Delhi High Court Allows Centre's Appeal Against Order Staying Notice To Delhi Race Club Under Public Premises Act
The Delhi High Court on Tuesday (May 26) allowed Centre's appeal against the single judge's interim order staying proceedings before the Estate Officer pursuant to a April 17 show cause notice ssued to Delhi Race Club under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Ac after the Club's lease had expired.For context, the Club was issued a show cause notice under Public Premises ...
The Delhi High Court on Tuesday (May 26) allowed Centre's appeal against the single judge's interim order staying proceedings before the Estate Officer pursuant to a April 17 show cause notice ssued to Delhi Race Club under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Ac after the Club's lease had expired.
For context, the Club was issued a show cause notice under Public Premises (PP) Act by Central Authorities, which was challenged by the Club before the single judge who had stayed it on April 24. Centre has alleged that the Club's lease had expired and it was not extended. Thus, the Club could not continue to occupy the premises.
A division bench of Chief Justice DK Upadhyay and Justice Tejas Karia passed the order.
The bench in its order noted that on account of the term of the lease having come to an end way back in 1994, the term of the lease stood determined and, therefore, it is a statutory right of the Centre to invoke the provision of Section 4 of the PP Act.
"We may also note that as laid down by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. (supra), the expression “unauthorised occupation” occurring in Section 2(g) has not to be confined to only a person who is found to have occupied any public premises without lawful authority, but it needs to be extended to those occupants whose occupation was initially permissible at the inception, but subsequently ceased to be authorised. Thus, on the basis of the lease, the respondent was validly in occupation and possession of the subject land; however, once the term of the lease had expired way back in the year 1994, such occupation ceased to be authorised in terms of the provisions of the PP Act," the court said.
The court said that remedy of Section 4 PP Act, seeking eviction of any unauthorised occupant from public premises is a statutory vested right available to the Centre.
It said, "if such a course of action is resorted by the appellant taking recourse to the provision of Section 4, any order, may be interlocutory in nature, passed by Single Judge restraining the Estate Officer from proceedings any further in the matter, in our opinion, impacts the available statutory right of the appellant".
The court thus said that the single judge's order would be termed as a “Judgment” for the limited purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a Division Bench of the High Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
The court said that in the proceedings instituted under Section 4 PP Act, the Club will have "amplest opportunity" to explain as to why an eviction order may not be passed.
All the grounds and pleas available to the respondent under the law will be permissible to be taken by it, including the ground that the notice is not lawful, it added.
"Accordingly, in view of the discussions made above, we opine that the impugned order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge is to be regarded as a “Judgment” for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction of intracourt appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, the instant appeal is maintainable. As regards issue “b” set out hereinabove, what we notice is that learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order, after discussing the respective cases of the parties, has only observed that looking at the chequered history of the previous litigation and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the matter requires consideration and, thereafter without giving any reason, even for the namesake, has directed that the Estate Officer shall not proceed further with the show-cause notice dated 17.04.2026.
Such a course, in our opinion, was not available to the learned Single Judge for passing the interim order, which has impacted the valuable right of the appellants to invoke the statutory right under Section 4 of the PP Act, without giving reasons and without giving a finding on the issue relating to prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience," the bench said.
The bench in its order has said that it on analysing the single judge's order on the touchstone of granting interim relief under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC, it had found that "nothing has been considered by the learned Single Judge in respect of a prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience while passing the impugned order".
The court said that even if it is presumed that the case of the Club is that by non-interference in the show-cause notice would renders its Writ Petition itself infructuous, the Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury and further that such injury would tilt the balance of case.
Only on recording finding on these aspects the interim relief of the nature which has been granted vide the impugned order, could have been granted, the court said.
"We may also notice that in such cases, the availability of a “very strong prima facie case”, of a standard much higher than just a “prima facie case”, is one of the requisite considerations for passing an order of interim relief. Accordingly, since the impugned order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge does not reflect upon any of the aforesaid aspects of the matter in as much as it does not even record any discussion, much less any finding, on the aspects of a strong prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience, in our opinion, such an order is not sustainable.
...For the discussions made and reasons given above, the instant appeal is allowed and the order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge, so far as it directs the Estate Officer to not proceed further with the showcause notice dated 17.04.2026 is hereby set aside," the bench said.
The appeal challenges order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the Single Judge which had issued notice on Delhi Race Club's petition and had stayed further proceedings before the Estate Officer pursuant to the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026 issued under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act.
The Centre had argued that the single judge's order fails to appreciate that the writ petition itself was directed only against a show cause notice, whereas the Act provides a complete, self-contained and efficacious statutory mechanism, including adjudication before the Estate Officer and an appellate remedy under Section
The Centre alleged that the single judge further failed to appreciate that the lease was no longer in currency and its continued occupation of the land is unauthorised, and that all pleas sought to be urged by the Respondent, including its disputed claim of a subsisting lease or lawful occupation, are matters to be raised and adjudicated before the Estate Officer in the first instance
The Appellant, through the Land & Development Office, Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Government of India, is the lessor and custodian of valuable public land admeasuring approximately 53.242 acres situated at Race Course Road, now known as Lok Kalyan Marg. The Respondent/Delhi Race Club
claims rights under a lease deed dated 08.03.1926. However, the lease was not a perpetual lease; it was granted on a purely temporary basis for a fixed term and the last extension, if any, expired on 31.12.1994. The consistent stand of the Appellant is that after expiry of the lease, no further extension was granted in favour of the Respondent, and consequently, the Respondent has no subsisting legal right, title or authority to continue in occupation of the said public premises.
Centre alleged that the Club's continued occupation is, therefore, unauthorised and is liable to be examined by the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
The Club contended continuation of leasehold rights, whereas the Centre categorically disputed the same and maintains that the lease stood expired and that the Respondent's continued occupation of the public premises is unauthorised. Centre said that such disputed questions, including the status of occupation, alleged subsistence of lease, validity of the Respondent's possession, and the consequences of expiry/non-renewal of lease, fall squarely within the statutory domain of the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
It was argued that the Act provides a complete mechanism for adjudication by the Estate Officer in the first instance and,thereafter, a statutory appeal under Section 9. Therefore, the Respondent could not have bypassed the statutory forum and sought interdiction of the proceedings at the threshold stage of show cause notice.
Case title: UNION OF INDIA & ANR v/s DELHI RACE CLUB (1940) LTD.
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 535
LPA 336/2026 & CM APPL. 30157-59/2026