Minor Marriage As Per In Muslim Personal Law; Conflicting High Court Views

The legal debate centres on the interplay between Muslim Personal Law, under which puberty is generally presumed at 15 years in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and statutory provisions prescribing minimum marriage age and protecting minors from sexual offences, irrespective of religion. The divergence raises crucial questions on the validity and legal consequences of Muslim child marriages, whether a minor's consent can be a defence under POCSO, and whether courts can protect the liberty of adolescent Muslim couples without adjudicating upon the legality of their marriage.

The Puberty-Based Approach: Personal Law, Choice and Protection of Liberty

A line of decisions from the Punjab and Haryana, Delhi, Jharkhand and Gujarat High Courts has recognised the traditional position under Muslim Personal Law that a Muslim who has attained puberty may enter into a marriage contract. Article 195 of Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law provides that a Muslim of sound mind who has attained puberty may contract marriage, with puberty presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, upon completion of 15 years.

In December 2014, Justice J. B. Pardiwala, then a judge of the Gujarat High Court, upheld a minor Muslim girl's marriage, relying on the personal-law position that a girl who has attained puberty may marry without parental consent. However, in a subsequent ruling in September 2015, the Gujarat High Court adopted the contrary position that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act is secular legislation that prevails over personal laws in the event of inconsistency. This divergence demonstrates that the relationship between personal law and child marriage legislation has not been approached uniformly, even within the same High Court's jurisprudence.

In September 2022, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Javed vs State of Haryana, recognised the argument that a Muslim girl above 15 could marry a person of her choice under Muslim Personal Law while considering a couple's plea for protection. Similarly, in August 2022, the Delhi High Court in 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 793 observed that a Muslim girl who has attained puberty may marry without parental consent and reside with her husband, even if below 18.

The Jharkhand High Court in (2026 LiveLaw (Jha) 94) also relied on Article 195 of Mulla's work in considering a Muslim girl's capacity to marry under personal law.

Most recently, in September, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in (2026 LiveLaw (PH) 331) reiterated the relevance of the puberty-based principle in a protection petition involving a 17-year-old woman. The Court directed the police to consider the couple's representation in accordance with law while expressly refraining from ruling on the marriage's validity.

These decisions highlight the distinction between recognising a couple's claim to protection from threats and determining the validity of their marriage under all applicable laws. In particular, personal-law rules on marital capacity do not automatically override statutory restrictions under child marriage or criminal law. Courts adopting this approach have treated the attainment of puberty as relevant to a Muslim adolescent's capacity to marry without parental consent. The reasoning has frequently arisen in petitions seeking protection from family members who oppose a relationship or threaten the couple with violence.

The Statutory Supremacy Approach: Child Marriage Act and POCSO Override Personal Law

A contrasting judicial approach places greater emphasis on the statutory definition of a child and the overriding effect of legislation enacted to prevent child marriage and sexual exploitation.

In 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 361, the Allahabad High Court rejected the contention that Shariat-based principles permitting marriage upon attaining puberty could override the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act and POCSO. A Division Bench held that the statutory framework governing child marriage applies irrespective of religion and that personal law cannot displace the consequences prescribed by criminal legislation. The proceedings arose from allegations that individuals had assaulted and obstructed police and the Childline team attempting to intervene in an impending child marriage. The Court declined to quash the FIR, holding that the allegations warranted investigation.

The ruling directly challenges the proposition that puberty at 15 years necessarily establishes an unrestricted legal capacity to marry for all purposes. It treats the statutory minimum age for marriage and protections against sexual offences as matters governed by legislation rather than exclusively by personal law. The Court also took note of the divergence among High Courts and the absence of an authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement conclusively resolving the underlying conflict.

The distinction between marital capacity and criminal liability was further emphasised by the Delhi High Court in 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 928. In October 2026, the court declined to quash an FIR, rejecting the contention that a marriage under Muslim Personal Law could shield the accused from prosecution for sexual relations with a minor wife. The couple maintained that their marriage was consensual and that no force or coercion had been involved. They argued that the marriage under Muslim Personal Law should prevent criminal prosecution arising from their relationship.

The Court rejected the proposition that personal law could create an exception to a criminal statute where Parliament had provided none. It stressed that the question of whether a marriage had been contracted was distinct from the criminal consequences of sexual activity involving a person below 18 years. POCSO defines a child as any person below 18 years and criminalises specified sexual acts involving children irrespective of consent. The Court also referred to Section 42A of POCSO, which gives the Act overriding effect in the event of inconsistency with other laws.

The judgment underscores that even if a marriage is recognised under personal law, that recognition does not automatically remove statutory protection against sexual offences. Nor does a claim that the relationship was voluntary necessarily defeat the ingredients of an offence where the applicable law does not recognise a minor's consent as a defence.

Supreme Court's Dismissal Of NCPCR Challenge And Legal Position as of Now.

The Supreme Court's involvement in the issue arose prominently from the challenge to the Punjab and Haryana High Court's 2022 decision in Javed v. State of Haryana. The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) challenged the High Court's approach before the Supreme Court.

In January 2023, while entertaining the challenge, the Supreme Court directed that the Javed judgment should not be relied upon as a precedent in other cases. Despite the SC's direction, the P&H High Court relied on the javed judgment to allow a minor muslim girl to live with her husband. The matter subsequently assumed an unusual trajectory. In August 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed the NCPCR's challenge, citing that NCPCR has no locus to challenge the judgment. The dismissal, however, did not necessarily amount to a general declaration that Muslim personal law overrides every statutory protection applicable to children.

As of October 2026, the legal position is that the High Courts continue to reflect divergent approaches to the interaction between Muslim Personal Law and child-protection legislation. The Supreme Court's dismissal of the NCPCR challenge in August 2025 did not, by itself, conclusively settle the substantive conflict. Accordingly, the position cannot be stated as a general rule that attaining puberty permits a Muslim girl below 18 to marry free from the operation of statutory child-protection laws. The precise legal consequences must be determined under the applicable legislation and binding judicial precedents. An authoritative Supreme Court ruling on the broader conflict would provide much-needed clarity.

Way Forward: Reconciling Personal Law, Constitutional Liberty and Criminal Liability

The above judgments raise three distinct questions: whether a marriage is valid under Muslim Personal Law; whether couples are entitled to protection under Article 21 against threats and unlawful confinement; and whether sexual activity involving a spouse below 18 attracts criminal liability.

The existing statutory framework prescribes a minimum marriage age of 18 years for women and 21 years for men under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA), irrespective of religion. Separately, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) treats every person below 18 years as a child, irrespective of religion, and protects every person below 18 years of age against sexual offences. Neither statute creates a general religious exemption permitting a person below the prescribed age to avoid the operation of these legislations by invoking a personal law. Accordingly, a marriage contracted under Muslim personal law does not, by itself, create an exemption from the applicable statutory provisions or criminal liability for offences under POCSO. This distinction is central to understanding the conflicting judicial decisions. Personal laws may continue to govern aspects of marriage, but they cannot automatically be treated as a source of immunity from statutory criminal consequences. At the same time, courts considering protection petitions must address genuine threats to life, liberty and personal safety. Such protection can be granted without prejudging the validity of the marriage or the merits of any criminal

There is a general impression that child marriage happens only in Islam, but the statistics show that it happens in all religions and conflict with statute is an issue to be addressed forever.