Appointing Authority Can Dismiss Employee Despite Being Appellate Authority If Higher Appeal Forum Exists: Calcutta High Court
The Calcutta High Court has held that an appointing authority is not precluded from imposing the penalty of dismissal merely because it also functions as the appellate authority, so long as a higher forum of appeal is available in the administrative hierarchy. Setting aside an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice...
The Calcutta High Court has held that an appointing authority is not precluded from imposing the penalty of dismissal merely because it also functions as the appellate authority, so long as a higher forum of appeal is available in the administrative hierarchy. Setting aside an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Smita Das De restored the dismissal of a government employee, observing that the Tribunal had erred in law despite upholding the findings on merits.
The case arose from a challenge by the Andaman and Nicobar Administration to a Tribunal decision which had quashed a dismissal order dated May 16, 2018 and the consequential appellate order, directing reinstatement with all benefits. While the Tribunal found that the charges were specific, the inquiry was properly conducted, and there was no procedural lapse, it interfered solely on the ground that the Chief Secretary—being the appellate authority under the applicable notification—could not have acted as the disciplinary authority, as this allegedly deprived the employee of a forum of appeal.
Rejecting this reasoning, the High Court clarified the scope of Article 311(1) of the Constitution, holding that “what the provision provides is merely that nobody subordinate to the Appointing Authority shall impose such penalty, but does not debar the Appointing Authority himself from doing so.” On facts, the Court found that the respondent had been appointed by the Chief Secretary, who therefore qualified as the “Appointing Authority” within the meaning of Rule 2(a) of the CCS-CCA Rules, being the highest among the authorities contemplated therein. Consequently, the Chief Secretary was fully competent to impose the penalty of dismissal.
The Bench further held that there was no illegality in the Secretary (Personnel) issuing the charge memoranda and conducting the inquiry. Interpreting Rule 14 of the CCS-CCA Rules, the Court observed that initiation and conduct of disciplinary proceedings need not be undertaken by the appointing authority itself and may validly be delegated to a subordinate authority. “It was not necessary that the Appointing Authority himself would issue the memoranda of charges… it was well within the powers of the Secretary (Personnel) to do so,” the Court noted.
On the issue of denial of appellate remedy, the Court found the Tribunal's reasoning to be flawed, holding that even if the Chief Secretary acted as disciplinary authority, an appeal would lie to the Lieutenant Governor, who is the highest executive authority in the Andaman and Nicobar Administration. The Court underscored that the respondent had in fact availed such remedy, remarking that “it is quite surprising that the respondent himself… after having preferred an appeal… takes the point… that he was deprived of an appellate forum.” While acknowledging that the right to appeal may not be an automatic facet of Article 311(2), the Court observed that where dismissal affects livelihood, any existing appellate remedy must be meaningfully preserved.
On merits, the Court noted that the respondent had repeatedly failed to comply with transfer and reporting orders, remained absent without authorization, and disobeyed even court directions to rejoin duty. It concurred with the Tribunal's own findings that the charges were proved and based on evidence, reiterating that judicial review does not permit reappreciation of evidence or substitution of penalty unless it is shockingly disproportionate. In this context, reliance was placed on B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India to emphasize the limited scope of interference.
The Court also firmly rejected the respondent's plea of res judicata, terming it as one that “borders on the absurd.” It held that an earlier Tribunal order had been set aside by necessary implication when the matter was remanded by a coordinate Bench for fresh consideration, and thus could not operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings.
Concluding that the Tribunal had “patently erred in law and without jurisdiction” in setting aside the dismissal on untenable grounds, the High Court allowed the writ petition, restored the dismissal order dated May 16, 2018 and the appellate order dated August 7, 2018, and declined to grant any relief to the respondent.
Case: The Lieutenant Governor & Ors. v. Dharam Raj
Case No.: WP.CT/18/2026