Click the Play button to listen to article

The Calcutta High Court's Circuit Bench at Port Blair has upheld the conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment awarded to a 24-year-old man under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), holding that the consent of a minor to a physical relationship cannot be treated as a mitigating factor.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj and Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra was dealing with an appeal against the April 2024 judgment of the Special Judge under the POCSO Act, which had convicted Rupesh Beck under Sections 5(j)(ii) and 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The Court, however, also considered whether the principles underlying the "Romeo-Juliet clause", recently suggested by the Supreme Court in the context of adolescent relationships, could have any application in the case.

The Court noted that the victim was about 17 years and 10 months old when she met the appellant, who was 24, at a relative's marriage ceremony in 2022.

Their acquaintance developed into friendship, attraction and ultimately a love affair. The victim left her home without informing her family and stayed with the appellant in a rented house for a substantial period.

The two subsequently entered into a physical relationship in December 2022, which continued for several months. The victim later visited a Primary Health Centre at Kadamtala after experiencing health problems and was informed that she was pregnant.

Following a complaint by the Medical Officer, the police recorded the victim's statement and an FIR was registered at Kadamtala Police Station on May 22, 2023.

The Special POCSO Court subsequently convicted the appellant and sentenced him to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment.

Before the High Court, the appellant argued, among other things, that the victim had never independently lodged a complaint, that her police statement was not recorded at her instance, that there were contradictions in her statements and that the FIR had been lodged after an unexplained delay.

It was also argued that the victim had turned hostile and that the prosecution had failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt.

The Bench rejected these submissions, observing that the evidence of the victim and her mother had not even been subjected to cross-examination by the appellant.

"Thus, the evidence led by the victim girl and her mother can be deemed to have been admitted by the appellant," the Court observed.

The Bench further noted that the doctor who examined the victim had recorded that she had stated that she had been in a continuous physical relationship with the appellant before her pregnancy.

The Court found that the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution was sufficient to establish that the appellant had engaged in penetrative sexual assault.

The Bench also upheld the application of the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act.

It explained that once the prosecution establishes the foundational facts necessary for application of the provision, the statutory presumption operates against the accused, who must then rebut it by leading appropriate oral or documentary evidence.

The appellant, the Court noted, had made no attempt to rebut the evidence regarding the relationship and sexual intercourse.

"Thus, the factum of the love affair, physical intimacy and sexual intercourse between the victim girl and appellant stands uncontroverted," the judgment stated.

The Court consequently held that the offence under Section 5 of the POCSO Act stood established and that the appellant had failed to displace the presumption under Section 29.

The Bench specifically addressed the appellant's contention that the relationship had been consensual.

The Court acknowledged that there had been a love affair and that the victim had consented to the physical relationship. However, it held that such consent could not mitigate an offence under the POCSO Act.

"The consent of a minor cannot be treated as a mitigating factor," the Bench held, observing that treating it otherwise would defeat the purpose of the legislation.

The Court therefore found no reason to interfere with the conviction or the sentence imposed by the Special POCSO Court.

The Bench thereafter considered the "Romeo-Juliet clause" referred to by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Another, decided on January 9, 2026.

The High Court noted that the proposed principle seeks to prevent adolescent love and intimacy between persons of similar age from being unnecessarily derailed by the rigid operation of the POCSO Act. It also observed that courts have encountered cases where parents allegedly invoke POCSO provisions in the context of adolescent relationships, including relationships involving inter-caste couples.

"However, this is not one of those cases," the Bench clarified.

The Court noted that the victim, who was 17 years and 10 months old at the time of the offence, had subsequently married another person, who had accepted both her and her child.

The victim had also expressed that she had no objection to the acquittal of the appellant.

Despite these circumstances, the Bench held that the Romeo-Juliet principle could not be invoked to grant relief to the appellant.

The Court observed that the purpose of such a clause was to give legal recognition to relationships between parties of similar age and to avoid branding one of them as an offender where the circumstances justify such protection.

In the present case, however, the victim was already married to another person and had a child.

"To apply the parameters of the 'Romeo Juliet' clause to this case would mean that the appellant is discharged of his crime not to start a life anew with the victim girl, but with a possibility of disturbing the peaceful life of the victim girl with her present husband and a child," the Bench observed.

The Court held that such an outcome would not serve the cause of justice.

It also distinguished an earlier coordinate Bench decision in CRA 4 of 2024, Shri Roshan Lakra v. The State and Another, as in that case the accused and the victim were in a position to resume their marital life.

"Here, the facts did not support the same," the Bench held, adding that the case was being decided on its merits and not on the basis of any other parameter.

The Division Bench ultimately dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special POCSO Court.

The Court directed that the trial court records be transmitted back and ordered that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the trial court and the Superintendent of the correctional home.

Case: RUPESH BECK v. THE STATE AND ANOTHER

Case No: CRA(DB)/4/2026

Click here to read order

Tags: