Delhi High Court Rejects Philips' Plea For Perjury Action Against Ex-Employee In Software Piracy Case

The Delhi High Court has refused to initiate perjury proceedings against a former Philips employee, holding that Philips had not produced the kind of clear and unquestionable evidence required for criminal action. The ruling came in a copyright and trade secret dispute involving Philips' medical imaging software “IntelliSpace Portal” (ISP).

In a judgment dated November 24, 2025, Justice Tejas Karia said the statements made by the ex-employee in a February 2025 affidavit, submitted in response to court-ordered interrogatories, did not amount to intentional falsehood. The court noted that inconsistencies, disagreements, or denials during litigation do not automatically become criminal offences unless the falsehood is deliberate and proven through unimpeachable evidence.

The perjury claim arose in a larger infringement suit filed by Philips. The company has accused Karma Mindtech and its associates of procuring, modifying and selling pirated versions of the ISP software, which provides advanced visualisation tools used with MRI and CT machines.

Philips says the defendants also accessed its confidential service tools and bypassed its Integrated Security Tool that protects proprietary information. Philips obtained an ex parte injunction in December 2023, after which a Local Commissioner was appointed to inspect the defendants' premises.

Philips later sought extensive discovery, including disclosures on piracy timelines, client details, software tools used to bypass technological protection measures, and the role of each individual involved in the alleged activity. The court directed the defendants to answer these interrogatories by affidavit.

The former employee's reply came on February 8, 2025. Philips alleged that his responses were vague, evasive and contradicted his written statement, the Local Commissioner's report and his past employment records with Philips. It claimed he had wilfully suppressed the truth and misled the court.

Philips pointed to three sets of material to support the perjury allegation. First, it said the employee's written statement admitted purchasing an ISP version from a Chinese seller, which Philips said showed he was aware of the software and its pirated nature. Second, it relied on a line in the Local Commissioner's report where he was recorded as having said that he began his business in August 2021, which Philips interpreted as an admission of infringing activity. Third, it cited his employment agreement and undertakings, which Philips said proved he had access to confidential information.

The High Court rejected all three arguments. It said the written statement merely narrated his version that he purchased what he believed was genuine software, and that the accuracy of this claim must be tested during trial. It also said the Local Commissioner's report must be read as a whole. The same report recorded that no infringing ISP material was found at his premises on the date of inspection.

The court observed that there was no undisputed admission about the use or sale of infringing software. As for the employment agreement, the court said that simply having been bound by a confidentiality contract does not prove that he actually accessed trade secret-level information, especially when he maintains he only handled basic operational manuals. None of these materials, the court said, met the legal test of “unimpeachable evidence” of deliberate falsehood.

It reiterated the settled principle that perjury requires a clear, intentional false statement on a matter of substance. Courts must be satisfied that the alleged falsehood is proved against reliable and uncontroversial evidence, and that initiating prosecution is necessary in the interest of justice. The judge emphasised that disagreements in factual narration, statements that will eventually be tested in cross-examination, or interpretations of documents cannot be converted into criminal proceedings.

“A mere denial of the Plaintiffs' assertions in response to the interrogatories, without any unimpeachable evidence to the contrary or any indication of deliberate intent to mislead the Court for securing a favourable order, cannot by itself attract the rigours of perjury. To treat such denial as a deliberate falsehood would be to convert differences in factual narrations into a criminal proceeding, which is not permissible in law. The essence of the perjury jurisdiction lies in punishing deliberate falsehoods, and not mere differences in factual narrations,” the court said.

It added that none of the circumstances cited by Philips created an exceptional situation where a perjury prosecution was necessary. It was not expedient in the interest of justice to pursue criminal charges during the ongoing trial. The application was dismissed.

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