Delay Beyond 60 Days To Seek Discharge U/S 250 BNSS Does Not Extinguish Accused's Right: Gujarat High Court
The Gujarat High Court has held that although Section 250(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) prescribes a period of sixty days to file a discharge application after committal, the expiry of that period does not extinguish the accused's right to seek discharge where sufficient cause for delay is shown.Section 250(1) of the BNSS allows an accused to file an...
The Gujarat High Court has held that although Section 250(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) prescribes a period of sixty days to file a discharge application after committal, the expiry of that period does not extinguish the accused's right to seek discharge where sufficient cause for delay is shown.
Section 250(1) of the BNSS allows an accused to file an application seeking discharge within 60 days from the date on which the case is committed to the Court of Session.
Justice P. M. Raval observed that limitation provisions regulate the procedure but do not eliminate the substantive defence available to an accused.
“Thus, by virtue of Section 250(1) an accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under section 232, if at all he desires to prefer such an application, but, in the considered opinion of the Court, it does not exclude the judicial discretion in appropriate cases or where delay is not attributable to the accused as in the present facts of the case. Thus, it can be held that 60 days period under Section 250(1) of the BNSS regulates the procedure and it does not extinguish the right to seek discharge. It also does not exclude the judicial discretion in appropriate cases where delay is not attributable to the accused while considering the condonation of delay as it reflects prima facie from the facts of the present case.”
Accordingly, the Court quashed the Sessions Court's orders refusing to condone delay in filing discharge applications and directed that the applications be decided afresh on merits.
Background
The case arose from a group of criminal revision applications challenging a common order passed by the 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, who had rejected applications seeking condonation of delay and discharge from criminal proceedings.
The prosecution alleged that the accused persons associated with Khyati Hospital, Ahmedabad, (including directors, doctors and administrators) had entered into a criminal conspiracy to obtain financial benefits under the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY). According to the prosecution, patients were induced to undergo angiography and angioplasty procedures “without medical necessity,” and false or misleading medical records were prepared to generate fear and obtain consent. It was further alleged that two patients died as a consequence of these procedures.
Based on these allegations, an FIR dated 13 November 2024 was registered at Vastrapur Police Station, Ahmedabad City for offences under Sections 105 (culpable homicide), 110 (attempt to commit culpable homicide), 336(2) (Forgery), 336(3), 340(1), 340(2) (Forgery), 318 (Cheating) and 61 (criminal conspiracy) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, after which a chargesheet was filed and the case was committed to the Sessions Court under Section 232 of the BNSS (commitment of a case to a Court of Session).
The accused subsequently filed discharge applications under Section 250 BNSS, but some of them were filed beyond the statutory sixty-day period from the date of committal. The Sessions Court rejected the applications seeking condonation of delay and consequently declined to entertain the discharge pleas, leading the accused to approach the High Court in revision.
Submissions on Behalf of the Applicants
Senior Counsel J. M. Panchal and others appearing for the accused applicants, argued that the Sessions Court had adopted a “hyper-technical approach” in rejecting the delay condonation applications.
It was submitted that Section 250(1) BNSS merely enables the accused to trigger consideration of discharge within sixty days, but failure to file within that period does not extinguish the underlying right to seek discharge. Counsel contended that the right to discharge is closely linked to the guarantee of a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, and therefore the limitation provision should not be interpreted in a manner that defeats substantive justice.
The applicants also argued that the committal proceedings were vitiated because certain documents relied upon by the prosecution were not supplied at the initial stage, thereby prejudicing their ability to seek discharge effectively.
Submissions on Behalf of the State
Opposing the revisions, Public Prosecutor Hardik Dave, assisted by Additional Public Prosecutor Rohan Raval, argued that the sixty-day limitation introduced in Section 250 BNSS was intended to expedite criminal trials. It was submitted that the law of limitation is founded on public policy and cannot be diluted merely because an accused wishes to challenge the prosecution at the threshold stage.
The State further contended that even if certain additional documents were referred to subsequently, that fact would not invalidate the committal proceedings unless specific prejudice to the accused was demonstrated. According to the prosecution, the amendment under the BNSS had not created any new right but had merely introduced a time period within which the existing right of discharge could be exercised.
Court's Analysis
Examining the statutory framework governing supply of documents to the accused, committal and framing of charges/discharge, the Court held that the sixty-day period under Section 250 serves as a procedural mechanism intended to ensure expeditious trials, but it cannot be interpreted so rigidly as to extinguish the accused's substantive defence.
The Court also rejected the argument that the committal proceedings were automatically vitiated due to subsequent supply of documents, observing that committal proceedings are “administrative in nature and not adjudicatory on merits,” and procedural irregularities do not invalidate proceedings unless a failure of justice or prejudice is demonstrated.
However, considering that certain documents were supplied subsequently and that the delay in filing the discharge applications was approximately 140 days at most, the Court held that sufficient cause had been shown and the delay deserved to be condoned.
Allowing the revisions, the High Court quashed the impugned orders of the Sessions Court, condoned the delay in filing the discharge applications, and directed the trial court to decide the discharge applications afresh on merits after ensuring complete supply of all documents relied upon by the prosecution to the accused.
Case Title: Kartikbhai Jashubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat
Case No.: R/Criminal Revision Application No. 2627 of 2025 (with connected matters)
Appearance: Mr. J. M. Panchal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Ajj H. Murjani for the Applicants; Mr. N. D. Nanavati, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Jigneshkumar P. Pandav; Mr. Mihir Joshi, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Rahul Dholakia; Mr. Ankit Shah for respective applicants; Mr. Hardik Dave, PP with Mr. Rohan Raval, APP for the State.