When Does An Independent 'Join' A Party? Tenth Schedule's Unanswered Question

Rajesh Ranjan, better known as Pappu Yadav, is a six-time Member of Parliament from Purnea, Bihar. In March 2024, he merged his Jan Adhikar Party (Loktantrik) with the Indian National Congress. He did so reportedly on a single condition: Congress would field him from Purnea. The condition was not honoured. Under the INDIA alliance's seat-sharing arrangement, Purnea was allotted to the Rashtriya Janata Dal. The RJD, whose founder Lalu Prasad had expelled Pappu Yadav twice from the party, had no interest in returning the seat. Congress, which had accepted his merger and his voter base, did not fight for him. Pappu Yadav contested as an Independent and won by over 23,000 votes.

What followed is a constitutional arrangement that would be difficult to defend in any court that cared to examine it. Since winning as an Independent, Pappu Yadav has attended Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee meetings. He has participated in Congress Working Committee sessions in Patna. He has travelled with Rahul Gandhi during the Bihar Nyay Yatra and praised Tejashwi Yadav on public platforms. His wife, Ranjeet Ranjan, continues to serve as a Congress Rajya Sabha MP from Chhattisgarh. In every material respect, Pappu Yadav functions as a Congress MP who happens to hold an Independent certificate from the Election Commission.

The question this arrangement raises is not political. It is constitutional. Paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule states that an elected member “who has been elected as such otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins any political party after such election.” The provision is absolute. There is no two-thirds exception. There is no merger defence. There is no grace period. The moment an Independent member joins a party, disqualification follows.

Has Pappu Yadav “joined” the Congress? The case law suggests he has.

What the courts have already decided

The argument that “joining” requires a formal membership card does not survive judicial scrutiny. Indian courts have consistently held that political affiliation can be established through conduct, not just paperwork.

In Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that “voluntarily giving up membership” of a party has a wider connotation than resignation. The Court stated that the act of abandoning a party can be inferred from a member's conduct without any written communication. The logical corollary is unavoidable: if departure from a party can be inferred from conduct, entry into a party can be inferred from conduct too. The Constitution cannot demand a resignation letter for one and a membership card for the other.

In G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Assembly (1996), the Supreme Court went further. It held that even members who had been expelled from their party continued to belong to that party for the purposes of the Tenth Schedule, and that their subsequent joining of another party amounted to defection. The Court drew no distinction between formal enrolment and functional alignment.

The Constitution Bench in Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007) established the most powerful principle. The Court held that the very act of giving a letter to the Governor requesting him to call the opposition leader to form a government was sufficient, by itself, to constitute voluntarily giving up membership. The Court used the phrase “res ipsa loquitur”: the thing speaks for itself. No further evidence was needed. If a letter to the Governor is self-evident defection, then attending party meetings, participating in organisational decision-making, and travelling with the Leader of the Opposition is conduct that speaks at least as loudly.

In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana (2006), the Supreme Court addressed Independents directly. It held that the factum of joining a political party can be inferred from the facts and conduct of a member who may not have formally joined. This is the most directly relevant precedent. Conduct was enough.

The most recent and most applicable ruling came from the Kerala High Court in 2022, in the Keerampara Grama Panchayat case. A member had contested as an Independent, won, and subsequently declared herself as a candidate of CPI(M). The Court upheld her disqualification, holding that an Independent who makes a declaration of party affiliation after winning has “joined” that party within the meaning of the anti-defection law.

This is not new: past cases where Independents faced disqualification

In Uttar Pradesh in 1997, multiple Independent MLAs who supported the Kalyan Singh government and subsequently joined the ruling coalition faced disqualification petitions. The dispute went to the Supreme Court and became a landmark case on the interplay between splits, mergers, and defection. The core principle: the Tenth Schedule does not permit manoeuvres designed to circumvent its purpose.

In Goa, Independent MLAs who joined parties after election have faced repeated scrutiny. The former State Election Commissioner of Goa wrote a detailed analysis arguing that an Independent member who accepts a ministerial berth in a party-led government has effectively joined that party by operation of the principle of collective responsibility. He argued that the current framework provides “unbridled privilege” to Independent members who can “dance with the ruling party and also the opposition” while claiming allegiance to no one.

In Maharashtra in 2019, when Independent MLAs supported the formation of a government during the brief midnight swearing-in, questions were raised about whether their support constituted joining the ruling coalition. The episode was short-lived, but the constitutional issue was the same: at what point does an Independent's support for a party become “joining” under Paragraph 2(2)?

Why nobody files the petition

The case law is clear. The conduct is documented. The provision is absolute. So why does Pappu Yadav continue to sit in the Lok Sabha as an Independent while functioning as a Congress MP?

Congress will not file because Pappu Yadav brings them a Seemanchal voter base they cannot otherwise access. They denied him a ticket, lost the seat allocation to the RJD, and now benefit from his Independent status because it gives them an MP without the cost of a ticket. It is the cheapest seat Congress holds in Bihar: they did not contest it, they did not spend on it, and they enjoy its benefits.

The RJD will not file because it would elevate Pappu Yadav's relevance in a region where the RJD's own support base has eroded. Filing a petition would make Pappu Yadav a martyr in Seemanchal, precisely the outcome the RJD wants to avoid.

Other INDIA alliance parties have no incentive to disrupt a colleague who, however loosely, aligns with their coalition in Parliament. The result is a constitutional provision that every legal scholar knows applies, that every precedent supports, and that nobody invokes because the political incentives all point in the opposite direction.

The four gaps that make this possible

First, the Tenth Schedule does not define “joining.” It uses the word without specifying whether it requires formal enrolment, public declaration, acceptance of a whip, or voting in accordance with party directions. The courts have filled this gap through the Jagjit Singh and Ravi S. Naik rulings, but the absence of a statutory definition gives political actors the cover to claim that attending party meetings is not the same as joining.

Second, the Speaker has no suo motu power. The Tenth Schedule requires a petition from a member of the House. If no member files, no proceedings begin. This creates a perverse incentive: parties that benefit from the Independent's support will never file.

Third, there is no time limit for filing a disqualification petition. Unlike election petitions, which must be filed within 45 days, a Tenth Schedule petition can be filed at any point during the term.

Fourth, even if a petition is filed, there is no time limit for the Speaker to decide it. The Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020) expressed concern over inordinate delays and recommended that Parliament create an independent mechanism to adjudicate Tenth Schedule disputes. That recommendation has not been implemented.

What this means for democratic accountability

The voters of Purnea elected an Independent. They are represented by a Congress member who carries no party label, faces no party whip, and owes no party accountability. He is answerable to no one. He is disqualifiable by everyone. And he continues to serve because the parties that could end this arrangement have calculated that it serves them better than the Constitution it violates.

The Supreme Court in Ravi S. Naik said conduct speaks. The Constitution Bench in Rajendra Singh Rana said it speaks for itself. The Kerala High Court in 2022 confirmed that an Independent who acts as a party member after election has joined that party. The law has spoken. The courts have spoken. The Speaker has not.

That calculation is not a legal argument. It is a political convenience. And the Tenth Schedule was written precisely to prevent political convenience from overriding constitutional principle.

Author Bhavya Razshree is an Advocate practicing at Delhi High Court & Aditya Ashok is an IIM Mumbai Post Graduate. Views are personal.