S. 309 CrPC | Timeline For Rape Trials Is To Ensure 'Speedy Justice' For Victim, Can't Be Leveraged For Automatic Bail: J&K&L High Court
Emphasizing victim protection over procedural shortcuts for the accused, the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has held that the timeline mandated under the proviso to Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) is designed to deliver speedy justice to victims and cannot be invoked to grant automatic bail to the accused merely due to a delay in completing the trial.
Clarifying the mandate of the proviso to Section 309 CrPC, which prescribes a two-month timeline for inquiry or trial in offences under Sections 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA or Section 376DB of IPC, Justice Sanjay Dhar observed:
“The intention of the legislature in providing for swifter trial of such offences is to ensure speedy justice to the victims of these crimes. This mandate given by the legislature cannot enure to the benefit of the accused”
These observations came while dismissing the bail application filed by two accused in a grave case involving the alleged gang-rape of a 13-year-old minor girl, booked under Sections 376D and 506 of the IPC read with Section 5(g)/6 of the POCSO Act.
The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocate ST Hussain, assisted by Advocate Nida Nazir, sought bail primarily on technical grounds. They argued that the trial court failed to complete the proceedings within two months from the filing of the chargesheet as required under the proviso to Section 309 CrPC, which entitled them to bail.
They further contended that the Principal Sessions Judge, Kulgam, was not properly designated as a Special Court under Section 28 of the POCSO Act and this rendered the trial without jurisdiction, and that the Public Prosecutor had not been appointed under Section 32 of the Act.
Opposing the plea, the UT of J&K, represented by GA Zahid Qais Noor and GA Ilyas Nazir Laway, asserted that the petitioners were involved in a heinous crime against a minor. The prosecution submitted that the victim had supported the prosecution's case during the trial and that granting bail would likely frighten her, leading to re-victimisation.
Justice Dhar first addressed the legal objections raised by the petitioners. Rejecting the challenge to the court's designation and the prosecutor's appointment, the Court observed,
“In terms of notification issued by the Government on 25th June, 2018, the Principal Sessions Judges in every District of Jammu and Kashmir have been designated as Special Courts to try the offences under POCSO Act. Similarly, the Public Prosecutors appointed for aforesaid Courts have been appointed as Special Public Prosecutors in terms of Section 32 of the POCSO Act. Thus, the contention… is misconceived and deserves to be rejected.”
On the pivotal issue of bail due to delay under Section 309 CrPC, the Court drew a clear distinction between the mandatory default bail provision under Section 167 CrPC (for delayed investigation) and the trial timelines under Section 309. It held that no similar automatic release mechanism exists for trial delays under Section 309.
Relying extensively on the Karnataka High Court's Division Bench ruling in Hanumantha Mogaveera vs. State of Karnataka (2021), Justice Dhar explained that timelines for speedy trial serve the victim's interest and cannot be weaponised by the accused.
The Court stated,
“From the foregoing analysis of the legal position, it is clear that the mandate regarding completion of trial within a particular period as given in the POCSO Act or under proviso to Section 309 of the Cr. P. C, is for the benefit of the victim and if the timelines set by the statute for completion of trial are not met…the accused would not become entitled to bail automatically.”
Further reinforcing the core principle, the court clarified that the proviso to Section 309 of the Cr. P. C makes reference to certain offences like Sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA or Section 376DB of IPC. The intention of the legislature in providing for swifter trial of such offences is to ensure speedy justice to the victims of these crimes. This mandate given by the legislature cannot ensure the benefit of the accused, it underscored.
The Court noted that the trial was progressing satisfactorily, with five out of twelve witnesses examined by May 2025, and dismissed the delay argument.
Turning to the merits, Justice Dhar applied the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, which arise upon framing of charges under Section 5(g), presuming commission of the offence and culpable mental state unless rebutted. The victim's trial testimony prima facie supported the prosecution, corroborated by her sister as an eye-witness, with no material rebutting the presumptions.
Describing the offence's gravity, the Court observed,
“The petitioners are alleged to have committed gang rape upon a minor girl, who, at the relevant time, was barely 13 years of age. The petitioners are grownup persons. While petitioner No.1 is aged 28 years, petitioner No.2 is aged 32 years. So, it is not a case of teen age love but it is a case where grownup men have molested a girl aged about 13 years. This makes the alleged act of the petitioners more heinous in nature and it shows an element of perversion in the offence alleged…”
Considering factors such as the nature and gravity of the charge, severity of punishment (minimum 20 years, up to life or death), and risk to the victim and justice, the Court concluded there was no merit in the petition.
“For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition. The same is dismissed accordingly.”, the court concluded.
Case Title: YASIR AMIN KHANDAY AND ANOTHER Vs UT Of J&K
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL)