Mere Omission To Disclose Other Properties Doesn't Disentitle Landlord From Obtaining Tenant's Eviction For Bonafide Use: Delhi High Court

Update: 2025-10-29 03:30 GMT
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The Delhi High Court has observed that mere omission by a landlord to disclose other properties owned by him will not disentitle him from obtaining eviction of a tenant for bonafide use of the tenanted premises.“In any event, mere omission to disclose the existence of alternative accommodation in the pleadings cannot, by itself, be construed as a ground to disentitle the landlord from...

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The Delhi High Court has observed that mere omission by a landlord to disclose other properties owned by him will not disentitle him from obtaining eviction of a tenant for bonafide use of the tenanted premises.

“In any event, mere omission to disclose the existence of alternative accommodation in the pleadings cannot, by itself, be construed as a ground to disentitle the landlord from obtaining a decree of eviction,” Justice Saurabh Banerjee said.

The Court was dealing with a plea filed by a tenant challenging an order passed by the Additional Rent Controller allowing the Eviction Petition filed by the landlord in respect to a tenanted shop.

The tenant was directed to evict after six months in terms of Section 14(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which stood over.

It was the landlord's case that the subject premises was needed for his bona fide requirement as his son, had experience and qualifications in the field of sales, wanted to commence a new business of selling electronics and communication items

However, the tenant denied the existence of any bona fide requirement by the landlord, stating that the son of the landlord was already employed.

The tenant also contented that there was omission on the part of landlord in disclosing the fact of existence of alternative accommodation in the Eviction Petition before the Additional Rent Controller as also in earlier litigations.

Rejecting the plea, the Court said that there was a clear difference between the landlord having an alternative accommodation and an 'additional' accommodation in the context of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

“The parameters for reckoning both the aforesaid being different, are not always the same. By treating them alike, the tenant herein cannot make a case for denying the relief sought by the landlord in an Eviction Petition under Section 14(1) (e) of the DRC Act,” the Court said.

It added "The factum of omission/ non-disclosure of other alternative accommodation with the landlord, in the considered opinion of this Court, can be of relevance if the tenant is able to establish a material significant, connection, linkage or like which carries sufficient weight for it to be treated as a triable issue. All the more so, whence, mere existence of such alternative accommodation with the landlord, which, as per the needs/ requirements of the landlord is not “suitable” in itself not to be treated as the landlord having an alternative accommodation."

The Court further held that it cannot simply agree with the contentions raised by the tenant that the recovery of another tenanted premises by the landlord was a substitute for the subject premises. The belated plea by the tenant does not cut much ice, the judge added.

It also said that any father, like the landlord in the case, intending to settle his son by starting a new business is "a genuine cause/ bona fide requirement for the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant from the subject premises". 

Further, Justice Banerjee said that a landlord is free to file for eviction on any of the grounds available to him under Section 14 of the DRC Act, at the same time or at different points of time.

The Court reasoned that pendency of an another or earlier Eviction Petition inter se the parties qua the same subject premises does not disqualify the landlord from filing another one at the same time or subsequently.

The Court directed the tenant to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the shop to the landlord within four weeks, since the benefit of six months had already lapsed.

It further directed the tenant to clear all the arrears of user and occupation charges in respect of the shop.

Title: HARBANS SINGH v. ANAND TYAGI

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1385

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