Truth, Procedure And Judicial Discipline: Re-Examining Foundations Of Adjudication In India

The persistent assertion is that there is not a judicial exercise of discretion to decide a case as a private individual under the sway of them that goes along with instincts, pity or their private morality, a point being expressed in Indian constitutional and procedural jurisprudence. Instead, they have acted as institutional actors bound to law, precedent and norms of reasoned justification.

Meanwhile, courts increasingly emphasise that adjudication is a “journey towards truth,” posing the seeming tension: If truth is the supreme requirement, why is adjudication framed by inflexible procedural rules?

The Supreme Court's jurisprudential journey shows a continuous effort to reconcile the three imperatives of truth, fairness, and procedural discipline and does not allow one of those imperatives to overwhelm the others.

Rejection of subjective adjudication:

The Indian Supreme Court has emphatically rejected the notion that judges might decide cases based on personal predilections. In Medical Council of India v. Q.C.R.G. Memorial Trust, the Court supported the classical interpretation that a judge is not a “knight-errant roaming at will” but is to be guided by established principles and institutional discipline. 

Muzaffar Husain v. State of U.P. reaffirmed this position, arguing that a judge must decide cases strictly on the basis of the record and applicable law, and that reliance on extraneous considerations constitutes a failure of judicial duty.³ Further reinforcing this point, the Court reaffirms judges as agents of public trust, as well as requiring the highest level of integrity on their part.⁴

Truth as the core of adjudication:

The Supreme Court has made truth a central tenet of adjudication along with this discipline. In Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju Das v. Union of India, the Court articulated truth as the 'very soul of justice' and concluded that justice depends upon the achievement of truth, which means the innocent would be protected and the guilty punished.

These precedents build on Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar in which litigation saw that its “journey towards truth” were considered prior precedent. The Court has reiterated multiple times that adjudication is an activity in the face of evidence and not simply the surrender and acquiescence with competing narratives.

This obligation is particularly pronounced in criminal adjudication. Courts have underscored that judges must separate “the chaff from the grain” and ensure that suspicion does not supplant proof (Mohan Singh v. State of M.P., (1999) 2 SCC 428). In Munna Pandey v. State of Bihar, the Court emphasized that judges are not mere “mute spectators,” and may have statutory powers to solicit truth while doing so with impartiality.

But the legal system does not explore absolute truth in an impassable way. What courts want is a legally demonstrable truth, framed by evidentiary rules with their burdens of proof and procedural safeguards.

Procedure as instrument and constraint:

In the case R. Nagaraj v. Rajmani, the Court reaffirmed that procedural law was a “servant, not a tyrant,” intended to promote justice, not serve as an encumbrance on it. Likewise, in J.K. Jute Mill Mazdoor Morcha v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills, judicial rules were reiterated to be built to serve justice.

In Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, the Court warned that procedural and technical obstacles should not be allowed to deprive justice of substance. However, procedure is not always just instrumental. Some of the guarantees of procedural rules (a fair hearing, equality of arms, reasoned decisions, etc.) are natural parts of justice. In addition, the Court has held that in certain procedural rules, such as statutory timelines, “the law should be applied strictly in order to ensure the efficiency and certainty of the process.”

Thus, procedure does two things: (i) acts as a way to find truth and (ii) limits fairness and legitimacy.

Arbitration and Quasi-Judicial Function:

In Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), the Court held that arbitral tribunals play a quasi-judicial role in determining rights and liabilities (through adjudicative proceedings).

The rule of independence and impartiality has been highly observed. In Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. DMRC and Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd., the Court declared that these are the “hallmarks” of arbitration.

While the courts have discretion in arbitration practice, Section 18 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides that parties must be afforded equal treatment and a fair opportunity to make their case. Contemporary jurisprudence reflects a judicialisation of arbitration, both in principle and in practice, not only to guard against excessive variability in arbitration, but also to ensure that judicial arbitrariness is not a net negative.

Legitimacy and Constitutional Objectivity:

The legitimacy of adjudication is measured not just by outcomes but by process. The Court articulated the principle of neutrality in Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India, holding that public confidence is grounded in the impersonal application of objective principles rather than subjective preferences.

Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India similarly defined the fundamental principles of constitutional objectivity, that decision-making ought to serve neutral principles instead of personal or political considerations.

Reconciling Truth, Fairness and Procedure:

The jurisprudence discussed reveals a structured equilibrium: (i) Truth is the objective of adjudication, (ii) Procedure provides the discipline for its pursuit, (iii) Fairness operates as a limiting condition.

This is why courts sometimes favour fairness over factual completeness, for example, by allowing the benefit of doubt or omitting unreliable evidence. It also goes to the heart of why certain procedural rules are relaxed but strictly enforced, depending on context.

Indian adjudicatory process is well-developed, consisting of a sophisticated balance between competing values. Judges and arbitrators are not free moral agents, nor are they mechanical rule-appliers. They are institutionally limited decision-makers, who must find legally relevant truth through structured, fair and reviewable processes.

Truth-seeking and procedural discipline are at odds, but procedural discipline is not a defect but a defining characteristic of adjudication in a constitutional democracy.

Author is a Senior Advocate at Supreme Court of India. Views are personal.