The Bombay High Court, while convicting 11 persons for the gangrapes and multiple murders in the Bilkis Bano matter, had said that the “truth and the falsehood are mixed up in such a manner that at every stage of investigation, the truth is hidden under layers of intentional laxity, omissions, contradictions, and falsehood, and the truth is required to be unearthed”.

Bilkis Bano was 21 years old when she lost all members of her family in the diabolical and brutal crime that was driven by pure communal hatred. Since then, she has knocked on the doors of the Supreme Court at least four times, reminding it that she is the one who lost everything. Yet, it seems like the focus remains more on the spelling of the word 'justice' for the purpose of 'reformation' and 'liberty' of the convicts.

Vide a two-page order, the Supreme Court bench comprising Justice MM Sundresh and Justice PB Varale on October 28 suspended the life sentence of two convicts, Bipinchand Kanaiyalal Joshi and Pradip Ramanlal Modhiya, and granted them bail based on the '17 years' of incarceration and considering that one of the accused persons is physically handicapped [SLP(Crl) No. 5265-5266/2026].

11 convicts were convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life by the Trial Court, which was upheld by the Bombay High Court on May 4, 2017.

The two convicts (who now got the relief of sentence suspension) filed Special Leave Petitions only in 2025.  A bench comprising Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice Vijay Bishnoi issued notice on March 17, 2026,  condoning the delay of '2935' days(8 years)

The suspension of sentence raises many questions, particularly on procedural fairness and the consideration of relevant grounds for suspending a sentence. Without issuing notice to the victim and affording her a right to be heard, the order simply states that issues of 'law and fact' arise in the present appeal.

Victim is not just any party but a necessary party

It is no longer an unsettled principle of law that the victim is not a mere spectator in a criminal proceeding which traditionally has been between the accused and the State. While the jurisprudence has long emerged to allow victims to file an appeal against acquittal of the accused(Mallikarjun Kodagali v State of Karnataka), it was in the Lakhimpur Kheri violence case that the Court made the rights of the victims to oppose bail and sentence suspension categorically clear.

While cancelling the bail granted to Ashish Mishra, son of Union Minister Ajay Mishra, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Allahabad High Court because the latter had denied the right of hearing to the victim. A three-judge bench made it clear that the victim has a right to participate in all proceedings, including bail hearings, particularly when she has herself come forward to participate.

"He/She has a legally vested right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of an offence. Such a 'victim' has unbridled participatory rights from the stage of investigation till the culmination of the proceedings in an appeal or revision", the Court observed in the Lakhimpur Kheri matter [Jagjeet Singh And Ors. v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu And Anr].

The principle laid down in this case came to be followed recently in the Unnao rape case, where the CBI challenged the bail granted to former BJP MLA Kuleep Singh Sengar, and the Court allowed the victim to be impleaded as a party. It was also followed in Ms X v State of Maharashtra(2023), where, in cancelling bail granted to a businessman accused of the offence of rape, the Court stated that even if the State is present in the proceedings, the right of the prosecutrix can't be whittled down. It stated that for serious offences where the witness is usually the prosecutrix herself, it is more necessary for the Court to hear her.

Granting a fair and effective right(Audi alteram partem) is one of the core principles of natural justice. In Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police(1985), the Supreme Court, in the context of an informant(who can also be a victim) who has set the criminal law into motion, said that the right of hearing, for it to be effective, must precede the decision-making process. 

This is a statutory mandate that was added to Section 439(1A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is now Section 483(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for the offence of rape committed against a minor.

Recently, the Delhi High Court extended the statutory scope to include that the prosecutrix under Section 376 IPC has a right to be heard and set aside a bail order because the Trial Court passed it without issuing notice to the victim.

Relevant considerations for suspension sentence

A sentence is suspended under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pending an appeal. The power exercised by Courts under this provision can't be mechanically exercised, as there has to be a due application of mind in assessing whether relevant factors have been considered, and such exercise of powers has to be cautiously used in offences of murder, rape, etc. They must record reasons for the same, as has been settled in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai and Others v. State of Gujarat(1999).

In Shivani Tyagi v State of UP (2024), the Supreme Court stated that in cases of short-term imprisonment, suspension of sentence is the normal rule. However, the position is reversed in serious offences and especially when the sentence is of life imprisonment. It particularly stated that the mere period of incarceration undergone by the convict can't be the reason to suspend the sentence because it would go against the very legislative intention of public interest and social security. This has been reiterated in Rajesh Upadhyay v State of Bihar(2025).

Further, another bench of the Supreme Court recently observed that a sentence in a heinous offence can't also be suspended merely because there is an unlikelihood that the appeal will be heard within a reasonable period of time [Hanuman Prasad@Hanuta Ram v State of Rajasthan (2026)].

The present case is a much worse case because the charges are more severe(Sections 143, 147, 148, 302/149, 376(2)(e) and (g) of the IPC). The crimes that were committed against Bilkis Bano were no ordinary crimes. She was gang-raped; her mother and her cousin, who had just delivered a baby, were also gang-raped and murdered. 8 minors, including the 2-day-old infant, were also murdered. Her 3-year-old daughter's head was smashed; her two minor brothers, two minor sisters, and her relatives and 3 other cousins were all murdered. These crimes were driven by communal hatred.

As per reports, Bano continues to face threats to her life and has left Gujarat after the two convicts were released.

It was on her plea that the trial was shifted to Maharashtra [TP (Crl)192/2004]. 

Their premature release, in 2022, apparently on 'good behaviour', had caused an uproar in civil society, and a batch of petitions was filed challenging it. In 2024, the Supreme Court had quashed their remissions, finding that not only had one of the convicts played fraud on the Court, but also that the Gujarat government had usurped the powers of the Maharashtra government who was the appropriate government to consider remissions. The Court had also recorded that the convicts had enjoyed liberal paroles and furloughs in prison.

The Court, while quashing their remissions, had observed :

"If the convicts can circumvent the consequences of their conviction, the peace and tranquillity in the society will be reduced to a chimaera. The courts have to be mindful not just to the spelling of justice but also the content of it. It is the duty of this court to correct arbitrary orders at the earliest and to retain the foundation of trust of the public...We cannot forget the conduct of the convicts, particularly, the one who had abused the process of this court. The deprivation of liberty is justified inasmuch as they have been erroneously set at liberty. One cannot overlook the fact that they were in jail for a little over 14 years, with liberal paroles and furloughs. The status quo ante must be restored. Plea of protection of liberties of these convicts cannot be accepted by us. The rule of law must prevail."

A pertinent question which should arise here is why the present case was not sent to a bench comprising Justice BV Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan that had the petitions challenging their remission.

While seeking interim relief, the two convicts argued that they were not named and the only evidence against them is that they were a part of the mob. To be convicted for unlawful assembly, does it require Bano specifically naming them?  In order to provide a counter-version of these grounds, the victim ought to have been issued notice and allowed to file a counter-affidavit.  

If convicts deserve a chance at remission or liberty, the least a victim deserves is a hearing.


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