Why Supreme Court Held State Laws Banning Online Gaming Are Traceable To 'Public Order' Entry
The Court held that 'Public Order' is not limited to riots or violence, and can include social or economic disturbances which shake society's orderly functioning.
The Supreme Court recently explained the ingredients of “public order” under Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and held that States can rely on their legislative power over public order to regulate and prohibit online betting and gambling activities.A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan relied on various judgments holding that...
A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan relied on various judgments holding that the constitutional expression “public order” is not confined to riots, violence or threats to the security of the State, but extends to social and economic disorders that disrupt the normal life of the community.
The Court made the observation while upholding the validity of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka laws regulating online betting and wagering.
The Court highlighted that the expression “public order” has consistently received a broad interpretation from Indian courts. Referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, the Court noted that public order signifies the state of tranquillity prevailing among members of a political society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the government.
Public Order Includes Public Safety, Public Health, Public Comfort And Public Interest
The Court highlighted earlier decisions holding that public order includes protection of health and comfort. Referring to State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, which upheld restrictions on loudspeakers, the Court noted that public order is not confined to preventing violence but also extends to preventing activities detrimental to the community's tranquillity, health, comfort and peaceful existence.
The Court observed that States have power to preserve public order includes power to prevent activities that create widespread social harm or public nuisance. The Court also emphasised that public order encompasses public safety, public tranquillity and public interest. Referring to decision in Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Court said public order is broad enough to encompass threats to public safety, public health and public welfare.
The Court also relied on a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in S. Bagavathy v. State of Tamil Nadu, which held that public order should not be understood only in the context of riots, insurrections or violent crimes. It also covers the orderly functioning of society and conditions that enable citizens to peacefully pursue normal activities of life. The High Court held that disturbances in the economic sphere can amount to breach of public order when they disrupt the orderly functioning of society.
Tests For Public Order
The Supreme Court relied on a series of decisions explaining how public order differs from ordinary law and order concerns. Reiterating the principle laid down in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, the Court observed that the decisive test is whether an act disturbs the “even tempo of life of the community”. Every breach of law affects law and order, the Court said, but only those acts that have wider societal repercussions amount to disturbances of public order.
The Court also noted the “concentric circles” doctrine evolved in Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar. Under this doctrine, “law and order” constitutes the widest circle, “public order” forms a narrower circle within it, and “security of the State” is the narrowest category. An act may affect law and order without affecting public order, just as an act may affect public order without threatening the security of the State.
The Court stressed the “potentiality test” developed in earlier cases. According to this principle, the nature of an act alone is not decisive, what matters is its potential impact on society. An act directed at a single individual may still affect public order if its consequences extend to the wider community and disrupt normal social life.
Ingredients Of Public Order
The Court culled out the following ingredients of Public Order –
“a) A state of tranquility prevailing amongst members of a political society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the Government;
b) The absence of disorder;
c) A positive condition of peaceful, ordered social existence enabling normal civic life;
d) Public order denotes an orderly state of society and community in which citizens may peacefully pursue their normal activities of life;
e) Public order is reflected in the “even tempo” of life in a locality. Therefore, conduct that maintains or secures this even tempo falls within the realm of public order regulation;
f) Public safety or interest may, depending upon context, be legitimately invoked in its relation to the maintenance of public order to support legislative action preserving public order;
g) Public order occupies a constitutional position between the widest circle of “law and order” and the narrowest circle of “security of the State”, signifying a broader societal impact rather than individual disturbances but less in magnitude when compared to threats to security of the State.”
The Court held that disruption or disturbance of public order arises in the following situations –
“a) An act disturbs public order when it affects the current or even tempo of the life of the community, rather than merely injuring an individual;
b) When repercussions of an act extend to large sections of the community, inciting further breaches of law and order or provoking communal passions, public order is subverted;
c) Activities that impair public health or constitute a manifest nuisance fall squarely within the State's competence under public order;
d) Activities that cause detriment of health, tranquility and comfort of others;
e) If something disturbs the current of the life of the community, and does not merely affect an individual;
f) Conduct which induces fear or panic in the community such that ordinary pursuits of life are abandoned becomes a matter of public order even if the immediate act is aimed at a particular individual;
g) Disturbances in the social or economic spheres that shake the orderly functioning of society, including large scale financial defaults undermining public confidence, may also constitute breach of public order.”
Online Gaming And Public Order
The Court observed that public order in the digital age cannot be confined to traditional forms of disturbance and must account for harms emerging from internet-based activities. Relying on the judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Court observed, “Shreya Singhal (supra) establishes that even in the digital age, online speech can be restricted on public-order grounds in circumstances where it poses a clear and present danger to public tranquillity, incites imminent violence or lawless action, or constitutes a true threat producing fear or disrupting public order.”
Applying the aforementioned principles to online gaming and gambling, the Court concluded that online betting and gambling have consequences extending beyond individual participants and can affect public tranquillity and public health. The Court ultimately held that Tamil Nadu and Karnataka were entitled to invoke their power to legislate on “Public Order” to enact laws against online betting and gambling.
Headnote
Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 34 – Betting and Gambling – Online Gaming – Games of Skill vs. Games of Chance – Scope of legislative competence of States – Interpretation of the conjunction "and" – Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Article 19(1)(g) – Res Extra Commercium – List II, Entry 1 – Public Order - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court which held that Entry 34 of List II is restricted to games of chance - The expression "betting and gambling" cannot be split disjunctively or interpreted narrowly as "betting on gambling" to provide immunity to games of skill played for stakes - Entry 34 of List II empowers the State Legislatures to regulate or prohibit betting activities on both games of chance and games of skill when played for stakes. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad Vaish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3029; Welfare Association v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Paras 217-228, 267 – 273]
Introduction of Stakes Converted Games of Skill into Betting/Gambling – Res Extra Commercium – Supreme Court ruled that while a genuine skill-based competition played without stakes does not amount to gambling, the moment real monetary stakes are introduced, the activity constitutes betting and gambling - A player or third person placing a bet on the uncertain outcome of a game of skill with the hope of winning more than what was staked transforms the business into a betting enterprise. [Relied on M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770; P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187; Paras 264-320]
Distinction and Correct Application of Landmark Precedents (RMDC Line & K.R. Lakshmanan) - Supreme Court clarified that the landmark rulings in RMDC-I, RMDC II, and K.R. Lakshmanan were misunderstood by the High Courts - None of these decisions foreclosed the State's power over betting on games of skill – i. RMDC-I & RMDC-II Clarified - In RMDC-I, the definition of "prize competitions" was held to be a gambling adventure as it invited the general public to forecast uncertain future events where common masses lacked statistical expertise – the Supreme Court in RMDC-I approvingly cited Hamilton's Hedaya, which explicitly states that even chess (a game of pure skill) constitutes gambling if anything is staked - RMDC-II explicitly left scope for States to step in if games of substantial skill started to pose problems for the State or cause public harm; ii. K.R. Lakshmanan Clarified - The immunity granted to horse-racing was based on a specific statutory exception carved out by the legislature itself and was limited to highly-regulated betting inside the physical club premises on the day of the race. It cannot shield the "veil of invisibility" and uncontained access inherent in online cyberspace gaming. [Distinguished State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I), AIR 1957 SC 699; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II), AIR 1957 SC 628; Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 244-245, 251-253, 279, 282-289]
No Manifest Arbitrariness under Article 14 – Empirical Evidence and Policy Decisions - The amended provisions do not suffer from manifest arbitrariness or discrimination under Article 14 - The classification and prohibition of staking money in cyberspace are backed by empirical studies, expert committee reports (such as the Justice K. Chandru Committee), and large-scale public surveys detailing severe socio-economic distress, gaming addiction, financial ruins, and child development harms - The State is fully competent to take such policy decisions for public welfare. [Relied On Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, (1978) 1 SCC 636; Paras 292, 305, 306 – 331, 350-365]
Alternative Source of State Legislative Competence – Entry 1 of List II ("Public Order") - Independent of Entry 34, the State Legislatures derive complete competence to regulate and ban online staking platforms under Entry 1 of List II ("Public Order") - Public order is an expression of wide connotation that encompasses public safety, social tranquillity, and the prevention of social and economic disorders - The rampant, digitally-mediated addiction and massive financial accumulation by online platforms trap vulnerable sections and disrupt the "even tempo of the life of the community," creating an immediate threat to the orderly state of society. [Relied on Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124; State of Rajasthan v. Shri G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544; Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 677; Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Paras: 332 – 357].
Case no. – Civil Appeal Nos. 6124-6131 of 2023 and connected cases
Case Title – State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. and connected cases
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591