred over a decade ago, noted. While affirming the right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court cautioned media, particularly those in influential positions, to exercise utmost responsibility and accuracy in reporting to avoid reputational harm, emphasizing the media's role in shaping public opinion and the need for publications to be in good faith and public interest. Criminal defamation proceedings quashed; media advised to exercise caution in publications. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241

Section 227. Issue of process

Section 204 Cr.P.C. - A Magistrate's order taking cognizance of a police report under Section 204 Cr.P.C. cannot be faulted merely for lacking explicit reasons, provided the Magistrate records a finding of a prima facie case based on case records, such as the case diary. Setting aside the High Court's interference with a trial court's cognizance order, the Court reaffirmed that a Magistrate is not required to provide detailed reasons at the stage of issuing summons, as long as the accusations and materials in the police report have been duly considered. The Additional Judicial Commissioner's approach was correct in applying its mind to the materials to determine the commission of an offence and identify the accused. The appeal was allowed, upholding the cognizance order dated 13.06.2019 as lawful. (Para 15, 16 & 21) Pramila Devi v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2025 INSC 560

Section 204 Cr.P.C. - Summoning of an Accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. The order of the Magistrate summoning the Accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The Magistrate is required to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary in support thereof and as to whether that would be sufficient for proceeding against the Accused. The Magistrate is not a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the Accused. (Para 35) Inox Air Products v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 INSC 128 : AIR 2025 SC 814

Section 239. Court may alter charge

Section 216 Cr.P.C. - Power to Alter or Add Charges - Deletion of framed charges not permissible - Whether the power under Section 216 CrPC, or its analogous provision Section 239 BNSS, allows deletion of charges already framed against an accused. Held, Section 216 CrPC (Section 239 BNSS) permits only the addition or alteration of charges and does not confer the power to delete charges already framed by the Trial Court under Section 228 CrPC. Once charges are framed, the accused cannot be discharged under Sections 227 or 216 CrPC, and the trial must proceed to either conviction or acquittal. The Court approved the Allahabad High Court's decision in Dev Narain v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 3216, reiterating that framed charges cannot be deleted mid-trial. The Trial Court and High Court erred in deleting charges under the NDPS Act and transferring the case to the Metropolitan Magistrate under the Drugs & Cosmetics Act without acquitting the accused. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders, directing the trial to proceed before the Special Judge, NDPS, in accordance with law. (Para 154, 161) Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2025 INSC 498

Section 250. Discharge

Sections 227, 402 r/w 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 - Rape - False promise of marriage - Breach of promise to marry does not constitute rape unless consent was obtained through fraud from the outset. The complainant knowingly entered a consensual sexual relationship with the accused for over a year, aware of his subsisting marriage. Terming the criminal proceedings an abuse of process, the Court noted a growing trend of initiating criminal cases when relationships sour, emphasizing that consensual relationships with a possibility of marriage cannot be deemed fraudulent if they fail. No fraudulent intent was proven, and the complainant's consent was not based on a misconception of fact, as she was fully aware of the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, and set aside the impugned findings noting that the physical relationship between the Complainant and the Appellant was consensual, cannot be said to be without her consent or against her will. (Para 15, 16 & 20) Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 404 : 2025 INSC 458 : AIR 2025 SC 1925 : (2025) 5 SCC 749

Section 227 Cr.P.C. – Penal Code, 1860; Section 304 Part II - Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder - Accidental Death due to Electrocution - Absence of Intention or Knowledge - Appeal against rejection of discharge applications - Where two employees, engaged in decorating a shop, died due to electrocution and a fall from a height while working on a signboard using an iron ladder, and the appellants, who were the contractor and store operation manager, were charged under Section 304 Part II IPC for not providing safety equipment, held, no prima facie case of culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC was made out. There was no intention to cause death or knowledge that the act would likely cause death. The absence of intention and knowledge, crucial ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC, warranted the discharge of the appellants under Section 227 CrPC. At the stage of discharge, the focus is on whether there are sufficient grounds to initiate a criminal trial, not on a threadbare analysis of evidence. Consequently, the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court rejecting the discharge applications were set aside, and the appellants were discharged. (Para 16 - 18) Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : AIR 2025 SC 1515 : 2025 INSC 338

Sections 227 and 390 Cr.P.C. - Legality of the High Court's ex-parte stay on an order of discharge granted to the appellant in a criminal case. The appellant, initially discharged by the Sessions Court in connection with offenses under Sections 302, 201, 34 IPC, and the Arms Act, was subsequently directed by the High Court to surrender and face trial after the discharge order was stayed. Held, the High Court's ex-parte stay of the discharge order was illegal and set aside both the stay order and the subsequent order directing the appellant's surrender. The Court emphasized that an order of discharge places the accused on a higher pedestal than an acquittal, and staying such an order without hearing the accused is a drastic measure that curtails liberty. The Court directed the appellant to furnish bail under Section 390 CrPC and allowed the High Court to proceed with the revision application without being influenced by the Supreme Court's observations. The appeals were allowed on these terms. (Para 25) Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2025 INSC 281

Sections 227 and 401 Cr.P.C. - Discharge - Stay of Discharge Order - An ex-parte stay of a discharge order is generally impermissible. The high court cannot stay a discharge order, in such a way that the trial court can proceed with the trial of the discharged accused. The Court must ensure that while granting a stay, the trial does not proceed against the discharged accused before the revision is decided, preventing a fait accompli situation. (Para 13, 14 & 22) Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2025 INSC 281

Sections 227 and 401 Cr.P.C. - Discharge - Stay of Discharge Order - Power of Revisional Court - Effect of Discharge - Principles Governing Stay of Discharge - A discharge order, unlike an acquittal, removes the accused from the status of an accused, placing them on a higher pedestal. The power to stay a discharge order is a drastic one, curtailing liberty granted by the discharge. Stay of a discharge order should only be granted in rare and exceptional cases where the order is ex-facie perverse, and only after affording the accused an opportunity to be heard. Such a stay should be moulded to prevent the trial from proceeding against the discharged accused pending the revision. (Para 13 - 17) Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2025 INSC 281

Sections 227, 228 and 401 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860 - Section 306 - Abetment of suicide - Communications demanding repayment of a loan - Held, to constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC, there must be: (i) Instigation or intentional aiding of suicide. (ii) An active or direct role in the commission of suicide. (iii) Mens rea (guilty mind) to push the deceased to commit suicide. Mere demand for loan repayment, even if harsh or persistent, does not amount to abetment unless it leaves no option but suicide. Emotional exchanges or heated arguments without intent to incite suicide cannot be termed as instigation. Demanding loan repayment was within the appellant's duty and did not constitute instigation or abetment to suicide. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was discharged from the charges. Mere financial disputes or demands for loan repayment, without any evidence of intentional instigation or a direct act compelling the deceased to commit suicide, do not constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC. Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2025 INSC 76 : AIR 2025 SC 568 : (2025) 4 SCC 801

Section 256. Entering upon defence

Section 233 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 24 - Safeguarding PMLA Burden - Given the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA, denying access to unrelied upon documents hampers the accused's ability to discharge this burden, necessitating liberal construction of Section 233(3) CrPC to protect the accused's rights. (Para 50, 51, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645

Section 262. When accused shall be discharged

Section 239 Cr.P.C. - Scope of Consideration for Discharge Plea - Held, a court must evaluate a discharge plea under Section 239 CrPC based solely on the prosecution's chargesheet and documents, without considering defence materials or conducting a premature merits-based assessment. The trial court and High Court erred by relying on a defence-submitted letter from the Cotton Corporation of India, claiming no loss, to counter the prosecution's allegations of fraud, forgery, and conspiracy under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, 471 of the Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in a cotton procurement scam under the Minimum Support Price scheme. Such reliance on defence materials at the discharge stage is impermissible and constitutes an illegal “mini-trial,” contrary to established precedent. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order affirming the discharge, allowed the CBI's appeal, and remitted the matter to the Special Court for reconsideration strictly in accordance with Section 239 CrPC. (Para 27) State v. Eluri Srinivasa Chakravarthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 633 : AIR 2025 SC 3068 : 2025 INSC 758

Section 279. Non-appearance or death of complainant

Section 256 Cr.P.C. - Non-appearance of a complainant will not always result in the acquittal of the accused. Acquittal under this section is warranted only when the complainant is absent on the date which was set for the appearance of the accused. If the date was set for a purpose other than the appearance of the accused, the absence of the complainant on such a date will not warrant the acquittal of the accused. (Para 19 & 20) Ranjit Sarkar v. Ravi Ganesh Bhardwaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : 2025 INSC 415 : (2025) 7 SCC 234

Section 348. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.

Section 311 Cr.P.C. - Right to Fair Trial - The right to a fair trial under Article 21 includes the accused's right to defend, which encompasses leading defence evidence, producing documents, examining witnesses, and recalling prosecution witnesses for cross-examination under Section 311 CrPC based on produced documents. (Para 45, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645

Section 311 Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 165 - Courts can summon additional witness as prosecution witness if omitted due to oversight; powers complementary for just decision – Held, Section 311 of the CrPC, courts may permit the examination of an additional witness as a prosecution witness if such a person ought to have been included but was omitted due to oversight or other reasons. The wide discretionary powers under Section 311 CrPC, exercisable suo moto or on application by either party, are complementary to Section 165 of the Evidence Act, enabling courts to summon material witnesses or question persons present at any stage of a trial, even after evidence is closed, to ensure the best evidence is available for a just decision. The Court distinguished between summoning an additional witness (allowing full examination and cross-examination) and a court witness (with restricted cross-examination, subject to court's leave). (Para 48, 49) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576 : AIR 2025 SC 2545

Section 311 Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 165 - Court Witnesses - Prosecution cannot contradict with prior police statements, but court can – Held, a "Court Witness," summoned under Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 of the Evidence Act, cannot be cross-examined by the prosecution using prior statements made to the police under Section 161 CrPC. The proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC restricts such contradiction to prosecution witnesses only, with court permission. However, the Court itself, under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, can question a Court Witness to contradict prior police statements, as this provision is not limited by Section 162 CrPC. The Court distinguished between additional witnesses (under Section 311 CrPC) and Court Witnesses, noting that the former allows broader cross-examination, while the latter is restricted to questions posed through the Court. (Para 51) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576 : AIR 2025 SC 2545

Section 311 Cr.P.C. - Principles governing the application of Section 311 Cr.P.C. : (a) The Section is divided into two parts, the first being directory with the use of the word 'may' and the latter being mandatory with the use of the word 'shall'. (b) The power of the Court is couched in the widest terms possible with no express limitation thereon. (c) The exercise of such power is not only the prerogative but also the duty of the Court, in connection with a witness who may be considered absolutely necessary, in the interest of justice. (d) This power is to be used both for the benefit of the prosecution and the defence. To summon a witness because it serves the case of one of the parties and not the other, would be improper. (e) This power can be exercised at any stage of proceedings, i.e. enquiry, trial or any other. (f) Power is to be exercised judiciously since wider the power, greater the requirement of the application of a judicial mind. (g) If a witness so-called under this power, gives evidence against the complainant, the latter should be given an opportunity to cross-examination. This power arises not under Section 311 but under the Evidence Act, 1872. (h) A witness cannot be recalled by the use of this power to simply fill up a lacuna in the case of the prosecution. (Para 30.1) Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2025 INSC 225

Section 351. Power to examine accused.

Section 313 Cr.P.C. - While the accused is not obligated to answer the questions put to him and still can maintain his silence or deny the evidence, yet silence or evasive or wrong answers to the questions put by the court provides a perspective to the court in properly evaluating the incriminating materials which have been brought forth by the prosecution by drawing necessary inference including an adverse one. (Para 10.16) Chetan v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3251 : 2025 INSC 793

Section 313 Cr.P.C. - Examination of an accused under Section 313 CrPC is an important component of the process of judicial scrutiny of the evidence sought to be relied upon by the prosecution against an accused. At the time of indictment and framing of charges against an accused, the untested evidence marshalled by the investigating authority in the course of the investigation is laid bare before the accused, who would have an idea as to the nature of evidence and case being built up against him by the prosecution. This is to enable the accused to prepare and strategize his defence. He will have all the opportunities to discredit any prosecution witness or question any evidence through the tool of cross examination. He will thereafter have the opportunity to lead his defence evidence if any. It is in this context that the answers given by an accused assume great significance in assessing the evidence by the court. (Para 10.16.1) Chetan v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3251 : 2025 INSC 793

Section 313 Cr.P.C. - Acquittals due to procedural lapses - Importance of presenting all material evidence to the accused - The Supreme Court emphasized the need for High Courts to proactively verify compliance with Section 313 CrPC (Section 351 BNSS) at the outset of criminal appeals to ensure all prosecution evidence is presented to the accused for explanation. This approach aims to conserve judicial time, rectify defects early, and prevent acquittals due to procedural lapses, which become incurable after significant time lapses. The Court also advised Judicial Officers to utilize Section 313(5) CrPC to minimize errors in recording statements, particularly in cases with numerous witnesses. (Paras 28) Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 456 : 2025 INSC 529

Section 313 Cr.P.C. - (i) It is the duty of the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction; (ii) The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence; (iii) The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused; (iv) The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused; (v) If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident; (vi) In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him; (vii) In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC; and (viii) While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered. Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2025 INSC 225

Section 358. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence

Section 319 Cr.P.C. - Summoning of additional accused - Prima facie evidence sufficient – Held, a summoning order under Section 319 CrPC, cannot be quashed based on alibi evidence presented by the additional accused at the summoning stage. The threshold for summoning an additional accused is the existence of prima facie evidence indicating involvement in the offence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. The plea of alibi is a matter of defence to be established during trial, not at the stage of summoning. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to quash the trial court's summoning order, emphasizing that untested documentary evidence (e.g., parking chit, chemist's receipt, OPD card, CCTV clip) cannot be treated as conclusive at the summoning stage. The trial court's order summoning the additional accused was restored. (Para 11, 13) Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2025 INSC 634

Section 319 Cr.P.C. - Additional accused can be summoned based on pre-trial evidence such as the unrebutted examination-in-chief of the witness without waiting for cross-examination to conclude. (Para 13 & 17) Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2025 INSC 416 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 708 : (2025) 5 SCC 740

Section 319 and 401 Cr.P.C. - Summoning Additional Accused - Revisional Jurisdiction - Relation Back - Trial Court's Functus Officio - Opportunity of Hearing - When a High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the CrPC, sets aside a Trial Court's order rejecting an application under Section 319 CrPC, the rectified order relates back to the date of the original Trial Court order. Consequently, a summoning order issued by the Trial Court in compliance with the High Court's revisional order also relates back to the initial rejection of the Section 319 application, deeming it to have been passed before the conclusion of the trial. Unlike initial Section 319 applications, the conclusion of trial does not bar the adjudication of a Section 319 application directed by the High Court in revision. The Trial Court is not rendered functus officio in considering a Section 319 application after trial conclusion when acting on a revisional order. A summoning order issued pursuant to a High Court's revisional order is an extension of that order, effectively replacing the original rejected Section 319 application. A person summoned under Section 319 CrPC does not have a right to be heard before being added as an accused, unless they were previously discharged in the same proceeding before trial. However, if a trial court rejects a 319 CrPC application, and therefore a right accrues to the proposed accused, and the high court in revisional jurisdiction then passes an order prejudicial to that right, the high court must provide an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused, as mandated by Section 401(2) CrPC. (Para 115) Jamin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2025 INSC 330

Section 319 Cr.P.C. - The petitioners, initially named in the FIR but exonerated by the Investigating Officer in a closure report, were summoned based on the testimony of the original informant during the trial. The Court reiterated that under Section 319 CrPC, a Trial Court can summon individuals not initially charge-sheeted if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial. The Court emphasized that the power under Section 319 is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly, based on evidence stronger than a prima facie case but not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The closure report, though not considered by the Trial Court, was deemed irrelevant once the Court invoked Section 319. The Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition, allowing the petitioners to raise all legal defenses, including reliance on the closure report, before the Trial Court. Omi @ Omkar Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2025 INSC 27 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 956 : (2025) 2 SCC 621

Section 403. Court not to alter judgment

Section 362 Cr.P.C. - Court not to alter judgment - Modifying Murder Conviction - Whether Section 362 CrPC permits substantive modifications to a judgment, such as altering a conviction from Section 302 IPC (murder) to Section 304 Part II IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), or is limited to correcting clerical or arithmetical errors. Held, Section 362 CrPC restricts courts to correcting only clerical or arithmetical errors in a signed judgment or final order. The Supreme Court disapproved the High Court's use of Section 362 CrPC to modify a criminal appeal judgment by converting a conviction under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC and reducing the sentence. The Court, noting the clear language of the provision, held that such substantive changes to reasoning or conviction violate Section 362 CrPC. The High Court's order was set aside. (Para 19) Ramyash @ Lal Bahadur v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : AIR 2025 SC 2151 : 2025 INSC 544

Section 415. Appeals from convictions.

Section 374 and 378 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860, Sections 147, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 323, 325, 452 – Incident of 1989 – Accused assaulted multiple persons, including deceased, over a dispute – Trial Court convicted under Section 302/149 IPC with life imprisonment – High Court converted conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, reduced sentence to time served (76 days) with fine, citing advanced age of accused (70–80 years) and 28-year delay –Medical evidence inconclusive on cause of death (asphyxia, 15 days post-assault) – No intent to murder established – Long lapse of time and age of accused justified leniency –Appeal dismissed. (Para 13 & 14) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2025 INSC 377 : AIR 2025 SC 1818 : (2025) 4 SCC 616

Section 374 and 378 Cr.P.C. - Criminal Appeal - Old age of the accused and the long lapse of time from the commission of the offence can always be a ground available to give some priority to the appeals against conviction of the accused on bail. (Para 15) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2025 INSC 377 : AIR 2025 SC 1818 : (2025) 4 SCC 616

Section 374 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 376 - Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2025 INSC 360 : AIR 2025 SC 1755 : 2025 Cri LJ 1807

Section 374 Cr.P.C. - Right to Appeal - The right to appeal against a conviction under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C. is both a statutory and a fundamental right under Article 21, given the expansive interpretation of liberty. Courts must consider reasons for delay in filing an appeal and cannot dismiss it on technical grounds alone. The High Court's dismissal of the appellant's appeal due to a 1637-day delay, without adequately assessing the reasons (lack of financial resources and absence from station for livelihood), was erroneous. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, condoned the delay, and remanded the appeal to the High Court for adjudication on merits in accordance with law. (Para 6) Mahesh Singh Banzara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 28

Section 419 Appeal in case of acquittal.

Section 378 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 106 - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - Prosecution must disprove accused's plea of alibi before convicting based on 'last seen' theory. Mere fact that the husband and wife were last seen together in their shared home does not, by itself, justify convicting the husband for the alleged murder if he raises a plea of alibi and the prosecution fails to effectively disprove it. The High Court wrongly placed the burden on the accused to prove his alibi, despite his early claim of absence in an intimation to the police and the police's failure to investigate the same. While a husband's failure to explain his wife's death in their shared home can be a strong incriminating circumstance, it cannot alone establish guilt, especially when he has raised a plausible plea of alibi offering an explanation about his absence at the place of incident. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2025 SC 2423 : 2025 INSC 460

Section 378 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 106 - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - If the prosecution establishes that shortly before the crime, they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also resides, then if the accused does not offer any explanation or offers an explanation which is palpably false; that would be a strong circumstance, establishing his culpability in the crime. However, it cannot be the sole circumstance leading to the conclusion of guilt on the part of the accused husband. In the present case, the accused has also offered an explanation that he had gone for duty at the cement factory; which is also mentioned in the first intimation given by the accused. The police ought to have inquired about his presence at the factory to disprove his alibi. Even before the FIR was registered, the intimation recorded clearly indicated this fact. The explanation was not one offered as an after-thought nor can it be termed to be false or even an improbable one. A mere suspicion cannot lead to a finding of guilt, especially when there is not available a chain of circumstances, unequivocally pointing to the guilt of the accused in the alleged crime. (Para 9) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2025 SC 2423 : 2025 INSC 460

Section 378 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302, 498 and 306 r/w. 34 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 106 - Murder - Acquittal - Reversal by High Court - Deceased, married for two years, found dead with ligature mark on neck - Trial Court acquitted husband and in-laws, finding death to be suicide - High Court convicted husband under Section 302 IPC, citing failure to explain death under Section 106 and disbelief in alibi. Held, High Court erred in reversing acquittal without evidence of manifest illegality or perversity in Trial Court's findings - Medical evidence inconclusive on homicidal death - Prosecution failed to disprove husband's plausible alibi of being at work, supported by initial police intimation - Section 106 inapplicable absent prima facie evidence of guilt - No chain of circumstances established guilt unequivocally -Allegations under Sections 498A, 306 IPC unsubstantiated - Conviction set aside, Trial Court's acquittal restored - Appeal allowed. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2025 SC 2423 : 2025 INSC 460

Section 378 (3) Cr.P.C. - Appeal against Acquittal - Leave to Appeal - Principles – Held, in considering an application for leave to appeal against an acquittal under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C., the High Court must apply its mind to determine whether a prima facie case or arguable points have been raised, rather than deciding whether the acquittal would be overturned. The Court emphasized that while not every leave petition must be allowed, the High Court should not refuse leave merely by stating the acquittal was not "perverse" without examining the material and recording reasons. Where arguable points exist, or the record suggests a need for deeper scrutiny, the High Court should grant leave and decide the appeal on merits. In this case, where a trial court acquitted an accused of murder, and the High Court declined to grant the State leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, upon an appeal by the first informant, found that the High Court erred in not granting leave, as the case warranted a deeper scrutiny of the circumstantial evidence. The matter was remitted to the High Court for consideration of the criminal appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court also permitted the first informant to file an appeal under the proviso to section 372 of the CrPC, and directed that if filed it be clubbed with the state's appeal. (Para 10 – 16) Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : 2025 INSC 282

Section 378 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 34 - Common Intention - The appeals arose from a judgment of the High Court, which reversed the trial court's acquittal of Constables in a case involving the death of a woman caused by a bullet fired by Head Constable (A1) during an attempt to intercept a car suspected of smuggling illegal liquor. The trial court had convicted A1 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act but acquitted the other accused due to lack of evidence of shared common intention. The High Court, however, convicted the other accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, holding that their presence in the car with A1 was sufficient to infer common intention. The Supreme Court reiterated the legal principle that for conviction under Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must prove prior meeting of minds and shared common intention among all accused to commit the crime. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellants (accused Nos. 2, 3, and 4) had any prior common intention with A1 to shoot the deceased. The trial court's acquittal of the appellants was based on the lack of evidence of their mental involvement in the crime, and the High Court's reversal of this acquittal was deemed unwarranted. The Supreme Court emphasized that interference in an acquittal is only justified if the trial court's decision is perverse, based on a misreading of evidence, or if no reasonable view other than guilt is possible. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, quashed the High Court's judgment, and restored the trial court's acquittal of the appellants. Mere presence in the same vehicle as the principal accused was insufficient to convict the appellants under Section 34 IPC without evidence of shared common intention. The trial court's acquittal was upheld, and the High Court's interference was found to be unjustified. Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2025 INSC 114 : (2025) 5 SCC 433

Section 378 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Extra judicial confession - Held, the High Court erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer. The Court emphasized the need for clear and unambiguous evidence of the confession, which was lacking in this case. Further, the Court found the evidence regarding the discovery of the alleged murder weapon, an iron rod, to be insufficient, as the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer's testimony did not adequately prove the contents of the discovery panchnama. While acknowledging the circumstantial nature of the case and the principle that the accused, especially in domestic murder cases, should offer an explanation, the Court stressed that the initial burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. The prosecution must establish foundational facts before invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts, rendering the reliance on Section 106 improper. The Court reiterated the importance of evaluating extra-judicial confessions with great care and caution, especially when surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution's case rested on weak and unreliable evidence, insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2025 INSC 93 : (2025) 4 SCC 275

Section 427. Powers of Appellate Court

Section 386 (iii)(b) Cr.P.C. - Right to appeal - Powers of Appellate Court - “but not as to enhance the same”- this term must be understood in spirit of Section 386 CrPC, that while maintaining the conviction, High Court cannot exercise its revisional jurisdiction under section 401 of CrPC and enhance the sentence awarded to accused - Appeal is not only a statutory right but also a constitutional right in case of an accused - An accused has a right to not only challenge a judgement on its merits but also on procedural aspects of the trial - It is duty of appellate court to consider the appeal from perspective of accused - Appellant therein to see if he has a good case on merits and to set aside the judgement of Trial Court and acquit accused or to remand the matter for re-trial or to reduce the sentence while maintaining conviction or else dismiss the appeal. [Para 10, 11] Nagarajan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 672 : 2025 INSC 802 : AIR 2025 SC 3079 : (2025) 7 SCC 479

Section 386, 401 Cr.P.C. - Appellate Jurisdiction – Sentence Enhancement – Whether an appellate court can enhance a convict's sentence in an appeal filed by the convict against conviction, in the absence of an appeal or revision by the State, victim, or complainant seeking such enhancement. Held, an appellate court cannot enhance the sentence in an appeal filed by the convict against conviction, as it violates the principle of fairness and the statutory scheme under Section 386(b)(iii) Cr.P.C., which prohibits enhancement in such appeals. The power to enhance a sentence can only be exercised in an appeal or revision filed by the State, victim, or complainant, with the accused given an opportunity to show cause against such enhancement. The High Court's exercise of suo motu revisional powers under Section 401 Cr.P.C. to enhance a sentence in a convict's appeal is impermissible, as it prejudices the accused. The High Court erred in remanding the case to the trial court for sentence enhancement in an appeal filed by the accused under the POCSO Act and IPC. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but set aside the enhanced sentence of life imprisonment, restoring the original sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment. As the appellant had served excess time, the Court ordered his release. Appeal allowed. (Para 27, 31, 34.6) Sachin v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 592 : 2025 INSC 716

Section 386 Cr.P.C. - Duty of the Appellate Court - A Court exercising first appellate jurisdiction must independently evaluate the evidence on record, after summoning the records of the lower courts, and arrive at its own findings, regardless of whether the challenged order is one of conviction or acquittal. In cases involving capital punishment, the High Court's responsibility is heightened due to the gravity of the consequences. The Court must meticulously examine all relevant and material circumstances before upholding a conviction and confirming a death sentence. (Paras 18, 19) Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2025 INSC 225

Section 431. Arrest of accused in appeal from acquittal

Sections 390 and 401 Cr.P.C. - Arrest of accused in appeal from acquittal - High Court's powers of revision - Section 390 CrPC, applicable to revisions under Section 401 CrPC, allows the High Court to direct the arrest and production of a discharged accused. The object of Section 390 is to ensure the accused's availability for trial if the discharge is set aside. While exercising power under Section 390 in a revision against discharge, the normal rule is to direct the accused to be admitted to bail, rather than committing them to prison. Section 390 CrPC can be invoked in revision applications against orders of discharge, ensuring the accused's availability for further proceedings without directly staying the discharge order. Thus, the preferred course of action in a revision against discharge is to direct the discharged accused to appear before the trial court and be admitted to bail under Section 390 CrPC, rather than staying the discharge order outright. This ensures judicial control over the accused while upholding their right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. (Para 18 - 20) Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2025 INSC 281

Section 438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision

Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. - Revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court – Power to Stay an Order of Discharge - The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is governed by Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC, with corresponding provisions under the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) being Sections 438 and 442. Under Section 401(1) CrPC, the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, has all the powers of an appellate court, including powers under Sections 386, 389, 390, and 391. (Para 8) Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2025 INSC 281

Section 442. High Court's powers of revision.

Section 401 Cr.P.C. - Revision - Suo Moto Powers of Revision - High Court registered suo moto revision petition and considered it along with accused/Appellant's appeal - High Court set aside acquittal of appellant/accused under Section 306 IPC by Trial Court and convicted him under Section 306 IPC while enhancing his sentence to 5 years rigorous imprisonment from earlier awarded 3 year imprisonment – Held, Appellate Court in an appeal filed by accused cannot while maintaining the conviction enhance the sentence - High Court cannot act as a revisional court, particularly when no appeal or revision has been filed by either State, victim or complainant for seeking enhancement of sentence against accused - High Court cannot exercise revisional jurisdiction by remanding the matter to Trial Court for purpose of enhancement of sentence - Revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked while exercising appellate jurisdiction in an appeal filed by accused/appellant - High Court can set aside judgment of conviction and sentence and acquit the accused, or order for a retrial, or else while maintaining conviction, reduce the sentence. Rationale behind above rule is that no appellant by filing an appeal can be worse off than what he was. Relied upon Sachin v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 Livelaw (SC) 592. Set aside conviction and sentence of appellant/accused under Section 306 IPC and confirm judgment passed by Trial Court. Appeal allowed. [Paras 11, 13-16] Nagarajan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 672 : 2025 INSC 802 : AIR 2025 SC 3079 : (2025) 7 SCC 479

Section 401 r/w. 397 & 372 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120

Section 446. Power of Supreme Court to transfer cases and appeals

Section 406 Cr.P.C. - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction? Held, a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Power to transfer cases under Section 406 Cr.P.C. is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly. Mere inconvenience or hardship to the accused, such as travel or language barriers, does not justify transfer unless there is a reasonable apprehension of injustice. (Para 49 & 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328

Section 406 Cr.P.C. - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Whether the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. encompasses cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act? Held, the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. does not include cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328

Section 406 Cr.P.C. - Transfer of Trial – Principles - Whether the Supreme Court can transfer a case under Section 406 Cr.P.C. if the court where the complaint is filed lacks territorial jurisdiction? Held, lack of territorial jurisdiction alone not sufficient ground. Broad factors to be considered include: (i) Prosecution acting in collusion with the accused. (ii) Likelihood of accused influencing witnesses or causing harm to complainant. (iii) Comparative inconvenience and hardship to parties and witnesses. (iv) Communally surcharged atmosphere affecting fair trial. (v) Hostile persons interfering with the course of justice. These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive. Ensuring a fair trial is the paramount consideration. (Para 49) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328

Section 406 Cr.P.C. - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 and 142 (2) - Petitioner sought the transfer of a criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh, to the Metropolitan Magistrate, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu. The petitioner argued that the entire transaction, including the loan processing, EMI deductions, and SARFAESI proceedings, occurred in Coimbatore, and no cause of action arose in Chandigarh. The petitioner also cited inconvenience, language barriers, and harassment as grounds for transfer. The Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act, as amended in 2015, the jurisdiction for complaints under Section 138 lies with the court where the cheque is delivered for collection through the payee's bank account. The court in Chandigarh had jurisdiction as the cheque was presented for collection there, even if the transaction occurred in Coimbatore. The petitioner's grievances did not meet the threshold for transfer, as the Chandigarh court had valid jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the transfer petition, holding that no case was made out for transferring the proceedings from Chandigarh to Coimbatore. It is always open for the petitioner accused to pray for exemption from personal appearance or request the Court that he may be permitted to join the proceedings online. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328

Section 473. Power to suspend or remit sentences

Section 432 Cr.P.C. – Remission - Accused has undergone more than 14 years and 10 months of actual incarceration and the contention that his case be considered by the provision/policy in vogue at the time of his conviction, if not, a more beneficial policy, could be applied. In this background, the Court gives liberty to the accused to apply afresh with a detailed representation justifying his claim to be considered for pre-mature release accounting for his actual incarceration of over 14 years and with remission included, of over 20 years. Upon such representation being filed, the State Government shall pass a reasoned order expeditiously and latest within 3 months from the date of filing such representation, in line with the legal principles outlined by the Court. (Para 30) Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2025 INSC 387

Section 432 Cr.P.C. - Premature Release of Convicts – Remission - Natural Justice - State Policy - Convict Rehabilitation - The Supreme Court directed that State Governments and Union Territories must consider eligible convicts for premature release under Section 432 of the CrPC and Section 473 of the BNSS as per existing remission policies, even without applications from convicts. Held, denying consideration to eligible convicts due to the absence of an application is discriminatory and violates Article 14. States without comprehensive remission policies must formulate them within two months. Conditions for remission must be reasonable, non-oppressive, and aimed at rehabilitation and public safety. Cancellation of remission requires a show-cause notice, an opportunity for the convict to respond, and recorded reasons. Orders granting or refusing remission must include brief reasons, be communicated to the convict, and inform them of their right to challenge rejection. The District Legal Services Authorities are tasked with monitoring compliance and maintaining relevant data. (Paras 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 21) In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : 2025 INSC 239

Section 432 Cr.P.C. - Remission - Conditions for granting remission must be reasonable and not oppressive – Held, conditions imposed by the Government while granting premature release to convicts under Section 432 of the CrPC and Section 473(1) of the BNS must be reasonable, non-arbitrary, and compliant with Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Considering eligible prisoners for remission is a governmental duty, not contingent on the convict's application. The conditions must not be vague, oppressive, or incapable of compliance, and should aim to rehabilitate the convict in society while ensuring public safety and checking criminal tendencies. The Court outlined four key factors: (a) consideration of factors like the nature of the crime, motive, and criminal background; (b) ensuring conditions curb criminal tendencies and promote rehabilitation; (c) avoiding oppressive or stringent conditions that hinder remission benefits; and (d) ensuring conditions are clear and performable. [Paras 13] In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : 2025 INSC 239

Section 480. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence.

Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. - Liberal approach to bail when magistrate trial not concluded within 60 days - The Supreme Court emphasized a liberal approach to bail applications under Section 437(6) of CrPC (corresponding to Section 480(6) of BNSS) when a trial before a Magistrate is not concluded within 60 days from the first date fixed for prosecution evidence, provided there is no risk of evidence tampering, absconding, or delay caused by the accused. (Para 17, 18) Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2025 INSC 242 : AIR 2025 SC 1483 : (2025) 5 SCC 140

Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. - Liberal approach to bail when magistrate trial not concluded within 60 days - The Court outlined illustrative factors for deciding such applications: 1. Whether delay in trial is attributable to the accused. 2. Likelihood of evidence tampering or prejudice to prosecution. 3. Risk of the accused absconding. 4. Whether the accused was in custody for the entire period. Additional considerations include the nature of the offence, expected trial duration, volume of evidence, number of witnesses, court workload, and number of co-accused. (Para 12, 13, 17) Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2025 INSC 242 : AIR 2025 SC 1483 : (2025) 5 SCC 140

Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. - Liberal approach to bail when magistrate trial not concluded within 60 days - The provision recognizes the accused's right to a speedy trial while balancing the Magistrate's discretion to refuse bail with recorded reasons. Normal bail parameters remain relevant but are applied with less rigour compared to regular bail applications. (Para 10, 17) Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2025 INSC 242 : AIR 2025 SC 1483 : (2025) 5 SCC 140

Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. - In the present case, involving economic offences (cryptocurrency-related cheating), the Court granted bail to the accused, in custody since December 2023, noting only one of 189 witnesses had been examined. The Court imposed a condition to deposit Rs. 35 lakh within six months, failing which bail would be automatically cancelled. Held, Applications under S.437(6) CrPC / S.480(6) BNSS should be approached liberally, particularly where there is no risk of evidence tampering, no fault of the accused in delaying the trial, no likelihood of absconding, and the trial is unlikely to conclude soon. The Court allowed the appeal, granting bail subject to conditions, emphasizing the protection of individual liberty under the Constitution. (Para 22, 23) Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2025 INSC 242: AIR 2025 SC 1483 : (2025) 5 SCC 140

Section 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. - Foreigners Act, 1946 - Whether a Foreign Registration Officer or Civil Authority must be impleaded in bail applications filed by foreigners under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Court held that it is not necessary to implead such authorities in bail applications, as they have no locus to oppose bail unless the offence falls under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. However, the Court directed that upon granting bail to a foreign national, the prosecuting agency or State must immediately inform the concerned Registration Officer, who will then notify the Civil Authority. This ensures compliance with the Foreigners Order, 1948, and allows authorities to take appropriate legal steps. The Court emphasized that this process avoids unnecessary delays in bail proceedings while safeguarding the interests of the State. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2025 INSC 30 : AIR 2025 SC 546 : (2025) 3 SCC 1

Section 482. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest

Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - Political bias or vendetta alone is insufficient to grant anticipatory bail. Courts must assess whether allegations are frivolous or baseless, supported by prima facie evidence, before considering political vendetta as a factor. (Para 27) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 438, 82, 204 Cr.P.C. - Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 and 447 - Punishment for Fraud - Investigation into affairs of company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office - Bail, including anticipatory bail, cannot be granted for an offence under Section 447 of the Act 2013 unless twin conditions are satisfied. Section 212 (6) of the Companies Act states that the offences covered under Section 447 are cognisable in nature and no person can be released on bail unless he satisfies the twin conditions, that are: (1) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; (2) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty and is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. Cryptic orders granting bail without adverting to the facts or the consideration of such restrictive conditions are perverse and liable to be set aside. (Para 23 – 25) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2025 SC 2431 : 2025 INSC 477

Sections 438, 82, 204 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - The law aids only the abiding and certainly not its resistants. When after the investigation, a chargesheet is submitted in the court, or in a complaint case, summons or warrant is issued to the accused, he is bound to submit himself to the authority of law. If he is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is concealing himself and does not submit to the authority of law, he must not be granted the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly when the Court taking cognizance has found him prima facie involved in serious economic offences or heinous offences. Granting anticipatory bail is certainly not the rule. The accused, who have continuously avoided to follow the due process of law, by avoiding attendance in the Court, by concealing themselves and thereby attempting to derail the proceedings, would not be entitled to the anticipatory bail. If the Rule of Law is to prevail in the society, every person would have to abide by the law, respect the law and follow the due process of law. (Para 23, 27) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2025 SC 2431 : 2025 INSC 477

Sections 438, 82, 204 Cr.P.C. - It cannot be gainsaid that the judicial time of every court, even of Magistrate's Court is as precious and valuable as that of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The accused are duty bound to cooperate the trial courts in proceeding further with the cases and bound to remain present in the Court as and when required by the Court. Not allowing the Courts to proceed further with the cases by avoiding execution of summons or warrants, disobeying the orders of the Court, and trying to delay the proceedings by hook or crook, would certainly amount to interfering with and causing obstruction in the administration of justice. (Para 27) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2025 SC 2431 : 2025 INSC 477

Sections 438, 82, 204 Cr.P.C. - Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 (6) and 447 – Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) investigated Adarsh Group for illegal loans worth Rs. 1700 crores, alleging fraud and siphoning of funds. Special Court issued bailable and non-bailable warrants and initiated proclamation proceedings against accused for non-compliance. High Court granted anticipatory bail, ignoring mandatory bail conditions under Section 212(6) and accused's absconding conduct. High Court orders set aside as perverse for disregarding legal provisions and Special Court proceedings. Accused directed to surrender. (Para 23 - 30) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2025 SC 2431 : 2025 INSC 477

Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 61(2) - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2025 INSC 320 : (2025) 4 SCC 493

Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory Bail – Ad Interim Relief – Legal Implications - The High Court granted interim protection with a condition that the accused join the investigation. Whether the nature of ad interim relief granted by the High Court amounted to the grant of final relief in anticipatory bail. The legality of directing the accused to join the investigation with an assurance of no arrest. Held, an ad interim order in anticipatory bail matters should not result in granting final relief, as it may hamper the investigation process and affect the prosecution's case. Courts must exercise caution and judicious discretion while granting such relief. Appeals Disposed of. Deepak Aggarwal v. Balwan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 68

Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory Bail – Matrimonial Dispute - Imposition of Maintenance Condition – The appellant challenged the High Court's order granting him anticipatory bail with a condition to pay maintenance of ₹4,000 per month to his wife. Held, conditions imposed while granting anticipatory bail should be relevant to ensuring the accused's presence at trial and not extend to issues unrelated to bail considerations, such as maintenance obligations. The Court quashed the condition of maintenance imposed by the High Court, emphasizing that irrelevant conditions should not be attached to bail orders. Appeal allowed. Condition of maintenance quashed. Srikant Kumar @ Shrikant Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Section 483. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail

Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Constitution of India, 1950; Article 20(3), Article 21 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 – Narco-Analysis Test - Right to Voluntary Narco-Analysis - Prohibition on Involuntary Tests - Evidentiary Value - An accused may voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test during the evidence stage of a trial, subject to court approval, free consent, and appropriate safeguards. However, this right is not absolute. Involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21, as held in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), and their reports or derived information are inadmissible as evidence. Information obtained from a voluntary test may be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but a report alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. The High Court erred in permitting narco-analysis tests during a bail hearing in a dowry death case, as bail decisions should focus on the nature of allegations, custody duration, and offense, not investigative methods. Courts must assess consent and safeguards before authorizing voluntary tests. The impugned order was set aside, reinforcing constitutional protections and procedural propriety. (Paras 8, 11, 12, 15, 20 & 21) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2025 INSC 810 : AIR 2025 SC 2753

Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Bail - Parameters for granting and setting aside bail –The Supreme Court allowed the State's appeals, setting aside the High Court's order granting bail to the accused in a case involving alleged compromise of a public recruitment examination. The Court distinguished between setting aside an order of bail and cancellation of bail, emphasizing that setting aside challenges the legality of the grant order itself, while cancellation addresses misuse of bail or supervening circumstances. The Court reiterated that while granting bail, factors like the nature of the offense, severity of punishment, and prima facie involvement of the accused are crucial. The Court stressed the importance of maintaining the sanctity of public examinations and the impact of such offenses on society's faith in public administration. The High Court erred in granting bail based on factors like lack of criminal antecedents and period of custody, without adequately considering the gravity of the offense and its societal implications. The Court directed the accused to surrender and clarified that its observations were limited to the bail matter and should not be construed as remarks on the merits of the case. The court allowed the accused to reapply for bail before the trial court after the examination of material witnesses. (Para 8, 11 & 14) State of Rajasthan v. Indraj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2025 INSC 341

Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 498A and 304B - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - Cancellation of Bail - Stringent Judicial Scrutiny Required - Granting bail in dowry death cases despite evidence of direct involvement shakes public confidence in judiciary. In cases of alleged dowry death, particularly where the death occurs within seven years of marriage and exhibits signs of severe physical violence and persistent dowry demands, stricter judicial scrutiny is imperative. Courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact and public confidence in the criminal justice system. Where evidence indicates direct involvement in fatal events, including persistent dowry demands and physical cruelty, bail should be cancelled to ensure a fair and unimpeded trial. The gravity of the offence necessitates a cautious approach, preventing the normalization of such heinous crimes. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Bail - Cancellation of - Factors - When considering bail in serious criminal offences, courts must consider factors such as the nature of accusations, gravity of the offence, role of the accused, criminal antecedents, probability of witness tampering, and likelihood of the accused being available for trial. Bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically, but an unreasoned or perverse bail order is open to interference. Supervening circumstances, post-bail conduct, attempts to delay trial, threats to witnesses, or tampering with evidence are grounds for setting aside bail. Courts must avoid detailed reasons that may prejudice the accused, focusing on prima facie considerations. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 498A and 304B - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - A young woman died within two years of marriage with multiple ante-mortem injuries and evidence of dowry demands - Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law, citing their principal role in pressurizing the deceased. However, the bail granted to the sistersin-law, whose role appeared less direct and who had personal and educational circumstances warranting leniency, was upheld. The Court emphasized that the trial court should proceed uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment and conclude the trial expeditiously. (Para 16 - 21) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Bail - Compensation for wrongful confinement - Whether the High Court, while adjudicating a bail application under Section 439 CrPC, had the jurisdiction to grant compensation for alleged wrongful confinement - Held, jurisdiction of a court under Section 439 CrPC is confined to granting or refusing bail and does not extend to awarding compensation. While compensation can be granted for violation of fundamental rights under Article 32, this does not extend to bail proceedings under Section 439 CrPC. Compensation for wrongful detention should be sought through remedies under constitutional provisions or civil suits, not under bail jurisdiction. The High Court erred in awarding compensation in a bail proceeding, as such power is not vested under Section 439 CrPC. (Para 7 & 9) Union of India v. Man Singh Verma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2025 INSC 292

Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (Maharashtra); Section 21(4) - Whether the High Court, while considering a bail application, transgressed into impermissible areas by making findings on the merits of the case, especially in light of the stringent conditions for bail under Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Whether the High Court failed to consider the rigors of MCOCA while granting bail to the accused. Held, the High Court had made observations akin to findings on the merits of the case, such as concluding that the accused had no direct or indirect contact with the gang leader (accused No. 4) and that they played no role in the shooting. Such findings are impermissible at the bail stage, as they could prejudice the trial. The High Court failed to adequately consider the stringent conditions for bail under MCOCA, particularly Section 21(4), which imposes specific requirements for granting bail in cases involving organized crime. Jayshree Kanabar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2025 INSC 13 : (2025) 2 SCC 797

Section 497. Order for custody and disposal of property pending trial in certain cases.

Sections 451 and 457 of Cr.P.C. - Interpretation of - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - No Specific Bar under NDPS Act - Whether a vehicle seized under the NDPS Act can be released to its owner during the pendency of the trial. The appellant owned a truck purchased on an EMI basis, which was his sole source of income. The truck was stopped at a police checkpoint, and 24.8 grams of heroin were found concealed in the vehicle. The main accused was arrested, but the appellant and his driver were not implicated in the crime. The appellant sought the release of the truck, which had been lying unused at the police station, citing natural wear and tear. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. Appellant relied on Sections 451 and 457 of Cr.P.C. and precedents to argue for the interim release of the vehicle, emphasizing that the appellant was not involved in the crime and that the vehicle was deteriorating in police custody. The State contended that the NDPS Act is a special law that does not permit interim release of vehicles used in drug trafficking, as they are critical evidence and may be reused for illegal activities. Held, the Court found no explicit prohibition in the NDPS Act against the interim release of seized vehicles. Section 51 of the NDPS Act allows the application of Cr.P.C. provisions, including Sections 451 and 457, for the custody and disposal of property. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241

Sections 451 and 457 of Cr.P.C. - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - Four Scenarios of Seizure - The Court identified four scenarios where contraband is seized from a vehicle: (i) Owner or agent is the accused. (ii) Vehicle is stolen by the accused. (iii) Contraband is found with a third-party occupant without the owner's knowledge. The Court held that in the third and fourth scenarios, where the owner is not implicated, the vehicle should normally be released on interim custody with appropriate conditions. The Court rejected the State's argument that vehicles should not be released due to the risk of reuse, noting that such a stance would lead to absurd outcomes, such as seizing private planes or ships used unknowingly in drug trafficking. Keeping the vehicle in police custody would serve no purpose and only lead to its deterioration. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241

Sections 451 and 457 of Cr.P.C. - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the trial court to release the vehicle to the appellant on interim custody under the following conditions: (i) The vehicle must be videographed and photographed, with the inventory authenticated by the Investigating Officer, owner, and accused. (ii) The appellant must furnish an undertaking not to sell or transfer the vehicle until the trial concludes. (iii) The appellant must surrender the vehicle or pay its value if directed by the court after the trial. The Court emphasized that the release of the vehicle would benefit the owner, the financier, and society at large, while ensuring that the vehicle remains available for trial purposes if needed. This judgment clarifies that vehicles seized under the NDPS Act can be released to their owners during the pendency of the trial, provided the owner is not implicated in the crime and appropriate conditions are imposed to safeguard the interests of justice. The decision balances the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act with the practical need to prevent unnecessary hardship to innocent vehicle owners. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241

Section 514 - Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of period of limitation

Sections 468, 482 Cr.P.C. - In cases involving cross-FIRs, held, that quashing one FIR while investigating the other is unfair and imprudent. Both FIRs must be investigated comprehensively by the same agency to ensure truth-seeking and avoid contradictory outcomes. Investigating agencies should examine both FIRs simultaneously, as evidence in one cannot be ignored while probing the other. Cross-cases should be tried by the same judge for consistency and fairness, extending the same logic to investigations. The High Court's decision to quash the appellant's FIR was reversed, and the FIR against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 was revived for a holistic investigation. [Paras 44, 45] Punit Beriwala v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 504 : 2025 INSC 582

Section 528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Inherent power of High Court - Quashing of criminal proceedings – Held, the pendency of a civil suit on the same subject matter, involving the same parties, does not justify quashing of criminal proceedings if a prima facie case exists against the accused persons - the criminal law and civil law remedies are not mutually exclusive but co-extensive, different in content and consequence - the object of criminal law is to punish an offender, which does not affect civil remedies - Civil remedy available does not bar criminal prosecution - Court concluded that criminal trial is necessary to ensure justice to the appellant considering chain of events including exclusion of daughters from family tree and partition deed and misappropriating Rs. 33 crore compensation for ancestral land acquired by Bengaluru metro - Prima facie case for conspiracy and cheating exists against respondents - Set aside order passed by High court to quash criminal proceeding. Appeal allowed. [Paras 18, 19, 23] Kathyayini v. Sidharth P.S. Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 712 : AIR 2025 SC 3316 : 2025 INSC 818

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Inherent powers of High Court - Quashing of FIR - Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 376 – Rape – Issue - Whether an offence under Section 376 IPC can be quashed upon an application filed by accused citing amicable settlement between victim and accused - Appellantaccused contended that the Complainant filed an affidavit in 2nd FIR expressing her unwillingness to pursue prosecution, stating that matter has been amicably resolved and that Complainant received Rs. 5 lakhs towards marriage related expenses - High Court dismissed the application on ground that an offence under section 376 IPC is serious and non-compoundable and could not be quashed based on a settlement or monetary compensation – Held - that criminal proceedings related to rape offences can be quashed based on settlement between parties in exceptional circumstances - Offence under section 376 IPC is grave and heinous nature and quashing of proceedings involving such offences on ground of settlement between parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly - the power of courts under section 482 CrPC to secure ends of justice is not constrained by rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case - Court noted that Complainant is married and settled in her personal life and continuing with criminal proceedings would only disturb her peace and stability - Complainant maintained her stand that she does not support prosecution and wants the matter to end - in this situation if matter is continued then it would only prolong distress - Considering peculiar facts of this case and nature of settlement, order of High Court is set aside. Appeals allowed. [Paras 3, 5-9] Madhukar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 710 : 2025 INSC 819

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 387 - Putting person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion - An offence under Section 387 IPC is constituted when a person is put in fear of death or grievous hurt to facilitate extortion, without requiring actual delivery of property. Reversing the High Court's decision to quash summons in a case involving gunpoint threats to extort ₹5 lakh/month, held, unlike Section 383 IPC, Section 387 IPC does not require property transfer. The trial court proceedings were restored, emphasizing that instilling fear is sufficient for prosecution under Section 387 IPC, and an expedited trial was directed. (Para 25, 26) Balaji Traders v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2025 INSC 806

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of an FIR – Issue - Whether High Court was justified in quashing of an FIR lodged by appellant citing mere counterblast and with the intention of causing wrongful loss to the bank – Held - Court emphasized that the scope of power under section 482 CrPC is limited to cases where FIR or chargesheet does not constitute the ingredients of the alleged offence - a “mini-trial” should not be conducted and evidence produced by accused in their defence cannot be looked into at the initial stage - the task of High court is to determine if a prima facie case is made out against accused - Held that High Court improperly embarked upon an appreciation of evidence and made findings on merits of the case such as absence of mala-fides on the part of the bank and appellant's ill intention, without evidence being taken into account - that determining intention requires evidence - it cannot be said that no prima facie case regarding commission of an offence, as alleged in the FIR, is made out from its perusal - Set aside order passed by High Court and restored the proceedings. Appeal allowed. [Para 5, 9, 15] Abhishek Singh v. Ajay Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 675 : AIR 2025 SC 3258 : 2025 INSC 807

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Rape - False Promise of Marriage - Manipulative Conduct - Vindictive Motive - Abuse of Process - Quashing of FIR - Held, complainant's chats disclosed a pattern of filing false complaints, aggressive sexual behavior, and intent to exploit the accused through threats of criminal action to coerce marriage. Allegations under the SC/ST Act were found baseless and introduced to harass the accused. FIR contained fabricated and malicious allegations, and continuing the criminal proceedings constituted an abuse of process. The rape case, based on allegations of forcible sexual intercourse under a false promise of marriage, was quashed, as the complainant's claims were deemed manipulative and vindictive. Appeal allowed, FIR quashed. (Paras 26 - 30) Batlanki Keshav (Kesava) Kumar Anurag v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : AIR 2025 SC 2695 : 2025 INSC 790

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Charges - Bank Fraud – One-Time Settlement (OTS) – Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings against appellants involving allegations of ₹25.89 lakh bank fraud under Sections 120B, 420, 468, and 471 of IPC and Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, following a full settlement of dues with the Bank via OTS of ₹52,79,000. Held, where dispute is purely commercial, fully settled post-offence, and no continuing public interest exists, criminal proceedings may be quashed. High Court's dismissal of quashing petition reversed, parity granted with co-accused whose charges were quashed earlier. Appeals allowed, proceedings quashed. [Para 9] N.S. Gnaneshwaran v. Inspector of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 654 : 2025 INSC 787

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986; Sections 2 and 3 - Quashing of FIR - Abuse of Process - Supreme Court quashed FIRs against Director of Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture Technology and Science (SHUATS) under the Act, deeming them an abuse of law. No prima facie case established, as investigation materials relied on conjectures and surmises. Gang-chart and records lacked competent authorities' satisfaction for action under the Act. High Court's orders refusing to quash proceedings and non-bailable warrants set aside. Allegations of appellant leading an organized gang in economic offences via fraud, deceit, and document tampering held insufficient. Continuation of proceedings would cause undue harassment and abuse of process. Observations limited to FIR in question, not affecting other pending prosecutions. (Para 61, 65, 66) Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2025 INSC 767

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Power of High Courts to quash complaints under Section 12(1) or orders under Sections 18 to 23 using inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) - Held, High Courts can exercise inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) to quash proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, or orders under Sections 18 to 23, to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The notion that Section 482 CrPC is inapplicable due to the predominantly civil nature of DV Act proceedings is incorrect. However, High Courts must exercise caution and restraint, intervening only in cases of patent illegality or abuse of process, given the DV Act's purpose as welfare legislation to protect women from domestic violence. A cautious approach is recommended to avoid undermining the Act's objectives. The civil nature of DV Act proceedings does not preclude the application of Section 482 CrPC. (Paras 37, 39) Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : AIR 2025 SC 2598 : 2025 INSC 734

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - High Courts, while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, cannot rely on or call for investigation reports, as this authority is exclusively vested with the Magistrate. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, which had relied on an investigation report to dismiss a quashing petition, reaffirming the principle laid down in Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi (2007) 12 SCC 369. The High Court's power under S. 482 is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, based solely on FIR allegations and undisputed facts, without interference at the investigation stage to avoid prejudicing the trial or the Magistrate's independent evaluation. Appeal allowed; criminal case quashed. (Para 8) Ashok Kumar Jain v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2025 INSC 614

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 420, 406 - Quashing of FIR - Civil Dispute vs. Criminal Offence - Non-payment of the sale price constituted a civil dispute and not an offense of criminal breach of trust or cheating. The continuation of the FIR was deemed an abuse of the process of law. A mere failure to pay the sale price does not automatically amount to cheating or criminal breach of trust; fraudulent or dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction must be proven. The dispute was primarily a civil matter concerning unpaid sale consideration, and converting it into a criminal prosecution was an abuse of the process of law. (Para 16 & 17) Ashok Kumar Jain v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2025 INSC 614

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide - Use of Insulting remarks like 'Impotent' - FIR against husband's in-laws - Held, merely using insulting remarks like "impotent" does not constitute abetment of suicide. Abetment requires direct instigation or persistent cruelty with clear mens rea, which was absent, as the suicide occurred a month after the alleged incident with no subsequent contact. The decision overturned the High Court's refusal to quash the FIR, emphasizing that abusive language alone, without intent to instigate suicide, does not meet the ingredients of Section 107 IPC. (Para 14, 15 & 19) Shenbagavalli v. Inspector of Police, Kancheepuram District, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2025 INSC 607

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Judicial Consistency - stare decisis - Inconsistent judicial decisions by co-ordinate benches of the High Court in a domestic violence case, leading to quashing of proceedings against the husband while allowing prosecution against in-laws, undermining judicial consistency and public trust. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing a domestic violence case against the husband, emphasizing that co-ordinate benches must adhere to stare decisis or provide reasoned distinctions for departing from prior rulings. The High Court's failure to reference an earlier decision refusing to quash proceedings against co-accused in-laws created an illogical inconsistency, fostering sharp practices like forum shopping and eroding public trust in the judiciary. The impugned order was deemed arbitrary, infracting judicial propriety, and the criminal proceedings against the husband were revived. (Para 11, 13, 17) Renuka v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2025 INSC 596

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Economic offences constitute a distinct class, requiring High Courts to exercise caution while quashing FIRs at an early stage. Reversing the High Court decision that quashed criminal proceedings against a company director involved in alleged economic offences, the Court emphasized that such cases, involving dummy/shell companies and significant monetary transactions, warrant thorough investigation. The Court reiterated that the wide discretionary powers under Section 482 CrPC should not be used arbitrarily to stifle legitimate investigations, particularly when economic offences threaten the financial health of the country. The appeal was allowed, directing the trial court to proceed in accordance with law. [Paras 21 - 25] Dinesh Sharma v. Emgee Cables and Communication Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2025 INSC 571

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 498A - Matrimonial Disputes - Malafide Complaints - Quashing of FIR - High Court's Duty under Section 482 CrPC - Vague Allegations - The Supreme Court quashed proceedings under Sections 498A and 411 IPC against the father-in-law and mother-in-law, while allowing continuation against the husband. Allegations raised after 14 years of marriage, filed three days after the husband initiated divorce proceedings, required scrutiny for malafide intent. Under Section 482 CrPC, High Courts must assess complaints in matrimonial disputes for ulterior motives, particularly when allegations lack specificity. Vague claims of "taunts" by in-laws over trivial matters, being part of ordinary domestic life, are insufficient to sustain criminal proceedings. Courts must exercise caution to prevent vexatious prosecution of family members in such disputes. (Paras 11 - 13) Kamal v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : 2025 INSC 504

Section 482 and 156 Cr.P.C. - CBI Investigation - High Courts should not order CBI investigation in a routine manner or on basis of vague allegations. Mere bald allegations against the incompetence of the local police to investigate the case without any kind of substantiation would not justify the transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Court set aside the High Court's decision which had transferred the investigation from local police to CBI based on bald allegations of the complainant that the local police was incompetent to investigate the case. The High Courts should direct for CBI investigation only in cases where material prima facie discloses something calling for an investigation by CBI. The “ifs” and “buts” without any definite conclusion are not sufficient to put an agency like CBI into motion. (Para 8 & 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 482 and 156 Cr.P.C. - CBI Investigation - In the present, an FIR was registered against the appellant for impersonating an IB officer and extorting ₹1.49 crore from the complainant, respondent no. 3. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation to the CBI, alleging collusion between the appellant and the police. The High Court allowed this transfer. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court noted the High Court's decision to transfer investigation to CBI was based on vague allegations (appellant's acquaintance with police) without substantiated evidence. The Court found that the investigation into the case was underway by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and there was no evidence suggested by the complainant that the local police were incapable or biased. After going through the records of the case, held, that the present case is not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed. (Para 2 - 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 482 and 156 Cr.P.C. - Contempt of Court - CBI Investigation - Breach of Stay Order - CBI registered FIR despite Supreme Court's interim stay - Contempt petition filed - CBI officer offered unconditional apology, citing mistake - Remedial steps taken - Apology accepted, contempt petition disposed. (Para 12) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1960; Section 306 and 420 - Abetment of suicide - Cheating - Quashing of Proceedings – Held, there was no proximate or direct instigation leading to the deceased's suicide. The time gap between the alleged fraudulent acts and the suicide indicated the absence of immediate provocation. FIR quashing under Section 306 IPC upheld, but reinstated under Section 420 IPC. The High Court failed to provide adequate reasoning for quashing the case under Section 420 IPC despite material evidence collected during the investigation. The trial court was directed to proceed with the case under Section 420 IPC, and the accused were given the liberty to seek discharge in accordance with the law. Appeal partly allowed. (Para 15, 18 & 19) R. Shashirekha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 363 : 2025 INSC 402

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - The High Court wrongly concluded the poem disturbed social harmony without evidence, relying solely on its “tenor” and social media responses. No absolute bar exists against quashing an FIR at a nascent stage if no offence is prima facie made out. The High Court failed to prevent an abuse of process. (Para 35 & 37) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 679

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Validity of Sanction – Held, the High Court acted improperly by conducting a mini-trial at the pre-trial stage and quashing the case before the actual case material were brought on record. The issue of conviction prospects and invalid sanction are matters to be determined during the trial. (Para 12 & 14) State v. G. Easwaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2025 INSC 397

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Rape - False Promise of Marriage - Consensual Relationship - Quashing of FIR - Where a complainant, a highly qualified major woman, alleges rape based on a false promise of marriage after a 16-year long consensual relationship, the allegations are deemed unreliable due to material contradictions and prolonged silence. The deletion of Section 313 IPC (causing miscarriage) by the Investigation Officer and the lack of evidence against other co-accused further weaken the complainant's case. The prolonged period of consensual sexual relations, the complainant's independent life and travel to meet the accused, and her portrayal of herself as the accused's wife indicate a live-in relationship gone sour, not rape. Applying the principles of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 921; Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 904; Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 and Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204 the court held that the physical relationship must be directly traceable to the false promise, and prolonged consensual relations negate the claim of vitiated consent. Mere breach of promise does not equate to a false promise, and the accused's mala fide intent must be established. The FIR and subsequent proceedings are quashed as an abuse of process. (Para 19, 26, 29, 30, 34, 37 & 39) Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 279 : 2025 INSC 308 : (2025) 4 SCC 197

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 504 - Intentional insult under Section 504 IPC requires a deliberate intent to provoke a reasonable person to breach public peace or commit another offence. Verbal reprimands by a senior at the workplace regarding official duties do not constitute an offence under Section 504 unless there is clear intent to provoke a breach of peace. Mere abuse, discourtesy, or rudeness does not meet the requirements of Section 504. The Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings against the Director of NIEPID, Secunderabad, for reprimanding an employee for negligence, holding that such admonitions, aimed at maintaining workplace discipline, do not amount to intentional insult. The High Court's refusal to quash the case was set aside, as the reprimand was an administrative action, not an intentional insult. The Court cautioned against interpretations that could misuse liberty and undermine workplace discipline, noting that failure to address employee misconduct could encourage similar behavior. The criminal proceedings were quashed, as the reprimand lacked intent to provoke and did not satisfy the ingredients of Section 504 IPC. [Paras 21 - 29] B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2025 INSC 194 : (2025) 3 SCC 475

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 307 - Attempt to Murder - Quashing Based on Settlement - The mere inclusion of Section 307 IPC in an FIR or charge-sheet does not bar the High Court from quashing criminal proceedings based on a settlement between parties, provided the allegations do not substantiate the offence. Factors such as the nature of the offence, severity of injuries, conduct of the accused, and societal impact are crucial in deciding whether a non-compoundable offence can be quashed on compromise. In this case, the invocation of Section 307 IPC was unjustified due to vague allegations, minor injuries, and the death of the primary accused, with the offence, at most, aligning with Section 326 IPC. Given the settlement, the nature of the injuries, and minimal societal harm, the Court quashed the proceedings, deeming further trial futile and an abuse of process. The appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. (Para 9 -12) Naushey Ali v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2025 INSC 182 : AIR 2025 SC 1035 : (2025) 4 SCC 78

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) - Essential ingredients of - "within public view" - The Appellant was accused of abusing a Revenue Inspector by using his caste name in a government office, leading to charges under Sections 294(b) and 353 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act. The High Court dismissed the Appellant's petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the criminal proceedings. Whether the incident occurred in a place "within public view" as required under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, and whether the High Court erred in not quashing the proceedings. Held, For an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, the act of insult or abuse must occur in a place "within public view." A place "within public view" refers to a location where members of the public can witness or hear the incident, even if it is a private place. The incident occurred within the confines of the Revenue Inspector's office, and not in a place "within public view." Therefore, the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act were not satisfied. The Court quashed the criminal proceedings, ruling that the High Court failed to consider this crucial aspect. The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of proving that an offence under the SC-ST Act occurred in a place "within public view." Since the incident took place in a private office without public witnesses, the charges under the SC-ST Act were not sustainable, and the proceedings were quashed. Karuppudayar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2025 INSC 132 : AIR 2025 SC 705

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Whether the summoning order issued by the trial court, without assigning reasons, is valid in light of the legal requirement for magistrates to apply their mind before issuing process in criminal cases. The appellants were accused of manufacturing and distributing drugs not of standard quality under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. A complaint was filed by the Drugs Inspector alleging that a drug sample failed the dissolution test. The trial court issued a summoning order without providing reasons. The appellants filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the proceedings, which was dismissed by the High Court. Held, the issuance of process in criminal cases is a serious matter, and magistrates must apply their mind to the facts and law before summoning accused persons. The summoning order in this case was a non-speaking order, lacking any reasons, and thus violated the principles laid down in precedents such as Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 and Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4 SCC 609. The Court reiterated that the magistrate must scrutinize the evidence and allegations before issuing process, and failure to do so renders the order unsustainable. The impugned judgment of the High Court and the summoning order of the trial court are quashed. All proceedings arising from the summoning order are set aside. The judgment reaffirms the necessity for magistrates to provide reasoned orders when issuing process in criminal cases, ensuring that the accused are not subjected to unwarranted legal proceedings without proper judicial scrutiny. The appeal is allowed. JM Laboratories v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 128

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Attempt to transform civil dispute into criminal matter - Workplace harassment case – Held, allegations stemmed from employment disputes exaggerated into a criminal matter. The proceedings were a deliberate attempt to reclassify a civil dispute as a cognizable criminal offense to pressure the appellants into settling. The complainant alleged forcible demand for resignation, confiscation of belongings, and physical and verbal harassment, invoking Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC. The complaint lacking essential facts to substantiate these offenses and mala fide intentions to coerce a settlement. The High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings was set aside, and the criminal case against the appellants was quashed. (Para 38 - 41) Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2025 INSC 105 : (2025) 3 SCC 612

Section 482 Cr.P.C.- Aircraft Act, 1934 - Section 12B - Investigation by Local Police - The appeals challenged the High Court's judgment quashing an FIR registered against the respondents, including a Member of Parliament, for alleged offences under Sections 336, 447, and 448 IPC and Sections 10 and 11A of the Aircraft Act, 1934. The FIR alleged that the respondents forcibly entered the Air Traffic Control (ATC) room at Deoghar Airport and pressured officials to grant take-off clearance for their chartered flight after sunset, violating airport security protocols. The High Court quashed the FIR, holding that it was vitiated by mala fides and that allowing the proceedings to continue would amount to an abuse of the legal process. The court noted that the Aircraft Act, 1934, is a complete code, and the IPC provisions were not applicable. It also observed that the respondents, including a sitting MP and members of aviation committees, had no role in influencing the ATC clearance, which was granted by the Kolkata ATC. Held, the allegations did not make out offences under Sections 336, 447, or 448 IPC. The respondents' actions did not amount to rash or negligent behavior endangering human life (Section 336 IPC), nor did they involve criminal trespass or unlawful entry (Sections 447 and 448 IPC). The Aircraft Act, 1934, and its rules constitute a complete code for aviation safety and security. Section 12B of the Act mandates that cognizance of offences can only be taken on a complaint by authorized aviation authorities, not by the local police. The local police could only forward the material collected during the investigation to the authorized officer under the Aircraft Act, who would then decide whether to file a complaint. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision to quash the FIR. However, it granted liberty to the State to forward the investigation material to the authorized officer under the Aircraft Act within four weeks for further action, if deemed necessary. The FIR was quashed, and the respondents were cleared of the charges under IPC and the Aircraft Act. The Court reinforced the primacy of the Aircraft Act, 1934, in matters of aviation security and the limited role of local police in such cases. State of Jharkhand v. Nishikant Dubey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 101

Section 482 Cr.P.C.- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 19 - Question of whether a sanction under the PC Act was granted by a competent authority is a matter of evidence. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order that quashed a sanction order and trial proceedings under Section 482 CrPC, emphasizing that such orders cannot be quashed unless a failure of justice is established due to irregularities in the sanction process. The High Court erred in quashing the proceedings mid-trial without evidence of a failure of justice, especially after the prosecution had examined seven witnesses. (Para 8) State of Punjab v. Hari Kesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 62 : 2025 INSC 50 : AIR 2025 SC 729

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Railways Act, 1989; Section 143 – Unauthorised Procurement and Sale of Railway Tickets – Applicability to Online Ticket Sales – Held, Section 143 prohibits unauthorised procurement and sale of railway tickets, regardless of whether conducted online or offline. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, which had quashed proceedings by limiting Section 143 to offline ticket sales. The Court rejected this narrow interpretation, holding that statutory provisions should be interpreted broadly to include technological advancements, such as e-tickets, even if not contemplated at the time of enactment, provided the language permits such application. The respondent's use of hundreds of fake IRCTC user IDs to procure and sell tickets without authorisation violated Section 143. Appeal allowed, proceedings restored. (Para 21, 26, 28, 36) Inspector, Railway Protection Force v. Mathew K. Cherian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 42 : 2025 INSC 51 : (2025) 4 SCC 245

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 415, 420 - Quashing of FIR - Allegations of Fraudulent Land Grabbing and Property Sale - Dispute primarily civil in nature, involving co-ownership rights under litigation since 2018. Complainant's suppression of ongoing civil suits while filing FIR in 2020 justified quashing of criminal proceedings. The Court allowed the appeal against the High Court's dismissal of the petition to quash the FIR, holding that the complaint failed to establish the ingredients of cheating under Section 415 IPC. (Paras 12, 13) Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : 2025 INSC 31 : 2025 Cri LJ 710 : AIR 2025 SC 361

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 354 and 506 - Quashing of criminal proceedings - The allegations did not meet the essential ingredients of the offense, as there was no evidence of criminal force or intent to outrage the complainant's modesty. The record contained only vague assertions without any concrete evidence of physical or mental harassment. The charge of criminal intimidation was not established, as there was no evidence of any threat with the intent to cause alarm or compel to act against will. The High Court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage but should ensure that the allegations, if taken at face value, constitute an offense. In this case, the allegations were found to be insufficient to proceed against the appellant. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the criminal proceedings holding that no prima facie case was made out against him under Sections 354 and 506 IPC. The Court reiterated that vague allegations without supporting evidence cannot form the basis for criminal charges. The inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of the legal process. The judgment emphasized the importance of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not used as tools for harassment, especially in cases arising from business disputes. Appeal Allowed. Naresh Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2025 INSC 19 : (2025) 2 SCC 604

Section 482 and 197 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B) - Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972; Section 83 - The appellant, an official of the Madhya Pradesh State Housing Board, was implicated in a criminal case involving allegations of forgery and cheating related to the transfer of property. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR and subsequent proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which was refused by the High Court. Whether the appellant, as a public servant, was protected under Section 83 of the Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972, akin to Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., which requires prior sanction for prosecution of public servants for acts done in their official capacity. Whether the allegations against the appellant, including conspiracy and forgery, were substantiated by evidence. Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed in light of the civil nature of the dispute and the absence of mens rea on the part of the appellant. Held, offences in the chargesheet cannot be based on bald assertions of connivance. There must be some substance to it. The appellant's actions were in furtherance of his official duties, and there was no evidence to suggest that he acted with any dishonest intent or knowledge of the alleged forgery. The allegations of conspiracy and forgery were not substantiated by the chargesheet or witness statements, and no prima facie case was made out against the appellant. The case was essentially civil in nature, and the criminal proceedings were an abuse of the process of law. The High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR, as the ingredients of the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B IPC were not met. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside. All proceedings arising from the FIR and subsequent chargesheet were quashed. Dinesh Kumar Mathur v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2025 INSC 16 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 617

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – High Courts can invoke their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, in addition to inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, to quash criminal proceedings to prevent misuse of the legal process. (Paras 6, 7) Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2025 INSC 8