26th Constitutional Amendment Abolishing Privy Purses Doesn't Alter Succession Law For Former Rulers' Estates: Karnataka High Court
The Karnataka High Court has upheld the vires, applicability of Section 5(ii) Hindu Succession Act–which exempts Act's applicability on estates passing to a single heir under a covenant between an erstwhile Ruler and the Indian Government or under a law enacted before the Act came into force–on personal properties, impartible estate of former rulers. The Court held that the provision is...
The Karnataka High Court has upheld the vires, applicability of Section 5(ii) Hindu Succession Act–which exempts Act's applicability on estates passing to a single heir under a covenant between an erstwhile Ruler and the Indian Government or under a law enacted before the Act came into force–on personal properties, impartible estate of former rulers.
The Court held that the provision is not rendered redundant merely because Articles 291 and 362 of the Constitution— which guaranteed privy purse, rights and privileges to former Rulers — were deleted by the 26th Constitutional Amendment.
Justice MGS Kamal said:
“Articles 291 and 362 were only with respect to guarantees and assurances made by the Dominion of India with regard to payment of Privy Purse, personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of erstwhile Rulers of Princely States of India and not with respect to their personal private properties and "Gaddi", impartible estate
The provisions of Section 5(ii) of the Act, 1956 will have its relevance to the extent of providing rules of succession to an 'impartible estate”, to be according to law and custom in view of covenants contained in instruments of merger at Article IV of Annexure-D and Article 5 of Annexure-F.
Apprehension of the petitioners regarding provisions of Section 5(ii) of the Act, 1956 being arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable stands redressed in the light of clarification by the Apex Court in its judgment in the case of TIKKA SHATRUJIT SINGH AND OTHERS supra, to the effect that the personal private properties of the Ruler will be governed in terms of the personal law of the parties and impartible estate as that of perceived throne would devolve according to the rule of primogeniture. Party contending to the contrary is required to plead and prove to the satisfaction of the Court"
The court held that the 26th amendment to the Constitution has no bearing on the validity of Section 5(ii) of the Act.
It held that the 26th amendment has now completely derecognized and abolished the “sovereign authority” attached to a “gaddi” or “throne”, rendering it to be a “mere reference to 'Physical throne' or 'Seat'” that today carries only historical and cultural relevance as an artifact or heirloom.
Commenting on the application of Section 5(ii) of the Act, the Court held that the provision retains relevance to the extent of providing succession rules to an “impartible estate” as per the law and custom in view of covenants contained in instruments of merger.
The Court quoted the Apex Court's judgement, “After the signing of the agreement of merger and notification of certain properties as the personal private properties of the Maharaja, only the perceived throne devolved according to the rule of primogeniture, but not the personal private properties of the Ruler.”
In light of the Tikka Shatrujit Singh ruling, the court held that the apprehension of the petitioners that Section 5(ii) of the Act, 1956 would prevent application of the 1956 Act to the Ruler's personal private properties stands redressed.
The Bench further rejected the petitioners' argument that Section 5(ii), though valid when enacted, had become arbitrary and discriminatory with the passage of time.
“Language employed in Section 5(ii) of the Act, 1956 clearly indicate it is directed to a specific nature of `estate' of specific class of `person' under `specific circumstance' which is indeed an intelligible differentia,” the Court observed, adding that the determination of succession to private properties as well as to impartible estate is still a relevant subject.
“It may be that purport and object of Gaddi has lost its relevance but from the customary practical perspective it is still a relevant subject,” the Court noted.
The Court found that the petitioners failed to make out a case for annulment of the provision.
“In the absence of the same and more particularly when the petitioners have not raised the issue of legislative competence and when they have neither pleaded nor discharged the burden of violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India, which are the primary tests for examining the constitutional validity of a statute, petitioners cannot seek to annul a legislative provision,” the Court said.
Background
The petitions arose from disputes concerning the estates of the erstwhile rulers of Mysore and Sandur.
One set of petitions was filed by Chaduranga Kanthraj Urs, who claimed to be the son of Gayathri Devi, daughter of the last ruler of Mysore, Jayachamarajendra Wadiyar. Following the death of his uncle, Srikantadatta Narasimharaja Wadiyar, the petitioner instituted a partition suit claiming a share in the joint family properties. Later, the respondents filed applications under Order VII Rule 11 CPC contending that the Hindu Succession Act was inapplicable in view of Section 5(ii).
The other petition too arose from a suit, seeking partition of joint family properties, filed by Venkatrao Y. Ghorpade and Gayatri Ghorpade, children of Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, the erstwhile Maharaja of Sandur. In response to the suit, the respondent (a Trust created by the widow and the eldest son of Yeshwantrao Ghorpade) contended that the Hindu Succession Act did not apply to the estate in view of Section 5(ii).
The petitioners argued that Section 5(ii) was introduced to further the guarantees provided under Articles 291 and 362. As the Articles have now been deleted, the retention of Section 5(ii) of the Act serves no purpose, and has now become redundant. They argued, that with passage of time, the provision has lost its rationale of classification and has become arbitrary and unreasonable, violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The respondents argued that Articles 291 and 362 only pertained to privy purses and certain guarantees, and not to the right to private properties, and thus have no bearing on the provision.
The respondents added that the Apex Court's ruling in Tikka Shatrujit Singh vs. Sukjith Singh has already “read down” the provisions of Section 5(ii) and clarified its applicability, therefore there is no need to reconsider the constitutional validity of the provision.
Finding no ground to declare Section 5(ii) otiose or redundant, the High Court dismissed the petitions.
Case title:
CHADURANGA KANTHARAJ URS v UNION OF INDIA & others, WRIT PETITION NO. 53075/2015
VENKATRAO Y. GHORPADE & another v UNION OF INDIA & others, WRIT PETITION NO.3221 OF 2022