Prosecution Suppressed First Dying Declaration Suggesting Accidental Fire: AP High Court Acquits Husband For Setting Wife Ablaze
The Andhra Pradesh High Court acquitted a husband of culpable homicide booked for setting his wife on fire, observing that the prosecution had suppressed the wife's first dying declaration given to the duty doctor where she stated that she suffered burn injuries during a fire accident while she was sleeping.Justice B.V.L.N. Chakravarthi held that the first dying declaration given by the...
The Andhra Pradesh High Court acquitted a husband of culpable homicide booked for setting his wife on fire, observing that the prosecution had suppressed the wife's first dying declaration given to the duty doctor where she stated that she suffered burn injuries during a fire accident while she was sleeping.
Justice B.V.L.N. Chakravarthi held that the first dying declaration given by the deceased before the duty doctor was more reliable and stood corroborated by the testimony of the couple's child witness which remained unchallenged.
The Court remarked:
"As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, Ex.P-13 was suppressed from the Court below by the prosecution. Ex.P-13 has not seen the light of the day, until cross-examination of P.W-12 for the first time. The reasons for not placing Ex.P-13 before the Court below are very clear. If Ex.P-13 is placed before the Court below, it will show that there are multiple dying declarations in the case. One recorded by the doctor, another recorded by the Police Officer and another by a Judicial Magistrate. The first dying declaration recorded in the case would be Ex.P-13 i.e., by the doctor at the time of admission of patient in the hospital.
The evidence of P.W-12 as well as P.W-13 both doctors would show that patient was conscious, coherent and in fit statement of mind to make a statement all throughout. Therefore, if Ex.P-13 is taken into consideration as first statement made by the victim/deceased, it is inconsistent with her later dying declaration recorded under Ex.P-12 and Ex.P-15 respectively. In fact, it is diagonally opposite to the statement made later. Probably to avoid the inconsistency, P.W-15 for the reasons best known to him suppressed Ex.P-13 statement recorded by P.W-12 at the time of admission".
Noting inconsistencies in multiple dying declarations the court said that the deceased in her first statement had stated that she was sleeping at the time of fire accident. In the later statement she stated that she poured kerosene on herself and then accused lit the matchstick.
"Therefore, it is the duty of the Court below to carefully attend not only the dying declarations but examine the rest of the materials in the form of the evidence placed before the Court...The trial Court did not refer Ex.P-13 and evidence of P.W-12. So, the trial Court ignored the material evidence. Simply based its decision on Ex.P-12 and Ex.P-15, though they are diagonally opposite to the statement under Ex.P-13. Hence, the finding of the trial Court is not based on material evidence placed before the Court," the court said.
Section 304 part II pertains to culpable homicide not amounting to murder where the act is done with the "knowledge" that it is likely to cause death, but "without any intention" to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
The case arose from the conviction of the accused by the Sessions Judge under Section 304 Part-II IPC for allegedly intoxicated and suspecting the fidelity of his wife, instigated her to commit suicide and lit a matchstick after she poured kerosene on herself, causing fatal burn injuries. The prosecution relied on later dying declarations allegedly recorded by a Judicial Magistrate and a Sub-Inspector of Police, wherein the deceased stated that the accused was responsible for the fire accident.
Challenging the conviction, the defence argued that the prosecution suppressed the earliest statement made by the deceased before the duty doctor and later proceeded on the basis that the Judicial Magistrate recorded it, though the Magistrate was not examined before the trial Court, while also relying on the testimony of the couple's minor son supporting the accidental fire theory.
Holding that only the earliest dying declaration was reliable and supported by the evidence on record, including the unchallenged testimony of the child witness supporting the accidental fire theory, the High Court found that the trial court wrongly relied on later inconsistent dying declarations, ignored material evidence, and failed to put the incriminating contents to the accused during examination.
The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal, acquitted the accused and set aside the conviction and sentence.
Case Title: Dudekula Somaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 678 of 2009
Counsel for Appellant: D. Purnachandra Reddy
Counsel for Respondent: C.P. Somayaji, Additional Public Prosecutor