Long Possession Alone Does Not Prove Adverse Possession,Hostile Intent Essential : Supreme Court

A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar ruled so while hearing an appeal filed against a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment which had reversed concurrent findings of the trial court and the first appellate court, and decreed a suit for declaration of title and possession in favour of the respondents.

The case concerns agricultural land and traces back to a civil suit instituted in 1981. The plaintiffs relied on a 1965 registered sale deed and a recital of delivery of possession. Per contra, the defendants contended that the property had long before been dedicated for Dharam Arth in favour of the Dera, and that revenue records consistently recorded the Mahant of the Dera to be in possession of it as gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth. It was also contended that the property had consistently been in possession of successive Mahants, thus, Dera had the title by adverse possession also.

Subsequently, the trial court ruled that the property stood dedicated to the Dera and that possession had continued through Mahants. This was subsequently affirmed by the first appellate court, holding that the dedication stood completed upon delivery of possession and that no separate registered instrument was required. However, the findings were reversed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, holding that the revenue entries did not conclusively establish either a completed dedication or adverse possession, particularly in the absence of evidence showing continuity of possession through the subsequent Mahants or any hostile assertion of title.

Aggrieved by the findings of the High Court, the appellants (Dera) approached the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that the High Court had erred, submitting that the revenue records from 1945-46 onwards consistently described the possession as being for Dharam Arth purposes, evidencing dedication, and that in any case the Dera's continuous possession for over four decades had turned into ownership by adverse possession. It was also argued that the sale deed of 1965 could not have conveyed title over the entire suit property since the two vendors together owned only a half share, the remaining half belonging to someone else (not a vendor).

On the contrary, the respondents (plaintiffs) contended that the trial court and the first appellate court had erred in treating the revenue entries as conclusive proof of title and presuming a completed dedication merely from property's description as Dharam Arth. It was contended that the plea of adverse possession was not maintainable in the absence of specific pleadings on when and how the possession turned hostile, and that the High Court had not appreciated evidence as a first appellate court but had corrected an erroneous application of legal principles after framing a substantial question of law.

The Supreme Court reiterated that revenue records are relevant only to possession and do not confer or extinguish title. “Revenue records, including Jamabandis and Khasra Girdawaris, are undoubtedly relevant pieces of evidence for determining the nature and continuity of possession. They neither create nor extinguish title, nor can they, by themselves, constitute conclusive evidence of ownership. The consistent view of this Court has been that entries in revenue records are primarily maintained for fiscal purposes and are admissible as evidence of possession, but they do not confer title to immovable property. The question of ownership must ultimately be determined on the basis of substantive evidence establishing the source of title”, the bench held.

Regarding the question of dedication, the Court held that while a formal deed is not always necessary, the burden lies on the party asserting dedication to show a clear and unequivocal intention on the part of the owner to permanently divest ownership. It, thus, observed as, “mere long possession of a Mahant or an entry in the revenue records indicating cultivation for Dharam-Arth purposes cannot, without more, be treated as conclusive proof that ownership itself stood irrevocably transferred.”

The Court also noted an internal inconsistency in the appellants' own case (pleading both dedication and adverse possession) when the two doctrines rest on contradictory premises, and also called out the findings of the trial court and first appellate court.

“Equally significant is the fact that the appellants themselves sought to derive title on two distinct juristic bases, namely, dedication and adverse possession. The two doctrines proceed on fundamentally different legal premises. If the property had already vested in the Dera by virtue of a completed dedication, the question of subsequently perfecting title by adverse possession would scarcely arise, for adverse possession necessarily proceeds on the assumption that title initially vested in another and was thereafter extinguished by hostile possession for the statutory period. The concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court do not reconcile these two distinct pleas, rather, both were accepted simultaneously as independent sources of title. Such an approach overlooks the different legal requirements governing each doctrine and renders the reasoning internally inconsistent,” the bench held.

Relying on T Anjanappa v Somalingappa, the bench reiterated that adverse possession requires proof of actual, open, continuous, and hostile possession amounting to a denial of the true owner's title, and that possession traceable to a lawful or permissive origin cannot become adverse merely with the passage of time. “Possession founded upon such an assertion cannot, without more, simultaneously be characterised as hostile possession so as to attract the doctrine of adverse possession”, the bench held as.

It further flagged the complete absence of pleadings identifying when the possession allegedly turned hostile. “There is no pleading identifying the date from which the title of the recorded proprietors was openly repudiated, nor is there evidence demonstrating any overt act by which such hostility was asserted to the knowledge of the true owners. The absence of these foundational pleadings is not a mere technical defect. They constitute the very basis upon which a plea of adverse possession rests. Unless the commencement of hostile possession is pleaded and proved, the statutory period prescribed under theLimitation Act, 1963 cannot even begin to run,” the bench ruled.

“The doctrine of adverse possession does not reward longevity of occupation alone. It protects only such possession as is accompanied by a conscious and hostile assertion of ownership in denial of the rights of the true owner. Unless the element of hostility is affirmatively established, the plea must necessarily fail,” the Court added, cautioning against conflating longevity of occupation with legal adverse possession.

Accepting the appellants' contention that the 1965 sale deed could not have conveyed a larger share than the vendors actually held, the Court reiterated that “a transferor cannot convey a better title than what he himself possesses.” However, it was also observed that, “even if the respondents' title under the sale deed were confined only to such interest as the vendors were legally competent to convey, that circumstance would not, by itself, establish that ownership had vested in the appellants.”

Relying on Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors and A Shahul Hameed v N Malligarjuna & Ors, the bench addressed the appellants' contention that the High Court had wrongly disturbed concurrent findings of the fact. It held that concurrent findings do not enjoy immunity from interference where they are vitiated by misapplication of law or ignore essential legal ingredients. “The High Court did not reassess the evidence merely because another view was possible. The High Court examined whether the legal ingredients necessary to sustain the findings of dedication and adverse possession had at all been established on the evidence relied upon by the Courts below,” the bench held.

Clarifying that a revenue entry of this kind is neither conclusive proof of a completed dedication nor conclusive proof of permissive possession and must be assessed along with the entirety of evidence, the bench affirmed the High Court's finding. It, thus, decreed the suit in favour of the respondents (plaintiffs).

Case: Bhag Singh (dead) through Mahant Kashmir Singh v Basant Kaur (dead) through LRs & Ors.

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923

Appearance:

For Appellant: M/s Ap & J Chambers, AOR; Mr Sunil Singh Parihar, Adv.; Mr Ankit Dwivedi, Adv.; Mr Dhawesh Pahuja, Adv.

For Respondent: Ms Shalu Sharma, AOR; Mr Saurabh Sharma, Adv.; Mr Karan Seth, Adv.; Mr Amaar Deewan, Adv.