Doctrinally Correct But Institutionally Problematic Approach To Kolhapur HC Bench Jurisdiction

Recently, the Bombay High Court has held that despite creation of a circuit bench, the principal seat will continue to retain jurisdiction. Apart from the legal impact, this decision is going to have wider repercussions for the cases which have been transferred or were due to be transferred to the circuit bench Kolhapur.

The Order dated March 06, 2026, delivered by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shekhar Champalal Pagaria & Ors. v. CFM Assets Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (Writ Petition No. 10011 of 2025) addresses a question of considerable constitutional and administrative significance: whether the establishment of the Circuit Bench at Kolhapur, divests the Principal Seat at Mumbai of jurisdiction over pending writ petitions where the underlying cause of action originates from districts falling within the territorial ambit of the newly constituted Circuit Bench?

The Divison Bench of High Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the Principal Seat at Mumbai had lost jurisdiction with the creation of Circuit Bench at Kolhapur. While the order is based on well-established Supreme Court precedents, it raises several critical questions about the effective functioning of Circuit Benches, the interpretation of Rule 3A of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, the balance between institutional convenience and litigant access, and the potential for strategic forum selection.

Genesis of the issue:

The writ petition challenged the order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) at Mumbai which remanded the matter for fresh consideration to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT).

The cause of action had arisen in Kolhapur. Location of the petitioner, respondent Bank and the loan transaction all was anchored in Kolhapur.

The Writ Petition filed at principal seat at Mumbai was sought to be transferred to the Circuit Bench at Kolhapur after its establishment vide Notification dated August 01, 2025. When the petition came up for hearing on January 29, 2026, the petitioners sought its transfer to the newly established Circuit Bench at Kolhapur.

Legal issue involved:

The issue is, does the establishment of a Circuit Bench, accompanied by Rule 3A of the Appellate Side Rules (which assigns jurisdiction over six districts from Western Maharashtra to the Circuit Bench), automatically divest the Principal Seat of jurisdiction over pending petitions where part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat?

The Division Bench rejected the petitioners' contention on several grounds, each anchored in well-established precedents:

The doctrine of cause of action and merger - Relaying on the Supreme Court's judgments in Nasrudin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1975), Kusum Ignots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004), and Ambika Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2007), the Court held that where the order of an appellate authority is challenged, the place where the appellate authority is located constitutes a substantial part of the cause of action. Since both the DRT (original authority at Pune) and the DRAT (appellate authority at Mumbai) fell within the Principal Seat's territorial jurisdiction, the Principal Seat retained jurisdiction.

The doctrine of merger- Based on the Constitution Bench decision in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Company Ltd. (1963), the Court reiterated that the order of the original authority merges into the order of the appellate authority in all three scenarios—reversal, modification, and confirmation.

Distinguishing the Single Judge's decision- The petitioners' primary reliance on the Single Judge's decision in Shri Shivneri Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. Rupee Co-operative Bank Ltd. (December 9, 2025) was rejected on factual grounds: in that case, the original authority (a Co-operative Court) was located within District Kolhapur, whereas in the present case, the DRT was at Pune—outside the Circuit Bench's territorial jurisdiction. The Division Bench also noted that the Volvo Group India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2024) precedent had not been brought to the Single Judge's notice.

Forum convenience- The Court observed that the petitioners themselves had contested the appellate proceedings at Mumbai and had originally chosen the Principal Seat to file the Writ Petition, thereby undermining their claim of inconvenience.

Firstly, the Court's application of the merger doctrine—holding that the DRAT's order at Mumbai constitutes a substantial part of the cause of action—is doctrinally sound and resists the temptation to venture into uncharted territory.

Secondly, the petition had been admitted, an interim order was operating, and the respondents were suffering restraint on their rights. Transferring the matter at this stage may have caused procedural delay, potential re-hearing, and uncertainty regarding the continuity of the interim order—all adverse to the interests of justice.

Practical Implications and issues arising from judgment:

This is perhaps the most significant issue with this decision. Rule 3A was introduced as part of a deliberate institutional reform, emanating from prolonged demands by the legal community and litigants of Western Maharashtra for accessible justice. The Supreme Court itself, in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982) and more recently in Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra (2025), recognised the need for decentralisation of judicial infrastructure.

If the Principal Seat can invariably retain jurisdiction over Writ petitions challenging orders of appellate authorities located in Mumbai—even where the entire underlying dispute arose in districts assigned to the Circuit Bench—then Rule 3A becomes, in practical effect, a dead letter for a substantial category of cases. This is because a very large number of statutory appellate authorities in Maharashtra (the DRAT, the ITAT, the NCLAT, the RERA Appellate Tribunal, MRT, CAT, MAT, Competent authority, under the new Land Acquisition Act of 2013, and several others) are located in Pune or Mumbai. Under the logic of this decision, any Writ petition challenging orders of these appellate authorities can always be sustained at the Principal Seat, regardless of where the underlying dispute originated. The Circuit Bench at Kolhapur would thus be rendered functionally irrelevant for a significant category of high-value commercial litigation.

The decision, in essence, creates a structural bypass around Rule 3A. While the Court is legally correct that cause of action arose partly at Mumbai, it does not adequately deal with whether the purpose of Rule 3A was to alter this default distribution. The omission is significant.

Maintainability vis-à-vis Entertainability-

Maintainability goes to the root of the matter — it concerns jurisdiction. If a maintainability objection is found to be of substance, the courts are incapable of even adjudication of disputes. In other words, if a writ petition is “not maintainable,” the High Court simply cannot hear it at all.

Entertainability, by contrast, is a matter of judicial discretion. A Writ petition, despite being maintainable, may not be entertained by a High Court for various reasons — relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite raising a sound legal point, if granting the claimed relief would not further public interest.

The recent judgment that drew a clear line between these two concepts is M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. The Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors. (Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 5393 of 2010, decided on February 1, 2023).

In the present case, the court could have relegated the case to Kolhapur bench while reaffirming the principle that the Principal Seat continues to retain the jurisdiction.

The petitioners' claim that the Principal Seat's jurisdiction had been completely extinguished represents one extreme of the legal spectrum, while the Court's decision to retain the case—though legally valid—occupies the other. This situation required a more nuanced 'middle path' that balanced strict doctrine with institutional goals.

The Court's reliance on the cause of action doctrine is technically unimpeachable under existing precedents. However, the precedents relied upon—Nasrudin, Kusum Ignots, Ambika Industries—were all decided in the contexts where the question was whether a High Court or a Bench also had jurisdiction, not whether it should exclusively retain jurisdiction in the face of a specific rule assigning matters to a newly created Bench.

Rule 3A is not merely a generic jurisdictional assignment. It is a specific, subsequent quasi-legislative instrument (made under the Chief Justice's rule-making power) that post-dates the general principles governing cause of action. The Judgment treats Rule 3A as if it were merely declaratory of existing jurisdictional principles rather than distribution of jurisdiction.

Issues with the local litigation:

The decision has a troubling implication for access to justice. Litigants from Kolhapur, Sangli, Satara, and other districts assigned to the Circuit Bench—many of whom may be small borrowers, agriculturalists, and small businesses engaged in SARFAESI disputes or any similar Appellate-Forum-Centric disputes—will be compelled to travel to Mumbai to pursue Writ petitions challenging such orders, even though the Circuit Bench was specifically established to bring justice closer to their doorstep.

This is not merely a theoretical concern. The financial burden of litigation in Mumbai—travel costs, accommodation, higher legal fees, and the associated opportunity costs for small litigants—is substantial. The Circuit Bench was established precisely to eliminate or reduce this burden. If the Principal Seat's jurisdiction is retained for all cases involving appellate authorities at Mumbai, the very purpose of the Circuit Bench—decentralisation and accessible justice—is significantly undermined.

While the Court acknowledges that the petitioners are the dominus litis (masters of the litigation), it does not adequately consider opposition to tranfer by the financial institution. The financial institutions, which are based in Mumbai may prefer the Principal Seat precisely because it is inconvenient for the borrower-petitioners. The judgment does not interrogate this power asymmetry.

Possibility of forum shopping:

The decision, in essence effectively creates a regime of concurrent jurisdiction between the Principal Seat and the Circuit Bench for all cases involving appellate authorities at Mumbai, Pune or districts retained with the Principal Seat. While concurrency is not inherently problematic, the decision gives no guidance on how this concurrence should be managed.

Respondent institutions (banks, asset reconstruction companies, large corporates) with resources and presence in Mumbai may resist transfers to the Circuit Bench, knowing that the Principal Seat's retention of jurisdiction has now been judicially endorsed. Conversely, petitioners from distant districts may be forced to litigate at the Principal Seat against their will, or may face contested transfer applications that add delay and cost to already protracted proceedings.

Forum convenience analysis:

The Court rejected the forum convenience argument on the ground that the petitioners had themselves chosen to file the Writ petition at the Principal Seat and contested it too. However, this reasoning is circular when scrutinised closely. The petition was filed at the Principal Seat because at the time of filing (prior to August 2025), the Circuit Bench at Kolhapur did not exist. They really had no choice. Once the Circuit Bench was established, they sought transfer at the earliest opportunity (January 29, 2026). To hold their pre-establishment filing against them penalises litigants for circumstances beyond their control.

The ramifications of the decision:

If this reasoning is applied consistently, it would equally affect the Aurangabad Bench and the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, as well as similar Bench arrangements in other High Courts across India. Any time a party challenges an appellate order passed by a Tribunal located at the Principal Seat, the cause of action doctrine would permit the Principal Seat to retain jurisdiction.

This has a cascading centralisation effect. The establishment of Circuit Benches and additional Benches of High Courts across India has been driven by a constitutional commitment to accessible justice—a commitment articulated by the Supreme Court, the Law Commission, and successive Parliamentary committees. If the cause of action doctrine is deployed as a gateway for the Principal Seat to retain jurisdiction over a wide swath of cases, the decentralisation project itself is placed in jeopardy.

If the legal community perceives that significant commercial matters—SARFAESI disputes, tax appeals, insolvency matters—will continue to be heard at the Principal Seat regardless of the Circuit Bench's establishment, the Circuit Bench may struggle to attract the quality of legal representation and judicial attention that it deserves. Over time, this could create a two-tier system within the same High Court, with the Principal Seat handling the “important” commercial work and the Circuit Bench handling only residuary matters. This would be deeply contrary to the purpose of the Circuit Bench's establishment.

What is the 'Way Ahead'?

The Rule 3A of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules as it stands today reads as follows:

Rule 3A: "All appeals, applications, references and petitions including petitions for exercise of powers under Articles 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India arising in the Judicial Districts of Kolhapur, Ratnagiri, Satara, Sangli, Sindhudurg and Solapur which lie to the High Court of Bombay shall be presented to the Registrar, High Court Circuit Bench at Kolhapur and shall be disposed of by the Judges sitting at Kolhapur."

This rule can be amended as follows:

Proposed Amendment to Rule 3A:

Insertion of Proviso and Transitional Clause

“Rule 3A shall apply mutatis mutandis to all pending matters.”

Proviso (Transitional Application): Notwithstanding anything contained in any other rule, practice direction or administrative order, all appeals, applications, references and petitions, including petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, arising from the Judicial Districts of Kolhapur, Ratnagiri, Satara, Sangli, Sindhudurg and Solapur, which are pending as on the date of commencement of this Rule, whether filed or admitted at any other Bench of the High Court of Bombay, shall stand transferred to and be placed before the High Court Circuit Bench at Kolhapur.

Explanation 1: Such transfer shall be automatic and without the necessity of any formal order, save and except where, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Chief Justice or a designated Judge directs otherwise.

Explanation 2: All interim orders, ad-interim reliefs, directions, and proceedings already passed or undertaken in such matters shall continue to remain in force and shall be deemed to have been passed by the Circuit Bench at Kolhapur.

Explanation 3: The stage of the proceedings in all such matters shall remain unaffected, and the Circuit Bench at Kolhapur shall proceed from the stage at which the matter stood immediately prior to such transfer.

Explanation 4 (Saving of Jurisdictional Objections): No objection as to territorial jurisdiction or maintainability shall be entertained solely on the ground of such transfer or presentation before the Circuit Bench at Kolhapur.

Explanation 5 (Administrative Facilitation): The Registry shall take necessary steps to ensure expeditious transmission of records, whether physical or electronic, and may issue suitable administrative directions to effectuate the transition.

Therefore, apart from clarity in administrative instructions and early judicial interpretation the aforesaid amendment of Rule 3A can smoothen the road ahead.

Author is an Advocate practicing at Bombay High Court. Views are personal.