Delayed Justice, Defeated Democracy: A Decade-Long Verdict On Supreme Court's Failings

The Wound That Democracy Cannot Afford

There is a recurring tragedy in Indian constitutional jurisprudence, one that wears the respectable garb of due process, shelter in the labyrinthine corridors of procedural complexity, and ultimately emerges, years later, as a verdict that is legally sound but democratically meaningless. The tragedy has a name: judicial delay in electoral and constitutional disputes. And its most troubling dimension is not that it happens, but that the institution most constitutionally obligated to prevent it , the Supreme Court of India , has, in a pattern too consistent to be coincidental, been a participant in it.

The Madras High Court's June 2026 judgment in the Radhapuram election petition, delivered by Justice G. Jayachandran, has brought this pattern into unprecedented public focus. In declaring former Tamil Nadu Assembly Speaker M. Appavu as the rightful winner of the 2016 Radhapuram constituency elections by a margin of 109 votes , the court also delivered something rarer: a High Court judgment that gently, respectfully, but unmistakably holds the Supreme Court of India accountable. It is perhaps a first for India.

It should not have had to be.

The Statutory Command: Six Months, Not Six Years

The Representation of the People Act, 1951 is unambiguous. Section 86(7) commands that every election petition "shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months." The Supreme Court itself, in Mohd. Akbar v. Ashok Sahu and Others (2015), reaffirmed this mandate, expressing deep concern that election disputes are rarely resolved during the tenure of the winning candidate, thereby reducing adjudication to, in its own words, "a mockery of justice."

In the Radhapuram case, the High Court had ordered a recount by October 4, 2019. The results were in. The numbers spoke clearly. But on the very same day, the Supreme Court entertained an SLP against the recount order, stayed the declaration of results, and kept the matter pending for nearly six years , through two subsequent state assembly elections (2021 and 2026). When the SLP was finally disposed of on May 21, 2026, the Court cited lapse of time and expiry of the assembly term. It left the core legal question as to whether Headmasters of Middle Schools are gazetted officers for the purpose of attesting postal ballots but entirely unanswered.

Justice Jayachandran's observation was surgical in its restraint: "The Hon'ble Apex Court should have answered this question since this Court has already, as Court of first instance/trial Court, given a finding in respect of the above question." The mandate contained in Section 86(7), the judge noted with deliberate precision, had been "conveniently ignored by the Apex Court."

Radhapuram is not an aberration. It is a symptom. To understand the disease, one must examine the pattern.

A Pattern Across India: When Justice Arrived Too Late

The Arunachal Pradesh Crisis (2016): Restoration Without Meaning:

In late 2015, Arunachal Pradesh was plunged into a constitutional crisis when rebel Congress MLAs, with the Governor's controversial backing, destabilised the Nabam Tuki government. The matter reached the Supreme Court, which referred it to a five-judge Constitution Bench. The bench began hearing the case in February 2016 by which time President's Rule had been imposed, a new government under Kalikho Pul had been sworn in, and five months of governance had passed under a dispensation whose constitutional legitimacy was under active judicial scrutiny.

On July 13, 2016, the Constitution Bench unanimously held that the Governor's actions were unconstitutional and ordered restoration of the Nabam Tuki government. It was a landmark ruling in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly (2016). But the clock had not been stopped. Three days after being constitutionally restored as Chief Minister, Nabam Tuki resigned unable to prove majority in an Assembly where political ground had shifted irreversibly during the months the court deliberated.

The legal correctness of the judgment was unimpeachable. Its democratic utility, by the time it was delivered, had been reduced to near zero. The Supreme Court's own commentary in subsequent cases has acknowledged that such delays allow "engineered majorities to rule without any checks." The Arunachal example demonstrated, with painful clarity, that a court that is right too late is, for practical purposes, wrong.

The Maharashtra Shiv Sena Defection (2022–2024): Democracy Held Hostage

The most consequential example of delay-as-democratic-erosion in recent Indian history is the Maharashtra Shiv Sena imbroglio. In June 2022, rebel MLAs led by Eknath Shinde broke away from the Uddhav Thackeray-led Shiv Sena. On June 27, 2022, a Supreme Court vacation bench granted Shinde's group an extraordinary 12 days of "breathing time" to respond to disqualification notices — nearly double the standard seven days. The floor test was not stayed. Uddhav Thackeray resigned without facing it. A new government was sworn in within days.

The core constitutional questions, whether the defecting MLAs were liable for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, whether the Governor's invitation to Shinde to form the government was constitutionally valid, and whether disqualification petitions should have been decided before a new government was allowed to consolidate — were referred to a three-judge bench, then a five-judge Constitution Bench, which reserved judgment in March 2023 and delivered it in May 2023.

The Constitution Bench, in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023), found the Governor's action constitutionally improper. It held that disqualification petitions must be decided by the Speaker expeditiously. But it declined to restore the Thackeray government, observing that this was not possible given subsequent developments. The disqualification petitions themselves were remitted to the Speaker, who ultimately in January 2024, ruled that Shinde's faction represented the "real Shiv Sena."

Nearly two years had passed. A government whose constitutional birth the Supreme Court found flawed had governed Maharashtra through that entire period, made appointments, signed contracts, and fundamentally altered the political landscape. The judicial verdict arrived after the political verdict had become irreversible. The democratic mandate of Maharashtrians had been kept alive on a constitutional ventilator while the operation was performed, only for the theatre to be told the patient had already walked out.

Telangana MLC Nominations, The Dasoju Sravan Saga (2023–2026): Constitutional Office in Legal Limbo

The Telangana Legislative Council nominations case is a study in how judicial delay can reduce a constitutional appointment to a prolonged political football. The BRS government under K. Chandrasekhar Rao had recommended Dasoju Sravan Kumar and Kurra Satyanarayana as MLCs under the Governor's quota in 2023. The then Governor rejected their nominations, citing their political affiliation, a ground that, as the Telangana High Court correctly held in March 2024, was constitutionally impermissible, since the Governor is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in such matters.

The High Court not only quashed the Governor's rejection but also set aside the subsequent Congress government's nominees, Prof. M. Kodandaram and Amer Ali Khan as MLCs. The matter came to the Supreme Court in August 2024. The Court (Civil Appeal Nos. 14172–14173/2024) stayed the High Court judgment but clarified that any nominations made in the interim would remain subject to its final verdict. Kodandaram and Amer Ali Khan were nonetheless sworn in as MLCs. The BRS nominees whose legal right to nomination has prima facie been upheld by the High Court remained in constitutional limbo. As of April 2026, the matter was adjourned again to July 22, 2026.

The consequence is a Legislative Council that functions with members whose appointments are under active judicial challenge, while the original nominees whose claim the High Court validated have been waiting since 2023. Three years. Two governments. Four Governors. One constitutional question is still unanswered.

Telangana Anti-Defection: The Speaker's Inaction, the Court's Warning

Even more recently, in the case of BRS MLAs who defected to the Congress in 2023, the Telangana Assembly Speaker sat on disqualification petitions for over eleven months before even issuing notices and only after the Supreme Court took cognizance. In the landmark ruling of Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025), the Supreme Court found the Speaker's conduct "lackadaisical" and warned that such inaction amounts to playing "a fraud on democracy."

Most significantly, Chief Justice B.R. Gavai's bench articulated what has now become the most memorable formulation of the judicial delay problem in Indian electoral law: the court said it could not permit a situation of "operation successful but patient dead" where allowing disqualification petitions to remain pending through an entire assembly term lets defectors reap the full benefit of their constitutional transgression.

This phrase, coined by the Supreme Court itself, is a devastatingly accurate self-description of what happened in Radhapuram, Maharashtra, Arunachal Pradesh, and Telangana.

The Supreme Court's Own Medicine: Prescribed for Others, Not Taken Itself

The Supreme Court's record as a prescriber of institutional discipline for others is impressive. In the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay matter, it directed those criminal trials against sitting and former legislators be concluded within one year of charge framing, conducted on a day-to-day basis where possible. The Supreme Court has separately constituted Arrears Committees, mandated High Court monitoring, and required web-based dashboards for case tracking to address trial pendency.

These are sound, necessary, and commendable institutional prescriptions. But a prescription written by a physician who does not follow it himself carries little moral authority. With over 81,000 pending cases as of April 2025 of which more than 40% of legislator-related matters have been pending for over five years , the Supreme Court cannot credibly demand expeditious disposal from forums below it while granting itself unlimited procedural latitude.

The Radhapuram SLP, entertained in 2019, sat on the court's board through at least six Chief Justiceships. In the Maharashtra case, two full years elapsed between the political crisis and the Constitution Bench's final word. The Dasoju Sravan matter has now entered its third year. In none of these cases was the delay caused by complexity of evidence or witnesses. These were pure constitutional questions , the kind that a well-resourced apex court should be uniquely equipped to decide swiftly.

It is important, in the interest of institutional balance, to acknowledge the genuine constraints. The Supreme Court operates under crushing institutional pressure: a sanctioned strength that has remained inadequate relative to filing volumes, a docket that covers everything from habeas corpus to complex commercial arbitrations, and a constitutional framework that makes it the court of final resort for a nation of 1.4 billion people. These are real constraints, and any critique that ignores them is itself intellectually dishonest.

But constraint explains; it does not excuse. And when the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly identified expeditious disposal of electoral matters as a constitutional imperative, indeed, a democratic necessity the standard to which it holds itself must be no lower than the standard it imposes on others.

Reforms That Can No Longer Wait

The pattern demands structural response, not seasonal handwringing. The following reforms are both constitutionally sound and practically urgent:

1. A permanent Electoral and Constitutional Disputes Bench — dedicated exclusively to election petitions, disqualification proceedings, and Governor-related constitutional questions, with strict internal timelines that mirror Section 86(7).

2. Mandatory SLP/Appeal timelines in electoral matters — any SLP/ statutory appeal challenging an election petition order to be listed, heard, and decided within 90 days, with automatic vacation of stay if this timeline is breached without a speaking order.

3. Obligation to answer substantial questions of law — when a case is disposed of as infructuous, the Supreme Court must nonetheless render findings on questions of law that carry prospective importance. The headmaster-gazetted officer question in Radhapuram is a perfect illustration: it will arise again in the next election. Silence now is merely delay deferred.

4. Legislative strengthening — the pending amendment to replace "endeavour shall be made" in Section 86(7) with "shall be concluded" must be enacted without further delay, and extended explicitly to appellate proceedings before the Supreme Court.

5. Institutional transparency — a publicly accessible, periodically updated register of all pending SLPs in election matters, including date of filing, stay orders in force, and reason for adjournments.

The Republic Cannot Afford Pyrrhic Verdicts

The Supreme Court of India has, over the decades, shown that it can rise to the moment when the nation needs it most. Its judgments have saved lives, protected individual freedom, reined in executive overreach, and defended minorities against the tyranny of the majority. That record stands and deserves respect. But a different question presses itself here: can a court that performs brilliantly in landmark constitutional cases be allowed to lag and drift when it comes to something as basic and as vital to democracy , as resolving election disputes on time?

Justice Jayachandran's warning that India risks going "the way of other autocratic countries which gained Independence around 75 years ago, along with us" is not mere rhetoric. It is a constitutional alarm. When voters' mandates are adjudicated after the mandate has expired, when defectors govern for full terms before disqualification is even decided, when MLCs are sworn in whose appointments are legally challenged for years without resolution, democracy does not end with a coup. It quietly drains away, verdict by delayed verdict, adjournment by adjournment, SLP by SLP.

The Supreme Court's own phrase "operation successful, patient dead" must not become the epitaph of Indian electoral justice. The Court has the power, the authority, and, one hopes, the institutional will to ensure it does not.

The voters of Radhapuram waited a decade. India's democracy cannot keep waiting.

Author is a former Senior Editor, The Economic Times, and is currently practicing as an advocate at the Telangana High Court. Views are personal.