1.Investigating Officer Must Be Given 'Free-Hand' While Probing Case Involving Serious Allegations: Andhra Pradesh High CourtCase Title: Pvhv Gopala Sarma v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh and OthersCitation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 25The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has held that in a case containing serious allegations, the Investigating Officer (IO) deserves a free hand to take the investigation to...
Case Title: Pvhv Gopala Sarma v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 25
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has held that in a case containing serious allegations, the Investigating Officer (IO) deserves a free hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion. Justice T Mallikarjuna Rao further observed that,
“The investigating officer, who has been prevented from subjecting the petitioner to custodial interrogation, can hardly be fruitful in finding prima facie substance in the grave allegations. The possibility of the investigation being effected once the petitioner is released on bail is very much foreseen. Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be considered along with other grounds while deciding an application seeking anticipatory bail.”
Case Title: THE MANAGING DIRECTOR v. JYOTHI PERAIAH
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 30
A Single Judge Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court comprising Justice A. Hari Haranadha Sarma, while dealing with an appeal contesting the sustainability of an award and decree passed by the Additional District Judge-cum-Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ongole, laid down certain advisory parameters to be followed in Motor Vehicle Accident claims cases while disputing negligence. The Court directed that in such cases-
- “There must be denial.
- There must be some evidence at least by the parties.
- There must be at least oath against oath and tested by cross-examination.
- Examination of eye witnesses reflected in charge sheet filed by Police is preferable. However, the same cannot be the thumb role, if the presence of such witnesses examined is probable at the scene of offence, at relevant time.
- The driver of the offending vehicle, if takes witness stand and denies the negligence, it will have its own importance, at least in cases of contributory negligence.
- In cases of serious disputes as to planting of either witnesses or vehicles, summoning the investigating officers and eliciting the probabilities or improbabilities will have considerable impact.
- The rough sketch of scene of offence and Motor Vehicles Inspector Report indicating the damage to the vehicles etc., will have its own effect to vindicate the stand of the parties.
- However, no stick jacket and standard formula is possible and each matter has to be considered on its own merits and facts and circumstances including the relevant and reliable evidence placed before this Court.
- Finally the Tribunal shall have holistic view of the matter.“
Case Title: Smt. K. Hamakshi v. State of Andhra Pradesh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 34
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has ruled that a daughter-in-law is an integral part of the family and is entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds.
The Court further noted that while the government recognises a son or daughter of the deceased government employee for compassionate appointment, the daughter-in-law, despite not being traditionally classified as family, should also be extended the same benefit.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sumathi Jagadam observed:
“After a daughter gets married, she becomes an integral part of the family she joins. Conversely, the daughter-in-law, who enters the family, becomes a vital member and has a more substantial right to request compassionate appointments to ensure the welfare of her children.”
Case Title: Vemagiri Raju @ Yesu, E.g.dt. v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 35
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has reiterated that if an accused person is identified by the prosecution witnesses before the Court, no separate identification parade is required.
Justice V. Srinivas made the observation while partly allowing a man's Criminal Revision plea challenging his conviction for causing death by negligence (under Section 304-A IPC) and one year sentence along with fine. In doing so the court modified the sentence imposed to six months instead of one year.
Referring to various Supreme Court pronouncements on this issue, the high court said:
"The said contention has no legs to stand in view of the categorical observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dana Yadav (referred to supra) by referring its earlier pronouncements in Dharamvir v. State of M.P., Mehtab Singh v. State of M.P. and Sajjan Singh v. Emperor that “if an accused person is already well known to the witnesses, an identification parade would, of course, be only a waste of time.”
Case Title: M/s. Sri Chakra Cements Ltd., v. The Employees Provident Funds and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 39
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that employees engaged by security agencies for the purposes of loading and unloading, office or factory maintenance and Pay Loader work are covered by the definition of 'employee' under Section 2(f) of the Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (“EPF Act”) and are entitled to the Provident Fund.
A Division Bench of the High Court comprising Chief Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur and Justice Ravi Cheemalapati held that the employees mentioned above cannot be equated with those persons who are “employed for a short period on account of some passing necessity or some temporary emergency beyond the control of the company” and are, thus, entitled to the benefits of the EPF Act.
Case Title: The Divisional Manager, Anantapur District v. B Gangamma, Anantapur District
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 45
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that a Hamali cannot be termed as a gratuitous passenger and comes within the ambit of 'third party' under Section 145(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
A Single Judge Bench comprising Justice Nyapathy Vijay, explaining the scope of Section 145(i), observed,
“The Section 145(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was amended vide the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 elaborating the term 'third party'. As per the amended definition, 'third party' includes any co-worker on transport vehicle other than the owner and the driver.
Case Title: The United India Insurance Co Ltd v. Karu Nukalamma
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 48
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that a daughter, whether married or unmarried, is a legal heir and therefore, a married daughter is entitled to stake a claim for compensation on the death of her father on account of a motor vehicle accident.
A Single Judge Bench of the High Court comprising Justice VRK Krupa Sagar however clarified,
“...eligibility to claim is one thing and as to how much is to be granted towards loss of dependency is another aspect. Every heir may not be dependent. Non-heirs may also be dependent. Simply because a daughter is married does not completely cease to be dependent. To what extent she is dependent on her father is a matter of fact and it is that fact which is required to be pleaded and proved and considered in such claims.”
Case Title: Kamma Aravind Kishore @ Kamma Aravind v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 50
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that confessional statements made by the accused during interrogation can be considered or looked into to connect the other co-accused and such a disclosure statement can be taken into consideration to provide a lead in the investigation.
Justice T. Mallikarjuna Rao further held that such a statement is admissible under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 30 provides for consideration of proved confession affecting the person making it and others jointly under trial for the same offence. It states,
“When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.”
Case Title: Batha Vamsi v. The State Station House Officer
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 52
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that the offence of rape cannot be considered as a mere physical assault, and adopting a liberal approach while granting bail in such cases goes against the interest of the society.
In this regard, a Single Judge Bench of Justice T. Mallikarjuna Rao, observed,
“The offence of rape is punishable by rigorous imprisonment for at least ten years, extendable to life imprisonment with a fine. Gang rape carries twenty years' rigorous imprisonment, extendable to life imprisonment with a fine. The offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner is grave in nature. In fact, rape cannot be considered as a mere physical assault. In an occurrence of this type, the resistance from the victim cannot be expected, there is no allegation that the victim was inimical or was acting against the instigation of somebody else. Therefore, the cases relating to granting of bail in offences of rape are required to be approached differently…”
Case Title: JAMMULA NANDASAI MITHRA v. THE STATE OF AP
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 58
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has allowed a writ petition for grant of additional compensatory time to a second year MBBS student suffering from cerebral palsy, during her examinations sought on account of her disability.
Justice Gannamaneni Ramakrishna Prasad, while granting a total of 4.5 hours instead of 3 hours to the petitioner to complete all the examinations concerning the MBBS course until she finishes the course, held,
“The success of the Writ Petitioner in the first year MBBS examinations after availing the compensatory time of 30 minutes made it evident that the extra 30 minutes was the one that made all the differences for the Writ Petitioner to succeed in the first year MBBS examinations. Although, it was stated by the learned Single Judge that it was not a binding precedent, the case of the Writ Petitioner is required to be assessed and evaluated based on the success in the first year MBBS examinations after availing the extra time. Having regard to the interpretation given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in respect of the socially beneficial laws governing the differently abled persons, this Court does not find any reason to reject the request made by the Writ Petitioner inasmuch as the Writ Petitioner was able to utilise the extra time that was given by this Court on the earlier occasion and pass the 1st year MBBS Examinations.”
Justice Prasad was of the view that the reasonable approximations should be made to give benefit to an individual suffering with any kind of benchmark disability rather than looking for any precision with regard to the degree of disability of an individual inasmuch as assessment to arrive at such precision goes counter to the provisions of the RPwD Act.
Case Title: Basuru Mani Bhushana Rao and Others v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 69
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that married sister-in-laws taunting their brother's wife for not being able to conceive child cannot be taken as sufficient grounds for continuation of proceedings under Section 498-A of IPC or Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Quashing proceedings against sisters of the husband (first accused), who were together accused of subjecting the wife of the first accused to cruelty and demanding dowry, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Harinath N, held,
“…the petitioners 3 and 4 after their marriage were staying away from the marital home of the 1st accused and the 3rd respondent. Even as per the complaint, the third respondent had joined the 1st accused and the petitioners 2 and 3 at Hyderabad. The only reference to the petitioners 3 and 4 is to the effect that, whenever they were visiting the home where the accused No.1 and the 3rd respondent were residing, they were taunting the third respondent for not being able to conceive, such vague allegations without any specific details as to on what date and when the said taunting was resorted to by petitioners 3 and 4 cannot sustain the scrutiny of law.”
Case Title: Akkala Rami Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 75
In a significant ruling, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, on 30.04.2025, held that the caste system is alien to Christianity and an individual, who converted to Christianity and actively professes and practices the same, cannot continue to be a member of the Scheduled Caste community and is consequently barred from invoking the provisions of the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
“The caste system is alien to Christianity. Having converted to Christianity and admitting his role as a Pastor in a Church the 2nd respondent could not invoke the provisions of the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,” the Court said.
Quashing charges filed by a complainant who had converted to Christianity and had invoked the SC & ST Act, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Harinath N. further held,
“The SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is a protective legislation introduced for preventing atrocities against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the present case, the 2nd respondent has misused the Protective Legislation though he is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act. The 2nd respondent had voluntarily converted to Christianity and was admittedly working as a Pastor in a Church for the last 10 years as on the date of incident. Thus, the 2nd respondent cannot be permitted to invoke the provisions of the Protective Legislation.”
Case Title: B VENKATESWARA RAO v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 83
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has allowed a plea of a B.Tech student whose result of 3rd Semester was withheld and subsequently was not allowed to attend classes of further semesters on account of low attendance due to two spells of sickness. The Court ordered the GMR Institute of Technology (Respondent 4), to publish the result of the petitioner and allow him to continue attending classes of the 4th Semester.
Subsequently, holding Academic Regulation No.9(b), on the basis of which the student's result was withheld, as irrational and arbitrary, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Gannamaneni Ramakrishna Prasad, held—
“The Regulation 9 (b) would indicate that even on medical grounds, lack of attendance can only be condoned to an extent of 10 % and not more than that. Therefore, this Court is required to examine whether such Regulation would stand to the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is a matter of common knowledge that sickness is beyond the human control. A variety of sicknesses can impair the functioning of the human being, thereby disabling the human being from attending to the normal duties. With respect to the things which are beyond the control of a human being, no specific Regulation can be issued, prescribing a limit for condonation of absence beyond a particular percentage of attendance. The present Regulation is not a Regulation which is prescribed by a Public Institution, but it is a Regulation prescribed by the Private College, which is Respondent No.4 - College, in the form of Academic Regulations. On the face of it, the Regulation No.9 (b) is not only irrational but highly arbitrary, inasmuch as no hard and fast rule can be laid with regard to the absence of a student on medical ground.”
Case Title: M/s. CBWTF Association of Andhra Pradesh v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 86
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has dismissed a writ petition challenging the adoption of new methodology for conducting gap analysis related to Common Bio Medical Waste Treatment and Disposal Facilities (CBWTFs) on the ground that such cases fall within the domain of expert bodies where the Courts should exercise judicial restraint.
Highlighting the importance exploring new methods for narrowing gaps for effective waste treatment, a division bench of Chief Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur and Justice Ravi Cheemalapati, explained,
“…it is needful to note that inadequate number of treatment facilities and treatment facilities with inadequate capacity to treat the waste generated may result in unscientific disposal of bio-medical waste to the detriment of public health. The guidelines and the methodology for conducting gap analysis must aim to ensure effective treatment of bio medical waste for protection of environment and public health. Therefore, the concerned Pollution Control Boards must always strive to explore the new methods and modalities to narrow down the gaps, if any, for ensuring compliance of the object of guidelines. Any attempt to curtail them from switching on to new methodology based on studies and adopting the methods followed by the nations across the globe would entail derailment of State's Constitutional obligation for providing pollution free environment and protection of natural environmental resources.”
Case Title: M/s Acme Fitness Pvt Ltd v. The State Of AP and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 87
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that while treadmills, dumbbells, rotators and fit-kit exercise kits, cannot be associated with one specific sport, these equipment are nonetheless used by sports persons to maintain physical fitness and thus fall in the description of “sports goods”.
While allowing a writ petition of a dealer of gym equipment who contended that such equipment related to sporting equipment, a Division Bench of Justice R. Raghunandan Rao and Justice B.V.L.N. Chakravarthi, explained,
“Weight lifting equipment, is connected to the sport of weight lifting and would therefore qualify to be treated as sports goods, even according to the interpretation placed by the 5th respondent that only goods which are directly associated with a sport can be treated as sports goods. The other goods, such as treadmill, dumbbells, rotators and fit-kit exercise kit cannot be associated with any one specific sport. However, the fact remains that every sports person has to maintain physical fitness and the goods mentioned are used for maintaining such physical fitness. In such circumstances, the goods mentioned above would also answer the description of sports goods as these goods are needed by sports persons to maintain themselves physically and to achieve the necessary physical fitness to participate in any physical sport.”
Case Title: National Insurance Company Ltd. v. K. Lakshmi
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 94
The Andhra Pradesh High Court, on 09.05.2025, held that an excavator, which is a “mechanically propelled machine”, comes within the definition of 'motor vehicle' under Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the 1988 Act”)
Section 2(28) enacts that a 'motor vehicle' or 'vehicle' means “any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding twenty-five cubic centimeters.”
In this regard, Justice V.R.K. Krupa Sagar further explained,
“The above definition informs that a motor vehicle is a mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads, whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source. The definition has an exclusionary principle stating that vehicles running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in factories or enclosed premises and vehicles of less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding 25 cubic centimeters. In the case at hand, the excavator was not on any enclosed premises, and it was not a vehicle with engine less than 25 cubic centimeters or less. At the material point of time, it was not in any factory or closed premises. It was in a public place. It was also not on fixed rails. Therefore, it does not fall within the exclusionary clause of motor vehicle.”
Case Title: X v. Y
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 105
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that criminal case filed by a wife to embarrass and incarcerate her husband and his family members, when in reality they are not guilty, causes persistent trauma and humiliation in social circle, and constitutes mental cruelty and is a ground for divorce under Hindu Marriage Act.
Applying this principle to a case where the wife's allegations resulted in the husband and his parents facing prosecution and eventual acquittal, a Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tihari and Justice Challa Gunaranjan held,
"Mental cruelty cause much serious injury than physical harm. The criminal cases filed by wife to embarrass and incarcerate the husband and his family members cause persistent trauma, humiliation in social circle which amount to mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of H.M.Act, and particularly when in reality they are not guilty and so acquitted. Such can only be imagined by others. Its difficult to prove mental cruelty and therefore the normal rule which governs the criminal proceedings is that it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt"
“We are of the considered view that the act and conduct of the wife in filing the criminal complaint in C.C.No.228 of 2003 under Section 498-A IPC against the husband and his parents in which they had to obtain bail and were finally acquitted as the allegations were not proved was a conduct causing mental cruelty, and agony to the husband. It amounted to mental cruelty and furnished a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the H.M.Act,” it added.
Case Title: VISWANATHAN KRISHNA MURTHY v STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 115
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that a transgender woman in heterosexual marriage can file a complaint against her husband and in-laws under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
Justice Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa emphasized that a transgender woman, identifying as a female and living in a marital relationship with a man, cannot be excluded from the protection of laws meant to safeguard women from dowry-related harassment and cruelty.
"A transwoman in a heterosexual relationship, cannot be deprived of her right to lodge a complaint against her husband or the relatives of her husband," it observed.
19. 'Ganja' Seeds, Leaves Not Banned Under NDPS Act: Andhra Pradesh High Court
Case Title: Killo Subbarao and Others v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 118
In a judgement dated 23.06.2025, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that the definition of 'Ganja' under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), is limited to the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant, and excludes from its ambit the seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops.
Justice Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa explained,
“As rightly put by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the definition of Ganja under NDPS Act takes in its ambit only the flowering or fruiting tops of cannabis plant and excludes the seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops. Thus, the definition of 'Ganja' is restricted and it does not include the seeds and leaves of Ganja plant.”
Case Title: AP Judicial Office Sub Ordinates Association v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 123
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has dismissed a plea by the AP Judicial Office Subordinates Association, which challenged the practice of office subordinates of District Courts being made to perform unofficial domestic duties at the residences/quarters of Judges, often beyond regular working hours.
The petitioner had relied on a Circular dated 24.02.1992 (Circular of 1992), issued by the Registrar (Administration) of the erstwhile combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh– to argue that the said Circular did not include any domestic services which office-subordinates were mandated to perform.
A Division Bench of Justice R. Raghunandan Rao and Justice Sumathi Jagadam, relied on the case of T.M. Mani Kumar vs. Registrar (Administration), High Court of A.P., Hyderabad and Anr (T.M. Mani Kumar 2005)—where the Andhra Pradesh High Court had dismissed a contention that the Circular of 1992 acts as a bar against any domestic duties, and held—
“…it would have to be held that the Circular of 1992 is not an exhaustive list of the duties that are to be performed by office subordinates and other duties may also be given to the office subordinates. The practice in the District judiciary has been that a certain number of office subordinates are attached to the residences of the Judicial Officers for domestic duties. In such circumstances, the claim of the deponent to the affidavit that domestic duties are not part of the duties of the office subordinates cannot be accepted.”
Case Title: KADURU CHINNAPPANNA v/s STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 125
In a case concerning allegations on use of adulterated ghee for preparing laddus offered as prasadam at Tirumala Tirupati Temple, the Andhra Pradesh High Court said that CBI Director overreached Supreme Court's directions by nominating an officer as IO to conduct the probe who was not part of the SIT constituted under the apex court's directions.
Justice Harinath N in his order noted that SIT was first formed by the State last year which was reconstituted with the directions of the Supreme Court of India and the respondent no. 10 J Venkat Rao "is not specifically named as Officer representing the State in the SIT constituted in pursuance" of the apex court's directions.
The court referred to Supreme Court's orders in the matter and observed that it made clear that investigation should be conducted by an independent SIT consisting of the five members and the investigation was entrusted to the independent agency consisting of these members, adding that in such circumstances the "CBI could not have nominated the respondent officer contrary to the apex court's directions.
"The submissions of the learned standing counsel that the Director, CBI is empowered to nominate the 10th respondent as investigating officer is unsustainable. The judgments relied upon by the learned standing counsel cannot be made applicable to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. The case on hand involves religious sentiments of the crores of devotees and the cloud on the invaluable sacredness of the Laddu Prasadam is being investigated... Inclusion of 10th respondent as investigating officer over and above the number of reconstituted SIT is not permissible and would certainly over reach the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Director, CBI could not have directed the 10th respondent to conduct investigation. The said direction is contrary to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 of the WP.(Civil).No.622 of 2024. The proceedings dated 28.10.2024 has been issued by the Director overreaching the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India".
Case Title: Veladi Suguna Shekara Rao v. The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 126
The Andhra Pradesh High Court had quashed criminal proceedings against a Senior Journalist and Editor of Sakshi Daily Newspaper, who was charged under Section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for publication of an article titled “Ummadi Krishnajillalo Arachakam”, which was alleged to be premised on false information having the potential to instigate violent riots and mislead the public.
For reference, Section 353(2) penalises anyone who makes, publishes or circulates any statement or report containing false information, rumour or alarming news, including through electronic means, with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or both.
Justice Harinath N., finding no element in the article that could instigate or promote enmity between groups, reiterated that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution not only guarantees freedom of speech and expression but also protects the right of an individual to listen, read and receive speech and article.
The Single Judge further observed,
“Registration of Crime on receipt of a complaint regarding publication of article which neither resulted in promoting enmity between groups nor did it incite any commotion or rights. This Court is of the considered view that the Law is well settled on the Freedom of Speech and Expression and the Freedom of Press has to be protected for ensuring that information from all angels would reach the masses. For every issue there can be a 360° degree dimensional view and as such views from different angles cannot become subjects of criminal complaints. In the event the article is defamatory it is always open for the person so defamed proceed damages by during the extent of defamation which the article allegedly caused.”
Case Title: V D MOORTHY v. THE STATE OF AP and others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 147
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that the power of a police officer under Section 179(1) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to secure the attendance of “any person”, is territorially restricted to persons residing within the limits of his own police station or any adjoining station, and the power, therefore, does not extend to persons residing beyond his jurisdiction. It further added that a policeman cannot secure the presence of such a person “as a matter of right.”
Section 179(1) authorises a Police Officer to secure the presence of “any person” subject to two conditions—- (1) if such person appears to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case, and, (2) if such person resides within the limits of his own Police Station or any adjoining station. However, the first proviso to Section 179(1) prescribes exceptions to the above-mentioned power and exempts a—- (i) male person under the age of 15 years or above the age of 60 years, (ii) woman irrespective of the age, (iii) mentally or physically disabled person, and (iv) person with acute illness. Further, under the second proviso, if such a person is willing to attend at the police station, he/she may be permitted so to do.
Explaining the application of the first proviso, Justice Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa observed–
“The proviso, referred to supra, makes it clear that the Police Officer can issue an order in writing to them by virtue of the power under Section 179(1) of BNSS, but he cannot secure their presence before him as a matter of right. Meaning thereby, the said persons have no legal obligation to appear before him in obedience to the notice under Section 179(1) of BNSS, in the light of the exceptions. Such being the case, the Police Officer can examine such person at his residence. If any person receiving notice falls into one of the categories mentioned above, he is not bound to attend before the Police Officer. His failure to attend would not lead to any legal action. The object of this proviso appears to be, such persons, being vulnerable, cannot be troubled by the Police Officer in the name of investigation.”
Case Title: M SREENIVASULU v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH and others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 153
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has directed the CID to seize all records relating to an alleged scam in the Parakamani process, and has subsequently set aside a Lok Adalat proceeding which compounded the offences framed against the accused– Sri C.V. Ravi Kumar, under Sections 379 (theft) and 381 (theft by clerk or servant of property in possession of master) of IPC, and acquitted him.
The Parakamani process is a traditional system followed at the Tirumala Venkateswara Temple by the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams (TTD), which involves counting and handling of Hundi offerings made to the temple.
While hearing a writ petition filed by M Sreenivasulu, who demanded a CID probe into the alleged scam in Parakamani, Justice Gannamaneni Ramakrishna Prasad directed,
“The IG, CB-CID, is directed to forthwith seize the entire record relating to F.I.R.No.24/2023 registered in Town-I Tirumala Police Station including the Proceedings before the Lok Adalat in Lok Adalat Case No.582 of 2023. The said Officer is also directed to seize the entire record from the TTD relating to the Board Resolutions, if any, and any other Proceeding made by any Official of the TTD and submit the same to the Court (properly sealed) for perusal before the next date of hearing through the Registrar (Judicial).”
Case Title: Guduri Rajani v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 155
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has set aside a 2022 seniority list which made a category of District Judges junior to another category from the same recruitment process, on the grounds that the date of appointment were different.
For context— the dispute arose after the State, in 2022, citing different dates of appointment under 10% accelerated and 65% promotion quotas, altered a 2017 seniority list that was prepared using the mandatory 40-point roster. The list so altered effectively placed the petitioner District Judges below the respondents on the ground that the date of appointment determines seniority.
The Court referred to the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service Rules 2007 (2007 Rules) which prescribe the method of recruitment and other conditions of service of District Judges, Senior Civil Judges, and Junior Civil Judges. Rule 13(a) prescribes seniority of a person appointed to the category of District Judges by direct recruitment as well as by transfer that it shall be fixed as per 40 point roster prescribed in Schedule-A. Further, Rule 13(b) provides for seniority of persons appointed to the category of Civil Judges by direct recruitment of transfer which shall be fixed as per 20 point roster prescribed in Schedule-B of the Rules.
In light of these provisions, Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam observed,
“The date of notification for the appointment to the post of District Judge under 65% promotion quota as also under 10% accelerated recruitment by transfer quota being of the same date 31.03.2015, for the same recruitment year 2015, the process for both the quotas having been completed and the result declared on the same date 14.11.2015 and also the selection list by the High Court having been sent to the Government for issuance of the Government Order for their appointment being the same date 24.11.2015 and after issuance of the Government Order, though on different dates, the posting orders also having been issued on the same dated 19.02.2016, merely because in the case of the selectees/appointees under 65% promotion quota, the Government Order was issued on 20.01.2016 whereas in the case of the petitioners under 10% accelerated recruitment by transfer quota, the Government Order was issued later on, on 08.02.2016, the petitioners cannot be made junior to all the 65% quota appointees based on the date of the Government Order for appointment. That would be contrary to the legislative mandate under Rule 13(a) of the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service Rules 2007”
The Court further noted that seniority of District Judges must be fixed in accordance with the 40-point roster system stipulated in Schedule-A, and not on the sole basis of date of appointment. The legislative intent required application of the roster system, and the same cannot be defeated by the State by making one category of persons junior to the other category. The Court thus held,
“As per Rule 13(a) of the Rules 2007, by which the seniority is to be determined of the District Judges of the persons appointed by direct recruitment as well as recruitment by transfer, it is to be fixed as per the roster points given in Schedule-A. When that is the legislative intent, we are of the view that either by its action or inaction, the State / Executive cannot act contrary to the legislative intent and take away the service benefits i.e., seniority position from one category or the other by issuing the appointment orders on different dates, making one category senior to the other.”
Case Title: Chittiboyina Bharata Rao v. The Krishna District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd and Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 163
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that financial incapacity cannot be used as a defence by the State institutions for non-fulfilment of statutory obligation to provide terminal benefits to its employees, and shirking of the responsibility to release the same amounts to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court was dealing with a case where terminal benefits were denied to retired employees of Krishna District Cooperative Central Bank (DCCB) (Respondent 1)— an institution falling within the ambit of “State” under Article 12, on the grounds that Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society (PACS)-(Respondent 3)— to which the petitioners were initially deputed, expressed financial incapacity to release its contributory share.
Referring to a Memorandum of Intent of 2013 which prescribed the scheme pertaining to payment of terminal benefits to retired employees, Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam held,
“…respondents 1, 3 & 4, being the 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India coupled with the fact that specific terms and conditions in Memorandum of Intent dated 11.01.2013, the said respondents 1, 3 & 4, are bound to release the terminal benefits to the petitioner. A mere financial incapacity or paucity of funds cannot be a valid defence for non-fulfilment of such statutory obligations, more particularly, when the employees rendered their services, as such, they are entitled to terminal benefits under law.”
Case Title: Katru Rekha v. State of Andhra Pradesh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 164
In a significant ruling, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has expressed a dire need for the State to mainstream the transgender community— which lie at the “bottom of social backwardness", and to subsequently take affirmative action for their inclusion in all spheres of life, including public employment.
In this regard, Justice Nyapathy Vijay stated,
“As the origin of the problems of transgender persons in India lies in stigma and discrimination they face in family and society, resulting in their exclusion from the socio-economic-cultural-political spectrum, there is a dire need to mainstream them and the adoption of an inclusive approach in all spheres of life including affirmative action by the State in public employment. The purpose of carving out an exception to the right of equal opportunity in employment by the introduction of Article 16(4) and 16(4A) of the Constitution of India is only to ensure that socially and economically backward communities are also allowed to come into the forefront of society and ensure intergenerational equality. The transgender community is not only socially and economically backward, but has also been abandoned by society. In these circumstances, the State has a moral obligation under the Constitution to take affirmative action on behalf of such communities.”
Case Title: V CHENCHAIAH NAIDU v. THE STATE OF AP and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 169
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has allowed an appeal of an ex-serviceman, who sought to sell land assigned to him under the ex-servicemen quota but was denied by the District Collector (DC) on the ground that the allotment was made while the appellant was serving in the Indian Army and was thus purportedly irregular.
Referring to a 2022 Circular of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, which permitted applications for assignment of land to be made by serving soldiers also, a Division Bench of Justice R. Raghunandan Rao and Justice Subhendu Samanta held,
“This Court had not been shown any provision of law nor has any material been placed before this Court, to support the contention that only Ex-Servicemen can be assigned land under the Ex-Servicemen quota and no serving member of the Armed forces can be assigned land. Further, the circular of Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, referred to, by the learned counsel for the appellant, clearly provides for assignment of the land to the serving members of the armed forces. In such a situation, the lands assigned to serving members of the Armed Forces, cannot be resumed nor can such an assignment be treated as illegal or irregular.”
Explaining the relevance of assigning land to ex-servicemen, the Division Bench observed,
“The objective of assigning land to Ex-Servicemen is as a measure of demonstrating the gratitude of the nation to persons defending its borders and people. It is also, in a manner, an incentive for volunteers who serve, in the Armed Forces of India. Such an objective, cannot be whittled down, by bureaucratic procedure and officials raising a contention that serving members of the Armed Forces should not be assigned land.”
Case Title: THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAJOLA JAGANNADHA REDDY AND ORS
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 170
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that in our society, land is loved like mothers, and the acquisition of land by the Government for public purposes upon an executive promise of compassionate employment to displaced persons or their family members makes the Government duty-bound to fulfil the same within reasonable time and without raising technicalities on flimsy grounds.
A Division Bench of Justice Battu Devanand and Justice A. Hari Haranadha Sarma explained that while compassionate appointment for land displaced persons cannot be claimed as a matter of right, a Government scheme specifically formulated for rehabilitation and employment of a member of the uprooted family to ensure social security binds the State to implement the same in true letter and spirit. The Division Bench further stated,
“The Governments itself framing the policies for providing jobs to the displaced persons whose lands were acquired for various public purposes, to ventilate the grievances and the hardships being faced by them with a laudable intention by making certain promises to those displaced persons. Then, it is the duty and responsibility of the State Authorities to fulfil the promises made in such policies without raising any technicalities or on flimsy grounds. What the State authorities have to consider is (1) whether the applicant is really displaced person or dependant of the displaced family or not? (2) Whether the candidate is eligible and suitable as per the respective schemes? Besides this, it is the duty and responsibility of the State Authorities to fulfil all promises made to the displaced persons within time frame to provide immediate rehabilitation to them to overcome from the hardships they have to face immediately after displacement from their lands.”
The Court added,
“In our society, no one can forget the attachment of people with their lands. Nobody, normally, will be ready to lose their lands, as they love it like their mother. But, when such lands are required for public purposes, though the owners of the lands are not agreeing to give their lands, Government is acquiring the lands as per Land Acquisition Act and the political executive is making several promises, like to provide employment to one member in the displaced persons family, as they are deprived of livelihood. If such promises are not fulfilled within reasonable time by raising technicalities and on flimsy grounds, the people loose trust on the State Executive. It makes them painful and then, it may leads to unrest. As such, State has to avoid such situations by implementing the rehabilitation schemes properly and promptly.”
Case Title: JAYAMANGALA VENKATA RAMANA v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH and Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 176
In a significant ruling, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has clarified that the Chairman of the State Legislative Council is not insulated with any constitutional immunity nor vested with absolute discretion to indefinitely sit on a resignation submitted by a Member, and its role is limited to determining, within a “reasonable time”, whether such resignation was tendered voluntarily.
The Court was dealing with a writ petition filed by Jaymangala Venkata Ramana— an elected Member of the Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Council, who assumed office from 23.03.2023, and tendered his resignation on 23.11.2024. However, the Chairman of the Council did not act on the resignation and such inaction compelled the petitioner to file a writ petition.
The Court referred to Article 190(3) of the Constitution— which governs resignations tendered to the Chairman, the Proviso of which was added by the Constitution (Thirty-third) Amendment Act, 1974, to authorise the Chairman to conduct inquiry into the voluntariness of the resignation, and reject the same if the Chairman is satisfied that such resignation is not voluntary or genuine. Reference was also made to sub-Rule (2) of Rule 190 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council (“Council Rules”) which stipulates that when a Member tenders his resignation personally and informs the Chairman during personal interaction that the resignation is voluntary and genuine and if the Chairman has no information or knowledge to the contrary, the Chairman may accept the resignation immediately.
Referring to the Parliamentary Debates of the 33rd Amendment and noting that an inquiry by the Chairman was envisaged to be undertaken within a fortnight, or maximum one month, Justice Gannamaneni Ramakrishna Prasad held,
“… the time line taken by the Hon'ble Chairman in initiating the process of inquiry (vide letter dated 08.09.2025) and calling for personal interaction after more than 2 ½ months is held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and as a necessary corollary has also offended the Wednesbury Principle of Reasonableness. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Rules do not contemplate that the Hon'ble Chairman is obligated to undertake a pathological diagnosis for ascertaining casual factors that had led the Member to voluntarily tender his resignation. Caution is indicated by the law makers during the 33rd Constitutional Amendment debates that the Speakers/Chairmen are expected to exhibit the exemplary characters of fairplay, neutrality and impartiality besides being apolitical.”