Corporal Punishment Not Offence Under POCSO Act: Supreme Court Quashes Case Against Teacher
The Court however criticised the teacher's conduct, terming it inappropriate and insensitive towards girl students.
The Supreme Court has recently quashed a case registered under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), against a school teacher accused of aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. The case was quashed, holding that his conduct of resorting to corporal punishment, though inappropriate and insensitive, did not disclose sexual intent necessary to constitute the offence. It also observed that an eventual acquittal would be “wholly inadequate” to undo the damage caused by the prosecution itself, and will have irreversible stigma on a teacher.
A bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S Chandurkar was hearing an appeal against a Calcutta High Court (Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri) order, which had refused to quash the proceedings under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS, earlier Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973).
An FIR was registered against the appellant under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, after female teachers informed the headmaster that he had physically touched some Class X girl students, who had verbally complained against him. Pursuant to this, the District Child Protection Unit (DCPU) visited the school and prepared a Counselling-cum-Enquiry Report, based on which police registered the FIR suo motu. The appellant sought quashing the FIR before the High Court, however, it was refused.
Aggrieved by the High Court's refusal, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, which had stayed the proceedings against the appellant.
The Supreme Court perused the Counselling-cum-Enquiry Report which recorded that the girl students said the teacher used to beat them on their upper back when they were inattentive in class, and that the way he touched them (touching their body parts like rubs their back, pinching at waist) was not comfortable for them. It further recorded an incident where the teacher had slapped a student for not carrying a map, and touched her neck “in an inappropriate manner.” Other students also complained that though the teacher did not touch them, he would look at them in a manner that made them uncomfortable.
Statements recorded by the Magistrate under Section 183 BNSS (earlier Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) were also placed before the bench.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant submitted that a plain reading of the victim's own statements did not disclose any act that could remotely be termed sexual assault, and that prosecuting him under Section 10 of the POCSO Act was without justification and an abuse of process.
Per contra, the State relied on the FIR and the Enquiry Report to argue that sexual intent could be deduced from the appellant's own conduct towards minor students, that the lady teachers and the headmaster had corroborated the allegations, and that the culpability of the appellant was a matter to be examined during trial.
The Supreme Court set out the relevant provisions of the POCSO Act. Section 10 punishes “aggravated sexual assault” with rigorous imprisonment of five to seven years and fine. Section 9(f) applicable in this case, covers persons on the management or staff of an educational institution who commit “sexual assault” on a child in that institution. “Sexual assault” is defined under Section 7 as touching the child's private body parts or any other act involving physical contact without penetration, done with “sexual intent.”
Perusing the above, the Court emphasised on the essentiality of sexual intent as, “whoever with sexual intent touches the specific parts of the anatomy mentioned in the said provision or does any other act with sexual intent, which involves physical contact without penetration, is said to commit sexual assault.”
Perusing the statements of the victims, the Court held that although the appellant's conduct as a teacher was inappropriate, it did not meet the threshold of Section 10.
“While the conduct of the appellant as a teacher may not be appropriate, particularly resorting to corporal punishment and also showing lack of sensitivity while dealing with girl students, however from a careful reading of the statements of the two girl students, certainly it cannot be said that he has committed a sexual offence contemplated under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. When the 02 students were found inattentive in class and did not carry with them their Geography maps which were essential for the Geography class, appellant, as a responsible teacher, could have handled the situation in a much more sensitive manner, but as pointed out above, inadequacy on the part of the appellant or resorting to corporal punishment would not attract Section 10 of the POCSO Act,” the Court observed.
The Court also pointed out the disproportionate and irreversible damage a POCSO allegation causes to a teacher's life and career, regardless of eventual outcome, and observed as, “for a teacher serving in a girls' school or a school which is co-educational, such an allegation or trial virtually amounts to condemning him, not only for his entire service career as a teacher but for his life as well. He has a family also. Therefore, to accuse a teacher of committing sexual assault on girl students, would be like a death knell for such a teacher. Ultimate acquittal would not redeem the appellant as it would be wholly inadequate to undo all the pervasive damage already suffered by him due to the severity of the criminal trial under the POCSO Act.”
The bench, however, clarified that this did not condone the appellant's conduct, adding that he “certainly needs to sensitize himself while dealing with students of tender age, particularly girl students.”
Flagging the delay in lodging the FIR and the manner in which the headmaster and lady teachers had set the criminal process in motion, the bench noted that their statements amounted to hearsay evidence.
In the aforesaid, the bench held that allowing the prosecution to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of law and cause extreme prejudice to the appellant.
“We quash the entire proceedings of Special Case No.83 of 2025 arising out Samuktala P.S. 10 Case No.187 of 2025 pending before the Special Court at Alipurduar,” the bench, thus, set aside the High Court's order and quashed the case.
Case: Bhaskar Paul v State of West Bengal
Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 927
Appearance:
For Petitioner: Mr Irshad Ahmad, AOR; Mr Shaik Mohammad Haneef, Adv.; Mr Junaid Ali Khan, Adv.; Mr Yasser Wali, Adv; Mr Abdul Mannan, Adv.; Mr Uday Sankar Sarkar, Adv.; Mr Ahmed Nabeel Rizvi, Adv; Mr Aashutosh Srivastava, Adv.; Dr Arjun Chowdhury, Adv.; Mr Suneet Singh, Adv.
For Respondent: Mr Nishant Awana, AOR; Mr Suraj Kundu, Adv.; Mr Amogh Pandey, Adv.; Ms Rini Kundu, Adv.