18-Months Delay In Pronouncement Of Judgment Alone Not Ground To Set It Aside: Calcutta High Court

The Calcutta High Court, on Thursday (January 29), dismissed an appeal challenging a Single Bench judgment on the ground that it was delivered about 18 months after the date of conclusion of the final hearing. 

The division bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya observed;

"...although we are somewhat disappointed at the long delay of more than 18 months from the conclusion of the arguments to the delivery of the impugned judgment, we are unable to set aside the same solely on the ground of such delay". 

The original writ petition was filed in 2016, and the arguments of both parties concluded on December 8, 2023. However, the judgment was delivered on July 13, 2025, which is after 18 months from the conclusion of the arguments. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the High Court. 

The counsel for the appellants contended that no judge could remember the arguments of the parties after 18 months, particularly in the absence of any written notes of submission. This delay, the appellants argued, defied the principle of the adversarial system of litigation and was a breach of natural justice. It was argued that judgment would merely be the personal opinion of the judge and not a true reflection of the arguments actually advanced by the parties. 

The counsel for the respondents contended that the appellants neither approached the concerned judge nor the Chief Justice to raise the prolonged delay issue. The appellants, it was argued, were attempting to circumvent a lawful judicial verdict by taking a technical objection as to the delay in passing the judgment. 

The main issue for consideration before the Division Bench was "whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the impugned judgment should be set aside on the sole ground of the delay of about eighteen months after conclusion of arguments in passing the judgment". 

The bench noted that the law recognises that once a hearing is concluded, its the judgment before whom the matter was heard who alone is competent to pronounce the final judgment, provided the Judge continued to be available in the same court at the time of delivery. 

The bench highlighted, "In fact, law recognizes the hiatus between conclusion of arguments and passing of judgment as a mere limbo, the matter being concluded for all practical purposes with the conclusion of the hearing". 

The bench noted that this principle finds statutory recognition in Order 22 Rule 6 of CPC, which provides that the death of either party between the conclusion of the hearing and pronouncement of judgment, there shall be no abatement and that the judgment may be pronounced with the same force and effect as if it had been delivered prior to such death. 

The bench noted that even though the provision is counterintuitive and contrary to the settled position of law, it creates a legal fiction by which is party is deemed to be alive for all practical purposes once the hearing stands concluded. 

The bench further observed, "mere alteration of determination or passage of time cannot denude a Bench of subject-matter jurisdiction to pass final judgment, by going to the extent of declaring it coram non judice, if it had such determination in the first place at the hearing stage. Thus, such contention of the appellants cannot be accepted". 

The bench noted that, in the present case, the appellants did not challenge the factual happening during the hearing, but the legality of the judgment on account of the delay itself. 

The bench noted that the appellants, rather than exhibiting some sense of urgency, waited for a prolonged period of more than 18 months only to wake up from their slumber when the judgment went against them. It observed;

"Although not going to the extent of labelling the appellants “fence-sitters”, we must observe this much that it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to cite the last-mentioned two judgments, when they themselves did not take recourse to the remedy provided in Anil Rai (supra) by approaching the concerned Bench or the Hon‟ble the Chief Justice when the arguments were still fresh in the mind of the learned Judge but sat tight over the matter while it became stale, taking up the ground of delay only when an unfavourable order was handed out to them by the writ court". 

The bench noted that while the appellants cannot be faulted for the delay in delivery of the judgment, which was entirely attributable to the court. The bench questioned the bona fides of the appellants in raising this ground for the first time in the appeal without prior attempt to seek an early pronouncement. 

Additionally, the bench observed, "In all cases where there is a huge delay in passing judgments, it cannot be automatically inferred that the concerned Judge did not have the benefits of the arguments of both parties if written notes of arguments were filed by the parties at the time of arguments. Even if no written notes of arguments are filed, it cannot automatically be construed that the Judge does not have any tools of recollection while passing the judgments after such delay... Moreover, mental capacities vary from person to person, some having phenomenal memory while others are average or worse in recollection (at least the author can speak for himself), thus making it impossible to fix any particular universal standard period to fit all Judges, beyond which it can be said beyond doubt that the Judge concerned cannot have any recollection of the arguments advanced". 

Thus, the bench dismissed the appeal. 

Case Title: New Parijat Co-operative Housing Society Limited v Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority [M.A.T. No. 1067 of 2025]

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