Supreme Court Expresses Pain Over Death Of Girl Due To School Pillar Collapse, Quashes Criminal Case Against Officer-Bearers

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Manmohan quashed the proceedings, allowing the appeal against the Bombay High Court's order by which it had refused to quash it.

The deceased was a Class 7 student aged 12 who met with an accident within the school premises when a pillar under construction collapsed and fell on her, resulting in severe fatal injuries. The incident happened on February 15, 2020 in a school in Amaravati District. A case was subsequently filed by the deceased girl's father alleging that the school's director and the hostel superintendent deliberately made the kaccha and standardless construction of the pillar and did not take the precautions while constructing the pillar. The appellants were thereafter prosecuted under Section 304 read with Section 34 of the IPC (now Section 105 and Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023/BNS respectively).

The appellants approached the High Court seeking quashing of the case against them. However, the High Court refused to quash the proceedings, relying on a Chemical Analyser's report, which showed that the cement-sand-aggregate ratio in the mortar was not maintained, and on the spot panchnama, which said the pillar had no solid base. It further held that there was a breach of duty and that “though there was no intention to cause death but admittedly knowledge was there that sub standard material while constructing the base for installation of pillar may cause harm or death to the person.”

Aggrieved by the High Court's refusal, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants argued that no voluntary commission of an offence was made out in the prosecution's case, therefore, Section 304 of the IPC would not apply. It was also submitted that Section 304A of the IPC would also not apply because the appellants' lack of care could be one of the causes of death, but not the direct consequence. For context, Section 304 of the IPC deals with the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and Section 304A deals with the offence of death caused by negligent act.

Per contra, the respondent (prosecution) argued that for quashing, the Court only had to consider whether a prima facie case is made out, and that a case of rash and negligent act punishable under Section 304A of the IPC is made out considering the facts of the case. It was further submitted that the trial court could decide the guilt of the appellants.

Perusing the submissions, the Supreme Court discussed the two parts of Section 304 IPC and the distinction between Section 304 and Section 304A, and noted that “no conviction ought to take place, unless such intention or knowledge can from the evidence be concluded to have really existed.” It stated Section 304A applies where “there is neither intention to cause death nor knowledge that the act in all probability will cause death.”

“We are of the view that the mere failure to attain the standard of care prescribed by the law, thereby committing breach of such duty as observed by the High Court would not be a criminal act. The contractor to whom the work was assigned could at the most be prima facie guilty of negligence, being in the knowledge of the fact that poor construction or inferior construction may lead to an accident or a casualty. However, that by itself would not suggest that the appellants had the knowledge that inferior construction in all probability was likely to cause death of any student studying in the school.”

Applying this, the bench concluded that the present case was not one of voluntary commission of offence against a person.

With respect to Section 304A, the bench said that it had to examine whether the accused's act was the direct result of a rash and negligent act, and that act was the proximate and efficient cause of the death without the intervention of others' negligence. Reliance was placed on Sushil Ansal v State through CBI on the meaning of causa causans, and on Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla v State of Maharashtra and Ambalal D Bhatt v State of Gujarat, which held that the act must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non. Referring to this, the bench held as follows:

“In our view, having regard to the materials on record, the incident in this case cannot be treated as a direct and proximate cause of the negligence, even if we assume one on the part of the appellants in not taking due care. Many other factors might have resulted in the unfortunate incident. It was the contractor and his team who were actually undertaking the construction.”

It held that the alleged negligence of the appellants cannot be regarded as the causa causans. Although it may be a causa sine qua non.

Further reference was made to Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, Syed Akbar v State of Karnataka, and Dr PB Desai v State of Maharashtra, to reiterate that mere negligence or rashness is not enough to bring a case within the ambit of Section 304A IPC. It observed that “the essence of criminal liability under Section 304A IPC is culpable rashness or negligence and not any rashness or negligence,” and that the difference marks off civil from criminal liability. It added that “simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough,” as a very high degree of negligence is required.

In the light of aforesaid, the bench held that if at all a person could be held responsible for the unfortunate death of the student, it is the contractor. This observation, it clarified, is prima facie and is subject to evidence led at trial.

“For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that so far as the appellants are concerned, they stand on a different footing as compared to the other accused if any. In our view, the appellants should not be asked to face the trial either for the offence of a rash or a negligent act punishable under Section 304A of the IPC or Section 304 IPC. At the most, the person who could be said to be prima facie responsible for the unfortunate death of the student is the contractor. This observation, of course, is prima-facie and subject to the evidence that may be led at the time of the trial if at all contractor is also one of the accused.

Expressing its sympathy for the family, the bench observed as follows:

“Dictating this order was a very painful experience. The very thought of a twelve-year-old girl getting crushed beneath the pillar of her own school makes our heart bleed with pain and agony. We can also imagine the pain and agony the parents of the deceased must be undergoing even as on today. However, such thoughts should not allow the mind of a judge to get boggled, otherwise justice cannot be done. However, harsh one may find the law, but at the same time, the law remains the law, and it has got to be respected.”

The proceedings were quashed against the appellants accordingly.

“In the result, this appeal is allowed. The criminal proceedings arising from Chargesheet No. 15 of 2020 are hereby quashed so far as appellants are concerned. 63. The trial may proceed further against any other coaccused, in accordance with law,” the bench held.

Appearances:

For Appellants: Mr. Kuldeep Jauhari, AOR; Mr. Tanav Kansal, Adv.; Ms. Antara Mishra, Adv.; Mr. Sahil Ahuja, Adv.; Mr. Kedar Bhoi, Adv.

For Respondents: Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR; Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.; Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv.; Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv.; Ms. Chitransha Singh Sikarwar, Adv.