Kerala's debate began with a crash involving a 19-year-old and a murder in which a 17-year-old stands accused. The law already reaches the gravest cases; international law points the other way, and the evidence is incomplete.
Society's emotional outbreak over recent incidents can be strong enough to move lawmakers, especially when it concerns children. Thinking deeper, I suspect the outrage comes from the lack of agency of the group "children": they cannot speak for themselves in this debate, so adults legislate on their behalf, in grief or in fear.
On 13 November 2026, Justice A. Badharudeen of the Kerala High Court observed, in an interim order in Vinod Vikraman Pillai v. State of Kerala (WP(Crl) 1746 of 2026), that it is "high time" to consider lowering the juvenile age to 16. The Women and Child Development Minister has said the suggestion deserves consideration, and the Home Minister has called for a review of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 (JJ Act).
The proposal looks like action. I argue in this article that it is not the right way to respond to the issue at hand: it does not fit the cases that prompted it, the law already reaches the gravest of them, it would widen an existing departure from the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and Kerala lacks the evidence a change would need.
1. When outrage sets the agenda
The petition cited the Nedumbassery accident, in which a 19-year-old allegedly drove under the influence of alcohol and killed three people. A 19-year-old is already an adult under the JJ Act, so lowering the juvenile age would have changed nothing in that prosecution.
The debate was also fuelled by where he was held: a Borstal School, as an adult offender (18-21). The Kerala Borstal Schools Act, 1961 defines an "adolescent offender" as a person convicted who is between 16 and 21 years of age. A borstal school is not a juvenile home. The remand drew widespread criticism on social media, and the discussion turned to the juvenile age.
The Home Minister tied the proposal to public feeling and cited the murder of 17-year-old Abhiram, in which a 17-year-old is among the accused. That case too falls within the existing framework.
Criminologists call this penal populism: sentiment after high-profile cases drives reform ahead of evidence (John Pratt, Penal Populism (2007); David Garland, The Culture of Control (2001)). The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child saw the same pattern in exceptions to the minimum age of criminal responsibility, usually created under public pressure, not a rational understanding of children's development (General Comment No. 24, para 25). The reports of the order do not refer to any study on maturity at 16. This heated discussion is another classic example of how social media and unacademic, not evidence-based, public discourse is putting a major proportion of the population into question, since the outcome would affect every 16- and 17-year-old in the State.
2. The law already reaches the gravest cases
Since 2015, a child above 16 accused of a heinous offence can be assessed by the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 15 and, if the Board so finds, tried as an adult under Section 18(3). In X v. State of Bihar (2026 INSC 728), the Supreme Court held that murder under Section 302 IPC is a heinous offence and upheld the transfer of a child to the Children's Court. So the mechanism is live and can reach a 17-year-old accused of murder. Whether Boards use it consistently is a question for data. It is not a reason to remove every 16- and 17-year-old from the juvenile system.
3. International law, and why 2015 is already the outer limit
Article 1 of the CRC defines a child as everyone under 18. General Comment No. 24 (2019) says child justice applies to all children under 18 at the time of the offence (para 29), and recommends that States allowing exceptions "because of the offence category" change their laws (para 30). India has heard this advice. The Committee expressed concern at the possibility of trying boys aged 16 to 18 as adults, and the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 adopted a uniform age of 18, as recounted in Salil Bali v. Union of India (2013) 7 SCC 705.
So Section 15 already departs from the Committee's standard. What makes it defensible is that it is narrow: limited to heinous offences, assessed individually and open to appeal. Lowering the general age would remove that narrowness. It would not refine the 2015 compromise; it would abandon its reasoning.
4. What the data can and cannot say
In Salil Bali, the Supreme Court refused to lower the age, saying that in the absence of proper data it would not depart from an Act reflecting Parliament's collective will. It noted that minors accounted for about two per cent of crimes in 2012, and the Verma Committee had also declined to recommend a reduction.
NCRB recorded 34,878 cases against juveniles in 2024, up 11.2 per cent and 77.7 per cent of juveniles apprehended were aged 16 to 18. Advocates will cite this, but a one-year rise does not show that the age line is the cause, and the 16 to 18 concentration shows who is apprehended, not who commits the gravest offences.
For Kerala, NCRB's Table 5A.1 records 331, 328 and 443 juvenile cases for 2020 to 2022. Beyond NCRB, publicly available State data is limited: the Kerala Police's published statistics cover offences against children, not by them. Every victim matters, but a State proposing to change who counts as a child should be able to show how many children are involved, and how that number has moved.
5. Adolescence and responsibility
The developmental case for treating 16- and 17-year-olds differently is long established. Steinberg and Scott argued in 2003 that adolescent immaturity diminishes culpability, and the US Supreme Court drew on that work in Roper v. Simmons (2005). Sawyer and colleagues argue that adolescence runs from 10 to 24, and General Comment No. 24 notes that adolescent brains keep maturing beyond the teens (para 22). This evidence supports assessment and rehabilitation, not a blanket cut-off. In the Netherlands, the 2014 Adolescent Criminal Law lets courts apply juvenile law to 18- to 23-year-olds, and adult trials of 16- and 17-year-olds fell from 2.1 to 0.2 per cent between 2014 and 2016. There is also a social argument: adult roles now generally arrive later than 18. Critics will say 16-year-olds once ruled, married and fought, but those roles sat inside different structures of kinship and dependency (Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood (1960), contested). In Kerala, most 16- and 17-year-olds are in classrooms, not workplaces: the State has among the highest school retention in India, and youth unemployment was 29.9 per cent in 2023-24.
6. A system that is not ready
In November 2025, the High Court issued 16 time-bound directions after finding vacancies in Boards and Child Welfare Committees, a shortage of probation officers and no regular social audits, citing non-compliance with the Supreme Court's Sampurna Behura guidelines. Nationally, 55 per cent of cases before Boards were pending, and one in four Boards lacked a full bench.
The police gap matters most, as police are first responders. The directions ordered Special Juvenile Police Units to be constituted where they had not been; in 2021 the State Child Rights Commission had told the Court that the units were not constituted as the Act envisages. On research, the available work is mostly small studies, such as an exploratory study of reintegration in Kerala. The published literature does not yet appear to offer a comprehensive study of why Kerala's children come into conflict with the law, or an independent evaluation of whether the system rehabilitates them. A system the High Court found falling short should show it is ready before it takes on more children.
7. What Kerala should do instead
Kerala should first audit Section 15: assessments conducted, children transferred, time taken and outcomes. It should publish annual data on children in conflict with the law by offence, age, district and outcome; implement the High Court's 2025 directions, starting with the police units; and commission independent research with a law university. And it should listen to children: Article 12 of the CRC gives them the right to be heard. Student unions, children's parliaments and child rights organisations can turn this into practice.
General Comment No. 24 also says what works: intensive family- and community-based programmes that change the home, school, community and peer settings behind serious behavioural difficulties reduce the risk of children entering child justice systems (para 9). Kerala should invest there. Nelson Mandela said in 1995 that "our children must be one of our highest priorities". Caring for children is an obligation the State owes them, not a favour it grants.
The question is not whether to take serious harm seriously, but whether to answer it with evidence or with outrage. A State that cannot yet show how many of its children offend, what happens to them, or whether they are rehabilitated should not redefine who counts as a child. As I always argue, we are never short of laws or regulations, but where we fall short is implementation.
Author is a Lawyer and child rights professional with an Advanced LL.M. in International Children's Rights from Leiden University, The Netherlands. Views are personal.