Tenant Admitting Receipt Of Eviction Notice Does Not Amount to Admission That Tenancy Was Validly Terminated: J&K&L High Court
The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has held that a tenant's acknowledgement of receiving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, does not, by itself, amount to an admission that the tenancy was validly and lawfully terminated for granting a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The Court was hearing a civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the rejection of an application seeking a decree on admissions in an ejectment suit.
The Court upheld the trial court's refusal to decree possession on admissions and dismissed the petitioner's civil revision.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Moksha Khajuria Kazmi observed: “The mere fact that the respondent has acknowledged receipt of the notice cannot, by itself, be treated as an admission that the tenancy stood validly and lawfully terminated in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Receipt of a notice and admission of the legal efficacy of such notice are two different things. Where the validity, effect and consequences of the notice are disputed, the Court cannot, at the stage of consideration of an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, proceed on the assumption that all requirements for a decree of possession stand admitted.”
The matter arose after the petitioner's late husband instituted an ejectment suit concerning a shop, claiming that the premises were required for commencing a business with his unemployed son. The plaint also alleged that the respondent was not carrying on any business from the premises.
The respondent opposed the suit and maintained that the shop was being used for a licensed wholesale kerosene dealership. It also disputed the alleged personal requirement, asserting that the plaintiff's son was pursuing his studies and had no immediate need for the premises.
The petitioner subsequently sought a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contending that the respondent had admitted the landlord-tenant relationship and receipt of the termination notice. The respondent argued that the alleged admissions were neither categorical nor unequivocal and that the validity of the notice and the grounds for eviction remained disputed.
The trial court rejected the application after finding that the pleadings did not contain the clear admissions necessary to dispense with a trial. In revision, the petitioner argued that the admitted tenancy and receipt of the notice were sufficient to grant a decree of possession.
The High Court, upon hearing the matter, explained that Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, enables an early judgment only when there is no genuine controversy over the material facts. It held that the provision is discretionary and does not give a party an automatic right to a decree merely because an isolated admission can be identified in the pleadings.
The Court observed: “The object underlying the provision is to enable the Court to pronounce judgment without requiring the parties to undergo a full-fledged trial in cases where there is no real controversy on material facts. However, the power is discretionary and is to be exercised only where the admission is clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional. A party cannot claim a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC as a matter of right merely by pointing out some admission in the pleadings.”
The Court referred to Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar (2022) and S.M. Asif v. Virendar Kumar Bajaj (2015), noting that a trial should not be bypassed where the defence is plausible and requires adjudication.
It also distinguished M/s Payal Vision Ltd. v. Radhika Choudhary (2012), observing that the pleadings in that case contained clear and unequivocal admissions concerning both the landlord-tenant relationship and the termination of tenancy.
The Court found that the respondent had not merely denied the petitioner's claim. It had raised specific factual disputes regarding the use of the shop, the alleged non-use of the premises and the competing requirements asserted by the parties.
The Court remarked: “In the case at hand, however, the respondent has not confined its defence to a bare denial of the plaintiff's claim. It has pleaded a specific factual defence regarding the nature and use of the premises and has disputed the plaintiff's assertion concerning non-use of the premises. It has also challenged the necessity pleaded by the plaintiff and asserted its own requirement. These pleas cannot be brushed aside as sham at the stage of consideration of an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.”
The Court held that whether the allegations concerning personal necessity and non-use were material to the ultimate relief could be considered by the trial court while deciding the suit on evidence. At the stage of an application for judgment on admissions, the inquiry was confined to whether an admission sufficient for an immediate decree existed.
The Court further held that interference under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was permissible only where the subordinate court's order disclosed a jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity or an approach contrary to settled law.
The Court underscored: “Unless the order passed by the subordinate Court suffers from jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity or is based upon an approach contrary to the settled principles of law, interference in revision is not warranted. Merely because another view may be possible on the pleadings would not furnish sufficient ground for interference in revisional jurisdiction.”
The Court also referred to Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Narayan Jaiswal (2025), which held that Order XII Rule 6 is enabling and discretionary, and Pushpa and Others v. Dayawati and Others (2026), which reiterated that a revisional court cannot substitute its interpretation of the pleadings merely because another view is possible.
The High Court dismissed the civil revision after finding no jurisdictional error or material irregularity in the trial court's refusal to grant a decree on admissions. It clarified that its observations would not affect the merits of the parties' respective claims and directed the trial court to decide the suit on the evidence placed before it.
Case Title: Madhu Suri v. M/s Ch. Aishi Ram Batra & Sons
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326
Appearances
Petitioner: Advocate Sudesh Sharma
Respondent: Advocate Rahul Raina