Bomb Threats Can't Be Taken Lightly Merely Because Sender Never Intended To Execute Them: Karnataka High Court Refuses To Quash FIR

In the e-mail, the accused had allegedly warned the Commissioner of bomb blasts at the Kempegowda International Airport and several shopping malls. [2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 427]

The single judge bench of Justice M Nagaprasanna opined that the allegations were not merely about an empty threat using the credentials of another person.

“…The alleged object of implicating another person does not, by itself, render the conduct any less serious. A false threat of terrorism is not rendered innocuous merely because the person issuing it never intended to execute the threatened act…”, the court opined.

The Court observed that the accused had allegedly done a deliberate act of creating electronic identities in another person's name, so as to transmit bomb blast threats, using the name of a terrorist organisation and setting the public safety machinery into motion.

“….The gravity of such conduct lies not merely in the possibility of the threatened event materialising, but also in the fear that the threat is capable of generating, the disruption it may occasion and the diversion of public resources that its verification inevitably entails. A threat of this nature compels the State to act, for the law enforcement machinery cannot afford the luxury of presuming that a threat to public safety is a hoax. It must proceed on the side of caution, lest indifference to a genuine warning culminate in consequences too grave to contemplate..”, the Court remarked.

To recap, according to the prosecution, on November 30, 2025, the Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru City received a mail in his inbox which stated that:

“…This is a warning from the Jaish-e-Mohammed White collar terror team, we targeted Kempegowda International Airport Bengaluru, Orion mall, Lulu Mall, Forum South mall, Mantri Square Mall... for bomb blast at 7pm onwards….”

The email further identified the sender as 'Mohit Kumar' and provided a mobile number, asking the police to call if they wanted to avert the danger. An FIR was subsequently registered by the police under Section 66F of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (Cyber Terrorism).

During the investigation, the police came to know that the petitioner-accused had allegedly created multiple fake email IDs in the name of another person called Mohit Kumar to intentionally frame him. The police alleged that the accused used these fabricated IDs in Kumar's name to send the bomb threat.

Ultimately, the charge sheet was filed under Section 351(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for anonymous criminal intimidation and Section 66D of the IT Act for cheating by personation, whereas the charge of cyber terrorism (Section 66F) was dropped. The charge sheet also noted that the accused did not have the actual intention to execute a terrorist act, his intent was to implicate Mohit Kumar in a criminal case.

Before the High Court, though the accused-petitioner raised a defence regarding a defunct internet connection, the Court stated that with respect to electronic communications, such a proposition is 'far too fragile' to result in the quashment of the FIR.

Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the High Court emphasized that it cannot conduct a mini-trial or appreciate evidence on disputed questions of fact, such as whether the internet connection was working or the electronic trail of the emails.

“…. The law cannot permit the electronic medium to become a convenient cloak behind which an individual may, with impunity, assume another's identity, issue threats of catastrophic violence and thereafter seek immunity from prosecution on the strength of a disputed assertion concerning internet connectivity. A threat transmitted through a keyboard may occasion consequences as real as one delivered in person.”, the Court stated.

For further context, the petitioner had argued before the High Court that the very foundation of the prosecution was shaky, and that the petitioner's internet connection was defunct on the date of the incident. According to him, without an active internet connection, the petitioner could not have authored or transmitted the threatening emails.

To the contrary, the state HCGP submitted that the non-functioning of the internet connection was a matter of defence, which could only be verified during a full-fledged trial. The gravity of the allegations cannot be trivialised in the matter based on a disputed factual assertion; it was submitted.

The Court, after hearing both sides, further clarified that an email account is not intertwined specifically with a particular computer, internet connection, or geographical location, since access could be very well secured through different devices and networks.

“…The complaint lodged by the petitioner with his Internet Service Provider may constitute a circumstance available to him in defence; it cannot, without more, be elevated into conclusive proof that the alleged communication could not have originated from him…”, the Court ruled further.

Finding no merit in the petition, the High Court dismissed the plea to quash the proceedings.

“……The alleged conduct, though said to have originated in personal animosity, travelled far beyond the confines of that animosity and entered the realm of public safety. The material collected during investigation, at this stage, furnishes a prima facie foundation for examining the offences alleged in the charge sheet, subject necessarily to satisfaction of their respective statutory ingredients…”, the court concluded.