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The Supreme Court today (24 September) has held that the constitutional protection under Article 311(1) of the Constitution is attracted only when the removing authority is subordinate in rank to the authority that made the appointment. It was also held that mere delegation of disciplinary powers to a subordinate officer under statutory rules does not trigger the constitutional bar. For context, Article 311(1) bars dismissal or removal of a civil servant by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him.

A bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Vipul M Pancholi observed so while setting aside concurrent findings of the Allahabad High Court and the first appellate court which had held that the removal of a Railway Protection Special Force (RPSF) Rakshak was unconstitutional.

The respondent was issued a call letter in May 1979 by the Commandant, RPSF (Gorakhpur), asking him to report for initial training for the post of Rakshak. The call letter made his appointment expressly conditional upon successful completion of the training. Upon completion of training, a Battalion Order was issued by the Assistant Commandant in December 1979, appointing him and other recruits as Rakshaks with effect from the date and posting them to their respective battalions. A subsequent Battalion Order reaffirmed the December 1979 appointment in February 1980.

Later, the respondent overstayed his sanctioned leave for 72 days. A chargesheet was issued to him under Rule 44 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, and after an ex-parte departmental enquiry, the Adjutant passed an order in March 1983 removing him from service. His departmental appeal was rejected in 1984.

The respondent challenged his removal in a civil suit, contending that since he had been appointed by the Commandant/Chief Security Officer by the 1979 call letter, his removal by the Adjutant violated Article 311(1) as the Adjutant is subordinate officer. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the first appellate court reversed the finding, holding the removal unconstitutional. Subsequently, the Allahabad High Court also affirmed the ruling in a second appeal in 2023.

Aggrieved by the High Court's ruling, the Union government (appellant) approached the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, the Additional Solicitor General Vikramjit Banerjee argued for the appellant that the 1979 call letter was merely a direction to report for training and did not constitute an appointment order, since there was no provision under the RPSF framework to appoint staff prior to completion of training. It was contended that the actual appointment order was the Battalion Order of December 1979 issued by the Assistant Commandant. It was also submitted that under Rule 20 read with Schedule I, the Assistant Security Officer/Assistant Commandant was competent to appoint Rakshaks, and equally competent under Rule 43 read with Schedule II to remove them.

Per contra, the respondent argued that the 1979 call letter itself constituted the appointment, and the 1979 Battalion Order was merely a posting order issued after training. Relying on Krishna Kumar v Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, it was submitted that since the Commandant was the appointing authority, the Adjutant being subordinate could not have validly removed him. It was also argued that the enquiry was vitiated as the respondent was undergoing medical treatment and could not participate in the departmental proceedings.

Perusing the two documents, the Supreme Court held that the distinction between them was material. The 1979 call letter “did not contain an unconditional declaration that the respondent stood appointed as a regular Rakshak, however, it expressly made the proposed appointment conditional upon successful completion of initial training.” On the contrary, the Battalion Order recorded that upon successful completion of training the recruits “were appointed as RK.” On this, the bench held that the respondent's contention that the Battalion Order “was merely a posting order is misplaced, because an order may validly operate as both an order of appointment and an order of posting.”

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appointment of the respondent as a regular Rakshak was made by the Assistant Commandant, and not the Commandant/Chief Security Officer.

Examining Sections 6 and 9 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, along with Rules 20 and 43 and Schedules I and II of the RPF Rules 1959, the Court held that while overall control of appointments rests with the Chief Security Officer, the proviso to Section 6 expressly permits other superior officers to exercise appointing powers, and the Rules specifically empower the Assistant Security Officer to appoint and remove Rakshaks and Senior Rakshaks. The Court referred to its decision in Union of India v Chandra Pal Pandey, which had held that the expression “shall rest” in Section 6 conveys only “overall control,” and does not exclusively vest the power of appointment in the Chief Security Officer alone.

Applying the principle from Krishna Kumar that delegation of appointing power does not alter the hierarchical rank of delegate, the bench held that since the Adjutant who passed the removal order was not subordinate in rank to the Assistant Commandant who had appointed the respondent, and was in fact competent under Schedule II of the Rules to impose the penalty of removal, the constitutional bar under Article 311(1) was never attracted.

“The constitutional prohibition contained in Article 311(1) is attracted only where the order of dismissal or removal is passed by an authority/subordinate in rank to the authority by which the employee was appointed, whereas, this essential ingredient of Article 311 is absent in the facts of the present case,” the bench held.

The Court also rejected the respondent's contention that the ex-parte departmental enquiry violated natural justice, noting that he had acknowledged the chargesheet, submitted a response, and was informed of the enquiry date, but did not appear, following which the enquiry proceeded ex-parte and a show-cause notice was issued before the removal order was passed. The bench held that “the departmental inquiry cannot be held to be vitiated merely on the ground that it proceeded ex-parte and therefore, the contention raised by respondent alleging violation of the principles of natural justice is rejected.”

In the aforesaid, the Supreme Court held that both the first appellate court and the High Court had erred in treating the 1979 call letter as the appointment order. It, thus, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the first appellate court, restoring the judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit.

Applying the above, the order of removal of the respondent was restored.

Case: Union of India & Ors v Ramdhani Prasad

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 983

Appearance:

For Appellants: Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, Ld., ASG; Mr. Amrish Kumar, AOR; Ms. Vaishali Verma, Adv.; Mr. Harish Panday, Adv.; Mr. Shashwat Parihar, Adv.; Mr. Nring Chamwibo Zeliang, Adv.; Ms. Prabhati Nayak, Adv.; Dr Arun Kumar Yadav, Adv.

For Respondent: Mr. Aviral Kashyap, AOR; Mr. Mananjay Mishra, Adv.

Click Here To Read/Download Order


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