“Not An Explanation But A Lame Excuse”: Delhi High Court Rejects State's Plea To Condon 541-Day Delay In POCSO Appeal

The Delhi High Court has refused to condone State's delay of 541 days in filing an appeal seeking conviction of an accused under graver charges of penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act and rape under the IPC, terming the explanation offered by the prosecution as “a lame excuse.”

A division bench of Justices Navin Chawla and Ravinder Dudeja dismissed the State's application for condonation of delay as well as the accompanying petition challenging a trial court judgment that had acquitted the accused of offences under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376 IPC, while convicting him under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.

The State had sought condonation of the delay on the ground that the file had moved through several departments, including the office of the Chief Prosecutor, Director of Prosecution, Law Department, Chief Secretary and Lieutenant Governor, for obtaining approvals.

It was also submitted that the concerned Additional Public Prosecutor had remained on medical leave for a substantial period.

Rejecting the explanation, the Court observed that administrative processing and inter-departmental correspondence are routine grounds repeatedly cited by government authorities and cannot be permitted to dilute the rigor of limitation law.

“The State cannot claim a different or preferential standard in matters concerning limitation. The Law of Limitation binds the State as much as it binds a private litigant, and the expression “sufficient cause” must receive a reasonable and not a liberal construction where delay is inordinate and unexplained,” it said.

Adding that the State's approach had been “utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent”, the Court refused to condone the delay.

“If such explanations are accepted mechanically, the very object underlying the Law of Limitation would stand defeated,” it said.

Even on merits, the Court found no reason to interfere with the trial court judgment. It noted that in the initial version, including the FIR and the statement of the victim recorded under Section 161 CrPC, the allegations against the respondent were confined to touching of the private part of the victim, and no allegation of digital rape or insertion of a finger were made.

As such, the Court dismissed State's appeal.

Appearance: Mr. Aman Usman, APP with Mr. Manvendra Yadav, Adv. for State

Case title: State v. Pawan

Case no.: CRL.L.P. 232/2024

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