J&K&L High Court Upholds Removal Of Civil Judge Accused Of Taking Bribe To Provide Job, Says Credibility Rests On Character Of Judges

The Court was hearing a writ petition filed by a former Civil Judge challenging the Government order removing him from service after a Full Court recommendation based on a disciplinary inquiry.

A Bench of Justice Rajnesh Oswal and Justice Sanjay Parihar observed: “The office of a Judicial Officer demands unimpeachable integrity, absolute honesty and conduct that inspires public confidence in the administration of justice. The credibility of the judicial institution rests not merely upon the correctness of judicial decisions but equally upon the character and rectitude of those who man it. Allegations of accepting money on the promise of securing public employment strike at the very root of judicial probity and erode public faith in the justice delivery system.”

The Bench further held that once such misconduct is established in a duly conducted inquiry, the High Court, under Article 235 of the Constitution, is “not only empowered but duty-bound” to maintain the purity of judicial service by recommending appropriate disciplinary action.

The petitioner was appointed as Civil Judge and was first posted as Munsiff/Additional Mobile Magistrate (Traffic), Doda. The disciplinary proceedings arose from a complaint alleging that, while posted at Doda, he induced three persons to pay ₹2.50 lakh each on the assurance that he would secure their appointment in the Judicial Department by influencing senior officers and members of the selection committee for Class IV posts.

The complaint alleged that the promised appointments did not materialise and the money was not returned. A preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Registrar Vigilance, who recorded the statements of the complainants and also considered a compact disc said to contain a recorded conversation. The matter was then placed before the Full Court, which resolved to initiate regular disciplinary proceedings.

The inquiry was entrusted to a Judge of the High Court. The Enquiry Officer proceeded ex parte after finding that the petitioner had failed to participate despite service of notices, and eventually held that the charges proved. The Full Court accepted the findings and recommended removal from service. The recommendation was accepted by the Government.

The petitioner challenged the order on grounds including non-service of charge-sheet and notices, violation of natural justice, improper ex parte inquiry, absence of evidence of demand or recovery, non-compliance with Section 65-B of the Evidence Act in relation to the CD, and disproportionality of punishment.

The Court rejected the petitioner's plea that he was unaware of the proceedings. It was found from the original record that the charge-sheet, notices during inquiry, and show-cause notices proposing major penalty had been served.

The Court noted: “The record reveals that the notice was served through the Principal District Judge, Kulgam and was acknowledged by the petitioner on 18.09.2019. The notice specifically informed the petitioner that, in the event of his failure to appear, the inquiry would proceed ex parte. Despite such service, the petitioner remained absent on 17.10.2019, whereupon the Enquiry Officer proceeded ex parte and recorded the evidence adduced by the Presenting Officer.”

The Bench also recorded that one additional opportunity was given by issuance of a fresh show-cause notice, but no reply was submitted.

The Court held that the Enquiry Officer had relied principally on the oral testimony of the complainants, who consistently stated that they had paid money on the assurance of securing appointments in the Judicial Department.

The Court observed: “The complainants consistently reiterated, both before the Registrar Vigilance and the Enquiry Officer, the allegations set out in the complaint, namely, that the petitioner had induced each of them to pay ₹2.50 lakh on the assurance of securing appointments in the Judicial Department; that no such appointments materialised; and that, when they demanded refund of the money, the petitioner either refused to recognise them or threatened them. In the absence of any rebuttal or cross-examination by the petitioner, the Enquiry Officer cannot be faulted for placing reliance upon their uncontroverted testimony.”

The Court further noted that the writ petition did not contain any categorical plea that the allegations were false, fabricated or actuated by mala fides.

The Bench held that a party who deliberately abstains from inquiry proceedings despite due notice cannot later invoke natural justice to assail the inquiry.

The Court stated: “Repeated and adequate opportunities were afforded to him to submit his defence, participate in the inquiry and cross-examine the witnesses. The petitioner, however, consciously opted to remain absent throughout. Having deliberately abstained from the proceedings the petitioner who is a judicial officer, cannot now invoke the principles of natural justice to assail the inquiry. The rule of audi alteram partem protects a diligent litigant; it cannot be converted into a weapon by one who, despite due notice, chooses not to avail the opportunity afforded to him.”

It also rejected the argument that the inquiry was vitiated merely because the petitioner had not been placed under suspension, holding that suspension is not a condition precedent for disciplinary proceedings.

On the argument regarding the absence of a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, the Court held that the Enquiry Officer had not relied on the CD to determine culpability.

The Bench observed: “We have examined the report of the Enquiry Officer and we find that though the witnesses had identified the voice of the petitioner when the compact disc (CD) was played before them during the course of preliminary enquiry, but the Enquiry Officer has not at all relied upon the said CD to determine the culpability of the petitioner. This contention is, therefore, misconceived and same is rejected. The Enquiry Officer has mainly relied upon the oral testimony of the witnesses and has determined the culpability of the petitioner.”

Referring to B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1996), State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (2010), Chairman-cum-MD, Coal India Limited v. Ananta Saha (2011), and Pravin Kumar v. Union of India (2020), the Court reiterated that judicial review is concerned with the decision-making process, not reappreciation of evidence.

The Court held: “It is equally well settled that, while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court does not sit as an appellate authority over disciplinary proceedings. The Court is concerned with the decision-making process and not the decision itself. Re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of the Court's own conclusions for those arrived at by the disciplinary authority is wholly impermissible unless the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, vitiated by mala fides, or rendered in flagrant violation of statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice. None of these contingencies arise in the present case.”

The Court also referred to Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) and R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat (2016) on disciplinary control and integrity in judicial service.

The Bench held that the High Court's constitutional control over the district judiciary includes disciplinary control, and that in cases involving major penalties, the High Court may conduct proceedings, record findings, and recommend punishment, while the formal order is passed by the competent constitutional authority.

The Court observed: “The control vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution is comprehensive, subject only to the constitutional powers of the Governor in matters of appointment, posting and promotion. In disciplinary matters involving major penalties, such as dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, the High Court is competent to conduct the disciplinary proceedings, record its findings and recommend the appropriate punishment.”

The High Court held that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956; the petitioner had more than adequate opportunity to defend himself; the findings of guilt were supported by evidence; and the Full Court recommendation suffered from no procedural infirmity or legal perversity.

The Court dismissed the writ petition, upheld the Government order removing the petitioner from service, and held that the penalty could not be termed disproportionate.

Case Title: Naveen Jamwal v. High Court of J&K and Ladakh and Others

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326

Appearances

For the Petitioner: Senior Advocate Surinder Kour with Advocate Manpreet Kour

For the Respondents: Senior AAG Monika Kohli, Aditya Gupta, Advocate

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