LiveLaw Supreme Court Weekly Digest: September 11 - 21, 2026

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Conditional Withdrawal Does Not Halt Interest: Where the award-debtor resists the release of deposited funds, or where the court permits withdrawal only upon furnishing security (such as title deeds), the deposit does not constitute satisfaction of the award under Order XXI Rule 1 - liability to pay interest continues to run until the date the awarded funds are unconditionally made available to the award-holder – i. Distillation of Principles Govering Interest on Court Deposits - The Supreme Court synthesized nine binding principles governing interest liability during deposit in court - (i) The 1996 Act incorporates CPC principles for enforcement under Section 36; (ii) Court must have regard to CPC provisions on money decree stays when staying an award [Section 36(3)]; (iii) Deposit merely places money beyond reach of the parties; (iv) Deposit must be unconditional and freely withdrawable; (v) Withdrawal permitted only against security is not payment in satisfaction of the decree; (vi) If deposit is non-compliant with Order XXI Rule 1, interest continues to run; (vii) Failure by the decree-holder to seek withdrawal when funds are freely available amounts to deemed refusal, stopping interest; (viii) If deposited sums are placed in a fixed deposit at the decree-holder's instance, only FD interest accrues; (ix) Partial unconditional deposit arrests interest only pro tanto on the deposited component. [Paras 21-28] National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. National Agro Seed Corporation (India), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2026 INSC 1017

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 36 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XXI Rules 1 & 4, Order XLI Rules 5 & 6 — Enforcement of Arbitral Award — Conditional Court Deposit vs. Satisfaction of Decree — Cessation of Post-Award Interest - Deposit in Court Not Synonymous with Payment - A deposit is not payment; placing money beyond the debtor's reach neither extinguishes liability nor places it at the creditor's disposal - Under Section 36(1) of the Arbitration Act, an award is enforced as a decree under the CPC - For a deposit in court to arrest the accrual of interest under Order XXI Rule 1, it must be made unconditionally, accompanied by notice under Rule 1(2), and be freely and immediately available for withdrawal by the award-holder. [Paras 21-25] National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. National Agro Seed Corporation (India), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2026 INSC 1017

Armed Forces Pension — Disability Pension — Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 vs. Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 2008 — Burden of Proof and Presumption of Attributability/Aggravation — Judicial Review of Release Medical Board (RMB) Opinions - Substantive Continuity Between 1982 and 2008 Regimes - The Entitlement Rules 2008 substantially reproduce the 1982 scheme concerning causal connection, onus of proof, and attributability/aggravation - Although Rule 5 of the 2008 Rules withdraws the initial presumption that any deterioration in health is deemed service-related by clarifying that mere manifestation of a disease in service does not per se establish attributability or aggravation, it does not dismantle the protective framework for service personnel - Under Rule 7 of the 2008 Rules, read with Rule 10(b)(iii), Rule 11, and Regulation 423 of the Regulations for the Medical Services of the Armed Forces (RMSAF), 2010, the primary burden of disproving entitlement still rests on the employer establishment - If the cause of a disease remains unknown and the presumption of entitlement in favour of the claimant is not rebutted, attributability must be conceded. [Paras 29 - 34] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993

Armed Forces Pension — Legality and Uncertainty Surrounding Promulgation of Entitlement Rules 2008 - The Union failed to establish the precise source, timeline, and valid promulgation through which the 2008 Rules officially superseded the 1982 Rules, rendering them a mere collation of executive instructions - Under the Allocation of Business Rules, 1961, the Department of Pension and Pensioners' Welfare (DoPPW) not the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW) holds jurisdiction over policy formulation on retirement benefits - Compelling necessity highlighted for the competent authority to authoritatively notify transparent, clear, and uniform rules/regulations - Batch of 271 appeals dismissed on grounds of severe limitation/delay as well as lack of merit - The Union's failure to implement the 2015 Raksha Mantri Expert Committee recommendation regarding the withdrawal of pending appeals against disabled soldiers deprecated. [Relied on Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 316; Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1064; Union of India v. Rajbir Singh, (2015) 12 SCC 264; Paras 20–28, 36-39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993

Armed Forces Pension — Limited Qualification under Rule 7 Proviso — Belated Claims Beyond 15 Years - The sole significant departure in the Entitlement Rules 2008 from Rule 9 of the 1982 Rules is the proviso introduced to Rule 7 - Where a claim for disability pension is preferred after 15 years of discharge, retirement, invalidment, or release by which time service documents are typically weeded out the onus of proving entitlement reverses and shifts entirely onto the claimant - Tribunals and Courts cannot mechanically apply the Dharamvir Singh presumptions to allow routine applications filed after 15 years without a detailed scrutiny of the claimant's evidence. [Paras 30–39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993

Armed Forces Pension — Weight Accorded to Release Medical Board Opinion - The Medical Board is an expert body, and its scientific opinion on medical causation is entitled to due deference and weight - Courts and the Armed Forces Tribunal ought not to substitute their own views merely because an alternative medical conclusion is plausible - Judicial interference is warranted only where there is an absence of reasons, omission of germane facts, or a patent defect in the decision-making process - Where an unreasoned Medical Board opinion is set aside, the appropriate course is ordinarily to direct a review/reconstitution of the Medical Board rather than judicial substitution of medical findings. [Paras 31- 39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993

Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Section 35-A — Indian Contract Act, 1872 — Constitution of India — Articles 14, 21, and 226 — Hypothecation - Where possession of a commercial vehicle was forcibly taken at 1:00 a.m. by breaking the steering lock without mandatory 7-day prior notice and without a signed inventory/possession memorandum, the action constitutes unlawful and arbitrary seizure bearing the mark of "goonda-ism" expressly condemned by the Supreme Court - Depriving a small transporter of his sole means of livelihood in such an arbitrary manner violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - Dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court solely on the ground of delay without examining the illegalities and subsequent traffic challans issued against the borrower was erroneous - The Supreme Court directed the financer to close both loan accounts, refund the vehicle's sale proceeds of Rs. 4,50,000/- with 6% interest per annum, and awarded compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the borrower for loss of livelihood and mental agony, along with Rs. 50,000/- costs - RBI directed to take effective steps to secure genuine compliance with Fair Practices Code guidelines. [Relied on ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Prakash Kaur and Ors., (2007) 2 SCC 711; Orix Auto Finance (India) Ltd. v. Jagmander Singh and Anr., (2006) 2 SCC 598; Sundaram Finance Limited and Anr. v. T. Thankam, (2015) 14 SCC 444; Paras 15-19, 21–32] Hari Dutta Sharma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 942 : 2026 INSC 998

Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Section 35-A — RBI Master Circulars / Guidelines on Fair Practices Code — Unilateral Repossession of Hypothecated Vehicles by NBFCs / Financers — Validity of Unconscionable Contractual Repossession Clauses — Use of Force and 'Goondaism' - Financiers and NBFCs cannot take forcible possession of hypothecated vehicles through brute force, deceit, or recovery agents in the dead of night in complete disregard of statutory RBI guidelines and contractual procedural safeguards - Held, directions and guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India under Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 possess statutory force and are binding on banking institutions and NBFCs - Self-help repossession clauses under hypothecation agreements are intended to facilitate credit expansion but operate under the implicit condition that they conform strictly to the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the procedural safeguards established by the RBI (mandatory pre-seizure notice, fair procedure, final opportunity to cure before sale, and transparent auction) - Contractual provisions such as Article 11 of the subject agreement stipulating that the borrower's rights determine ipso facto without notice, empowering recovery agents to enter any place without process, and conferring unfettered discretion on the lender to waive pre- and post-repossession notice, are unconscionable, opposed to public policy, and violate the RBI Fair Practices Code. Hari Dutta Sharma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 942 : 2026 INSC 998

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 92 — Urgent Interim Relief — Dispensation of Notice Prior to Grant of Leave — Ex Parte Leave - Where compelling circumstances and extreme urgency exist to prevent waste or damage to trust property, the Court is empowered to dispense with prior notice to the defendants and grant leave to sue ex parte, recording reasons in writing - Once leave is granted, the suit stands instituted, and the court acquires full jurisdiction to pass interim orders (including temporary injunctions or receiver appointments) - The defendants retain the right to apply for revocation/recall of leave on merits. [Relied on Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, (2026) 1 SCC 569; Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R, (2008) 4 SCC 115; Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378; Paras 57–60] S. Panchalingu v. People's Education Trust (R), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 955 : 2026 INSC 1010

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 92, Section 94, Section 141, Section 151, and Order XL Rule 1 — Public Charities — Application for Leave to Institute Suit — Power of Civil Court to Grant Protective/Preservatory Interim Orders (Receiver) Pending Leave Application — Jurisdiction Excluded - Obtaining leave of the court under Section 92(1) CPC is a mandatory condition precedent and a "threshold gateway" to the institution of a suit against public charities - In the absence of leave, there is no validly instituted suit or substantive lis pending before the court - A Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain applications for interim, preservatory, or protective relief including the appointment of a receiver under Order XL Rule 1 prior to the grant of leave - Supplemental powers under Section 94 presuppose an underlying, validly instituted proceeding and cannot be invoked at the pre-leave stage - Section 141 applies purely to procedural matters and cannot dilute substantive statutory safeguards, nor can inherent powers under Section 151 override express statutory bars (generalia specialibus non derogant). [Paras 28–31, 35, 38–41, 44– 60] S. Panchalingu v. People's Education Trust (R), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 955 : 2026 INSC 1010

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XIV Rule 2, Order XX Rule 5, Order VII Rule 11(d), and Section 151 — Framing of Issues vs. Trying an Issue — Trial of Preliminary Issue — Stage at which Power to Try an Issue First under Order XIV Rule 2(2) Ceases — Ongoing Composite Trial Cannot Be Severed Retrospectively - Scheme and Cumulative Requirements of Order XIV Rule 2(2) - Under the post-1976 amended scheme of Order XIV Rule 2, the general rule under sub-rule (1) is that the Court shall pronounce judgment on all issues - The exception carved out under sub-rule (2) is discretionary and strictly conditional upon three cumulative criteria - (i) it must be an issue of law only; (ii) it must relate either to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force; (iii) the Court must form an opinion that the suit or any part thereof may be disposed of on that issue alone - A mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. [Paras 16-19] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Framing All Issues Does Not Exhaust Rule 2(2), but Embarking upon General Trial Does - The statutory words 'may try that issue first' are distinct from the optional power that the Court 'may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues' - The four procedural operating settings are – i. Court frames only the qualifying issue of law and postpones settlement of other issues; ii. Court frames all issues and contemporaneously directs that the qualifying issue be tried first; iii. Court frames all issues and fixes a date for evidence, but before the court actually embarks upon the trial and evidentiary recording generally, an application under Rule 2(2) is made (mere fixation of a date does not bar exercise of discretion); iv. Court has already embarked upon the trial of the issues generally (e.g., plaintiff has closed evidence and defendants have entered upon evidence) - Once the trial on the issues generally has commenced, the statutory occasion to direct that an issue be 'tried first' has irrevocably passed - The word 'first' is relational and authorizes only a prospective ordering of the trial, not a retrospective reordering or severance of an ongoing composite trial. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to bypass this temporal bar. [Paras 21-47] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Harmonious Reading with Order XX Rule 5 - Limitation Involving Mixed Questions of Law and Fact - Order XX Rule 5 obligates the Court to render findings on each separate issue unless a finding on one or more issues is sufficient for disposal of the suit - This exception applies where a preliminary issue was validly isolated and tried first - where issues have entered a composite general trial, findings must be rendered on all issues to avoid unnecessary remands and piecemeal adjudications - Where limitation depends on determining whether a registered alienation was void ab initio for want of authority under a General Power of Attorney (attracting Article 65 of the Limitation Act) or voidable requiring cancellation (attracting Article 59), it involves mixed questions of fact and law requiring adduction of evidence and cannot be severed for summary dismissal under Order XIV Rule 2(2) or rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d). [Relied on Sathyanath v. Sarojamani, (2022) 7 SCC 644; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557; Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322; Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 INSC 465; Paras 19 – 26, 41-46] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

Constitution of India — Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 19(6) — Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972 — Rules 18A and 18B (inserted vide 2011 Amendment) — Subordinate Legislation — Methanol Regulation — Mandatory Addition of Denaturants (Bitterant & Colourant) — Restricting Purchase to Form A Licensees & Confiscation — Manifest Arbitrariness & Proportionality Test - Rules 18A and 18B of the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972, mandating the compulsory mixing of a colourant (methylene carmine) and a bitterant (denatonium saccharide) in methanol prior to sale to non-drug manufacturers, restricting purchases solely to Form A licensees, and prescribing confiscation for possession without a Form A licence, are manifestly arbitrary, disproportionate, and unconstitutional - Sub-rule (1) of Rule 18A errs in conflating sellers with consumers, excluding legitimate industrial consumers holding Form B permits from procuring essential raw material - Sub-rule (2) imposes severe, destructive burdens on downstream industries (rendering methanol unusable in paints, resins, laminates, and life-saving drug catalysts) while serving merely a speculative chance of visual/taste identification without remedying illicit diversion, pilferage, or masking of hooch in unregulated channels - The rules fail all four prongs of the proportionality doctrine (K.S. Puttaswamy) and violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). [Paras 23–25, 29–37, 40–51, 53–68] Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2026 INSC 1009

Constitution of India — Public Health & Regulatory Governance — Hooch Tragedies — Preventive Guidelines for States & Union Territories - Striking down excessive subordinate legislation does not diminish the State's duty to control toxic substances - The Supreme Court laid down 15 comprehensive guidelines for States/UTs to check spurious liquor tragedies, including multi-departmental coordination, tracking industrial solvents, dedicating exclusive tankers with tamper-evident seals, mandatory stock reconciliation, and establishing specialized medical disaster management cells and de-addiction facilities. [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9 J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1; Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2009) 16 SCC 569; Vasu Dev Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753; Paras 65–67] Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2026 INSC 1009

Constitution of India — Article 22(1), Article 22(2), and Article 21 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 50, Section 57, and Section 167 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 47 and Section 58 — Arrest and Re-arrest — Violation of Fundamental Safeguards against Arrest — Procedure and Judicial Imprimatur Required for Re-arrest — Public Law Remedy – i. Mandatory Nature of Written Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) - The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) is a mandatory, binding constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural formality - The grounds must be communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee - Any infringement vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand, entitling the arrestee to immediate release - Procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not fall under a prejudice-oriented test; when there is a constitutional violation, the question of demonstrable prejudice does not arise - When released for violation of Article 22(1), the accused is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention; ii. Mandatory Production within 24 Hours under Article 22(2) - The constitutional mandate under Article 22(2) and Section 57 CrPC (Section 58 BNSS) requiring production of an arrestee before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time) must be strictly and scrupulously observed - Detention beyond 24 hours without magisterial authorization is unconstitutional and unlawful, rendering the arrest otiose and vitiated, which infringes both Article 22(2) and Article 21. [Paras 20-33] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India — Procedure for Re-arrest / Fresh Custody Following Release for Breach of Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) - An accused who has suffered a breach of Article 22(1) or Article 22(2) does not enjoy a blanket permanent immunity from re-arrest - the investigating agency cannot automatically re-arrest the accused by executive fiat - Re-arrest requires prior judicial sanction/imprimatur; i. The investigating agency must file a formal application for custody before the concerned Magistrate setting forth the reasons and necessity for re-arrest and custodial interrogation, accompanied by an explanation for the initial default; ii. Such application can be moved only after furnishing the written grounds of arrest to the accused; iii. To eliminate foul play or collusion, the application must bear the prior endorsement of the immediate superior authority; iv. On the administrative side, the superior authority must transfer the investigation to another officer and initiate departmental/disciplinary proceedings against the erring officer(s); v. The Magistrate shall decide the application expeditiously, preferably within one week, adhering to principles of natural justice, and may grant custody only upon being satisfied with the bona fides of the explanation and the genuine necessity for re-arrest; vi. The same procedure applies mutatis mutandis to breaches under Article 22(2). [Paras 24 - 38] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India — Distinction from Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC - Public Law Remedy of Compensation - Default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC (Section 187(2) BNSS) operates on a distinct footing - In default bail cases, re-arrest is permissible upon filing of the chargesheet on cogent grounds, whereas breaches under Article 22(1) and 22(2) occur at the threshold of the arrest itself and violate fundamental rights, requiring strict judicial safeguards before custody can be sought again - For illegal detention in violation of Article 22(2), the constitutional court may direct payment of compensation under public law remedies as exemplary damages / palliative relief for infringement of civil liberties, without relegating the citizen solely to private law remedies, though reserving liberty to claim damages under private civil law. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500; Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799; Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240; Paras 28-36] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India – Articles 21, 226, 227 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173(8), Section 482 – Rape and Murder of minor – Botched and tainted investigation resulting in full acquittal – Inherent & Constitutional Power to order Reinvestigation / De Novo Investigation - Held, although normally only 'further investigation' can be directed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. upon submission of a final report under Section 173(2), Constitutional Courts possess the dynamic and uncurtailable power under Article 226/227 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to order a fresh or de novo investigation by an independent agency or Special Investigation Team (SIT) where the investigation was tainted, biased, sham, or conducted to shield real culprits - A fair investigation is as fundamental a facet of Article 21 as a fair trial - Where a trial culminates in the acquittal of a wrongly accused person due to lack of evidence, it underscores that the real perpetrators remain unapprehended - The refusal of the High Court to direct reinvestigation on the premise that evidence lost during the "golden hour" cannot be collected was erroneous, especially when key physical evidence (intact clothes bearing foreign male hair samples for DNA comparison) and material witnesses remain readily available. [Paras 25, 26, 46 - 61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 2(1)(g) – Insurance Act, 1938 – Section 64UM – Fire Insurance – Repudiation of claim on grounds of false declaration, manipulated accounts, and suspected arson – Scope and effect of policy forfeiture clauses - Held, when an insured willfully makes false declarations or relies on manipulated books of account and inflated inventory to buttress an insurance claim in violation of policy conditions (specifically Policy Conditions No. 6 and 8), the insurer is lawfully entitled to reject and repudiate such claim in its entirety without further ado - The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) erred in casually brushing aside findings recorded in multiple detailed surveyor reports and the report of an investigative agency which demonstrated that unusable dead scrap was lying in the affected shed rather than usable raw material, the books showed an imaginary yield and arbitrary consumption to create non-existent book stock, and the fire-fighting and loss-minimization efforts were non-genuine - the order of the NCDRC awarding compensation was set aside and the repudiation was sustained. [Paras 31-35] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Insurance Act, 1938 – Section 64UM(1-A), Section 64UM(2) Proviso – Surveyors and Loss Assessors – Evidentiary value of surveyor reports – Requirement of recording reasons for appointing a second surveyor / investigative agency - Held, although the assessment of loss by an approved surveyor under Section 64UM(2) is a prerequisite for settling a claim exceeding the statutory threshold, the surveyor's report is neither sacrosanct nor conclusive and is not the last word binding either the insurer or the insured - While an insurer cannot appoint a second surveyor as a matter of course without recording cogent reasons, appointment of subsequent surveyors/investigators is fully permissible where the preliminary surveyor expressly observes serious abnormalities requiring meticulous investigation to rule out arson and hypothetical loss - consumer fora cannot ignore joint/final surveyor reports containing detailed empirical data; doing so causes a serious miscarriage of justice. [Paras 18-25] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Fire Insurance – Presumption of accidental fire – Limits – Where reasonable suspicion exists of instigation by insured - Held, the legal principle that the precise origin or cause of a fire is immaterial so long as the claimant is not the instigator does not apply where there is reasonable cause to suspect arson, deliberate staging, or gross lack of bonafide fire-minimization efforts by the insured - Where physical verification contradicts the very occurrence of massive structural fire damage, material has been pre-demolished, and the insured willfully engages in delaying tactics in informing authorities, the claim cannot be allowed merely by presuming the fire to be accidental. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited v. Pradeep Kumar, (2009) 7 SCC 787; Khatema Fibres Limited v. New India Assurance Company Limited and another, (2023) 15 SCC 327; Sri Venkateswara Syndicate v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another, (2009) 8 SCC 507; Paras 26-30] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023

Criminal Jurisprudence – Victimology – Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 300 – Scope of fresh SIT investigation post-acquittal - Held, criminal jurisprudence places paramount emphasis on victimology, recognizing that an offence is one against society at large, casting an onerous duty on the State to bring real culprits to book - While injustice to a falsely prosecuted person can be compensated, injustice to a brutally raped and murdered victim can never be compensated if the real perpetrators escape justice due to institutional failure - where the originally prosecuted accused has undergone full trial and stands acquitted on merits, he is fully cloaked with the constitutional protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. and cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution - An SIT composed of fresh independent officers must carry out the de novo probe untainted by earlier investigations. [Relied on Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Admn., 1988 Supp SCC 482; Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160; Paras 56-61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Criminal Trial — Evidence — Appreciation of Testimony — "Sterling Witness" — Non-Corroboration by Forensic and Medical Findings - Where the prosecution relies heavily on a prime witness whose account is riddled with contradictions, material improvements over Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements, and is directly refuted by expert medical and FSL examinations (showing an intact hymen, no vulval injury, and total absence of semen or male DNA), such a witness cannot be characterised as a "sterling witness" - When ocular testimony is entirely inconsistent with the scientific and medical evidence, and a plausible defence of false implication stemming from local disputes (water-sharing) is established, the accused is entitled to acquittal. [Relied on Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21; Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417; Naresh Kumar alias Nitu v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 15 SCC 684; Gangadhar alias Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2020) 9 SCC 202; Paras 5-10] Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2026 INSC 1008

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Section 14B & Section 7Q — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) — Liability of Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) — Mandatory vs. Discretionary Nature of Damages under Section 14B — Reference to Larger Bench - Liability of SRA to Clear EPF Dues - Provident fund and gratuity dues fall outside the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(b)(iii) of the IBC and cannot be subjected to the waterfall mechanism under Section 53(1) - In terms of Section 11(2) of the EPF & MP Act, statutory first charge is created in respect of workmen dues (including Section 7Q interest and Section 14B damages), which overrides non-obstante priority clauses in subsequent legislation - the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) is liable to pay provident fund and gratuity dues in full to save the resolution plan from being hit by Section 30(2)(e) of the IBC. Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Rehabilitation Mechanism and Power of Central Board under Second Proviso to Section 14B - The Second Proviso to Section 14B empowers the Central Board to reduce or waive damages for an establishment undergoing rehabilitation under the now-repealed SICA - Since the IBC superseded SICA for corporate turnaround, a resolution plan under IBC is functionally akin to a scheme of rehabilitation sanctioned by BIFR - The Central Board is competent to consider an application for reduction or waiver of damages preferred by an SRA under the Second Proviso. [Paras 6-18] Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Discretion of Authorized Officer to Impose Damages under Section 14B — Doubt Cast on Horticulture Experiment Station: A doubt was expressed regarding the ratio in Horticulture Experiment Station Gonikoppal v. Regional Provident Fund Organization, (2022) 4 SCC 516, which held that imposition of damages under Section 14B is strictly automatic and mandatory upon civil default without requiring discretion - The phrase 'may recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages' in the post-1988 amended Section 14B indicates that the Authorized Officer retains quasi-judicial discretion to decide whether or not to levy penalty/damages at all under extenuating circumstances - If the officer decides to impose damages, only the quantum is rigidly regulated by the scheme under Paragraph 32A - Statutory interest under Section 7Q is purely compensatory and distinct from the punitive damages under Section 14B - Question referred to a Larger Bench - Appellants directed to deposit outstanding EPF dues and Section 7Q interest in four quarterly installments, subject to final determination of waiver/damages by the competent forum. [Relied on Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Limited v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, (2009) 10 SCC 123; Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2513; State Bank of India v. Murari Lal Jalan & Florian Fritsch (Consortium), (2025) 4 SCC 354; Jet Aircraft Maintenance Engineers Welfare Assn. v. Ashish Chhawchharia, 2022 SCC OnLine NCLAT 418; Paras 7– 20] Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 read with Section 114, Illustration (b) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 306 — Approver/Accomplice Testimony — Rule of Prudence — Requirement of independent material corroboration connecting the accused with the crime - An accomplice who secures pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. possesses a powerful incentive to minimize his own culpability and shift blame onto others - Although an accomplice is a competent witness under Section 133 of the Evidence Act, the rule of prudence under Section 114, Illustration (b) mandates independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the commission of the offence, and not merely connecting the transaction with the offence - Testimony of one participant in a bribe transaction (the bribe-giver) corroborating another participant (the approver intermediary) does not satisfy the requirement of independent corroboration in the sense required by law. [Relied on Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 52–55, 70-82] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Chapter XIX-A, Sections 147, 148, 245C, 245D(4), 245D(6), 245F(2) & 245-I — Reassessment notice issued under Section 148 after final settlement order under Section 245D(4) — Bar of jurisdiction on Assessing Officer - Whether the Assessing Officer (AO) has statutory jurisdiction under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to initiate reassessment proceedings to disallow statutory deductions (Section 80IB(10)) in respect of an assessment year already concluded and settled by the Income Tax Settlement Commission (ITSC) under Section 245D(4) - Held, Chapter XIX-A is a self-contained code providing a specialized alternate dispute resolution mechanism. Once an application under Section 245C is admitted under Section 245D(1), Section 245F(2) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Settlement Commission to exercise the powers and perform the functions of an income-tax authority over the entire case for that assessment year, placing the regular assessment machinery under Sections 142 to 156 in statutory abeyance - Once a final settlement order is passed under Section 245D(4), it permanently displaces the regular assessment machinery - By virtue of Section 245-I, the order passed by the ITSC is conclusive as to the matters stated therein and cannot be reopened in any proceeding under the Act or any other law, except under Chapter XIX-A - The Settlement Commission takes into consideration the gross total income, returns filed, and permissible deductions to arrive at the net taxable income - The Assessing Officer cannot reopen the settlement or assume independent reassessment jurisdiction under Sections 147/148 on the pretext that a specific deduction was wrongly claimed or not separately adjudicated - The only recourse open to the Revenue to unsettle a concluded Section 245D(4) order is to invoke Section 245D(6) before the ITSC by establishing fraud or misrepresentation of facts, or to pursue limited judicial review under Articles 226/136 of the Constitution of India - Where an application under Section 245D(6) moved by the Revenue had already been rejected by the ITSC, the AO is completely denuded of power to reopen the assessment via Section 148 - Both the Assesses and the Revenue must "take the crust and the crumb together" under Chapter XIX-A. [Relied on Brij Lal and Ors. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Jalandhar, (2011) 1 SCC 1; Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Express Newspapers Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 374; Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi & Ors., (1993) Supp (3) SCC 389; Paras 21–27] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. v. M/s. Omaxe Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 944 : 2026 INSC 1000

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Section 263, Section 80HHC read with Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiie) & Explanation (baa) — Revisional Jurisdiction of Commissioner — Erroneous and Prejudicial to Interests of Revenue — Binding Nature of CBDT Circulars — Deductions on Export Quota Premium – i. Pre-conditions for Revision under Section 263 - The revisional power of the Commissioner under Section 263 requires the concurrent presence of two conditions - the order of the Assessing Officer must be both "erroneous" and "prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue" - An order becomes erroneous if it rests on an incorrect assumption of facts, misapplies the law, or is passed without application of mind - If two views are possible and the Assessing Officer adopts one tenable view, the Commissioner cannot exercise revisionary powers unless the Assessing Officer's view is wholly unsustainable in law; ii. Non-Binding Effect of Executive Circulars on Courts - Administrative circulars and Office Memoranda (O.M.) issued by the CBDT bind only subordinate administrative departmental officers, not Constitutional Courts - When the text of the statute or judicial interpretation runs contrary to an executive circular, the statutory enactment and judicial declaration prevail; executive circulars cannot override statutory terms or create an impermissible legal fiction; iii. Assessment without basic inquiry renders order revisable - Where the Assessing Officer mechanically allowed deduction under Section 80HHC on export quota premium on the basis of a CBDT Office Memorandum without conducting basic inquiries or applying statutory criteria under Section 28 and Explanation (baa) to Section 80HHC, the Assessment Order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue, justifying the Commissioner's invocation of Section 263. [Relied on CCE, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries, (2008) 13 SCC 1; CIT v. Amitabh Bachchan, (2016) 384 ITR 200 (SC); Paras 12–15] Orient Crafts Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 960 : 2026 INSC 1018

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 61(2), Proviso — Maxim Actus curiae neminem gravabit — Limitation & Technical Portal Glitches in E-Filing — Exemption of non-functional portal period -Although the NCLAT has no statutory discretion under Section 61(2) of the IBC to condone delay beyond the outer limit of 30 + 15 days, a litigant cannot be turned away when the appeal was prevented from being e-filed within the condonable period solely due to backend technical defects and OTP failures in the tribunal's own registry/portal - Limitation runs against a litigant only when the forum is functional and capable of receiving papers - Where a bona fide attempt to e-file is established prior to the expiry of the condonable window, the court/tribunal must invoke the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no one) to exempt the days during which the portal was non-functional and treat the date of the first bona fide attempt as the date of presentation. [Relied on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602; Distinguished from National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Anil Kohli, RP for Dunar Foods Ltd., (2022) 11 SCC 761; Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors., (2025) 9 SCC 483; Paras 13–22] Regional Provident Fund Commissioner II v. Ms Mamta Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 946 : 2026 INSC 1003

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Distinction between Original Stage and Appellate Stage Objections — Inapplicability of Section 21(1) CPC at Threshold - An objection to territorial competence raised at the threshold before the Claims Tribunal must be adjudicated strictly within the parameters of Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988 - The condition precedent of establishing a "failure of justice" under Section 21(1) of the CPC is attracted exclusively when an objection to territorial jurisdiction is raised or entertained at an appellate or post-award stage - Where an objection is raised prior to adjudication on merits, Section 21(1) CPC does not bar the Tribunal or High Court from ordering transmission/transfer of the claim to the competent forum. [Relied on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta & Others, 2011 INSC 759; Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2008 INSC 1453; Balveer Batra v. New India Assurance Company, 2024 INSC 361; Paras 10-14] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Insurer is Not a "Defendant" for Conferring Jurisdiction under Section 166(2) - The phrase 'within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides' in Section 166(2) refers to the owner and/or driver of the offending vehicle, and does not encompass an insurer - Impleading an insurance company as a defendant is not mandatory under the Act - A claimant cannot invoke the territorial jurisdiction of a Tribunal solely on the ground that the insurance company maintains a branch or head office within that territory when the accident took place outside and neither the claimant nor the owner/driver resides or carries on business there. [Paras 8 - 15] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Right of Impleaded Insurer to Object to Territorial Jurisdiction - While an insurer cannot demand to be made a party as of right and is typically issued notice under Section 149(2), if a claimant elects to voluntarily implead the insurer as a contesting party respondent, the insurer acquires the right to resist the claim on all available legal grounds without restrictions, including challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal. [Paras 6 - 14] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166(2) read with Section 168(1) and Section 169 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 20 & Section 21(1) — Motor Accident Claims — Territorial Jurisdiction — Forum Convenience — Meaning of "Defendant Resides" vis-à-vis Insurance Company - Scope of Territorial Options under Section 166(2) - Under Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988, an application for compensation can be instituted at the option of the claimant before the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over: (i) the area where the accident occurred; (ii) the local limits where the claimant resides; (iii) the local limits where the claimant carries on business; or (iv) the local limits where the defendant resides - The legislature has consciously omitted the phrase "or carries on business" with respect to the defendant, which departs from the broader terminology used in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [Paras 7-10] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 52-A — Non-compliance with statutory sampling procedure — Total failure to draw samples before a Magistrate - While minor procedural delay or lapses under Section 52-A may not automatically vitiate the trial in the absence of prejudice, total non-compliance with the statutory mandate to draw representative samples in the presence of an Executive/Judicial Magistrate and certify the inventory strikes at the root of the prosecution case, rendering the integrity of the seizure and sampling process wholly doubtful. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 8 SCC 452; Nadeem Ahamed v. State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1779; Paras 31–34] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 42 and 50 — Applicability — Search of bags carried in open public place - Provisions of Section 42 and Section 50 of the NDPS Act do not apply where the recovery of contraband is effected from bags being carried by suspects apprehended from an open public place rather than through personal search of their bodies or search of an enclosed building/conveyance. [Para 16] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8, 20(b)(ii)(B), 20(b)(ii)(C), and Section 52-A — Search, Seizure & Sampling — Link Evidence & Chain of Custody — Unexplained delay and custody gap fatal to prosecution - To admit and rely upon a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report in NDPS prosecutions, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of custody and proper link evidence demonstrating that the samples were safely kept, properly sealed, and remained untampered with from the point of seizure until receipt at the laboratory - Where sample packets do not bear identifying marks or signatures of the accused/panch witnesses, maalkhana registers lack corresponding exit entries, carrier witnesses are not examined, and an unexplained gap of five days exists between dispatch from the SP Office and receipt at the FSL, the link evidence totally collapses - Once the FSL report is rendered unreliable and discarded, no admissible evidence survives to prove the nature of the seized substance. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Tara Singh, (2011) 11 SCC 559; Paras 20–29, 30-35] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Benefit of Doubt Where Links in Chain are Missing - Mere prior threats, generalized presence of villagers, or recovery of unlinked weapons/articles from the crime spot do not establish authorship of the crime - Where the prosecution alleges death was caused by a 53 kg laterite stone but fails to produce evidence as to who brought it, fails to recover the weapon, and omits to submit it for medical opinion, substantial gaps remain in the prosecution case - Where two views are reasonably possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail, entitling the appellants to an acquittal. [Relied on Tamilselvan v. State, (2008) 7 SCC 755; Kamal v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 93; Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 111; Paras 33–35] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Circumstantial Evidence — Appreciation of Evidence — Night Identification — Rejection of Ocular Evidence - Unreliability of Identification in Pitch Dark Night: The testimony of related eye-witnesses alleging identification of assailants from a distance of 60 cubits during a pitch-dark night cannot be accepted - Where the source of light is a torch flashed by the assailants themselves towards the victim, it would partially blind the witnesses looking from a distance rather than enable clear identification of the assailants (Paragraph 20). Identification based merely on the sound of assault during a dark night is inherently weak, improbable, and liable to be discarded. [Paras 9, 18-29] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Standard of Proof in Circumstantial Evidence — "Panchsheel" Requirements - Where direct ocular evidence is rejected, conviction can only be sustained if circumstantial evidence satisfies the Panchsheel test enunciated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Paragraphs 22, 23) - The circumstances must be conclusively established ("must or should be proved", not merely "may be proved"), forming an unbroken chain that points solely to the guilt of the accused and excludes every hypothesis of innocence. [Paras 24 - 32] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015

Precedents — Ratio Decidendi — Application of Precedent to Differing Facts - A decision is an authority only for what it actually decides - What constitutes the ratio decidendi is the rule deducible from the application of law to the specific facts and circumstances of the case, and not conclusions based on superficially similar facts; one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions. [Relied on Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334; Paras 10–12] Regional Provident Fund Commissioner II v. Ms Mamta Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 946 : 2026 INSC 1003

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 — Illegal gratification — Intermediary/Conduit — Trap operation — Failure to establish complete chain of demand, acceptance, and recovery qua the accused — Non-applicability of statutory presumption - Mere recovery of tainted currency notes from an intermediary/conduit who invokes the name of the accused public servant cannot automatically result in criminal liability being fastened on the public servant - Where the investigating agency prematurely aborts the trap operation at the stage of recovery from the intermediary instead of allowing the chain to run its course to verify if the money was actually intended to reach or did reach the public servant, the link remains incomplete - Proof of demand is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d), and statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only after foundational facts of voluntary acceptance/obtainment are established - Held, conviction cannot be sustained where residual gaps in receipt are bridged by mere speculation. [Relied on C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779; P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; State by Lokayuktha Police v. K. Rangayya, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 963; Paras 44–51, 66–74] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) — Sections 29, 30, and 6 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 363 — Statutory Presumption of Guilt — Reverse Burden of Proof — Standard of Proof on Prosecution vs. Accused — Rebuttal of Presumption — Medical & Forensic Evidence Contradicting Oral Testimony - The statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 and culpable mental state under Section 30 of the POCSO Act are rebuttable and do not dispense with the fundamental obligation of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt - The statutory presumption does not convert the prosecution's ipse dixit into gospel truth, nor does it absolve the trial court from critically scrutinising the evidence - The presumption only shifts the evidential burden once foundational facts are established - the accused can successfully rebut it on the standard of preponderance of probability, inter alia, by pointing out contradictions, demolishing witness credibility, demonstrating a mismatch between ocular and forensic evidence, or establishing a plausible defence such as prior enmity. [Paras 7 - 10] Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2026 INSC 1008

Service Law — Precedent — Distinction between Officiating and Provisional/Ad Hoc Appointees - Candidates holding higher posts merely on an officiating basis are strictly governed by the ratio in BSNL v. Mishri Lal, and cannot claim parity with candidates who were provisionally promoted under earlier rules and had vested rights recognized as a one-time measure under Rule 10(3) of the 2002 Rules as dealt with in Medini C. v. BSNL – Appeals allowed. [Relied on CMD/Chairman, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. v. Mishri Lal & Ors., (2011) 14 SCC 739; State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Raj Kumar & Ors., (2023) 3 SCC 773; Distinguished from Medini C. & Ors. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors., (2022) 4 SCC 562; Paras 8–10] Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. G.N. Mani Ravinder, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2026 INSC 1007

Service Law — Promotion — Officiating Appointments — Claim for Consideration under Old/Repealed Rules — Vested Right — Rajbhasha Adhikari Recruitment Rules, 2005 - Employees holding a post purely on a local officiating basis have no vested legal right to seek regular promotion under repealed administrative instructions or obsolete statutory rules that were never brought into operation - The right to be considered for promotion arises only under the rules prevailing on the date when the candidature is considered - An employer/State is entitled to take a conscious, non-arbitrary policy decision altering the method of recruitment (e.g., introducing a Limited Internal Competitive Examination under the 2005 Rules for executive cadre posts) - The High Court erred in directing consideration of officiating employees under pre-2005 provisions. [Paras 8, 10–12] Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. G.N. Mani Ravinder, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2026 INSC 1007

Service Law — Recruitment & Selection — Disregard of essential eligibility criteria in advertisement — Erroneous clarification by subordinate authority — Fraud on public - When an employment notification/advertisement specifies an essential eligibility requirement (e.g., 10 years of service as Anganwadi Sevika within the same district), an appointment made in disregard thereof is illegal and amounts to a fraud on the public, as it excludes eligible candidates who did not apply on the faith of the terms - A subordinate authority like a Divisional Commissioner has no power or jurisdiction to issue an administrative clarification overriding Government Resolutions or the advertisement; any genuine doubt must be referred to the appropriate Government Department - In the absence of an express relaxation clause in the advertisement, an ineligible candidate acquires no right to the post despite selection or continuance in service. [Relied on Distt. Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655; Paras 5–13] Sunita Lahu Panchpande v. District Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 947 : 2026 INSC 1002

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Section 43D(2)(b) and Section 45 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 167(2), Section 173(2), and Section 196 — Investigation — Extension of Time for Completing Investigation — Default Bail — High Court Cannot Pre-emptively Declare Investigation Complete or Sever Intertwined Reasons – i. Extension of Time under Section 43D(2)(b) UAPA — Pendency of Data Analysis & Retrieval of Forensic Evidence - An extension of time beyond 90 days up to 180 days under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA is statutorily permissible upon the Public Prosecutor's report demonstrating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention - The analysis of scientific data, digital evidence retrieved from forensic science laboratories (mobile devices, hard drives, audio recordings), and financial verification of foreign funds form an integral part of ongoing investigation that must be concluded prior to filing a complete charge sheet; ii. Holistic Interpretation of Prosecutor's Report vs. Premature Declaration of Completion of Investigation - Statements in an extension application indicating that "there is enough evidence to file a charge sheet" cannot be read in isolation or ripped out of context to mean that the investigation is complete in all respects - Investigation of cognizable offences falls within the exclusive domain of the police, and Courts cannot artificially truncate or curtail statutory investigative powers or declare the investigation complete when specialized analysis of digital and financial material remains ongoing. [Paras 14 - 33] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Interplay Between Stage of Investigation and Stage of Sanction under Section 45 UAPA - Extinction of Right to Default Bail - While sanction for prosecution under Section 45 UAPA and Section 196 CrPC is an embargo on the Court taking cognizance (and not a bar to merely filing a charge sheet), the sanctioning authority requires an independent review of all collected investigative material under Section 45(2) to apply its mind - Where the prosecution requires additional time to collate retrieved scientific data to present a complete report before the sanctioning authority, such grounds cannot be discarded as invalid or flimsy - The High Court erred in holding that awaiting sanction was the sole reason accepted and thereby invalidating the extension order - Since the order dated 18.01.2023 granting a valid 15-day extension was lawful and within the statutory framework of Section 43D(2)(b), the accused acquired no indefeasible right to default bail under the first proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC upon the expiry of earlier periods - the charge sheet having been filed within the extended timeframe. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, (2024) 2 SCC 632; State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik Gadling, (2019) 5 SCC 178; Judgebir Singh @ Jasbir Singh Samra v. National Investigation Agency, (2023) 17 SCC 48; Paras 26 – 35] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021