When Can A Probationer's Termination Be Considered Punitive? Supreme Court Explains
| The Court said that terminating a probationer is not punitive merely because it follows complaints about the employee's conduct.
The Supreme Court on Monday (November 16) held that an employee working on probation can be terminated from service based on an inquiry or a complaint that the employee is unsuitable for confirmation in service, and such termination cannot be challenged as 'punitive' merely because of the non-assignment of grounds for termination. Only when the termination order specifies more than imputing unsuitability for the post in question, i.e., alleges misconduct, can the order be considered to be punitive and prone to be challenged.
“…if the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for deciding to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive; however, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice.”, the Court observed.
A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu dismissed an appeal filed by one Dr. G Srinivasan, who, being appointed on a probation period as an Associate Professor at the Centre for Earth Sciences funded by the Union Government, was aggrieved by his termination order which simply recorded his unsuitability for confirmation in service due to his inability to fraternise with his co-workers.
Challenging the termination order, the Appellant moved to the Karnataka High Court, which resulted in dismissal by both the Single Bench and the Division Bench, prompting him to move to the Supreme Court.
The bone of the Appellant's contention was that the termination order was stigmatic and passed without allowing him to be heard.
The Respondent Institute, with which he was employed, supported the termination, citing that no adverse remarks or imputation were labelled in the termination order against the Appellant to treat it as a stigmatic/punitive order affecting the career of the Appellant. According to the Institute, since the Scheme, Regulations and Bye Laws of the Institute permit a simple termination without assigning any reasons, a mere recording of an unsuitability based on a complaint would only be a motive, and not the foundation detailing the reasons in a simple termination order.
Finding force in the Institute's submission, the judgment authored by Justice Datta upheld the termination order, noting that the termination order does not attribute any misconduct or moral turpitude to the appellant.
“The decision of the Institute not to retain the appellant in service followed an assessment of suitability during probation and was not an order imposing punishment disguised as a simple termination.”, the Court said.
“Mere use of a word like 'unsatisfactory' or 'unsuitable' does not amount to stigma. The taint of stigma gains traction where the order imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. To separate the grain from the chaff, three questions in sequence need to be answered. First, does the order on its face, carry any imputation against the probationer? Second, if the order is innocuous on its face, does the material placed disclose that the foundation thereof is a finding of misconduct and not a mere assessment of suitability? Third, does that foundation, in substance, visit the probationer with civil consequences likely to affect his prospects of future employment? Only if the answers to both the second and third questions are in the affirmative does the taint of stigma gain traction. A grievance, a complaint, or an adverse perception, without more, remains chaff.”, the Court explained.
According to the Court, while examining an order discharging a probationer, when challenged on the ground that it is punitive, the inquiry of the court ought to be structured around the following parameters:
"a. Object and purpose of probation — At the beginning of our judgment, we referred to Ajit Singh (supra). The said decision clarifies the objective behind probationary employment and the purpose it seeks to serve. Probation is a period of trial to assess an employee's suitability. Such a period is meant to give time and afford the employer an opportunity to assess the suitability of an employee vis-à-vis the post to which he is appointed. This enables the employer to decide on the retention of the employee assessed to be suitable by confirming him in service, while weeding out any undesirable employee by ordering his discharge without holding a formal inquiry, should his credentials and performance at the time of appointment prove to be deceptive.
b. The contours and limits of veil lifting — Since weeding out an undesirable employee for unsuitability ordinarily carries with it no stigma, lifting of the veil to look into the background file is neither necessary nor permissible. However, should the facts of a particular case so warrant, it would be permissible to lift the veil to examine the true nature of the order only within the circumscribed limits necessary to ascertain whether the alleged unsuitability is the real ground or merely a cloak for a punitive action founded on a specific misconduct, but not to re-appreciate suitability.
c. The motive-foundation test as a substantive, and not a mechanical, inquiry — The distinction between 'motive' and 'foundation', however, does not admit of a purely mechanical application. The motive foundation distinction has to turn on the substance of the record as a whole, and not merely the form of the order; and, therefore, necessarily involves a measure of judicial assessment of whether 'misconduct' was the 'motive' or the 'foundation'. This requires a reading of the entire record, and in that reading some element of a Judge's individual perception as to what is 'motive' and what constitutes 'foundation' inevitably enters - what to one mind appears as the mere occasion for examining the probationer's suitability may appear to another as the very foundation of the order. The Court must, therefore, not look merely at the words of the order or the language employed therein, but at whether any alleged misconduct was the trigger for it or the ground of condemnation itself.
d. Demarcating stigma from mere administrative assessment — It cannot be gainsaid that termination of a probationer's service by ordering his discharge by an ostensibly innocuous/non-stigmatic order, whatever the language used, imports an element of unsuitability either on account of ineptitude or misconduct or moral turpitude or otherwise. However, the implicit unsuitability, even if explicit in the termination order, does not make it stigmatic, thereby converting a simple termination into a punitive order. Mere use of a word like 'unsatisfactory' or 'unsuitable' does not amount to stigma. The taint of stigma gains traction where the order imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. To separate the grain from the chaff, three questions in sequence need to be answered. First, does the order on its face, carry any imputation against the probationer? Second, if the order is innocuous on its face, does the material placed disclose that the foundation thereof is a finding of misconduct and not a mere assessment of suitability? Third, does that foundation, in substance, visit the probationer with civil consequences likely to affect his prospects of future employment? Only if the answers to both the second and third questions are in the affirmative does the taint of stigma gain traction. A grievance, a complaint, or an adverse perception, without more, remains chaff.
e. The scope and bounds of the Pavanendra test — it is the aforesaid three-stage filter to discern stigma that Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra) must be understood to embody. Notably, the test laid down in paragraph 21 thereof has neither been overruled nor doubted in any subsequent decision of this Court. It continues to be applied as one of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether, in substance, an order of termination is punitive. Since the test is stated to be “one” of the judicially evolved tests, it is not exhaustive and is to be read along with the stigma test in paragraph 29 of the same judgment and the object of inquiry test.
f. The final inquiry — The inquiry, therefore, is not whether the order is innocuous in form but whether, on a fair reading of the record as a whole, the termination was the outcome of a bona fide assessment of suitability, or a punishment for a specific act visited without the protection of an inquiry. If it is the former, the order must stand as termination simpliciter; if the latter, it cannot survive without compliance with due process – where Article 311(2) of the Constitution applies, by an inquiry thereunder, and in other cases, by an inquiry in accordance with the applicable service rules and the principles of natural justice."
Applying the law, the Court observed:
“…nothing therein persuades us to conclude that the decision to discontinue the appellant's services was founded upon any specific charge of misconduct or was intended to visit him with a punishment. The material on record, viewed as a whole, indicates that the Institute assessed the appellant's suitability for continuation in service during the probationary period.”
The appeal was dismissed.
Appearance:
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv. Mr. Shailesh Kumar Sinha, Adv. Mr. Suman Kumar, Adv. Mr. Amartya Bhushan, Adv. Mr. Shubhanshu Singh, Adv. Ms. Swantika Rajvanshi, Adv. Mr. Shashwat Dubey, Adv. Ms. Shefali Singh, Adv. Ms. Vandana, Adv. Mr. Ram Lal Roy, AOR
For Respondent(s) :Mr. S. S. Ramdas, Sr. Adv. Mr. Shanthkumar Mahale, Sr. Adv. Mr. Pradeep Sawkar, Adv. Ms. Jahanvi Malik, Adv. Mr. Shreyas Shanth Mahale, Adv. Mr. Madhvender Singh, Adv. Mr. Harisha S. R., AOR Mr. Ankit Anandraj Shah, AOR Mr. Syed Kashif Ali, Adv. Mr. Ankit Kumar Tiwari, Adv. Ms. Samiksha Yadav, Adv.