Public Function Of Imparting Education Alone Does Not Make Army's Op Sadbhavana School Amenable To Writ Jurisdiction J&K&L High Court

Update: 2026-08-10 05:55 GMT
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The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has held that the mere fact that an educational institution established under the Army's "Operation Sadbhavana" performs the public function of imparting education does not make every dispute concerning its employees amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court ruled that where the relationship between the institution and its employees is purely contractual and the dispute lacks any public law element, a writ petition seeking enforcement of service conditions is not maintainable, notwithstanding the institution's public welfare objectives.

Rejecting a writ petition filed by teachers of Army Goodwill Public School, Wayne, Kupwara, the Court held that Article 226 cannot be invoked to enforce contractual service rights against a self-financed institution merely because it was established under "Operation Sadbhavana" or is affiliated with the CBSE.

“…Even if a body performing a public duty is amenable to the Writ jurisdiction of this Court, not all its decisions are subject to judicial review. Only those decisions which possess a public element can be subjected to judicial scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution”, Justice Shahzad Azeem remarked.

The Court made these observations in a judgment while upholding the preliminary objection regarding maintainability raised by the respondents and dismissing the writ petition without examining the merits of the teachers' claims.

The petitioners, who had been appointed between 2013 and 2017 in the Army Goodwill Public School, claimed that they were holding substantive teaching posts and were entitled to salaries in accordance with the CBSE pay scales. They alleged that after demanding revision of their pay, the school management initiated recruitment of fresh teachers, giving rise to an apprehension that they would be illegally replaced or terminated.

Accordingly, they approached the High Court seeking protection of their services and a writ of mandamus directing payment of salaries in terms of CBSE norms.

The respondents raised a preliminary objection contending that the school was a self-financed institution established under Operation Sadbhavana, neither a Government department nor a Government-aided institution, and therefore not amenable to writ jurisdiction in matters relating to contractual employment.

They further asserted that the petitioners had been engaged under yearly contractual appointments governed exclusively by the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) framed for Army Goodwill Schools.

Court's Observations:

The Court first examined the organisational structure of the institution and noted that the school had been established under Operation Sadbhavana with the objective of providing quality education in the region.

It also noted that Its administration was entrusted to the Army Goodwill Education Society, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, which functioned through a School Management Committee in accordance with the SOP governing recruitment, service conditions, pay scales and termination of employees.

The Court further noted that it was undisputed that the institution did not receive annual financial assistance from the Government and functioned through self-generated resources and support from NGOs and corporate foundations, besides limited assistance under Operation Sadbhavana.

While considering the judgments cited by the petitioners, the Court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, observing that the case concerned employees appointed against sanctioned government posts, whereas the petitioners before it were governed exclusively by contractual terms contained in the SOP.

The Court instead relied extensively on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024), which had held that although institutions like Army Public Schools perform the public function of imparting education, disputes concerning service conditions of their employees arise out of private contracts and ordinarily do not involve any public law element.

Referring to the ratio of the Supreme Court, Justice Azeem observed that the width of Article 226 extends to bodies performing public duties, but the jurisdiction can be exercised only where the dispute itself possesses a public law character.

The Court noted that the Supreme Court had categorically held that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced, and that CBSE affiliation bye-laws do not possess statutory force so as to convert a contractual employment dispute into one involving public law.

Quoting the principles emerging from the Supreme Court judgment, the High Court observed that although imparting education is undoubtedly a public function, the relationship between the institution and its employees remains that of a private employer and employee arising out of a private contract, and therefore a pure service dispute does not attract writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

The Bench further observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation, relied upon by the petitioners, is fundamentally a public law doctrine evolved to check arbitrariness in State action and cannot ordinarily govern purely contractual relationships between private parties.

Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court held that the Army Goodwill Public School was neither a Government department nor a Government-aided institution, and that its service conditions were governed solely by the contractual stipulations contained in the SOP. The Court observed,

"The relationship between the Petitioners and the Respondent-School is... that of a private employer and employee governed solely by the contractual stipulations in the shape of guidelines and instructions contained in the SOP. Consequently, such SOP cannot be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution, nor is the dispute amenable to judicial review under Writ jurisdiction."

The Court also emphasised that even where an institution performs a public duty, not every decision taken by such an institution becomes subject to judicial review.

In a significant observation, the Court held,

"Only those decisions which possess a public element can be subjected to judicial scrutiny under Article 226... Where the action challenged lacks a public law element, a Writ of Mandamus cannot be issued, as such action remains essentially of a private character."

Holding that the writ petition sought enforcement of purely contractual service rights against a self-financed educational institution and did not disclose any enforceable public law element, the High Court upheld the preliminary objection regarding maintainability and dismissed the petition, vacating all interim orders.

Case: Showkat Yousuf Shah & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment


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