Jharkhand RTI Row: Appointment Process Contravenes Section 15(6) And Dilutes Legislative Intent

The process was delayed, and the final meeting of the selection committee was held on 25 March 2026. Section 15(3)^[1] provide the appointment process for the commissioners, The State Chief Information Commissioner and the State Information Commissioners shall be appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a committee consisting of-- (i) the Chief Minister, who shall be the Chairperson of the committee; (ii) the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly; and (iii) a Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Chief Minister.

Section 15(5) ^[2] further lays down the eligibility “The State Chief Information Commissioner and the State Information Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance”

Whereas, Section 15(6) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 lays down the disqualification criteria for appointment of the State Chief Information Commissioner and State Information Commissioners. Section 15(6) clearly reflects the legislative intent to ensure institutional independence by preventing political affiliation to achieve institutional independence by having a State Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner not to be affiliated to any political party. (It reads: 'The State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession.) This is not a moment-in-time eligibility criteria but a substantive protection that the whole selection process is not politicized. So, a resignation by a member of a political party where the person is still a full member of that political party in the selection process or even up to the time when his or her name is shortlisted and officially proposed to the Governor by the statutory selection committee of the Chief Minister, Leader of Opposition and a Cabinet Minister is nothing more than a manoeuvre. These post-selection resignations are a form of abuse of the statutory scheme, they perpetuate prejudice, and are a direct failure to realise the legislative purpose in Section 15(6). The law does not even contemplate of a case in which political affiliation is tactically divested at the last moment to give a semblance of objectivity; instead, it requires that there be neutrality as a matter of fact, during the course of consideration and advice.

The Jharkhand State Information Commission appointments controversy

It has long since ceased to be just another case of administrative wrangling it is a graphic demonstration of the extent to which statutory protections may be eviscerated by a policy of formalism. In the ongoing case of Contempt Case (Civil) No. 283 of 2020, titled Raj Kumar v. Sukhdeo Singh, Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand & Others ^[3] Jharkhand High Court has given orders to complete the process of appointment of information commission, office of Jharkhand as soon as possible, which is vacant for the last six years. This was followed by an advertisement of the appointment of the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioner posts. The advertisement clearly said that Members of Parliament, Members of the Legislature, persons holding or having held any office of profit, or connected with a political party or business, might also apply. But it declared this, on the condition that those persons would be required to resign their office of profit, business interests, or political attachments only after they had been appointed to the position of Information Commissioner.

However, a more consistent and tougher approach is taken by several other states. An example is in Himachal Pradesh, where the advertisement made regarding such appointments expressly barred Members of Parliament, Members of the Legislature and persons connected with political parties in the first instance. It also stressed that only Indian citizens of eminence who had a long background in such areas as law, science, technology and journalism could qualify as long as they were not affiliated to any political party. This discrepancy indicates a significant discrepancy in the understanding of the rules of eligibility in the different states and this is a serious issue concerning the watering down of the concept of institutional independence.

Violation of 15(6) ), Right to Information Act, 2005

According to the reports, four names were selected by the selection committee on 25^th of March, 2026 among which three of them have direct active connection to the political party, one individual is a member of a major national political party and holds a position involving active participation rather than mere passive membership. Another individual has been associated with a different national political party, with state-level involvement indicating proximity to party leadership and engagement in political processes. A third individual has links with a regional political party through organisational or youth-level structures aligned with the party. These associations are not incidental; they reflect definite, immediate, and practical political affiliations that existed at the time of the selection this selection of names violated the provisions of 15(6) “connected with any political party”

However, the defence normally made in such instances is that the resignation was made after selection or just before appointment somehow remedies the disqualification. This is a very fallacious argument. The statutory requirement that a Commissioner must not be a member of any political party cannot be brought down to a photo image of qualification taken at a single point in time. This disqualification is not on optics when the appointment is made; but on ensuring that the whole process of consideration is not politicized. When the active people in politics are involved in the selection process there is no mere speculation the apprehension of bias is real Following objections, the Jharkhand Lok Bhavan returned the file concerning the appointment of Information Commissioners. The controversy surrounding the appointment of State Information Commissioners in Jharkhand has intensified, as various organizations and civil society members raised objections against the alleged violation of prescribed eligibility criteria and the recommendation of individuals linked to political parties.

According to sources, the Lok Bhavan first sought a legal opinion on the entire matter. Thereafter, taking serious note of the issue, the Hon'ble Governor returned the appointment file without granting approval. The Lok Bhavan has clearly directed the state government to re-examine the appointment process in light of the provisions of the RTI Act and the relevant judgments delivered by the Supreme Court on the subject.

This development has sparked a renewed debate in the state regarding transparency and the fairness of the appointment process.

The danger lies in treating resignation as a legal cleansing mechanism. Bias, once introduced, does not vanish with a letter of resignation. It attaches at the stage of consideration, where political proximity may influence both the candidate's selection and the decision-making environment of the appointing authority. To have such candidates being able to justify their appointing by resigning at the last moment is to turn the statutory protection into a sham.

The Supreme Court rulings on RTI appointments.

In the case of the Supreme Court Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India, [(2019) 18 SCC 246)], ^[4]it was noted that the validity of the Information Commissions is based on the fairness, transparency, and impartiality of the selection process. The issue of bias and especially structural or institutional bias that is of concern of the Court is directly relevant here. Once people of definite political inclinations are taken into account, the procedure itself becomes questionable, whether formal adherence is reached in the future or not.

This is also aggravated by the fact that Information Commissions under The Union of India v. Namit Sharma [(2013) 10 SCC 359)]^[5], are also considered to have a quasi-judicial role and therefore need to be independent just like adjudicatory bodies. The fact that bias has not been proven is not the standard, but that one does not even have an apprehension of bias. This norm is blatantly breached by political affiliation during selection.

The rule is simple and strict: a political neutrality should be present not only at the time of appointment, but also during the selection process. Any shortfall of that is not conformity to Section 15(6) it is a wilful avoidance of the same.

Interpreting Section 15(6): A Jurisprudential Inquiry into Legislative Intent and Statutory Mandates.

This shift also welcomes a more in-depth consideration of constitutional principles and jurisprudence that regulate institutional honesty and autonomy of oversight institutions (IOS). Fundamental to it is the doctrine of institutional independence requiring that any bodies undertaking quasi-judicial and accountability functions should be insulated not merely by actual bias but by any reasonable fear of bias. This is directly relatable to the dictum nemo judex in causa sua (no one is a judge in his own cause), which is not only applicable to adjudication but also extends to the very procedure of selection, where no politically close person or one with a vested interest is allowed into the decision-making framework. Moreover, the rule of law according to A. V. Dicey demands the discretionary power to be exercised within a strictly defined legal framework, with no arbitrary or politically charged appointment. Constitutional morality as upheld by B. R. Ambedkar, supports the idea that mere adherence to the stipulations of the statutes is not enough when the very nature of neutrality and justice is violated. Also, legitimate expectation applies in favour of the populace, which has a legitimate expectation that statutory institutions such as Information Commissions will be formed by a fair, transparent, and apolitical process. The new jurisprudence of institutional bias also explains that bias may be institutional and does not have to be proven by overt actions; the mere fact that politically-aligned people are in the pipeline of selection causes a lack of trust in the justice system. All these doctrines bring to the fore the fact that independence is not an after-appointment prerequisite but a precondition which needs to permeate the whole selection process otherwise the integrity of the institution itself is compromised.

In the perspective of interpretation of statutes (IOS), the matter at hand needs to be considered under the principle of legislative intent whereby, Section 15(6) of the RTI Act should be interpreted in a way that promotes the fundamental purpose of the statute which is the achievement of institutional independence instead of turning it into a technical or procedural formalism. The mischief rule (Heydon rule) goes further to explain that the law should be construed in a way that it discourages the mischief of political interference and promotes the remedy of neutrality in appointments. Similarly, the purposive interpretation method requires that courts and authorities interpret the statute to reflect the wider intent of the statute, which is to establish a separate transparency watchdog in this instance. The mere literal meaning, whereby politically affiliated individuals are allowed to take part in the selection process provided they step down at the last level, would be a failure of the whole plot of the Act. The harmonious construction principle also states that the provisions concerning eligibility must be construed in harmony with the institutional purpose of Information Commissions as independent, quasi-judicial institutions.

Combined with each other, these interpretative doctrines add up to one thing, to wit, the necessity that the political neutrality should be effective at all stages of the selection, and not only at the stage of formal appointment. Any other interpretation would be tantamount to a watering down of legislative intent and a way around the protections incorporated into the RTI framework.

A Clear Breach of Legislative Intent: Section 15(6) Reduced to a Formality.

To sum up, the advertisement published with regard to the appointment of the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners is clearly against the law and the constitutional principles, which forms the basis of the RTI framework. By allowing people who are affiliated with political parties, who are in offices of profit, or in business to apply, except on resignation after appointment, the advertisement functions to make the statutory requirement in Section 15(6) to be a mere formality. This is an unacceptable solution in line with the legislative purpose of institutional independence and non-partisanship since the beginning of the selection process. It is in direct opposition to the purposive and mischief based statutory interpretation which aims to exclude political influence instead of acknowledging it at an earlier point. Thus, the advertisement, both in its form and in its effect, is in overt abrogation of statutory and otherwise accepted jurisprudence and cannot be upheld in law.

Currently, the file has once again been returned by Lok Bhavan authorities on the ground that the proposal allegedly breaches the law and is not with constitutional framework. Consequently, despite the prolonged delay and repeated administrative correspondence, the constitutional post of the Information commissioner, Jharkhand, continues to remain vacant, adversely affecting the effective functioning of the transparency and accountability mechanism under the law.

1. Section 15(3), Right to Information Act, 2005 ↑

2. Section 15(5), Right to Information Act, 2005 ↑

3. Contempt Case (Civil) No. 283 of 2020, titled Raj Kumar v. Sukhdeo Singh, Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand & Others. ↑

4. Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India 2019 LiveLaw (SC) 115 ↑

5. The Union of India v. Namit Sharma AIR 2014 SC 122. ↑