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The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu has held that a trial court must not hasten to draw conclusions and dismiss a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for non-appearance of the complainant, more so when the complainant happens to be a senior citizen whose absence is supported by medical advice.

The Court further held that repeatedly deferring the cross-examination of the complainant at the mere asking of the opposite party was unwarranted, and that if the complainant could not produce the original loan documents, the proper course was to draw an adverse inference rather than to defer his cross-examination. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of dismissal, and restored the complaint for trial.

The Court was hearing an appeal preferred by a limited private finance company against an order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, whereby a complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was dismissed in default of appearance, resulting in the acquittal of the accused under Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The appeal was heard by Justice Yash Paul Bourney, who observed,

“In such matters, the trial Court must not have hastened to draw the conclusions and more so when the appellant happened to be a senior citizen.”

Background

The appellant, a finance company, filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the respondent. The Memorandum of Accusations was read over to the respondent, which he denied. The record revealed that the respondent did not dispute his signatures on the cheque in question and admitted to having obtained the loan, but claimed that he had cleared the same and obtained a receipt or no objection certificate.

The respondent, however, did not mention having got the advance amount adjusted against the vehicle, nor did he tender any reply to the demand notice issued by the appellant. Nevertheless, he was not precluded from demanding the details of the loans.

The appellant, on being asked to produce evidence to substantiate the allegations, was examined in chief. However, his cross-examination was deferred for production of the loan documents on as many as three occasions. The appellant produced photocopies of the relevant documents, but was again directed to produce the original record, even though there was no denial of the factum of taking the loan.

Thereafter, on account of his ailing health as confirmed by medical advice, the appellant could not appear on the relevant date, and the counsel for the appellant also did not cause appearance, which resulted in the dismissal of the complaint.

The appellant contended that the doctor had advised the Managing Director to take complete bed rest, owing to which he was prevented from causing appearance before the Court. It was further contended that the appellant had been pursuing the complaint with all seriousness, and that the dismissal of the complaint was not justified.

Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent contended that the appellant had been seeking time and opportunities repeatedly for production of the loan documents, which he could not produce without justification, resulting in the deferment of his cross-examination.

It was further contended that a frivolous complaint had been filed against the respondent, despite the fact that he had already cleared the loan taken for one vehicle, and that an old cheque was being misused to claim an amount on account of loans for two other vehicles which he had never availed. It was submitted that revival of the complaint at that stage would seriously prejudice the interest of the respondent, who was also in old age.

Court's Observation

The Court observed that Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permitted the Magistrate to put an end to proceedings where the complainant adopted dilatory tactics, since the accused is required to attend the Court on posting dates and thereby has to undergo harassment.

The Court noted that in such a situation, the Magistrate had two options, namely, either to adjourn the case when the presence of the complainant was necessary, or to proceed further with the trial when it was considered not necessary, as had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand (1998), which was relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant.

The Court, however, observed that a perusal of the order impugned showed that neither the complainant nor the accused was present on the date when the complaint came to be dismissed, though the learned counsel for the accused appeared and sought exemption. The Court noted that the appellant had been granted exemption by his counsel on account of his indisposed condition, and held,

“Therefore, there was no justification for posting the matter just three days later, i.e., on 02.02.2019 and to dismiss the same.”

The Court further held,

“Deferring the cross-examination again and again was also not warranted at all and, if at all, appellant could not produce the loan documents in original it would have left the Court free to draw adverse inference but certainly there was no occasion to defer his cross-examination on the mere asking of the other side.”

The Court concluded that the trial court was not justified in prolonging the proceedings and then dismissing the complaint. The Court further held,

“Therefore, the trial Court was not justified in prolonging the proceedings and then, to dismiss the complaint.”

The appeal was thus allowed, and the order of the trial court was set aside. The complaint file was reopened and restored for proceeding further with the trial in accordance with law. Considering the time already taken, the trial court was directed to proceed with the matter expeditiously and to endeavour to conclude the same within a period of three months.


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