“Punitive & Stigmatic”: AP High Court Reinstates Probationary Judicial Officer Discharged Over Alleged Misconduct Without Inquiry

The petitioner was posted as Additional Junior Civil Judge at Rayachoti, Kadapa District. During her training at the Andhra Pradesh Judicial Academy, two particular incidents were reported which lay the genesis of her suspension and later discharge.

The first related to an incident when, in 2018, she was assigned to observe proceedings in a particular courtroom, and instead of doing so, she was allegedly found sitting in another courtroom beside a male trainee judicial officer, and talking, thereby causing disturbance. The second related to an alleged incident which occurred at the field survey training, wherein officers were divided into Andhra Pradesh and Telangana groups, and the petitioner was alleged to have remained with a male trainee from the Telangana group, and conversing instead of participating with the assigned group.

In light of these incidents, the Director of the Andhra Pradesh Judicial Academy sent a suo-motu report regarding the incidents, and based on the same, the petitioner was suspended in 2018, and issued a show-cause notice. However, despite her response, the Administrative Committee and Full Court later resolved that she was not suitable for the post, and accordingly discharged her from service vide an order of December, 2018.

Claiming that the discharge was arbitrary, stigmatic, punitive, and violative of Article 14, 19, 21, and 311 of the Constitution, the petitioner approached the High Court where she argued that she was discharged without proper enquiry in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. She further submitted that the order was stigmatic, and would harm her future career. The order was also devoid of consideration of her service record, Annual Confidential Reports, and work performance, and the same were arguably not considered while determining suitability, she claimed.

In contrast, the respondents argued that the petitioner was discharged only because she was found not suitable for her post during probation, and the specific incidents mentioned were only background facts, and not the real basis of the order. It was further submitted that the Administrative Committee and Full Court aptly considered her suitability, and thus the order was argued to be neither punitive nor stigmatic.

At the outset, the Division Bench of Chief Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur and Justice Challa Gunaranjan took note of the fact that the petitioner's performance was evaluated earlier as compared to her 122 colleagues, whose evaluations were made later upon completion of two years from the date of their respective appointments as probationers. It also took note of the fact that while determining her suitability towards the post, the petitioner's ACRs, judgments, work reviews or other relevant material, which depict the suitability factor, were not taken into consideration. The Court thus observed that “this was a segregated and isolated act of embarking on the evaluation of petitioner's performance.”

It added, "...in the present case, as noticed by us and referred to supra, firstly, the assessment of petitioner was an isolated act and not along with other officers and secondly, the record clearly disclose and rightly undisputed by even learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the evaluation of performance of petitioner was not with reference to the judgments, Annual Confidential Reports and other relevant material which would form basis for such assessment in adjudging the suitability to hold the post.”

Referring to the suspension resolution of 2018, passed by the Administrative Committee, the Bench held,

“The decision so made was ostensibly being dissatisfied with the explanations offered by both the officers, meaning thereby the decision was predicated mainly on the foundation of misconduct and therefore, punitive casting stigmatism. The decision was definitely not driven based on any application of mind in regard to the assessment of performance and consideration of relevant materials. The genesis of the order of discharge clearly lies in specific acts of misconduct, regardless of overall performance of duties during probation period. Thus, we are convinced that, in the present case, the termination was by way of punishment clearly founded on misconduct and thus, such termination founded on misconduct without enquiry clearly is in contravention to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.”

The Court went on to note that the allegations levelled against the petitioner of “chit-chatting inappropriately" with another male officer clearly “cast a stigma”.

“The said allegations are explicitly and repeatedly referred to in all the proceedings including the termination orders. Therefore, we are of the opinion that by not conducting regular enquiry and merely concluding and confirming the allegations so charged, leading to termination order would stand vitiated,” the Court observed.

As the petitioner had submitted that her discharge from service had rendered her without livelihood, besides castigating stigma to her character, the Court held that the petitioner clearly demonstrated a strong case for awarding back wages and consequential benefits.

Allowing the petition, the 2018 orders of suspension and subsequent discharge were set-aside, and the respondents were directed to reinstate her into service with back-wages.

Case Number: WRIT PETITION NO: 4041 of 2019

Case Title: M.Manasa v. State of Andhra Pradesh

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