In 2026, India will face a constitutional issue that could remodel the Union balance: Who represents India at Parliament and on what grounds? The allocation of seats in the Lok Sabha has been based on the demographic realities that have been frozen in time for more than half a century. The inter-state seat allocation was also made dependent on the 1971 Census under the 42nd, 84th and 87th Constitutional Amendments, which was extended till the first Census after 2026. What was initially an upright attempt to offer incentives to the population and even to secure states who have achieved the goal of lowering the population rate, has grown to be a structural conflict in the federal design.
As the freeze will expire, the reallocation of seats according to the current population would greatly benefit states with high growth especially in northern and central India over those with lower ranks like those of the south and some eastern states which already have experienced demographic transition. This poses a structural dilemma of how India can balance the principle of democracy of “one person, one vote” and the requirements of the federal system to safeguard those states that have done well in terms of social and demographic performance.
The need of the hour necessitates the country to stop existing in a binary system of strict proportionality and frozen status quo. India can maintain democratic equality without any loss of federal equilibrium if it institutionalises calibrated inequality with regard to representation, which is not a foreign notion to comparative constitutional practice.
Under Article 81 of the Constitution, the seats in the Lok Sabha shall be allotted to the states according to the population 'as far as practicable'. Under this provision, the framers never intended mathematical correctness, however, they enclosed flexibility into the term “as far as practicable”. This flexibility was actualised by subsequent constitutional amendments which froze the seat allocation until the 2001 Census to avoid discouragement of the regulation of population, which was further prolonged to the first census following 2026, while partially permitting intra-state delimiting based on the 2001 census.
The outcome is a representational imbalance wherein the proportion of population served by parliament has changed significantly since 1971, whereas the representation in the parliament has not. In case strict proportionality were adopted post-2026, such states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar would receive seats, whereas such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala would lose their impact. An entirely proportional re-calibration would otherwise be equal in status, but would interfere with cooperative federalism. On the other hand, the indefinite proposal to freeze would undermine democratic legitimacy. There is a need however, to have a structural innovation.
Degressive Proportionality: Moderated Equality in Relatives Perspective
One of the potential conceptual pathways is that of the degressive proportional representation (DPR), a principle adopted by the European Parliament. In this model more populous member states are allocated more seats that the less populated ones, although fewer than proportionately high population would provide. As an example, the largest member country of the EU, Germany has 96 seats, and a small member state, Malta, has 6 seats, which should commensurate the size of smaller states in proportion but guarantee numerical power to larger states.
Degressive proportionality appreciates the fact that, in the setting of composite polities, two tasks are performed by representation i.e. it reflects citizens, and also acknowledges constituent units. It thus makes inequality institutionalised, but in a controlled way to maintain systemic stability.
In India, DPR, would involve increasing the overall strength of the Lok Sabha and assigning more seats to the high-growth states, although in a proportionated form of the population. Less populous or demographically stabilised states would retain some sort of overrepresentation as compared to rigid arithmetic equivalence. A formula like a sub-linear exponent on the population numbers would make sure that larger states could receive seats, but at a decreasing marginal rate.
More importantly such strategy would not dismiss the democratic equality. The more populous states would continue commanding more seats and greater influence; but the change would only ensure the lack of disproportional concentration of the legislative authority. The federal nature of the Indian Constitution which is largely said to be a quasi-federal one implies a logic of holding-together where states continue to be an essential part of the political community. The reality concerning proportionality in degrees would be constitutionalized instead of considering states as aggregates in terms of demographics.
The normative value of DPR is that it reconceptualised the concept of equality. Equality in a federation does not necessarily imply getting the same weight of votes in the territorial units, but it may imply the equal influence given to the population, as well as to the federal solidarity.
Protecting Federal Balance
Whereas degressive proportionality takes care of the allocation of extra seats, federal equilibrium must be equipped structurally as well. A constitutional floor is one such protection ensuring that no state will hold less seats than current. This is the principle that is reflected by the minimum representation provision in the United States House of Representatives, whereby each state is entitled to at least one seat whether small or large. Demographic change could be accommodated in India by increasing the total number of seats in the Lok Sabha instead of reducing the seats in demographically stabilised states.
A bigger House possibly consisting of 700 to 750 members would also bring down the incredibly high ratio of people per representative in India, fortifying the constituency service and lawmaking deliberation. The fear of the inconvenience of a larger room, should be weighed against the representational loss of the existing system.
An equivalent reform would take a dual-index formula of allocation. A minimum number of seats would be allocated to each state as a symbolic representation of federal equality and the rest of the seats will be divided based on population rate but under degressive readjustment or limitations. An example is provided by experience; in the Bundesrat of Germany, Lander receive the votes from the population in bands, with maximum and minimum limits, so that one can never have extreme disparities. Despite being an upper house, the logic that the Bundesrat is based on, in terms of equalizing demographic reality with federal parity, is informative.
It is also essential to de-link electoral representation and fiscal redistribution. The Finance Commission of India distributes central tax revenues among the states based on criteria which also involve population, income distance, area and demographic performance. If both parliamentary representation and fiscal transfers are tilted towards higher growth states, the states with a demographic success may end up paying a twofold price.
Therefore, there needs to be a principled division between representation which symbolises political voice and fiscal devolution which represents distributive justice. Although moderated population numbers can be applied on the allocation of seats, any fiscal transfer must be based on a composite index where human development, ecologically sound stewardship and demographic stabilization are rewarded. This type of differentiation makes sure that constitutional design is based on the different normative grounds of democracy and redistribution.
Legitimacy at Institutional Level
Any reconfiguration of Lok Sabha representation has to be contained within a wider federal structure. Currently, the Rajya Sabha apportion seats on a broad basis in accordance with the population of the states, though smaller states have some over-representation. Its representation to states is not equal like in the United States Senate. Giving the Rajya Sabha a more federal nature through either a modest expansion of minimum representation by smaller states or making the Rajya Sabha a more legitimate centre of federal legislature may have a compensatory effect on the perceived disproportions within the Lok Sabha. A recalibrated upper, and moderated proportionality lower house would distribute federal safeguards across institutions, instead of concentrating them in one.
Furthermore, procedural legitimacy also plays a crucial role. The Delimitation Commissions of India have traditionally been independent, yet politically sensitive. Premeditated reforms after 2026 should thus be a gradual process that is firstly subject to a wide-based consultation with the states. Canadian experience shows that a traditional electoral boundary commission, operating under clear guidelines and in open sessions, is a way of reducing political partisanship. Systemic shock would also be mitigated by a phased implementation lasting two general elections. It does not entail redistribution in strict mathematical sense, but a maintenance of confidence in the constitutional order. The sense of demarcation needs to be one of a common re-calibration as opposed to local or party triumph.
Offering Calibrated Proportionality as Constitutional Prudence
The future delimitation of India is not merely the technical change; it will also be the challenge to the ability of the Republic to transform the constitutional principles in response to the demographic change. Excessive proportionality is explosive towards federal moderation; open-ended freeze is fatal to democracy. The third way between these two extremes is calculated proportionality based on degressive representation, constitutional floors, dual-index allocation and fiscal separation.
Such a scheme does not ignore the democratic linking imperative that the change in the populations should be reflected in the representation, and yet also the federal compactness of India cannot be limited to arithmetic. Similar practices in the European Parliament where it is assigned a degrading assignment compared with federal protection in the United States and Germany prove that plural democracies habitually scale down equality in order to maintain cohesion.
With the adoption of reasoned proportionate moderation, as well as institutional security, India can turn the 2026 and make it a moment of apprehension in the region, rather than a sup rem in respect to cooperative federalism. The equality postulated in the constitution cannot be discarded; the only thing it must do is to be reseen in the perspective of the federal nature of the Republic and its developmental diversity.
Authors are research scholars at Indian Law Institute, New Delhi. Views are personal.