Vehicle Driven At Person Can Be 'Instrument Of Death'; Victim's Survival Doesn't Efface Attempt To Murder Charge: Karnataka High Court

The Karnataka High Court has held that a motor vehicle driven recklessly toward a person is capable of becoming an “instrument of death” and the fact that victim survived does not dilute the gravity of the act or efface the criminality.

In doing so the court dismissed a plea to quash criminal proceedings against the petitioner booked for attempt to murder after he allegedly ran over his vehicle on a police constable during a drunken-driving check.

“The law does not countenance a motor vehicle being converted into an instrument of intimidation or violence against those entrusted with its enforcement. The authority of a public servant lawfully discharging his duty cannot be made to yield to the arrogance of an individual who considers himself beyond the reach of the law,” Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed.

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by an Airport Traffic Head Constable alleging that on October 23, 2021, while he was deployed on special duty to detect drunken driving, the petitioner sped away to evade inspection. When intercepted, the petitioner drove his car over the complainant, causing him injuries and damaging the police department's drunken-driving detection (DD/PDA) machine.

Following an investigation, a charge sheet was filed under Sections 279 (rash driving), 307(attempt to murder), 353(assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging their duty), 427 (damage to property) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the IPC. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner approached the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings against him.

Commenting on the offence of Attempt to Murder, the Court said, “Section 307 of the IPC predicates its application upon the commission of an overt act accompanied by the requisite intention or knowledge that, if death were to ensue as a consequence of such act, the offender would be guilty of murder. The gravamen of the offence lies not in the nature or magnitude of the injury ultimately inflicted, but in the intention or knowledge that animates the act and the circumstances in which it is perpetrated.”

Noting that the wound certificate revealed ten abrasions, swelling and a displaced multi-fragmented fracture of the head of the fibula of the victim, the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the complainant suffered no serious injury.

The Court said, “The medical records, therefore, unmistakably demonstrate that the incident was not one which merely resulted in superficial abrasions or transient bodily discomfort, but one which occasioned a fracture, an injury falling within the statutory contours of grievous hurt. The contention that the complainant had suffered no serious injury must, therefore, be tested against this contemporaneous medical material, which speaks to the contrary.”

The Court further added, “A motor vehicle, when driven in such a manner towards a human being, is capable of becoming an instrument of death. The distinction between an injury and a fatality, in circumstances of this nature, may rest upon nothing more than the slender thread of providence. The fact that the complainant survived the incident cannot, by itself, dilute the gravity of the act alleged or efface the intention or knowledge that may be gathered from the manner in which it was committed.”

Inferring the existence of men rea from the “cumulative effect of the surrounding circumstance”, the Court held, “the accusation under Section 307 of the IPC cannot be said to be so bereft of foundational ingredients as to warrant its obliteration at the threshold. The allegations disclose a case worthy of trial, and it is for the prosecution to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt, affording the petitioner full opportunity to contest the accusation.”

The Court also refused to quash charges under Section 279 of the IPC, for the offence of rash driving.

The Court reiterated the three essential ingredients to constitute the offence, as stated by the Supreme Court in Ravi Kapur vs. State of Rajasthan (2012)— that the vehicle is driven on a public way, that the driving is rash or negligent, and that the degree of rashness or negligence is such as to endanger human life or likely hurt or injure another person.

“It is not necessary, for attracting Section 279 of the IPC, that human life should actually be lost. The gravamen of the offence lies in the endangerment of human life by rash or negligent driving, and not merely in the consequence that ultimately ensues. In the case at hand, the consequence has travelled beyond mere apprehended danger, as the complainant has allegedly suffered a fracture on account of the incident,” the Court said.

The Court further rejected the plea to quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioner for the offence of use of criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging his duties and mischief to cause loss or damage of property.

Words accompanied by acts of violence go beyond their literal expression

Commenting on the charge of criminal intimidation under Section 506, the Court said, “Words, when accompanied by acts of violence, may acquire a significance far beyond their literal expression. What may otherwise appear to be an expression of arrogance or indignation may, when viewed in the setting of the accompanying conduct, assume the character of intimidation.”

Expounding on the facts of the case, the Court noted, “The allegations in the complaint and the summary of the charge sheet, extracted supra, further disclose that the petitioner, immediately before the occurrence, is alleged to have confronted the complainant with the words, 'Who told you to stop me? Do you know who I am?' The utterance of these words is alleged to have been immediately followed by the petitioner driving his vehicle towards the complainant and running over his legs, resulting in grievous injuries. The words so uttered cannot be viewed in complete isolation from the conduct that allegedly succeeded them.”

Accordingly, the Court found that the material on record discloses “sufficient circumstances” from which the mens rea and essential ingredients required to constitute the alleged offences can be prima facie inferred.

Finding no merit, the Court rejected the petition and allowed the trial court to proceed with the matter.