“Courtroom Most Profound Classroom”: Justice Vinod Chandran Dissents On Relaxing 3 Year Practice Rule For Judicial Service

Justice K Vinod Chandran has dissented from the Supreme Court judgment modifying the three-year practice requirement and reducing it to one year for recruitment as Civil Judge (Junior Division), holding that there was no ground to review the earlier judgment restoring the requirement.

Describing the courtroom as “the most profound of all classrooms”, Justice Chandran disagreed with the decision to replace the three-year practice requirement with a transitional arrangement of one year of deemed practice followed by one year each of training and law clerkship.

“The forensic and analytical skills of an adjudicator are better learnt in the profession by observing what happens in the Courts; not necessarily as a Presiding Officer controlling it, but as a keen and eager student of law; the Court room being the most profound of all classrooms. A Presiding Officer's mistake puts to peril a litigant, and her remedy is only by way of an appeal. A lawyer's mistake can be remedied by an experienced Presiding Officer, a seasoned Senior or an astute colleague, or even by a ministerial staff of the Court with first-hand experience of the proceedings. The requirement of experience is the need of the hour and essential in the immediate future, otherwise we would be accused of creating a cadre of careerists rather than of jurists capable of enriching a robust system, alive to the needs of the nation, society and its people”, the observed.

Justice Chandran also rejected the argument that the practice rule is futile as three years of practice did not equip young lawyers for judicial service because fledgling lawyers may not initially be entrusted with briefs or have opportunities to argue in court.

He pointed out that this contention raises a question on suitability of fresh lawyers being given decision-making responsibilities. “The question that arises immediately is that when a senior lawyer or litigant would not entrust a case to a lawyer who is fresh out of college, will it be safe to entrust such persons with the decision-making process in a case; when even legal services require an amount of experience to ensure; not mere representation, but quality assistance”, he highlighted.

Supporting the 3-year practice requirement, he emphasised that the initial years of practice involved much more than conducting trials or making arguments. A young lawyer learns by working with seniors, handling files, interacting with other lawyers and observing court proceedings, he observed, adding that drafting, research, cross-examination and formulating arguments were among the skills acquired through such experience.

Justice Chandran further disagreed with equating judicial service with other public services such as the IAS, IPS and IFS. He highlighted that judicial officers exercise adjudicatory powers without supervisory interference in their judicial acts, with errors being corrected through appeals, revisions or the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction. For this reason, he said judicial service could not be equated with other public services in the context of recruitment requirements.

He also questioned the two-year training arrangement prescribed by the majority. He noted that requiring new recruits to undergo two years of training would mean that they would continue for two years on half the pay of a Civil Judge (Junior Division), while the period would not be reckoned as service. He opined that this would prejudice new recruits and place a strain on the exchequer, while vacancies in the judiciary would remain unfilled during the training period.

He further objected to making regular appointment dependent on the satisfaction of the High Court judge supervising the law clerkship, observing that this could create another hurdle in the transition from training to active service. He also pointed to the possibility of two classes of candidates emerging from the same recruitment process, with some having one year of practice and others having two, three or more years.

Justice Chandran agreed with the majority that some prior experience of court functioning was desirable for judicial recruits but said he could not agree with the structured two-year training program adopted by the majority. He observed that the 2025 judgment had been based on the views of a vast majority of High Courts and States, which had supported prior experience at the Bar.

He stressed that experience at the Bar was essential for law graduates “steeped in academics” to understand the affairs of people and the difficulties faced by litigants before deciding their cases. He also rejected criticism that the High Courts' views were based on anecdotal observations, prejudices and subjective reviews, pointing out that High Courts exercise administrative control over the District Judiciary and regularly assess the performance of judicial officers.

The three-year practice requirement had been removed by a three-judge bench in the 2002 All India Judges Association judgment and restored by another three-judge bench in 2025. Justice Chandran rejected the argument that the subsequent decision could not have altered the earlier judgment because it was a Coordinate Bench holding that this argument was “outrightly fallacious”.

“Quite attractive, in the normal circumstances, but outrightly fallacious in the scenario of a 'continuing mandamus'. The 1st All India Judges' Association v. Union of India case [(1992) 1 SCC 119] also decided by a three-judge bench; issued directions to improve the conditions of service of the judicial officers, found necessary to maintain independence of the judiciary”, he said.

He concluded that there was no scope for review of the earlier judgment and dismissed the review petitions.

Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - The Supreme Court had, vide its Judgment dated 20.05.2025 in All India Judges Association v. Union of India(Judgment under Review), restored the mandatory requirement of a minimum 3 years' practice at the Bar to be eligible to appear for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination - On review and clarification petitions, the Court examined the disproportionate impact and hardship caused to law graduates, women, and marginalized candidates due to the abrupt restoration of the 3-year practice rule - Held (per Surya Kant, CJI. and Augustine George Masih, J) - While the institutional necessity for prior exposure to court functioning before assuming judicial office is neither unreasonable nor displaced, the 3-year practice requirement cannot be applied in a manner that abruptly excludes candidates who arranged their careers under the pre-existing regime - The judgment under review stands modified to balance practical readiness with intellectual merit by prescribing a phased transitional model and a restructured post-transitional framework.

Key Holdings & Scheme Framed By Majority – i. Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued after 20.05.2025 up to 31.03.2027) - Deemed Practice Exemption - All law graduates are eligible to apply without having to satisfy the 3-year actual bar practice requirement. Candidates are deemed to have completed one year of active practice, and no separate Certificate of Practice is required for this deemed period - Two-Year Training & Clerkship Model - Selected candidates shall be designated as "Trainee Judicial Officers"and must complete - Compulsory 1 year of intensive training at the State Judicial Academy (treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar) with fixed emoluments equal to half the salary of a Judicial Magistrate First Class - Compulsory 1 year of structured Law Clerkship (6 months under a Principal District/District and Sessions Judge or Higher Judicial Service Member, and 6 months under a sitting High Court Judge), also treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar - Confirmation: Trainee Judicial Officers shall be appointed to regular cadres carrying full pay scales only upon a satisfactory, reasoned evaluation report submitted by the supervising High Court Judge - ii. Post-Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued on or after 01.04.2027) - 1-Year Actual Practice Mandatory: Candidates must possess at least 1 year of actual practice in the District Courts, verified through a Certificate of Practice showing recorded presence and participation in effective judicial proceedings - Subsequent Training: Selected candidates must undergo 1 year of institutional training at the State Judicial Academy, followed by 6 months of Law Clerkship in District Courts and 6 months of Law Clerkship under a sitting High Court Judge - iii. Higher Legal Education Not Countable as Practice - The duration spent pursuing higher legal education (LL.M., etc.) cannot be counted towards the mandatory practice requirement, as it does not foster the requisite familiarity with courtroom processes and practical court functioning - iv. Operation & Review of the Scheme - The scheme shall operate for five years, following which empirical data regarding its efficacy, recruitment quality, and officer performance shall be placed before the Supreme Court for reconsideration. [Relied on Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481; All India Judges Association v. Union of India (Judgment under Review / 6th AIJA Case), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184; Paras 58–80]

Dissenting Opinion (Per K. Vinod Chandran, J.) - No Ground for Review - There is no error apparent on the face of the record to warrant reviewing the well-considered judgment restoring the 3-year practice requirement - Impracticability of the Two Year Training Model - Requiring candidates to undergo two years of post-selection training/clerkship on half-pay prejudices recruits, creates unviable financial and administrative burdens on the exchequer, and leaves courts undermanned - making confirmation contingent on the subjective satisfaction of a High Court Judge creates arbitrary hurdles and results in disparate classes of recruits - Distinction from Civil Services - Judicial service cannot be equated with executive services like IAS/IPS; judicial officers exercise unhindered adjudicatory discretion from day one without hierarchical supervisory control over their judicial decisions - Courtroom practice is irreplaceable by pre-service training. [Paras 4-10]

Case no. – W.P.(C) No. 001110 / 2025 and connected cases

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841

Case Title – Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and connected cases

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