The Supreme Court has reiterated that appellate courts cannot substitute their own interpretation of contractual terms for that of an Arbitral Tribunal if the interpretation adopted by the Tribunal is a possible and plausible one.

The Court observed that the Arbitral Tribunal is the final arbiter of facts, and that the construction of contractual terms primarily falls within its domain. It further clarified that a court exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is confined to the grounds available under Section 34 and cannot independently reassess the merits of an arbitral award.

The Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd (RVUNL), challenging a Rajasthan High Court judgment that restored arbitral awards in favour of Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd (PKCL).

A bench of Justice Satish Chandra Sharma and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held that the Commercial Court had stepped beyond Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by setting aside the findings on Claims 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8. Further, the bench found no patent illegality or perversity in the findings on Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9.

RVUNL is a Rajasthan Government undertaking that generates and sells electricity, and PKCL is a joint venture company. Both of them signed a Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement (CMDA) in 2008, under which PKCL was to develop the Parsa East and Kanta Basan (PEKB) coal block and deliver coal to RVUNL's thermal power stations. The Supreme Court cancelled the allocation of 204 coal blocks, including PEKB, in Manohar Lal Sharma v Principal Secretary. The block was later re-allocated to RVUNL under the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015. In 2016, the parties signed a Supplementary Agreement under Section 11(1) of the Coal Act, continuing the CMDA with some added obligations on PKCL.

PKCL alleged that RVUNL had not made payments and had not reimbursed expenses incurred on its behalf, and raised nine claims in arbitration before a Sole Arbitrator, Justice Sudhir Kumar Katriar (Retd.), which passed an Award in January 2021 and an Additional Award in July 2021, under Section 33(4) of the Act.

On RVUNL's petition filed under Section 34 , the Commercial Court (Jaipur) rejected the challenge on Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9 and set aside the findings on Claims 2, 4, 6, 7 and the Additional Award on Claim 8, holding that it had no power to modify the award. It then set aside both awards in full. Thereafter an appeal was filed before the Rajasthan High Court by PKCL under Section 37, which restored both awards.

Aggrieved by the High Court's finding, an SLP was filed before the Supreme Court by RVUNL.

The Supreme Court first set out the limits of its own jurisdiction, observing that Article 136 is a special and residuary power that is of a purely discretionary nature, and that an award should ordinarily attain finality at the Section 37 stage. It referred to its earlier decision in DMRC Ltd v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., wherein it was held that under Article 136 the Court “must limit itself to testing whether the court acting under Section 37 exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to apply the correct tests to assail the award.”

The bench also relied on Associate Builders v. DDA, Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) and Jan De Nul Dredging India (P) Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust and summarised that a Section 34 court does not sit in appeal over the award, and that a patent illegality under Section 34(2-A) exists only where a finding is perverse where the tribunal's construction of the contract is one no fair-minded person would adopt, or where the award breaches the Act itself or natural justice. It also observed that construction of the terms of the contract is primarily for the arbitral tribunal under Section 28(3), and a plausible interpretation is not to be interfered with merely because another view is possible. Further, it was observed that Section 37 court examines only whether the Section 34 court acted within its limits, and its powers are more restricted than those under Section 34.

Observing aforesaid, the bench framed the issue as under:

“Were the Tribunal's findings plausible and free from patent illegality? Did the Commercial Court stay within Section 34? Did the High Court correctly exercise its Section 37 jurisdiction?”

The bench decided the issue claim wise.

On Claim 1 (rejected rakes of coal, Rs 71.77 crores), the Tribunal held that RVUNL, having consumed the coal before receiving the analysis reports, was deemed to have accepted it, and that Clause 5.4.1 of the CMDA applies only to coal that is actually rejected. The bench called this a construction of the CMDA which is a possible view, adding that the finding that RVUNL failed to prove its analysis reports and suffered no loss rested on its own witness's evidence, and re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible under Section 34 and certainly not under Section 37.

On Claim 2 (stamp duty and charges on fresh mining lease, Rs 83.47 crores), the Commercial Court had set aside the finding because the Arbitrator read 'adversely' in Clause 7.1 in isolation from 'directly.'. The Supreme Court observed that the Arbitrator had set out Clause 7.1 in full, noticed the 'adversely and directly' requirement, and held that cancellation removed the fundamental basis of the CMDA. It observed that “whether that is the only possible construction is not the question, but whether it is a construction that no fair-minded person could take,” and that the Commercial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting its own construction.

With regards to Claim 3 (interest on overdue payments, Rs 67.27 crore), the Tribunal could not apply Clause 6.3 literally because RVUNL had no working-capital loan from the State Bank of India, so it took the rates RVUNL actually paid other banks (averaging about 11.95%). The bench found no perversity or patent illegality in this.

On Claim 4 (legal fees and litigation expenses, Rs 3.75 crores), the Commercial Court set aside the finding on limitation, on which the Supreme Court observed that the Commercial Court had reappreciated the evidence and acted “as if it was sitting on appeal on facts and law,” and the Tribunal's reasoning as to when limitation began, with arbitration invoked after RVUNL rejected the claim in 2018, could not be called perverse or patently illegal.

On Claim 5 (bank guarantee charges, Rs 43.59 crore awarded out of Rs 58.96 crore claimed), the bench found no patent illegality in the concurrent findings, and held that RVUNL “cannot set up a new case before this Court, which was not there before the Tribunal,” noting that its argument based on Clause (j) of the Supplementary Agreement had not been raised before the Tribunal.

With respect to Claim 6 and Claim 7 (267 additional project-affected families, Rs 8.01 crore; vocational training centre, Rs 3.38 crore), the bench said the finding on Claim 6 does not depend on force majeure but rests on the construction of PKCL's scope of work, which was limited to the 458 families identified in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report. On Claim 7, it was observed that the training centre condition was inserted in 2011, after the 2009 acquisition notification and the CMDA, both were possible views and the Commercial Court “went beyond the scope of Section 34”.

With regards to Claim 8 (additional land acquisition cost, Rs 66.70 crore, and the Additional Award), the Supreme Court upheld the Arbitrator's view that this part of the claim had escaped adjudication entirely, so a Section 33(4) application was the right remedy. On limitation, the Commercial Court had set aside the Additional Award because the Tribunal did not deal with it. The bench observed that limitation was never raised before the Tribunal, and that it was a mixed question of fact and law. It held that “a plea not raised before the Tribunal ought not to have been considered by the Commercial Court in the challenge under Section 34” and that the Additional Award cannot be called patently illegal merely because it is silent on limitation.

On Claim 9 (interest and costs), the Court saw no reason to interfere as interest was in the Tribunal's discretion, and simple interest at 11.95% was the rate PKCL itself had claimed on overdue payments.

Relying on Gayatri Balasamy v ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., RVUNL argued that the High Court should have examined claim by claim whether any invalid portions could be severed, or that the matter be remanded to do so. On this, the Court said the power to sever arises only if some part of the award is found invalid. Since no part of the Award or the Additional Award was found invalid, “the question whether the valid and invalid portions are severable, and the alternative prayer for remand, do not arise.”

Further, the bench also observed that the claim-by-claim examination it had undertaken answered the contention that the High Court had disposed of the appeal on a single finding.

“We have not asked whether we would have reached the same conclusion on the same material. On close and minute scrutiny, some of the Arbitral Tribunal's findings may admit of another plausible view. Others may appear to rest on an incorrect appreciation of the facts or even an erroneous application of the law. That, however, is not the test under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as delineated above.”

“The Arbitral Tribunal is the final arbiter of the facts, and the construction of the contractual terms is primarily its domain. Where the interpretation adopted is a possible and plausible one, the court cannot substitute its own interpretation, however persuasive the alternative reading may be. The Section 37 court is, moreover, confined to the grounds available under Section 34 of the Act and cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award. Taking a holistic view, we find that both the Awards, read as a whole, do not suffer from patent illegality, perversity or any other ground that would justify these being set aside under Section 34 of the Act. This accords with the consistent approach of this Court, which has emphasised the restricted scope of interference with arbitral awards, so that the autonomy and finality of arbitration are respected, and the process of scrutiny is not turned into an ordinary appeal on facts and law. Having found that the Arbitral Tribunal has not deviated from the established principles in a manner warranting interference, we decline to interfere with the impugned Judgment of the High Court which has upheld the Awards,” the bench concluded.

In the light of aforesaid, the SLP was dismissed.

Appearances:

For Petitioner: Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Kartik Seth, Adv.; Ms. Shilpa Saini, Adv.; Mr. Pranjal Jaiswal, Adv.; Mr. Ujjwal Kumar, Adv.; Mr. K.M.Abish, Adv.; Ms. Ratakshi Sarvaria, Adv.; M/s Chambers Of Kartik Seth, AOR

For Respondent: Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Adv.; Ms. Abhisaar Bairaagi, Adv.; Mr. Milind Sharma, Adv.; Mr. Ausaf Ayyub, Adv.; M/S. Khaitan & Co., AOR

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