The transition to the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (“IRC” or “Code”) was far from straightforward. The Code came into force[1] on 21 November 2025, but the subsumed enactments were not immediately repealed. This created uncertainty about the functioning of existing adjudicatory bodies. When the repeal was later declared retrospectively, further questions arose regarding the validity of actions taken under the subsumed laws during the transitional phase between 21 November 2025 and 2 February 2026. Subsequent notifications, legislative amendments, and judicial interpretation attempted to address the resulting uncertainty. The sequence of developments ultimately reveals how legislative gaps and judicial grafts shaped adjudicatory continuity under the Code. Much of this difficulty could have been avoided through a simple validating clause without inviting expansive judicial interpretation.
The article examines how gaps in the legislative design of the Industrial Relations Code compelled the institutional trinity of the executive, legislature, and judiciary to intervene to preserve adjudicatory continuity, with the interpretation adopted by the Karnataka High Court in Glastronix LLP v. Glastronix Karmika Sangha & Ors.[2] arguably supplying a casus omissus
I. Commencement: The First Transitional Uncertainty
The first source of transitional uncertainty arose at the stage of commencement itself. While section 104 of the IRC empowers the Central Government to repeal the subsumed legislations, such repeal is contingent upon the issuance of an express notification[3]. Although the Code came into force on 21 November 2025, the subsumed laws continued to operate as no express notification repealing them was issued until 2 February 2026. As a result, the legacy institutions such as Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals, and other adjudicatory authorities functioned within the new statutory regime. This created a baffling situation with respect to the position of adjudicatory authorities during the transition.
II. Executive Patchwork: The Removal Of Difficulties Order
To palliate the situation, the Central Government issued the Industrial Relations Code (Removal of Difficulties) Order through a notification dated 8 December 2025, clarifying that the existing Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals and National Industrial Tribunals would continue to adjudicate[4]. Although the Government attempted to resolve the issue through this interim measure, the notification soon became the subject of judicial scrutiny.
III. The First Judicial Test: Challenge Before The Kerala High Court
This notification was challenged before the Kerala High Court by way of a Writ Petition filed on 7 January 2026 in M.K. Suresh Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.[5]. The petitioners submitted that the notification was ultra vires the provisions of the Code i.e. Section 103(Removal of difficulties), Section 44(7) (Composition of Industrial Tribunals), & Section 55(1) (Transfer of pending proceedings). The petitioners also submitted that permitting adjudication of disputes by the existing Labour Courts and Tribunals would amount to sidestepping the provisions of the Code and would defeat the purposes of the legislation.
During the pendency of this proceeding, the legal position underwent a substantial shift with the issuance of retrospective repeal notifications by the Central Government.
IV. Retrospective Repeal And The Section 10 Reference Issue
The legal position changed with the issuance of two further notifications[6] dated 2 February 2026[7], which retrospectively repealed the subsumed legislations from 21 November 2025 and permitted existing authorities to function until the constitution of new corresponding bodies. This created a brief transitional period during which the Code was in force while disputes continued to be referred under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The retrospective repeal of the laws created a structural issue concerning the validity of such references. This raised an important question: how can a reference made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any action taken under the same Act between 21 November 2025 and 2 February 2026, remain valid if the Act itself has been retrospectively repealed from 21 November,2025.
The problem was then prompted by a legislative response aimed at clarifying the repeal framework and preserving institutional continuity.
V. Legislative Repair: The 16 February 2026 Amendment
In response to the perplexity created by retrospective repeal and the continued functioning of legacy adjudicatory forums, Parliament enacted the Industrial Relations Code (Amendment) Act, 2026[8]. The Amendment substituted Section 104 of the Code and introduced a statutory continuity clause, deeming the repeal of the earlier enactments to operate from the date of commencement while preserving the functioning of existing Tribunals and statutory authorities during the transition. While the February 2026 Amendment Bill[9] primarily clarified the mechanics of repeal and addressed interpretive concerns, the Amendment Act of 16 February 2026 marked a distinct legislative shift by statutorily re-anchoring institutional continuity through the insertion of section 104(1A).
Section 104(1), as amended by the Industrial Relations Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, provides: “1) The following enactments shall stand repealed on and from the date appointed in the notification issued under sub-section (3) of section 1, namely: (a) the Trade Unions Act, 1926; (b) the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; and (c) the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (1A) Notwithstanding such repeal under sub-section (1), the functioning of the Tribunals and statutory authorities functioning under the Acts so repealed shall continue to function till such Tribunals and other statutory authorities becomes functional under this Code.”
VI. Judicial Rescue: Continuity In The Courts
A. Kerala High Court Judgment
The Kerala High Court on 17 February 2026 held that the notification dated 8 December 2025 is not ultra vires the provisions of the Code, and permitting existing adjudicatory mechanisms and statutory authorities to continue till new mechanisms are put in place cannot be said to sidestep the provisions of the Code[10].
B. Karnataka High Court – Glastronix
In the case of Glastronix LLP v. Glastronix Karmika Sangha & Ors., WP No. 3784 of 2026[11], The petitioner challenged a reference order dated 19 December 2025 issued by the State Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, contending that once the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 had come into force and the repeal notification operated retrospectively from 21 November 2025, the statutory foundation for such reference ceased to exist.
The Hon'ble Court held:
(1) The Industrial Disputes Act was in force when the reference order was passed therefore, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would save the order of reference dated 19.12.2025.
(2) The Court after considering the amendment dated 16.02.2026, held that the Tribunals, the Labour Courts and other statutory authorities under the Act, 1947 will continue to have jurisdiction till the Tribunals are formed under the Code, 2020
(3) The Court held that the expression statutory authorities found in Section 104(1A) would also include the Labour Courts.”
The judgment therefore stabilized the transitional architecture of the Code. The Court filled the gap of adjudicatory vacuum with the grafts of judicial wisdom.
VII. Doctrinal Tension: The Glastronix Interpretation
While the Court adopted an interpretation to preserve adjudicatory continuity, the inclusion of Labour Courts within the expression “statutory authorities” under Section 104(1A) invites doctrinal scrutiny. The Code restructures the adjudicatory framework and does not expressly retain Labour Courts. The Amendment dated 16 February 2026 substituted section 104 yet, it did not specifically include Labour Courts. If the legislative intent was to continue Labour Courts expressly, such inclusion could have been made within the amendment itself. The judicial interpretation therefore appears to have overlooked the principle of casus omissus and seems to have supplied omissions left by the legislature. The doctrinal tension becomes evident when viewed in light of established Supreme Court jurisprudence on casus omissus.
In Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India, the Supreme Court observed: “Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself….” Further, in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, the Court emphasised: “The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do… Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency….. The Court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and amend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.”[12]
The interpretation in Glastronix appears to depart from the approach articulated in the above judgments. Such an interpretation arguably does not avoid the creation of a casus omissus, nor does it remain confined to the four corners of the statute. The Court also appears to have overlooked the presumption that the legislature has acted deliberately and that the omissions in statutory language should not ordinarily be filled by the Court. By treating Labour Courts as falling within the expression “statutory authorities” under Section 104(1A), the Court effectively expanded the textual scope of the provision without an express legislative basis. Instead, the judgment reflects a continuity-oriented approach aimed at preventing an adjudicatory vacuum, even if it requires stretching the statutory language beyond its textual boundaries.
VIII. Legislative Silence And The Absence Of A Validating Clause
While the notification (S.O. 464(E)) ensured institutional continuity, it did not expressly validate interim references, registrations, certifications, recognitions, or other actions taken between 21 November 2025 and 2 February 2026. An express validating provision, along the lines of the clause set out below, could have been included in the notification (S.O. 465(E)):
“Notwithstanding the repeal of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with effect from the 21st day of November, 2025, any reference made, proceeding initiated, registration granted, action taken, order passed, recognition accorded, certification issued, or any other thing done under the said enactments on or after the 21st day of November, 2025 and before the publication of this notification shall be deemed to have been validly made or taken as if the said enactments had continued in force for the limited purpose of such action or proceeding.”
Such language would have protected Section 10 references and other actions taken under the subsumed enactments, thereby eliminating jurisdictional ambiguity. No explicit validation was inserted. At the same time, it may be argued that Parliament relied upon the general saving principle under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 rather than incorporating an express validating clause within the notification framework.
The transition to the Industrial Relations Code shows how gaps in legislative design can shift the burden of continuity onto courts. The problem was not limited to the short period between 21 November 2025 and 2 February 2026. It also reflected the absence of careful transitional planning at the stage of implementation. The repeal notification could have accompanied the commencement of the Code. The statute itself could also have included a clear validating framework. Either step would have avoided much of the uncertainty. Even the later notifications could have expressly validated interim actions. In the absence of such safeguards, courts stepped in to preserve adjudicatory continuity through interpretation. The reasoning adopted in Glastronix therefore appears less as judicial innovation and more as a response to legislative silence, even if it raises concerns of judicial overreach. The transition ultimately reflects a simple lesson: where legislative gaps remain, judicial grafts inevitably follow.
End Notes & References:
Notification No. S.O. 5320(E), Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, § 3(ii) (Nov. 21, 2025), https://www.labour.gov.in/offerings/schemes-and-services/details/labour-codes-gzNzQzMtQWa ↑
Glastronix LLP v. Glastronix Karmika Sangha & Ors., NC: 2026:KHC:7984 ↑
The Industrial Relations Code, 2020, § 104 ↑
Notification No. S.O. 5683(E), Industrial Relations Code (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2025, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, § 3(ii) (Dec. 8, 2025), https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2025/268334.pdf ↑
M.K. Suresh Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., WP(C) No. 827 of 2026, filed on 7 January 2026, registered as WP(C) No. 824 of 2026 on 8 January 2026 before the High Court of Kerala (CNR No. KLHC010017432026; E-File No. EF-HCK-2026-001928) ↑
Notification No. S.O. 464(E), Industrial Relations Code (Removal of Difficulties) (Amendment) Order, 2026, https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/269763.pdf ↑
Notification No. S.O. 465(E), Gazette of India, https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/269764.pdf ↑
The Industrial Relations Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, (Feb. 16, 2026), https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/270186.pdf ↑
The Industrial Relations Code (Amendment) Bill, 2026, Bill No. 33 of 2026, Lok Sabha (India), available at https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-industrial-relations-code-amendment-bill-2026 ↑
M.K. Suresh Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., Neutral Citation 2026:KER:14042 ↑
Glastronix LLP v. Glastronix Karmika Sangha & Ors., NC: 2026:KHC:7984 ↑
Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India, 2005: INSC:369 (neutral citation); Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, 2001: INSC:388 (neutral citation) ↑
Author is an Advocate practicing at Patna High Court. Views are personal.