Arrest Made Prior To 'Pankaj Bansal' Judgment Not Illegal For Want Of Written Grounds: Karnataka High Court Denies Bail To Terror Accused
The Karnataka High Court upheld a trial court order denying bail to a man accused of being member of a terrorist gang and being part of criminal conspiracy to wage war against Government of Syria, observing that the mandate of furnishing written grounds of arrest as per Supreme Court's Pankaj Bansal judgment applies prospectively. In doing so the court said that the accused who was arrested...
The Karnataka High Court upheld a trial court order denying bail to a man accused of being member of a terrorist gang and being part of criminal conspiracy to wage war against Government of Syria, observing that the mandate of furnishing written grounds of arrest as per Supreme Court's Pankaj Bansal judgment applies prospectively.
In doing so the court said that the accused who was arrested in 2020, prior to Pankaj Bansal judgment cannot seek this ground to claim that the arrest was illegal.
A division bench of Justice HP Sandesh and Justice Venkatesh Naik T noted that a person whose bail plea has been rejected earlier is not precluded from filing a subsequent bail plea if there is a change in the fact situation. It noted that in the present plea, apart from grounds urged in earlier bail pleas, three new grounds had been sought–delay in trial, non-furnishing of grounds of arrest to the appellant and appellant's health condition.
On the appellant's contention regarding non-furnishing of grounds of arrest the bench said that the Supreme Court in Pankaj Bansal judgment had laid down the mandate of furnishing grounds of arrest and clarified that the Investigating Officer shall be duty bound to furnish the grounds of arrest “henceforth” i.e., from the date of the judgment i.e., 03.10.2023”.
This aspect was also considered by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorateof Enforcement wherein, it was clarified that the requirement to furnish grounds of arrest would only apply prospectively.
In the present case the court noted that the appellant was arrested on 07.10.2020 i.e., prior to the Supreme Court judgments. It noted that in the present case the Investigating Officer orally informed appellant about the grounds of arrest at the time of his apprehension, however, he failed to provide the grounds of arrest in writing, thereby raising the issue of non-compliance with the constitutional and statutory mandate.
The central issue for determination is "whether accused No.3 is entitled to bail on the sole ground that the grounds were not communicated in writing at the time of his arrest, thereby constituting a violation of Article 22(1)". The bench observed that the use of "henceforth" in Pankaj Bansal would mean that the mandate "applies prospectively, from the date of the judgment". It said:
"Consequently, the failure to provide written grounds of arrest prior to the pronouncement of the Pankaj Bansal (Supra) judgment, cannot be deemed illegal, nor can the action of the concerned officer be faulted on that ground. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that oral communication of the grounds of arrest to the arrestee constitutes sufficient compliance with Section 19 of the PMLA as well as Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. In the present case, accused No. 3 was arrested prior to the pronouncement of the Pankaj Bansal (Supra) judgment, and the grounds of arrest were duly communicated to him at the time of his arrest. In light of the above authoritative pronouncement, such oral communication satisfies the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, and accused No.3 is not entitled to bail on this ground. Such being the case, the aforementioned contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/accused No.3 is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Hence, in view of the same, the appellant cannot avail such ground"
The prosecution has alleged that two accused persons were arrested on 08.03.2020 for their alleged affiliation with the banned terrorist organization Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). During the investigation, another accused, Abdur Rehman @ Dr. Brave was arrested on 17.03.2020. During his interrogation, he disclosed that he had traveled to Syria in the year 2013-14 along with Afroz Ahmed, allegedly funded by members of agroup called “Quran Circle.”
He further revealed that pro-ISIS activists were actively operating in Bengaluru, involved in identifying and radicalizing gullible Muslim youths, recruiting them, raising funds and facilitating their illegal travel to Syria via Turkey to join and fight for ISIS. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs by its order dated 18.09.2020 directed the NIA to register and investigate a new case under Sections 120B and 125 IPC and Sections 17, 18 and 18B of UAPA.
The NIA registered a case on 19.09.2020 against four accused persons and took up the investigation. Thereafter on 07.10.2020, a search were conducted at the residential premises of the appellant–accused No.3 Irfan Nasir and accused No.5 Ahamed Abdul Cader, during which incriminating digital and physical articles, including a diary, were seized. Based on the materials recovered and subsequent examination of the accused, accused Nos.3 and 5 were arrested on the same day and they were remanded to judicial custody. Later, the Investigating Officer completed the investigation and filed the charge-sheet against the appellant and others.
The Special Court rejected the petitioner's bail application holding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant has committed the offences alleged against him. The Special Court further held that having regard to the material available on record with regard to commission of offences under the provisions of UAPA, the Court is barred from granting bail in view of Section 43D UAPA. Against this the appellant moved the high court.
On the appellant's contention regarding delay in trial the court said that it appeared that the prosecution has shown much progress in the matter and it was only on the request of the accused persons, the framing of charge was deferred from time to time. It said that though the Supreme Court directed to expedite the trial, but this was not brought to the notice of the Special Court by the appellant.
"Hence, the delay cannot be attributed to the prosecution and the accused person shall not be permitted to take the benefit from his own wrong doing as the prosecution has got examined 19 witnesses out of 60 witnesses and has shown substantial progress in recording the evidence," the court said.
On the appellant's contention regarding his health condition, the bench said that the appellant has not furnished any documents on this issue; hence, he is not entitled for any relief under this ground. "However, this Court can direct the Special Court to expedite the trial," the court said.
The court thus upheld the trial court order rejecting the appellant's bail plea.
The appeal was dismissed but the trial court was directed to expedite the trial.
Case title: MR. IRFAN NASIR @ IRFI v/s THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1015 OF 2025