S 156(3) CrPC Order Is Pre-Cognizance Step, Sanction Under S 197 CrPC Not Required At That Stage: Supreme Court

A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta held so while hearing a batch of appeals filed against a Karnataka High Court judgment which had quashed an FIR registered against certain police officials on a private complaint filed by the appellant.

The case of appellant is that subsequent to a business dispute with his former business partner, he was falsely implicated in a criminal case, illegally detained, and coerced by police officials into signing documents relinquishing his business interests. Subsequent to these instances, he filed complaints before the local police, and eventually to the Director General (DG) and Inspector General of Police (IGP). All of these complaints went unheeded. Later, he filed a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC (now Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Magistrate directed registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC against four police officials and some other persons.

The concerned police officials approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) seeking quashing of the FIR. The High Court quashed the proceedings on the grounds that prosecution required prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC since they had acted in discharge of official duty, and that the appellant (complainant) had violated the guidelines laid down in Priyanka Srivastava v State of Uttar Pradesh, by directly approaching the Magistrate without first exhausting the remedies under Section 154 CrPC before the police.

Aggrieved by the High Court's ruling, the complainant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's view as regards sanction under Section 197 CrPC was “per se erroneous.” Referring to Section 197(1), the Court explained that the provision comes into play only when a court is to take cognizance of an offence, and does not apply at the stage of registering an FIR or conducting investigation.

Relying on Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India and State of Karnataka v Pastor P Raju, the Court reiterated as follows:

“The requirement of sanction is, therefore, a condition precedent only for taking cognizance and not for the registration of an FIR or for the conduct of investigation. Any interpretation that makes the registration of an FIR contingent upon prior sanction would invert this statutory scheme and render the provisions relating to investigation unworkable.”

The bench held that the process of criminal law is sequential as information of a cognizable offence, registration of FIR, filing of police report, and it is only thereafter that the question of sanction and cognizance arises. Since the Magistrate's order in this case was passed under Section 156(3) CrPC and did not amount to taking cognizance, the absence of sanction could not have been a ground to quash the FIR at that stage.

With regards to the non-compliance with the mandate laid down in Priyanka Srivastava, it noted that the petitioner (complainant) had repeatedly approached the local police to register his complaint, and upon inaction, escalated the matter first to the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) by email and thereafter to the DG and IGP, before finally approaching the Magistrate.

The bench observed that since the very allegations were directed against police officials, insisting on a mechanical, formal representation specifically addressed to the Superintendent of Police (SP) under Section 154(3) CrPC (now Section 173(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) despite the complainant having already approached superior police authorities, would be putting form over substance. It, thus, observed as follows:

“The ratio of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) has to be understood in the light of the mischief which the said decision sought to curb. The law is governed by reason, and a judicial direction intended to prevent abuse of a statutory remedy cannot be applied in a manner which defeats the very purpose for which the safeguard was evolved. Where the complainant has, in substance, approached the police authorities and thereafter pursued the matter before superior police authorities, the inference of a direct and casual invocation of Section 156(3) CrPC, without first giving the police an opportunity to act, would not arise. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the object underlying the directions issued by this Court in Priyanka Srivastava (supra), namely, to ensure that the extraordinary remedy under Section 156(3) CrPC is not invoked without first approaching the police authorities, stood substantially fulfilled.”

The bench held that the object of the Priyanka Srivastava guidelines to prevent casual or mechanical invocation of Section 156(3) CrPC without first approaching the police, stood substantially fulfilled in the facts of the case.

In the aforesaid, the Supreme Court held that both grounds relied upon by the High Court to quash the FIR were unsustainable in law. It, therefore, set aside the High Court's judgment and directed that the final report earlier submitted be reopened, and that investigation resume from that stage in accordance with law.

“35. The impugned order does not stand to scrutiny and is hereby set aside. Pursuant to the impugned order passed by the High Court, the Investigating Agency had submitted the Final Report on 20th September, 2023, wherein the proceedings against accused No.4 and accused Nos.8 to 11, i.e., the respondents herein, were recorded closed purely as a consequence to quashing of the proceedings by the High Court. Insofar as the other accused are concerned, the Final Report records that the dispute between the parties was essentially civil in nature and that no evidence was found to substantiate the allegations.

36. As a sequitur to the impugned judgment being set aside, the Final Report shall be reopened and the investigation shall be resumed from the stage at which the Final Report was submitted, in accordance with law.”

Further, the bench clarified on the mandate of sanction for prosecution in case the allegations are found to be true. “Needless to say, the desirability of seeking sanction shall be kept in mind by the Investigating Officer in case the offences are found proved, and it is concluded that the acts alleged against the official respondents were done in the discharge of their official duties,” it clarified.

Case: Sri Anumandala Rajesh Reddy v State of Karnataka & Anr.

Appearance:

For Petitioner: Mr. Nikhil Goel, Sr. Adv.; M/s Venkat Palwai Law Associates, AOR; Mr. P. Venkat Reddy, Adv.; Mr. Prashant Kumar Tyagi, Adv.; Mr. P. Srinivas Reddy, Adv.; Mr. Adithya Koshy Roy, Adv.; Mr. P.V. Narsimha Reddy, Adv.

For Respondent: Mr. Avishkar Singhvi, AAG; Mr. Sanchit Garga, AOR; Mr. Naved Ahmed, Adv.; Mr. Kunal Rana, Adv.; Mr. Shashwat Jaiswal, Adv.; Ms. Diksha Arora, Adv.; Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, Adv.; Mr. Vijender Kumar, Adv.Mr. Gaurav Agarwal, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Divyanshu Kumar Srivastava, AOR; Mr. Alok Nayak, Adv.; Mr. Shivam Nagpal, Adv.; Ms. Rasika Jalan, Adv.