Marriage Became 'Deadwood' After 19-Year Separation; Irretrievable Breakdown Amounts To Cruelty: Calcutta High Court Grants Divorce

The Calcutta High Court has held that an irretrievable breakdown of marriage can constitute "cruelty" under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and can therefore furnish a valid ground for dissolution of marriage, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rakesh Raman v. Kavita.

A Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya granted a decree of divorce to a husband whose marriage had effectively ceased to exist after the parties lived together for barely two months and remained separated for nearly two decades.

"The marriage between the parties is a mere deadwood," the Bench observed, adding that "sustaining such marriage and keeping the facade of the broken marriage alive would be doing injustice to both the parties and operate as cruelty by both the parties against each other."

Background

The husband had filed a matrimonial suit in 2007 seeking a declaration that the marriage was void due to non-consummation. In the alternative, he sought divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The trial court dismissed the suit in April 2022, following which he preferred the present appeal.

Before the High Court, the husband argued that the parties had married on January 28, 2007, separated on March 24, 2007, and had never resumed cohabitation. He contended that the marriage had irretrievably broken down, mediation had failed, and there was no animus revertendi (intention to resume matrimonial life).

He also alleged that the marriage was never consummated due to the wife's refusal and sought to rely on photocopies of her medical prescriptions to suggest that she suffered from a psychiatric disorder.

The wife opposed the appeal, arguing that the husband himself had admitted during cross-examination that the marriage had been consummated. She further contended that the allegations of cruelty were unsupported by evidence and asserted that she was still willing to resume matrimonial life.

Court's Findings

The Division Bench rejected the husband's contentions regarding nullity, desertion and psychiatric illness.

On the plea of non-consummation, the Court noted that the husband had admitted in cross-examination that it was "not a fact" that the marriage was not consummated, which amounted to an admission that consummation had taken place. Consequently, the plea for declaring the marriage a nullity failed.

The Court also held that desertion had not been established, observing that the matrimonial suit had itself been instituted within the statutory period required for a divorce on that ground.

As regards cruelty, the Bench found that the husband had failed to substantiate his allegations through corroborative evidence. It also refused to permit additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure by accepting photocopies of the wife's medical prescriptions.

The Court observed that no foundational facts had been established to justify reception of secondary evidence. Even otherwise, a bare reading of the prescriptions merely indicated complaints of anxiety and disturbed sleep, which could not be treated as a psychiatric disorder warranting divorce.

"The treating Doctor diagnosed the problem of the wife to be anxiety, disturbed sleep and the like, which afflicts more than half of the population and cannot be construed to be a psychiatric disorder as such," the Bench observed.

Irretrievable Breakdown As Cruelty

The Court, however, accepted the husband's submission that the marriage had irretrievably broken down.

Relying extensively on the Supreme Court's decision in Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, the Bench held that although irretrievable breakdown is not an independent statutory ground under the Hindu Marriage Act, the Supreme Court has authoritatively recognised that such a breakdown itself amounts to cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia).

The Court emphasised that under Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts and carries the same force as statutory law.

Referring to the Supreme Court's observations, the Bench reiterated that a marital relationship which has become irreparably bitter inflicts cruelty upon both spouses, and preserving only the legal façade of such a marriage serves no useful purpose.

The Court clarified that the Supreme Court's decision in Nayan Bhowmik v. Aparna Chakraborty was distinguishable because the decree of divorce in that case had been granted in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and therefore did not lay down a binding legal principle for subordinate courts.

Applying the law to the present case, the Bench noted that mediation between the parties had failed, they had remained separated since 2007, had no children, and had made no attempt over nearly two decades to restore matrimonial relations.

"There is nothing on record to show that... any efforts have been taken by either of the parties to resume their conjugal relationship."

Holding that the marriage had completely broken down and continuing it would amount to cruelty to both parties, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's judgment and granted a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty arising from the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.

At the same time, the Bench clarified that its judgment would not prevent the wife from filing an application under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking permanent alimony, which the trial court would consider independently in accordance with law.

Case No.: FAT 234 of 2022

Case Title: Sri Sanjib Tarafdar v. Smt. Mausumi Tarafdar

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