Criminal Minor Acts - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest Jan - Mar, 2026

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Joint Meeting Requirement – Under Section 5(3) of the Rules, the approval of the Gang Chart must occur after a joint meeting between the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police – Held that no indication of such a meeting in the records, which constitutes a violation of the prescribed rules - Relying on the principle that when a statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all - Noted that since the Act permits the mere naming of a person as a "gangster" with "perilous consequences" to individual liberty, the prescribed procedure must be followed scrupulously – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 SCC Online SC 1216; Paras 8-12] Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 3(1) – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Rules 5 and 16 – Quashing of FIR – Procedural Irregularity in Gang Chart – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered under the Act of 1986 on the grounds that the accompanying Gang Chart was not prepared in accordance with the statutory mandate – Held that a valid Gang Chart requires the recommendation of the Nodal Officer (SHO) and the Additional Superintendent of Police, followed by approval from the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate - These recommendations must be in written form and approvals must be evidenced by signatures - In the present case, a certified copy of the Gang Chart obtained from the Court lacked these necessary signatures and recommendations. Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Co-accused Statements – Noted that the appellant was arraigned as an accused solely on the basis of a statement made by a co-accused (who was apprehended with 6.330 kg of Ganja) - noted that the actual complicity of the appellant is a matter to be thrashed out during trial - Supreme Court restored the bail and directed that the appellant be released on anticipatory bail by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-8] Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 – Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted – Non-compliance with mandatory requirements – Provision of "Third Option" for search – Noted that the High Court's acquittal of the accused was upheld where the Investigating Officer, while apprising the accused of his rights, provided a "third option" to be searched by the Police Officer instead of only a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer - Such an option is contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 50, which only allows for search before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate – Held that although the contraband (11 kg 50 grams of Charas) was recovered from a bag carried by the accused, Section 50 was attracted because a personal search was also conducted alongside the search of the bag – noted that the prosecution's case was further weakened by the testimony of PW-8 (shopkeeper), who denied providing an electronic weighing scale as claimed by the police, stating he only possessed traditional scales - This discrepancy rendered the prosecution's version of events doubtful and untrustworthy. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and Another (2014) 5 SCC 345; Suresh and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 1 SCC 550; Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (2011) 1 SCC 609; Paras 17-18] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surat Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 246 : 2026 INSC 240 : AIR 2026 SC 1420

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Sections 8, 21, and 22 – Drugs (Control) Act, 1950 – Sections 5 and 13 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Appellant sought anticipatory bail in a case involving the seizure of 710 bottles of cough syrup from a car registered in his name, though he was not named in the FIR - Noted that since the appellant had already joined the investigation and was cooperating within the limitations prescribed by law, custodial interrogation was not warranted at this stage - allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court's denial of bail, the Supreme Court directed that in the event of arrest, the appellant be released on terms fixed by the trial court, subject to compliance with conditions stipulated under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(b), 22(c), 25, 27-A, and 29 — Grant of Bail — Prolonged Incarceration vs. Seriousness of Offence — Prosecution's Intention to Examine 159 Witnesses — The petitioner was arrested on March 29, 2022, in connection with the recovery of approximately 2428 Kilograms of Mephedrone - Despite the seriousness of the crime, Supreme Court noted that the petitioner remained in judicial custody as an undertrial prisoner for over 3 years and 6 months - the charge was only framed on January 16, 2026, after the Court's previous intervention. Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99

Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 22(c), 23, 28, and 29 — Bail — Commercial Quantity — Prolonged Incarceration — Parity — The Supreme Court granted regular bail to the appellant despite the seizure of a commercial quantity of contraband - noted that the appellant had been in custody for 4 years, 1 month, and 28 days - Relief was further justified on the grounds of parity, as an identically situated accused person traveling on the same flight had already been granted bail by the Court – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order denying bail and directed release on stringent terms, including the surrender of her passport. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127 : AIR 2026 SC 800

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 and 142(1)(b) - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Karnataka High Court that had treated the sequence of condoning delay and taking cognizance as interchangeable or a "curable irregularity" – Noted that under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the power to take cognizance of a complaint filed after the prescribed period is expressly subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for the delay – Held that an order taking cognizance before the delay is formally condoned is legally unsustainable and satisfaction of the Court regarding sufficient cause for delay must precede the act of taking cognizance of a belated complaint - Supreme Court made following Findings: i. Mandatory Sequence: The satisfaction of the Court regarding "sufficient cause" resulting in the condonation of delay must precede the act of taking cognizance; ii. Irregularity not Curable: Held that High Court's view that taking cognizance before condoning delay is a "curable irregularity" is not in keeping with the statutory mandate of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b); iii. Impact of Misrepresentation: noted that the respondent (complainant) contributed to the procedural error by erroneously stating in her complaint that it was filed within time – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 9 SCC 129; Paras 13-15] S. Nagesh v. Shobha S. Aradhya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : 2026 INSC 27 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 12

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 372 and 378 – Appeal against Acquittal – Right of Complainant as 'Victim' – Conflict of Judgments – Reference to Larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed a conflict between a recent co-ordinate Bench decision in Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 INSC 804) and earlier decisions in Satya Pal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration) regarding whether a complainant in a Section 138 NI Act case must seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC or can appeal directly as a 'victim' under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dishonour of Post-dated Cheques – Presumption of Cheating – Dishonour of a post-dated cheque by itself is not sufficient to presume the existence of a dishonest intention at the time of issuance - Post-dated cheques are often issued to discharge existing or future liabilities and do not carry a representation of sufficient funds at the time of issuance - While dishonour may trigger proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, it does not ipso facto amount to cheating under Section 420 IPC unless dishonest intention is proved from the start. [Relied on Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2011) 1 SCC 74; Vesa Holdings Private Limited and Another v. State of Kerala and others (2015) 8 SCC 293; Paras 12-20] V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Separate Cause of Action – Held that a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque, provided the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay is complete - The fact that multiple cheques arise from a single transaction does not merge them into a single cause of action - Once a cheque is issued in discharge of liability and subsequently dishonoured, a presumption of liability in favour of the complainant arises - The burden of proving the absence of a debt or liability lies with the accused and must be discharged during the trial – Noted that the High Court, while exercising power under Section 482, must avoid conducting a "mini-trial" or usurping the function of the Trial Court when disputed factual questions exist - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that maintaining two separate complaints for the same underlying debt (one for personal cheques and one for firm cheques) amounted to parallel prosecution - held that since the instruments were distinct, drawn on different accounts, and presented on different dates, the law does not bar separate prosecutions - Questions regarding whether cheques were issued as alternative securities or in substitution of one another are mixed questions of fact that cannot be resolved at the threshold under Section 482 - Noted that statutory weight must be given to the presumption under Section 139 - Quashing proceedings prematurely overlooks this legal presumption which operates in favor of the complainant. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 745 M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Another vs. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234; Paras 26-45] Sumit Bansal v. MGI Developers and Promoters, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2026 INSC 40

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Section 30(1) – Search and Seizure – Collective Decision Required – The power to authorize a search under Section 30(1) must be exercised by the "Appropriate Authority" collectively as defined under Section 17 - An individual member, including the Chairperson/Civil Surgeon acting alone, cannot legally authorize a search – Noted that in this case, the search was directed solely by the Civil Surgeon without the association of the other two members (District Programme Officer and District Attorney), rendering the search technically illegal. [Paras 41 - 50] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 – Rule 9 and Rule 10 – Maintenance of Form F – Maintenance of records in "Form F" is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality - Non-maintenance or inaccurate maintenance of records constitutes a "springboard" for the offence of female foeticide and amounts to a contravention of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act - Even if sex determination is not proven, the failure to maintain statutory records is a punishable offence under Section 23. [Paras 33 - 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 – Section 2(f), 100, 101, and 102 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 2(s) and 2(o) – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court of Andhra Pradesh judgment that had quashed several FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Vijayawada – Held that the High Court had erroneously held that the ACB office in Vijayawada was not a notified "police station" under Section 2(s) of the CrPC following the state's bifurcation - The Supreme Court clarified that under the 2014 Reorganisation Act, existing laws and notifications (including G.O.Ms. No. 268 of 2003) continue to apply to successor states to prevent a legal vacuum - A "police station" under Section 2(s) includes a "post" held by a police officer and does not strictly require a specific physical building declaration in every instance - a subsequent 2022 clarificatory Government Order by the State of Andhra Pradesh did not have retrospective application but merely confirmed the existing legal position under the Reorganisation Act - Section 2(s) of the CrPC is exhaustive and inclusive, meaning any "post" or "place" declared by the State - A post held by a police officer can constitute a police station - Sections 100-102 of the 2014 Act ensure that laws (including notifications) in force before the appointed day continue to apply to the territories of the successor states until altered or repealed - A subsequent Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 137 of 2022) issued as a clarification does not constitute retrospective application but merely reiterates the statutory position to avoid legal ambiguity. [Relied on Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and Another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 6 SCC 689; State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir Singh and Others (1976) 3 SCC 24; Paras 21-24, 26-29] Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Dayam Peda Ranga Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2026 INSC 37 : 2026 CriLJ 708

Article 14 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 17A - Vires of Section 17A - Whether the requirement of prior approval for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation into offences relatable to recommendations made or decisions taken by a public servant is unconstitutional? - Held (per Nagarathna, J.) - Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down - The provision is a resurrection of the Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, both of which were previously struck down by the Supreme Court - Resurrection of Struck-down Provisions: Section 17A is an attempt to reintroduce a prior approval regime that was already declared unconstitutional in larger bench decisions. It is "old wine in a new bottle" and does not remove the basis on which Section 6A of the DSPE Act was invalidated - The primary object of the Act is to effectively curb the "cancerous growth of corruption" - Section 17A forestalls even a bare preliminary enquiry, thereby protecting corrupt officials rather than merely honest ones - The provision is arbitrary because it requires approval from the very government department to which the public servant belongs - This creates a "policy bias" and a "conflict of interest," as the authority granting approval may have been involved in the same decision-making process, leading to a lack of objectivity and neutrality - The classification based on the nature of duties (recommendations or decisions) to protect a certain class of public servants is illegal and violates the mandate of equality before the law - The expression "Government" or "competent authority" in Section 17A cannot be substituted with "Lokpal" or "Lokayukta" through interpretation, as such substitution would amount to impermissible judicial legislation. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 68; Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1; Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532; Paras 19-22] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A — Constitutional Validity — Reading Down (per K.V. Viswanathan; J) — The Supreme Court delivered a split verdict, holding the constitutional validity of Section 17A but read it down to mandate an independent screening mechanism - held that the "previous approval" of the Government/Competent Authority for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation must be preceded by an independent screening of the information/complaint by the Lokpal (for Central Government employees) or Lokayukta (for State Government employees) - The recommendation of the Lokpal/Lokayukta shall be binding on the Government/Authority. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees – The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - It is incorrect to contend that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) holds exclusive jurisdiction or that its prior consent is mandatory for the ACB to proceed. [Para 3] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 170

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Scope of Previous Approval – Demand of Illegal Gratification –The protection under Section 17A, which requires previous approval for enquiries or investigations into decisions taken or recommendations made by a public servant in the discharge of official duties, does not apply to cases involving the demand of illegal gratification - Noted that Section 17A was enacted with a specific object and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be applied to bribery/extortion cases as these do not constitute "official functions or duties." [Paras 6-7] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 170

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 4 and 156 — Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees — The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - Noted that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE Act), 1946, is permissive and does not expressly or impliedly divest regular State police authorities of their power to investigate offences under the PC Act - While an internal arrangement exists where the CBI typically handles Central Government employees and the ACB handles State employees to avoid duplication, this does not exclude the State's legal power to investigate - The only mandatory requirement is that the investigating officer must hold the rank specified under Section 17 of the PC Act – Key findings by Supreme Court – i. CrPC as Parent Statute: Unless a special law provides a separate, exclusive procedure for investigation, the general provisions of Section 156 CrPC (powers of police to investigate cognizable offences) prevail; ii. Non-Exclusivity of CBI: The DSPE Act (which governs the CBI) does not impair any other law empowering State police authorities to investigate offences - It is incorrect to claim that only the CBI has the authority to institute such prosecutions; iii. Validity of Charge-sheet: A charge-sheet filed by a State agency against a Central Government employee without the prior consent or approval of the CBI is valid in law – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726; Paras 3-9] Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : 2026 INSC 71 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 172

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Difference between Section 6A (DSPE Act) and Section 17A (PC Act) — While Section 6A was struck down in Subramanian Swamy for being discriminatory (protecting only high-ranking officers), Section 17A is applicable to all levels of public servants - the requirement for an independent screening mechanism remains a constitutional necessity to prevent the "chilling effect" on honest officials while ensuring the accountability of the corrupt - In cases where the public servant is not covered under the jurisdiction of the Lokpal/Lokayukta, the competent authority must commission an appropriate independent investigative agency to screen the information before granting or refusing approval. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682; K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655; Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1: Paras 50, 81, 93, 98-100] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Rule of Law — Independence of Investigative Agency — The executive cannot have the unbridled power to foreclose an enquiry into corruption allegations against its own officials, as this would violate the "rule of law" and the principle of independent investigation - Any decision to block an enquiry must be taken by a body independent of the executive - SOP) — Held that the existing SOP (dated 03.09.2021) governing Section 17A to be "wholly unsatisfactory" as it failed to provide for an independent screening mechanism and allowed the executive to judge the actions of its own limbs. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 – Penal Code, 1860 – Section 120B – Criminal Conspiracy – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Individual Liability vs. Collective Culpability – The Supreme Court held that even if a charge of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC) fails due to lack of evidence regarding a prior meeting of minds or demand by one of the accused, the other accused can still be independently convicted for demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act if the evidence specifically establishes their individual role - The conduct of an accused person—such as turning pale, remaining "mum," or attempting to escape/dispose of the bribe money when challenged by the Trap Laying Officer—is admissible as relevant conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7 and 13(2) – Illegal Gratification – Trap Proceedings – Evidentiary Value of Shadow Witness – Credibility of Independent Witnesses – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an Excise Constable caught in a trap for demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹500 - held that the testimony of a shadow witness (PW-2) cannot be branded as "interested" merely because they are acquainted with the complainant - To disqualify a witness as interested, the defense must provide specific material demonstrating actual hostility. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 2(1)(u) – "Proceeds of Crime" – The definition is wide enough to include property equivalent in value to the property obtained from criminal activity - This allows for the attachment of alternate property if the direct proceeds of crime are unavailable – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1; Paras 37-52] Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 45 – Grant of Regular Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – The Supreme Court granted bail to accused, emphasizing that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without the commencement of trial violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court observed that statutory restrictions under special acts like the PMLA cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention - Noted that the trial had not yet commenced and was only at the stage of scrutiny of documents - A significant delay of eight months was attributed to the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) due to its challenge of a procedural order by the Special Judge, which was later withdrawn - With 208 witnesses cited and over 63,000 pages of documents, there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future – Held that the appellant had joined the investigation on multiple occasions even prior to his arrest - found the ED's allegations of witness tampering and dissipation of properties to be "incredulous" and "untenable," as the appellant was in custody when these alleged events occurred, and no material link was established between the appellant and the entities involved in the property transfers – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791; Paras 15- 23] Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2026 INSC 12

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(3), 8(7), and 8(8) – Interplay between Adjudication, Confiscation, and Restoration – Finality of Confirmation Order – Held: Section 8(7) and Section 8(8) are stand-alone provisions - An application for confiscation under Section 8(7) can only be decided by the Special Court once the confirmation order passed under Section 8(3) attains finality - If a confirmation order is challenged before a higher forum (Appellate Tribunal or High Court), a "deemed embargo" operates on the conclusion of proceedings under Section 8(7) until that challenge is resolved - The Special Court must refrain from deciding Section 8(7) applications while an appeal under Section 26 is pending, as the doctrine of merger applies. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(7) – "Material before it" – The expression "material before it" in Section 8(7) has a limited import, primarily to demonstrate the contingency (death of accused, proclaimed offender, etc.) and entitlement to possession - A party who suffered an adverse order under Section 8(3) can only seek relief under Section 8(7) if there is "new material" not previously considered by the Adjudicating Authority or higher forums. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(8) and 2016 Rules – Claim for Restoration – An application under the second proviso to Section 8(8) for restoration of property during trial is maintainable only if the claimant satisfies the essential conditions under Rule 2(b) and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 - This includes acting in good faith, not being involved in money laundering, and suffering a quantifiable loss. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender Act, 1986

Preventive Detention – Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender Act, 1986 – Section 2(a), 2(f) and 3 – Detention of "Drug Offender" – Law and Order vs. Public Order - Subjective Satisfaction and Extraneous Factors - Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority manifested an intention to detain the detenu "at any cost" - held that preventive detention should not be used as an alternative to the ordinary criminal law or to "clip the wings" of an accused when the State fails to resist bail – Held that if the detenu violated bail conditions, the appropriate remedy was to seek cancellation of bail under ordinary law, which the State failed to do - Resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention to circumvent ordinary criminal procedure is unsustainable – Held that mere registration of three criminal cases involving "Ganja" does not automatically impact "public order" unless there is specific material showing the activities caused harm, danger, or a feeling of insecurity among the general public - The detention order failed to indicate how the detenu's acts were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as opposed to mere "law and order" - Law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed - Liberty cannot be jeopardized unless the case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute – Held that simply declaring the detenu a 'habitual drug offender' was not sufficient for preventive detention unless shown how detenu's actions specifically threatened public order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others 2023 INSC 788; Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar 1984 3 SCC 14; Paras 8-10] Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2026 INSC 41 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 161

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Effect of Probation on Conviction and Departmental Action – The Supreme Court reiterated that the release of an offender on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction - The conviction of the accused or the finding of the court that he is guilty remains untouched, as it is the sine qua non for an order of release on probation – Held that in a case where a workman obtained employment as a Helper by using his brother's educational certificates and impersonating him, Supreme Court held that such misconduct justifies departmental action - that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act does not preclude a department from taking action for misconduct leading to an offence or conviction – Noted that Section 12 only removes "disqualifications" provided by other laws (e.g., for holding office or seeking elections) but does not sweep away the factum of guilt or the misconduct resulting in conviction - a person dismissed from service due to conviction is not entitled to reinstatement merely because they were granted the benefit of probation - While the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's observation that conviction alone is not a ground for removal, it declined to interfere with the modified punishment of "compulsory retirement" in this specific instance, noting that the respondent-workman had since passed away and the appellant did not wish to unsettle benefits accrued to the family. [Relied on Union of India Vs. Bakshi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 426; Paras 9-13] Superintending Engineer v. Labour Court Madurai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 78

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Quashing of Prosecution – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – Essential Ingredients - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal prosecution against the appellant, holding that the mere presence of an accused at the scene of an incident, without a specific overt act or intentional insult directed at the complainant's caste, does not satisfy the statutory requirements for an offense under the SC/ST Act – Noted following points – i. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) - To constitute an offense under this section, there must be an intentional insult or intimidation with the specific intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place within public view Noted that mere fact that a complainant belongs to a protected community is insufficient; the insult must be because of their caste identity - Even knowledge of the complainant's caste is not enough to attract this section without the intent to humiliate; ii. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(s) - This section requires the accused to abuse a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe "by the caste name" in public view - noted that the intent behind the abuse must be found to be denigrating toward the caste, resulting in a feeling of caste-based humiliation - Merely saying a caste name or simple abuse does not automatically constitute an offense; iii. Application to Facts - Held that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contained allegations of the appellant uttering any specific words or performing overt acts - The allegations were deemed general in nature and failed to prima facie constitute an offense – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 224; Paras 11-20] Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 62

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 14-A – Nature of Appellate Jurisdiction – Held that an appeal under Section 14-A is a statutory first appeal on both facts and law – Noted that High Court does not function merely as a revisional or supervisory court but as a first appellate court obliged to independently evaluate the material on record - A mechanical affirmation of a Trial Court's order without independent scrutiny is inconsistent with settled appellate jurisprudence. [Paras 17, 18] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3 — Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 — Clause 3 — Effect of conversion to Christianity on Scheduled Caste status —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash criminal proceedings under the SC/ST Act initiated by a person who had converted to Christianity and was practicing as a Pastor - Held, that as per Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste - Since the appellant indubitably professed Christianity by performing pastoral duties for over a decade, his caste status as a member of the Madiga community stood "eclipsed in the eyes of law" upon conversion - once the foundational requirement of caste status is extinguished, the statutory protection under the SC/ST Act is no longer available. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Quashing of Charges – Requirement of Knowledge – The Supreme Court quashed charges under the SC/ST Act against the appellant, observing that "knowledge" of the victim's caste is an essential ingredient for attracting liability under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Held that where the FIR and Section 161 CrPC statements are silent on the use of casteist slurs or the specific identity of the victims as SC/ST members, the charge cannot stand - Allowing proceedings to continue without a prima facie disclosure of statutory ingredients amounts to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 36; Bani Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1996) 4 SCC 720; State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39; Paras 14, 15, and 19] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Statutory vs. Non-Statutory Benefits — Reliance on State Government Orders (G.O.Ms. No. 341) extending benefits to converts is misplaced regarding central statutory enactments - Held, that such executive orders only apply to "non-statutory concessions" like economic support schemes and cannot override the Presidential Order or apply to statutory benefits/protections under Central Acts like the SC/ST Act. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Section 18 – Appeal against ICC Recommendations – Jurisdiction of Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – The Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act is maintainable before the Armed Forces Tribunal when read in juxtaposition with Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Held that the High Court erred in holding that the appellant had no right of appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act against the recommendations of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC). 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 43D(5), 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 – Grant of Bail – Prolonged Incarceration vs. Statutory Bar – Constitutional Perspective under Article 21 – Role Differentiation in Conspiracy – Governing Principles for Bail under UAPA - emphasized that the "prima facie true" standard under Section 43D(5) does not reduce the judicial role to a mechanical acceptance of prosecution assertions, but requires a threshold inquiry of real content- i. Contextual Inquiry into Delay - that the constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt, but whether continued detention remains constitutionally permissible. This is "necessarily contextual" and includes factors like the nature of allegations, the trial's realistic trajectory, and causes contributing to delay – ii. Individualized Role Differentiation- Supreme Court rejected a "case-centric" approach in favor of an "accused-specific" one. It distinguished between those with "strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality" and those whose roles were "peripheral or episodic"- iii. Speedy Trial vs. Statutory Embargo - While recognizing the right to a speedy trial as a foundational guarantee under Article 21, the Court held that "delay simpliciter" does not automatically eclipse the statutory regime enacted by Parliament for special category offences. Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 32